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With prepositioning, the MAB can be there within days, with its equipment readied in half that time. Will this deter the Soviets from trying for northern Norway in the event of NATO-Warsaw Pact hostilities?
1981 to provide for the prepositioning of heavy
he United States and Norway agreed in January
equipment, supplies, and aviation support equipment of a Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) on Norwegian soil. This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) represented a significant economic and political commitment by both nations, stemming from a growing awareness of the geographic importance of the Norwegian land- mass—the northern flank of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)—to the defense of Europe, and from a steadily increasing Soviet presence on the Kola Peninsula and in the Norwegian Sea. The agreement acknowledged the limited time available for the deployment of major combat units, and the overextended condition of current strategic mobility assets.
Basically, the 1981 MOU provided for the “rapid reinforcement of Norway with an airlifted brigade-sized force,” to be ready by 1989.1 The agreement is somewhat of a deterrent in itself, but the relatively small size of the MAB, the location of storage sites in south central Norway, and the continued scarcity of strategic airlift raises questions of the MAB’s own significance as a deterrent, or even whether the MAB has a credible warfighting capability at all. To be the former, it must have the latter: The MAB must be able to deploy rapidly with sufficient combat power to be effective against the enemy threat.
A close analysis of this agreement begins with a review of the strategic importance of northern Norway and the correlation of opposing forces. However, the MOU grew out of the self-interests of two different nations. Accordingly, to measure the utility of the agreement accurately, the differing national threat perceptions, defensive strategies, and economic and political constraints of each nation must be considered.
“World War III may not be won on the Northern Flank, but it could definitely be lost there.”2 A strongly defended Norway would enable NATO to:
- Monitor, surveil, and interdict Soviet Northern Fleet operations
- Support sea control operations by denying or limiting Soviet access to the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic sea lines of communication (SLOCs)
- Project power into the European landmass
- Project power against the Kola military complex3
Conversely, a Norway under Soviet control would:
- Provide in-depth defense for Soviet nuclear-po
fleet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) forces an value land targets on the Kola Peninsula the
- Provide the Soviets relatively unimpeded access ^ ^
Norwegian Sea and the critical North Atlantic S Europe pjeet
- Provide extended air coverage for Soviet North operations
- Improve long-range interception of Allied the' ^
strategic nuclear threats from B-52s, carrier aircra • submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) jei
Both the United States and NATO perceive the^ 0f occupation of Norway as a maritime threat bee .
Norway’s geographic position with respect to tw° eaS in the strategically important Soviet SSBN operating ^ (o the Arctic Ocean and the North Atlantic Allied S Europe. -onofl
Norway has a common border with the Soviet ^
the Kola Peninsula, home of the Soviet Northern ^ flf where there are facilities from which an estimate the modem Soviet SSBNs, 66% of their surface c
34
/ Nove1"
ants, and 75% of their nuclear-powered attack sU perljfi' (SSNs) operate.5 Despite its small size, the sula is an excellent basing area for the Soviet s t® submarine force. It not only provides ice-free a <,0yid open water for the surface ships protecting 1 SSBN fleet, but it also provides ready access to1 jeS$ Ocean, where U. S. acoustical detection capa minimal. The recent introduction of longer rang cJasS rine-launched ballistic missiles and the new TyP110
Proceedings
$Ubmari
P°rtanc nCSfto t'le Northern Fleet shows the growing im- giVes^ under-ice operations to the Soviets, which Soviet6 K°*a ^eninsula even more strategic importance. <kfense°|CCU^at*°n Norway would provide a forward area, WL-lne a§a'nst any Allied air or sea attacks into this Subn\ar' ' eProv't*'n8 an in-depth defense for its strategic read,, ,.lnc fo«*s, by denying NATO air and sea forces The CCess.to Norwegian Sea.
^°hhenrtpy*n® su*3mar’ne an(J air power of the Soviet threaten u eet now operating in the Norwegian Sea also S°viet1 ® United States’ ability to reinforce Europe. Tu-22 m- av*at'on units consisting of Tu-16 Badger and fires fly; ltl(^er aircraft, reinforced by Baltic Fleet Back- Soviet ^r°m ^orward bases in the Kola, support these CUrsion • £et °Perat*ons in the Norwegian Sea. Soviet in- 1,000 'n,t0 Nonvay would project this threat another 700- Kingjoj^ p’ We" south of the Greenland-Iceland-United forces in r; 3P’ t0 change the balance of conventional submariUroPe to the Allies’ disadvantage. Soviet attack % |\(0re and surface forces would have secure access to Wegian Sea and North Atlantic, and would also gain the natural protection of the numerous coastal islands and the deep-water Norwegian fjords. Air support for surface forces and air attack of Allied maritime targets could be extended from 400-600 miles if Soviet aircraft operated from Norwegian airfields. Additionally, occupation of these airfields would bring Great Britain within range of Soviet tactical air units, and would also improve forward air defense/waming facilities for the Kola Peninsula and the Soviet homeland.6
The United States views the Soviet occupation of Norway as a maritime threat, but the Norwegians have a more pragmatic view. Soviet land and air forces threaten the sovereignty of Norwegian soil. Accordingly, in order to maintain an air of cordial relations and thus avoid a Norwegian defensive build up, the Soviets have been more restrained in their efforts to improve the correlation of land and air forces than to strengthen the Northern Fleet. They have emphasized increased capability—through rapid reinforcement—instead of large increases in standing forces. They have modernized equipment, hardened facilities, and greatly improved existing road and rail networks.
The Soviet 6th Army, consisting of three motorized rifle divisions (MRDs), its normal support units (a self- propelled artillery [Scud B] brigade, and an SA-6 antiair brigade), along with the 63rd Naval Infantry Regiment, comprise the main ground threat to northern Norway.7 Although the disposition of the MRDs and the severity of the terrain favor the Norwegian defenders, the recent addition of troop transport and Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter units to one MRD and to the Naval Infantry Regiment represents a major offensive improvement in cross-country mobility.8 The improved rail and road links within the Kola Peninsula now permit a rapid flow of reinforcements—up to seven divisions—from the rest of the Leningrad Military District. An artillery division, an airborne division, and the Spetsnaz naval brigade of the Northern Fleet would also be available for such operations.9
The Norwegians’ primary concern is air defense. The Kola Peninsula holds one civilian and 16 military air bases within operating range of major Norwegian facilities. Each has a runway longer than 2,000 meters and support facilities to sustain combat aircraft operations. Although more than 350 combat aircraft of various types are associated with these bases, only one half of the facilities are currently used. The active bases have been hardened and there is continuous prepositioning of ammunition and supplies, and the number of Soviet combat aircraft there could probably be doubled in a matter of hours.
The Soviets have developed the necessary prestockage levels, basing facilities, lines of communication, and force structure improvements to conduct an invasion of northern Norway without increasing their standing air and ground units in the Kola Peninsula. This restrained force posturing has, and will continue to have, a major impact on the development of the Norwegian defense strategy.
Nevertheless, there are several limiting factors with respect to potential Soviet operations in Norway. Any Soviet incursion there would be conducted as part of a general war in Europe. Major forces would not be redeployed to the northern region to the detriment of Soviet strength
35
storage
, and maintenance facilities were designed
Ground defense improvements should continue a creased rate as the air defense and base mode programs culminate. eejan
Despite the quality and the training of N° terraiOi forces, the defense-favoring characteristics of the 0f and the extensive modernization program, the power in the north still favors the Soviets. A sU on defense of northern Norway still depends mo NATO reinforcement. . (0 the
NATO: With all major ground units commits ^.[e(j defense or reinforcement of the Central Front,mearjtirfle States and NATO, out of necessity, developed a n* the strategy for the reinforcement of Norway. Until
,tlief
strate NATO resolve and solidarity.
on the Central Front. Thus, only the finite, though very capable, resources already mentioned would be available for operations on the Northern Flank. Also, Swedish neutrality would be respected. Sweden is peripheral to Soviet objectives, and it maintains relatively strong air and land forces to ensure its neutrality. The Swedish Air Force, one of the strongest in the region, consists of 100-120 combat aircraft. Moreover, the five well-trained and -equipped Swedish “Norrland Brigades” are supported by a mobilization infrastructure capable of quickly producing up to 30 brigades and 100 separate battalions.10 The commitment of sufficient Soviet air and land forces to overcome a combined Swedish/Norwegian defense would require a reallocation of major forces and threaten the success of any Central Front campaign. The Soviets would consider such a course of action unacceptable.
Norway: Norway’s military is highly trained and highly skilled, capable of responding strongly to any Soviet incursion. It consists of 43,000 active-duty personnel whose primary function is to delay Soviet forces until mobilization is completed and NATO reinforcements can arrive. Although this number seems small, it represents 1% of the total Norwegian population, a significant contribution for a democratic society in peacetime.11 These forces can be augmented by 122,000 army reserves, of whom 80,000 can be mobilized and deployed to northern Norway within 72 hours.12 This force is organized into 12 Arctic-trained and -equipped brigades with the necessary support forces. The navy is small but formidable—equipped with diesel submarines, frigates, and missile-armed fast-attack craft. Within the Norwegian fjords or within the close confines of the numerous islands on the Norwegian coastline, the Navy, together with the modernized coastal defenses, should be able to defend against a limited amphibious invasion and ensure seaborne resupply to northern Norway. (Doubt still exists, however, about the Norwegian ability to defend against Soviet Spetsnaz operations.)
The Norwegian Air Force maintains two squadrons of F-16 fighters and one squadron of maritime surveillance aircraft on the northern airfields for air defense.13 One additional squadron of F-16s and two squadrons of F-5 fighter-bombers are located in southern Norway and can easily be redeployed as needed.14 The air force, navy, and army are all augmented by a Home Guard of 90,000 men from all services.
Norway’s commitment to defense is also displayed in an expensive modernization effort. Its defense expenditure is significantly greater than that of other European nations. Norway had the highest percentage growth rate in defense expenditures in all of NATO from 1975 to 1980, and averaged 3.5% real growth from 1981 to 1983.15
In the early 1980s, 80% of Norway’s defense equipment expenditure went toward purchasing 72 F-16 fighter aircraft. Air defense was further improved by the purchase and installation of the U. S. Improved Hawk (54 launchers and 162 missiles), and Swedish RBS-70 missile systems around the critical northern airfields.16 Runways and ramp spaces were enlarged to accommodate reinforcing squadrons, and an elaborate system of underground hangars,
now being built. Hardened bulk fuel sites are now ^ constructed throughout the northern region to servi sea, and ground units. j,avc
Improvements to the Norwegian Army and Navy slowed because of the high expenditures of aircrave- curement and base development. Significant > ments have been made, however, on coastal forti1 jve command and control facilities, and permanent ■ the positions against the major avenues of approach ^ northern provinces. Two “brigade sets” of heavy ment have been purchased and positioned in Troms. will greatly reduce mobilization and transport^ ^ ^
strategy was based on acceptable warning time, ^ ^ initial Norwegian defense, and a rapid Allied air a j. phibious ground reinforcement. Seven to 17 All>e( 0p- rons were available, depending on the reinforce111 ^ tion chosen by the Supreme Allied Commander. ejy (SACEur). Norwegian ground forces, aided by c>\cted to formidable but highly defensible terrain, were eXP . vaiof hold against five to seven Soviet MRDs until the a{0\i- Allied amphibious ground reinforcements—in grat'd mately three weeks.17 The need for rapid deploy11^ the rugged, compartmented terrain required brigatl combined arms forces. Ground reinforcements c< of four forces: . ^ylti'
► The Allied Command Europe Mobile Force is a ^ jp national force composed of light infantry supporte^j four tillery, helicopters and logistic support units, a jfof squadrons of fighter and attack aircraft. It is well sUtjngef*' Arctic operations but is committed to multiple c0 cies throughout NATO Europe. Under control of ^flit is designed to deploy rapidly to crisis areas, to
The Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade lS pat- light infantry organization consisting of three iota ^ talions, an artillery regiment, an armored reconna'• <$
squadron, a tactical helicopter squadron, and ataC j^- squadron. Unlike other forces, this 4,000-man ofS, pfi- tion is earmarked for Norway. However, the CA gade would take more than 30 days to arrive ► The 3rd Commando Brigade, a Great Brita‘nrajpS111 lands combined amphibious force, deploys and Norway for three months each year. This we ^jts, unit, reinforced with artillery, engineers, suppOIjo^ and helicopter support, will be airlifted to Norway {gy a potential threat, but it also has multiple deploy111
36
Proceedings
/ Novel"1
ibef*
l*ons
lu*iS anH ' •
^ The n 1S su^Ject t0 other commitments.
. • S. Marine Corps Marine amphil ^
als or§anized by task and consists of: a headquar- i'mk r,°Unc^ corr,bat element, an air combat element, and
(MAB)V ^ ^ar'ne Corps Marine amphibious brigade ters " ' "
SCrV'Ce suPPort element. It can be deployed en- rriaritimearn^>^'^>*°US s^'PP*n§ or used >n conjunction with deploy PrePositioned ships equipment. In either case, means a lengthy transit time. The PrePosit^° ^US.mu*t'P'c deployment options, but the MAB that thea^16^ ^orway bas been specifically tailored for
'J'hg \
crisis m°iSS'^e unavahability of these forces in times of regi°n ak 6S des*8nated specific support to this critical forcemg S°*ute'y necessary. Furthermore, the rapid rein- asthe Sont°f Norway by sea was made more unattainable Ued to p V*et nava^ presence in the Norwegian Sea contin- ing units°M reduce the deployment times of reinforc- f°rcertlp ’ NATO's strategy changed from seaborne rein- cqujpm ,0 a*rhfted reinforcement, tied to prepositioned in Nony111 lateral agreements to preposition equipment States py Were made between Norway and the United bior\verCat ^r'ta'n’ and Canada. nearnes« "!an defense strategy is heavily influenced by the
tages and only one disadvantage: The equipment would be easier to protect; the central, more protected location would offer more options during a crisis situation; scarce transport planes would be less exposed to hostile action; but a 400-mile redeployment of assets to the northern area would be required at the outbreak of hostilities.19 To offset this disadvantage, the Norwegian Government agreed to
l'°ns to ~ the ^ov*et Union and by attempts by both
’'orthem rmaintain non-escalatory force postures in the defense /"e®lon- A strategy which provides for a strong ^nionjsUt °Ers minimal provocation to the Soviet lhe Kola pSSCnt'al' Pbe restrained Soviet force posturing in 'he basj en*nsula and the Norwegian decision to prohibit by both ^ 0 Allied ground forces in Norway are attempts ^egian Lnat.‘0ns to reduce tensions in that area. The Nor- 'ag Aik jSfln^ P°hcy does not prohibit bases from receiv- St°ckpiHn'-,0rCeS *n bnle °f attack, nor does it prohibit the
£y
(Si ^ eclu'Pment or joint Allied exercises in Nor- proh?Ce 1^61, however, the Norwegian Government dan t *ted stockpiling of nuclear warheads on Nor-
^ vyx uuvi.
The bi]17'101^ during peacetime.)
'vay a ' ateral agreements on prepositioning among Nor- 'vere de ^ United States, Great Britain, and Canada wpr 6 °Ped according to Norwegian defense strategy execu,ed:
i UPon th 2 dlrecti°n Of SACEur * With th C recluest °f the Norwegian Government The 6 concurrence of the providing government %T0a^reeiT|ents reaffirmed Norway’s position in T\VedthSCnt 3 stron§ signal to the Soviet Union, and rhey ej.ree major strategic problems facing the Alliance: ^PhibjITllnated the lengthy transit time associated with arr,Phibi°US Enforcement; they reduced the reliance on Cr0ssin„ and, ideally, they eliminated a hazardous
T/je f the Norwegian Sea during hostilities, filled inNorway: Although Norway had accepted • l^eEs't’oning for years, the idea of prestocking P°liticai anne Corps equipment did not gain immediate
3CPPnfr.~__________________________ • xt rr-ii r“ .j _________________________ 1 ____
life p8
acceptance in Norway. The first proposal, pre- . -• reln lbe Troms area, was considered too provocation w‘n§ escalatl°n by the Soviets, a compromise de- Sosit.as adopted by the Norwegian Parliament to MAg511 ^ar*ne equipment near Trondheim. Locating ln south central Norway offered several advan-
N,
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November 1986
preposition the second Norwegian “brigade set” of heavy equipment in the northern area. After reviewing the size and combat capability of the MAB, the parliament decided that although the MAB was heavy in combat power, it was not a serious offensive threat to the Soviets, and, therefore, would not destabilize the region.
The United States is committed to the purchase, transport, and prepositioning of ammunition and specific pieces of heavy equipment and supplies for all elements of the Marine air-ground task force. It will also provide air transport for personnel and helicopters, and the air “ferry” of fixed-wing aircraft to Norway. The MAB can deploy to northern Norway within ten days of an execution order—considerably less time than a deployment by sea. Also, the prestocking of MAB equipment—tailored specifically to the reinforcement of Norway—reduced the strategic airlift requirements by almost 80%. Strategic mobility had required that the MAB remain light, while
37
air, will form an imposing air defense network ov ^ northern land and sea areas. The organic comm3 ^ control organization, a Stinger platoon, and an Hawk-battalion complete the air defense package
MAB- r II ran2e°f
The air combat element will also include a tun -
Marine Corps helicopters. Fifty-four of the 75
of
^ /CN
ROYAL NETHERLANDS NAVY
The U. S. Marine Corps demonstrated improved Arctic warfare capabilities in the NATO exercise Cold Winter 85, held in Norway. Here, British paratroopers, far right, prepare to attack U. S. positions and a U. S. Marine, above, sights in.
the countering Soviet threat called for a force heavy in combat power.
The MAB will contain more than 13,000 Marines, organized as an air-ground task force and provisioned with 30 days of supplies.20 The ground combat element, a reinforced infantry regiment, will deploy without tank, assault amphibian, or self-propelled artillery support. (The Norwegian weather and terrain limits the tactical mobility of this equipment anyway, and the size of the equipment would place unacceptable demands on strategic airlift.) More anti-tank assets and organic attack aircraft will compensate for the lack of armor. Artillery support will be provided by a battalion of prepositioned 155 mm. M-198 Howitzers.
The air combat element will contribute significantly to the mission, with two F-18 Hornet fighter squadrons, one large AV-8B Harrier attack squadron, EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft detachments, RF-4B Phantom reconnaissance aircraft, and OV-IOD Bronco observation aircraft. These fixed-wing assets will provide close-air support to ground units, and when employed in conjunction with Allied, U. S. Air Force, and U. S. Navy carrier
38
enhance battlefield mobility. The CH-46 Sea ^ be the primary troop carrier, and a detac CH-53 Super Stallions will move the M-198 c0n- UH-1N Huey helicopters will handle command aI1 patrol, and the AH-IT Cobra will provide an anti-a011ck pability. The fixed-wing A-6E Intruder all-weather^^ squadron (nuclear capable), usually attached to a flS was omitted to comply with Norwegian basing res ^ prohibiting the positioning of nuclear weapons or . f delivery systems in Norway during peacetime. AJ all the Norway MAB involves approximately one-0 U. S. Marine Corps prepositioned equipment- s(0fage Norway’s Contribution: Hardened permanent facilities are being constructed to shelter the MA ^Repositioned equipment in Trondelag province. The gnt, gians provide security and maintenance for the eCj^ gjrpot1 and are responsible for transporting troops from the ^ of entry, and the equipment from the storage slte’ce|[ent area of employment—in this case, Troms. The ^ and
will
will
Norwegian civilian transportation system (air,
land,
400
ini'e
sea) should be capable of accomplishing the Tapped move, even during combat conditions. Logis0ca ^ (N
for the MAB will be enhanced by the Norwegians ^ addition of two motor transport companies (18° refueler one ambulance company (35 ambulances), °ne ^ip- section (six trucks), specialized heavy engi0eer ment, and recovery vehicles. Swedish Bandvago - ^ BV-202/BV-206) will contribute over-snow mob' Qtle thus will provide a reliable resupply capability’
MAB battalion.21 depf0^
Operating in the Arctic Environment: A rapid jo ment capability and modem prepositioned equip111^^- not in themselves make a unit combat-ready in [he jjjs Survival during extreme cold weather operations ^jtli extensive and specialized training. Familiarizat' basic survival techniques and specialized equip1112 be completed before combat training begins. lack The U. S. Marine Corps has been criticized f°r^ p0w of experience in Arctic warfare. Critics must reahze’ g[1t, ever, that experience begins with a mission requj alld progresses through individual and small unittrain1 culminates in large-scale exercises and opera00^^^! evolution that takes time and resources. In 1981-
d cdd
John Scharfen lamented the inadequacy of outda ^ to
weather clothing, compared the “snow-shoed’ ^ ^jjjed the more mobile, more capable ski-equipped ^ N forces, and predicted that heavy Marine forces w irrelatively immobilized, protecting the defiles a*°n^ed >n way’s north-south artery, E-6.22 But lessons lea£ Ia one exercise are incorporated into the next exer^,eattief 1984, more than 14,000 Marines underwent cold ^ <jjj6
training at various bases throughout the Un.rfdin!’traiflif1' Marines are continually assessing and modify111^ 1
Proceedings
/ Nove",bCr
and
lrnpro'"'t.J‘nent' and their proficiency in Arctic warfare has "ith t^e 1 Compare Colonel Scharfen’s 1981 prediction M/\g ® reality of exercise Cold Winter 85, when the ements were airlifted into central Norway, and
ie: and a strong and effective deterrent signal to the union
ecluipme
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- ^ .
"'ay equipment was transported to northern Nor-
try, artii|ln five days- Combined U. S./Norwegian infan- 'Hfantrv f ’ and helicopter training took place, and all Prep0sjf 0rces were on skis, supported by helicopters, ci$e CU] l0ned artillery, and over-snow vehicles. The exer- attac^ ^'aa^d with the “combined” MAB defeating an Sovief 3 ^rh'sh/Netherlands amphibious force. fofce^ c°ncern for the sanctuary of its strategic SSBN SuPp0rt f11^ *tS °Perat'ng areas in the Arctic Ocean and its logical aCd'des on the Kola Peninsula—make Norway a into thi^0lnt °f Soviet expansion. But a Soviet incursion Preven(S crhical area on NATO’s Northern Flank can be
rent^ ae d the Soviets are faced with a credible deter-
and deterrent that demonstrates Norwegian resolve Pabilit* 3r'ty with NATO, and a credible warfighting ca- kettve ’ sd°uld deterrence fail. The 1981 bilateral MOU St°ckao tae United States and Norway, governing the pre- ^•errp , and reinforcement of Norway, provides such a Dea and capability.
"'ay> t.lte the warfighting capabilities of the MAB in Nor- l)ot jne real strength of the prepositioning agreement is ^ e.troop fist, but rather in the political statement of et)uipm1Si°n *tself. The decision to preposition U. S. Sto6nt 0n Norwegian soil was a commitment to
‘Joseph H. Alexander, “The Role of U. S. Marines in the Defense of North Norway,” Proceedings, May 1984, p. 186.
2Ibid., p. 182.
3Ibid.
4Tomas Ries, “Defending the Far North,” International Defense Review, July 1984, p. 876.
5Ibid., p. 874.
6Ibid., p. 879.
7Ibid., p. 878; John Berg, “Soviet front-level threat to northern Norway,” Jane's Defence Weekly, 2 February 1985, p. 169.
8Ries, p. 878.
Alexander, p. 183.
10Richard C. Bowman, “Soviet Options on NATO’s Northern Flank,” Armed Forces Journal International, April 1984, p. 90.
“Alexander, p. 184.
12Erling Bjol, Nordic Security, Adelphi Papers, no. 181 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 25.
13Bjol, p. 25.
,4Unknown author, “Facts on Norwegian Defence,” Press and Information Department, Royal Ministry of Defence.
15Alexander, p. 184.
16Bjol, p. 25.
“Ries, p. 879.
l8George R. Hofman, “Reinforcing North Norway: The Marine Amphibious Brigade’s Contribution,” unpublished paper, 1984, p. 9.
“Bjol, p. 26.
20Alexander, p. 189.
21 “Memorandum of Understanding Governing Prestockage and Reinforcement of Norway,” United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (Washington, DC: U. S. Department of State, 1981), p. 3.
22J. C. Scharfen, “Cold Weather Training: The Absolute Necessity,” Marine Corps Gazette, February 1981, p. 41.
Lieutenant Colonel Schopfel was commissioned in 1968 from the University of Texas. He instructed at the U. S. Army Field Artillery School and the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, and commanded the 1st Battalion 10th Marines at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. He recently graduated from the College of Naval Warfare and is currently assigned to the Advanced Amphibious Study Group, Headquarters Marine Corps.
n8s 1 November 1986