The MAB in Norway

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With prepositioning, the MAB can be there within days, with its equipment readied in half that time. Will this deter the Soviets from trying for northern Norway in the event of NATO-Warsaw Pact hostilities?

1981 to provide for the prepositioning of heavy

he United States and Norway agreed in January

equipment, supplies, and aviation support equip­ment of a Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) on Norwe­gian soil. This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) represented a significant economic and political commit­ment by both nations, stemming from a growing aware­ness of the geographic importance of the Norwegian land- mass—the northern flank of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)—to the defense of Europe, and from a steadily increasing Soviet presence on the Kola Peninsula and in the Norwegian Sea. The agreement acknowledged the limited time available for the deployment of major combat units, and the overextended condition of current strategic mobility assets.

Basically, the 1981 MOU provided for the “rapid rein­forcement of Norway with an airlifted brigade-sized force,” to be ready by 1989.¹ The agreement is somewhat of a deterrent in itself, but the relatively small size of the MAB, the location of storage sites in south central Nor­way, and the continued scarcity of strategic airlift raises questions of the MAB’s own significance as a deterrent, or even whether the MAB has a credible warfighting capabil­ity at all. To be the former, it must have the latter: The MAB must be able to deploy rapidly with sufficient com­bat power to be effective against the enemy threat.

A close analysis of this agreement begins with a review of the strategic importance of northern Norway and the correlation of opposing forces. However, the MOU grew out of the self-interests of two different nations. Accord­ingly, to measure the utility of the agreement accurately, the differing national threat perceptions, defensive strate­gies, and economic and political constraints of each nation must be considered.

“World War III may not be won on the Northern Flank, but it could definitely be lost there.”² A strongly defended Norway would enable NATO to:

• Monitor, surveil, and interdict Soviet Northern Fleet operations
• Support sea control operations by denying or limiting Soviet access to the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic sea lines of communication (SLOCs)
• Project power into the European landmass
• Project power against the Kola military complex³

Conversely, a Norway under Soviet control would:

• Provide in-depth defense for Soviet nuclear-po

fleet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) forces an value land targets on the Kola Peninsula     the

• Provide the Soviets relatively unimpeded access ^ ^

Norwegian Sea and the critical North Atlantic S Europe pj_eet

• Provide extended air coverage for Soviet North operations
• Improve long-range interception of Allied the' ^

strategic nuclear threats from B-52s, carrier aircra • submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)   j_ei

Both the United States and NATO perceive the^ ₀f occupation of Norway as      a maritime threat  bee          .

Norway’s geographic position with respect to ^tw° _eaS in the strategically important Soviet SSBN operating ^ ₍o the Arctic Ocean and the North Atlantic Allied S Europe.                                    -_onofl

Norway has a common border with the Soviet                    ^

the Kola Peninsula, home of the Soviet Northern ^ _flf where there are facilities from which an estimate the modem Soviet SSBNs, 66% of their surface c

34

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ants, and 75% of their nuclear-powered attack ^sU p_erljfi' (SSNs) operate.⁵ Despite its small size, the sula is an excellent basing area for the Soviet _s t® submarine force. It not only provides ice-free ^a <,₀yid open water for the surface ships protecting ¹ SSBN fleet, but it also provides ready access to¹ j_eS $ Ocean, where U. S. acoustical detection capa minimal. The recent introduction of longer rang _cJa^sS rine-launched ballistic missiles and the new TyP¹¹⁰

Proceedings

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P°rtanc ^nCS_f^{to t}'^le Northern Fleet shows the growing im- gi_Ves ^ under-ice operations to the Soviets, which Sovi_et ^{6 K}°*^a ^^eni^nsula ^even more strategic importance. ^<kfense°|^CCU^^at*°ⁿ Norway would provide a forward area, _WL-l^{ne a}§^a'^{nst a}ny Allied air or sea attacks into this ^Subn\ar' ' ^eP^rov'^t*'ⁿ8 an in-depth defense for its strategic read,, ,.^{lnc fo}«*s, by denying NATO air and sea forces The ^CCess.^to Norwegian Sea.

^°hhenrtpy*ⁿ® ^su*^3mar’^{ne an(}J air power of the Soviet threaten u ^{eet now} operating in the Norwegian Sea also S°_viet ¹ ® United States’ ability to reinforce Europe. Tu-22 m- ^av*^at'^{on un}i^ts consisting of Tu-16 Badger and fires fly; ^ltl(^^er aircraft, reinforced by Baltic Fleet Back- Sovi_et ^^r°^m ^^orward bases in the Kola, support these ^CUrsion • ^£et °P^erat*ons in the Norwegian Sea. Soviet in- 1,000 'ⁿ,^{t0 Nonva}y would project this threat another 700- Kingjoj^ p’ ^We" ^south of the Greenland-Iceland-United fo_rces in r; ³P’ ^t0 change the balance of conventional sub_mari ^UroP^e to the Allies’ disadvantage. Soviet attack % |\(_0r ^{e an}d surface forces would have secure access to ^Wegian Sea and North Atlantic, and would also gain the natural protection of the numerous coastal islands and the deep-water Norwegian fjords. Air support for sur­face forces and air attack of Allied maritime targets could be extended from 400-600 miles if Soviet aircraft oper­ated from Norwegian airfields. Additionally, occupation of these airfields would bring Great Britain within range of Soviet tactical air units, and would also improve forward air defense/waming facilities for the Kola Peninsula and the Soviet homeland.⁶

The United States views the Soviet occupation of Nor­way as a maritime threat, but the Norwegians have a more pragmatic view. Soviet land and air forces threaten the sovereignty of Norwegian soil. Accordingly, in order to maintain an air of cordial relations and thus avoid a Nor­wegian defensive build up, the Soviets have been more restrained in their efforts to improve the correlation of land and air forces than to strengthen the Northern Fleet. They have emphasized increased capability—through rapid re­inforcement—instead of large increases in standing forces. They have modernized equipment, hardened facili­ties, and greatly improved existing road and rail networks.

The Soviet 6th Army, consisting of three motorized rifle divisions (MRDs), its normal support units (a self- propelled artillery [Scud B] brigade, and an SA-6 antiair brigade), along with the 63rd Naval Infantry Regiment, comprise the main ground threat to northern Norway.⁷ Although the disposition of the MRDs and the severity of the terrain favor the Norwegian defenders, the recent addi­tion of troop transport and Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter units to one MRD and to the Naval Infantry Regiment represents a major offensive improvement in cross-coun­try mobility.⁸ The improved rail and road links within the Kola Peninsula now permit a rapid flow of reinforce­ments—up to seven divisions—from the rest of the Lenin­grad Military District. An artillery division, an airborne division, and the Spetsnaz naval brigade of the Northern Fleet would also be available for such operations.⁹

The Norwegians’ primary concern is air defense. The Kola Peninsula holds one civilian and 16 military air bases within operating range of major Norwegian facilities. Each has a runway longer than 2,000 meters and support facilities to sustain combat aircraft operations. Although more than 350 combat aircraft of various types are associ­ated with these bases, only one half of the facilities are currently used. The active bases have been hardened and there is continuous prepositioning of ammunition and sup­plies, and the number of Soviet combat aircraft there could probably be doubled in a matter of hours.

The Soviets have developed the necessary prestockage levels, basing facilities, lines of communication, and force structure improvements to conduct an invasion of northern Norway without increasing their standing air and ground units in the Kola Peninsula. This restrained force postur­ing has, and will continue to have, a major impact on the development of the Norwegian defense strategy.

Nevertheless, there are several limiting factors with re­spect to potential Soviet operations in Norway. Any So­viet incursion there would be conducted as part of a gen­eral war in Europe. Major forces would not be redeployed to the northern region to the detriment of Soviet strength

35

storage

, and maintenance facilities were designed

Ground defense improvements should continue a creased rate as the air defense and base mode programs culminate.           _eejan

Despite the quality and the training of N° _terraiOi forces, the defense-favoring characteristics of the ₀f and the extensive modernization program, the power in the north still favors the Soviets. A ^sU on defense of northern Norway still depends mo NATO reinforcement. . ₍₀ the

NATO: With all major ground units commits ^._[e(j defense or reinforcement of the Central Front,m^e _arjtirfl^e States and NATO, out of necessity, developed a n* _th^e strategy for the reinforcement of Norway. Until

,tlie^f

strate NATO resolve and solidarity.

on the Central Front. Thus, only the finite, though very capable, resources already mentioned would be available for operations on the Northern Flank. Also, Swedish neu­trality would be respected. Sweden is peripheral to Soviet objectives, and it maintains relatively strong air and land forces to ensure its neutrality. The Swedish Air Force, one of the strongest in the region, consists of 100-120 combat aircraft. Moreover, the five well-trained and -equipped Swedish “Norrland Brigades” are supported by a mobili­zation infrastructure capable of quickly producing up to 30 brigades and 100 separate battalions.¹⁰ The commitment of sufficient Soviet air and land forces to overcome a com­bined Swedish/Norwegian defense would require a reallo­cation of major forces and threaten the success of any Central Front campaign. The Soviets would consider such a course of action unacceptable.

Norway: Norway’s military is highly trained and highly skilled, capable of responding strongly to any Soviet in­cursion. It consists of 43,000 active-duty personnel whose primary function is to delay Soviet forces until mobiliza­tion is completed and NATO reinforcements can arrive. Although this number seems small, it represents 1% of the total Norwegian population, a significant contribution for a democratic society in peacetime.¹¹ These forces can be augmented by 122,000 army reserves, of whom 80,000 can be mobilized and deployed to northern Norway within 72 hours.¹² This force is organized into 12 Arctic-trained and -equipped brigades with the necessary support forces. The navy is small but formidable—equipped with diesel submarines, frigates, and missile-armed fast-attack craft. Within the Norwegian fjords or within the close confines of the numerous islands on the Norwegian coastline, the Navy, together with the modernized coastal defenses, should be able to defend against a limited amphibious in­vasion and ensure seaborne resupply to northern Norway. (Doubt still exists, however, about the Norwegian ability to defend against Soviet Spetsnaz operations.)

The Norwegian Air Force maintains two squadrons of F-16 fighters and one squadron of maritime surveillance aircraft on the northern airfields for air defense.¹³ One additional squadron of F-16s and two squadrons of F-5 fighter-bombers are located in southern Norway and can easily be redeployed as needed.¹⁴ The air force, navy, and army are all augmented by a Home Guard of 90,000 men from all services.

Norway’s commitment to defense is also displayed in an expensive modernization effort. Its defense expenditure is significantly greater than that of other European nations. Norway had the highest percentage growth rate in defense expenditures in all of NATO from 1975 to 1980, and aver­aged 3.5% real growth from 1981 to 1983.¹⁵

In the early 1980s, 80% of Norway’s defense equip­ment expenditure went toward purchasing 72 F-16 fighter aircraft. Air defense was further improved by the purchase and installation of the U. S. Improved Hawk (54 launchers and 162 missiles), and Swedish RBS-70 missile systems around the critical northern airfields.¹⁶ Runways and ramp spaces were enlarged to accommodate reinforcing squad­rons, and an elaborate system of underground hangars,

now being built. Hardened bulk fuel sites are now ^ constructed throughout the northern region to servi sea, and ground units.                      j,_avc

Improvements to the Norwegian Army and Navy slowed because of the high expenditures of ai^rcra _ve- curement and base development. Significant > ments have been made, however, on coastal forti¹ j_ve command and control facilities, and permanent ■ _the positions against the major avenues of approach ^ northern provinces. Two “brigade sets” of heavy ment have been purchased and positioned in Troms. will greatly reduce mobilization and transport^ ^ ^

strategy was based on acceptable warning time, ^ ^ initial Norwegian defense, and a rapid Allied air a j. phibious ground reinforcement. Seven to 17 All>^e _{( 0}p- rons were available, depending on the reinforce¹¹¹ ^ tion chosen by the Supreme Allied Commander. _ejy (SACEur). Norwegian ground forces, aided by ^c>\_cted to formidable but highly defensible terrain, were ^eXP . _vaiof hold against five to seven Soviet MRDs until the ^a _{0\i- Allied amphibious ground reinforcements—iⁿ grat'd mately three weeks.¹⁷ The need for rapid deploy¹¹^ the rugged, compartmented terrain required brig^atl combined arms forces. Ground reinforcements ^c< of four forces:   . ^ylti'

► The Allied Command Europe Mobile Force is ^a ^ jp national force composed of light infantry supp^orte^j fo^ur tillery, helicopters and logistic support units, ^a jfof squadrons of fighter and attack aircraft. It is well ^sU_tj_ngef*' Arctic operations but is committed to multiple ^c0 cies throughout NATO Europe. Under control of ^fl­it is designed to deploy rapidly to crisis areas, to

The Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade ^lS pat- light infantry organization consisting of three iota ^ talions, an artillery regiment, an armored reconna'•         <$

squadron, a tactical helicopter squadron, and a^taC j^- squadron. Unlike other forces, this 4,000-man ofS, pfi- tion is earmarked for Norway. However, the CA gade would take more than 30 days to arrive ► The 3rd Commando Brigade, a Great Brit^a‘ⁿ _rajpS¹¹¹ lands combined amphibious force, deploys and Norway for three months each year. This we ^jts, unit, reinforced with artillery, engineers, supp^OIj_o ^ and helicopter support, will be airlifted to Norway _{gy a potential threat, but it also has multiple deploy¹¹¹

36

Proceedings

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ibef*

^l*ons

^lu*iS anH '          •

^ The n ^{1S su}^J^{ect t0} other commitments.

. • S. Marine Corps Marine amphil                                 ^

_a ^{ls or}§anized by task and consists of: a headquar- i'mk ^r,°^Unc^ ^corr,bat element, an air combat element, and

(MAB)V ^ ^^ar'^ne Corps Marine amphibious brigade ters " '               "

^SCrV'^{Ce su}PP^ort element. It can be deployed en- ^rriaritime^arn^^>^'^^>*°^{US s}^'PP*ⁿ§ ^{or use}d >ⁿ conjunction with deploy P^reP^ositioned ships equipment. In either case, means a lengthy transit time. The P^rePosit^° ^^US.^mu*^t'P'^c deployment options, but the MAB that thea^¹⁶^ ^^orway bas been specifically tailored for

'J'hg           \

crisis m°i^SS'^^{e unava}hability of these forces in times of ^regi°n _ak ^{6S des}*8^nated specific support to this critical forcemg ^S°*^ute'y ^necessary. Furthermore, the rapid rein- ^asthe _So^nt°^{f Norwa}y ^by ^{sea was} made more unattainable Ued to p ^V*^{et nava}^ presence in the Norwegian Sea contin- ing units°M ^reduce the deployment times of reinforc- f°^rc_ertlp ’ NATO's strategy changed from seaborne rein- cqujpm ^{,0 a}*^rhfted reinforcement, tied to prepositioned in Nony¹¹¹ lateral agreements to preposition equipment States p^{y Were ma}de between Norway and the United bior\v_e^rCat ^^r'^ta'ⁿ’ ^and Canada. ^nearnes« "!^an defense strategy is heavily influenced by the

tages and only one disadvantage: The equipment would be easier to protect; the central, more protected location would offer more options during a crisis situation; scarce transport planes would be less exposed to hostile action; but a 400-mile redeployment of assets to the northern area would be required at the outbreak of hostilities.¹⁹ To offset this disadvantage, the Norwegian Government agreed to

^l'°^ns to ~ ^the ^^ov*^et Union and by attempts by both

’'orthem _r^maintain non-escalatory force postures in the defense /"^e®^lon- A strategy which provides for a strong ^nio_nj_s ^Ut °E^rs minimal provocation to the Soviet ^lhe Kol_a p^SSCnt'^al' Pbe restrained Soviet force posturing in 'he b_asj ^en*ⁿsula and the Norwegian decision to prohibit ^by both ^ ⁰ Allied ground forces in Norway are attempts ^^egian L^nat.‘^0ns to reduce tensions in that area. The Nor- 'ag Aik j^S_f^ln^ P°hcy does not prohibit bases from receiv- ^St°^ckpiHn'-^,0rCeS *ⁿ b^nle °f attack, nor does it prohibit the

£^y

(Si ^ ^ecl^u'Pment or joint Allied exercises in Nor- p_roh?^Ce 1^61, however, the Norwegian Government dan t *^ted stockpiling of nuclear warheads on Nor-

^                                                                                            vyx uuvi.

Th_e bi]¹⁷'¹⁰¹^ during peacetime.)

'vay _a ' ^ateral agreements on prepositioning among Nor- '^ver_e d_e ^ United States, Great Britain, and Canada wpr ⁶ °P^ed according to Norwegian defense strategy ^execu,ed:

i ^UPo_n th ^{2 dlrecti}°n Of SACEur * ^With th ^{C rec}l^uest °f the Norwegian Government The ^{6 concu}rrence of the providing government %T₀ ^a^^reeiT|ents reaffirmed Norway’s position in T\^Vedth^{SCnt 3 stron}§ signal to the Soviet Union, and ^rhey _ej.^ree major strategic problems facing the Alliance: ^Phibj^ITllnated the lengthy transit time associated with ^arr,Phibi°^US Enforcement; they reduced the reliance on ^Cr0ssi_n„              ^and, ideally, they eliminated a hazardous

T/j_e f the Norwegian Sea during hostilities, filled ⁱⁿ Norway: Although Norway had accepted • l^^eE^s'^t’oning for years, the idea of prestocking P°liti_cai ^anne Corps equipment did not gain immediate

3CPPnfr.~__________________________ • xt                                                                    rr-ii r“ .j _________________________ 1              ____

life p⁸

acceptance in Norway. The first proposal, pre- . -• r_e ^{ln l}be Troms area, was considered too provoca­tion w‘^{n§ esca}l^atl°ⁿ by the Soviets, a compromise de- So_sit.^as adopted by the Norwegian Parliament to MAg⁵¹¹ ^^ar*ne equipment near Trondheim. Locating ^ln south central Norway offered several advan-

N,

8s /

November 1986

preposition the second Norwegian “brigade set” of heavy equipment in the northern area. After reviewing the size and combat capability of the MAB, the parliament decided that although the MAB was heavy in combat power, it was not a serious offensive threat to the Soviets, and, there­fore, would not destabilize the region.

The United States is committed to the purchase, trans­port, and prepositioning of ammunition and specific pieces of heavy equipment and supplies for all elements of the Marine air-ground task force. It will also provide air transport for personnel and helicopters, and the air “ferry” of fixed-wing aircraft to Norway. The MAB can deploy to northern Norway within ten days of an execution order—considerably less time than a deployment by sea. Also, the prestocking of MAB equipment—tailored spe­cifically to the reinforcement of Norway—reduced the strategic airlift requirements by almost 80%. Strategic mobility had required that the MAB remain light, while

37

air, will form an imposing air defense network ov ^ northern land and sea areas. The organic comm³ ^ control organization, a Stinger platoon, and an Hawk-battalion complete the air defense package

^MAB-                                                                           r II ran2^e°^f

The air combat element will also include a tun -

Marine Corps helicopters. Fifty-four of the 75

of

^ /CN

ROYAL NETHERLANDS NAVY

The U. S. Marine Corps demonstrated improved Arctic warfare capabilities in the NATO exercise Cold Winter 85, held in Norway. Here, British paratroopers, far right, prepare to attack U. S. positions and a U. S. Marine, above, sights in.

the countering Soviet threat called for a force heavy in combat power.

The MAB will contain more than 13,000 Marines, or­ganized as an air-ground task force and provisioned with 30 days of supplies.²⁰ The ground combat element, a rein­forced infantry regiment, will deploy without tank, assault amphibian, or self-propelled artillery support. (The Nor­wegian weather and terrain limits the tactical mobility of this equipment anyway, and the size of the equipment would place unacceptable demands on strategic airlift.) More anti-tank assets and organic attack aircraft will com­pensate for the lack of armor. Artillery support will be provided by a battalion of prepositioned 155 mm. M-198 Howitzers.

The air combat element will contribute significantly to the mission, with two F-18 Hornet fighter squadrons, one large AV-8B Harrier attack squadron, EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft detachments, RF-4B Phantom reconnaissance aircraft, and OV-IOD Bronco observation aircraft. These fixed-wing assets will provide close-air support to ground units, and when employed in conjunc­tion with Allied, U. S. Air Force, and U. S. Navy carrier

38

enhance battlefield mobility. The CH-46 Sea ^ be the primary troop carrier, and a detac CH-53 Super Stallions will move the M-198 _c0n- UH-1N Huey helicopters will handle command ^aI1 pa­trol, and the AH-IT Cobra will provide an anti-a⁰¹¹ _ck pability. The fixed-wing A-6E Intruder all-weather^^ squadron (nuclear capable), usually attached to a _flS was omitted to comply with Norwegian basing res ^ prohibiting the positioning of nuclear weapons or . _f delivery systems in Norway during peacetime. AJ all the Norway MAB involves approximately one-⁰ U. S. Marine Corps prepositioned equipment- _s(0fage Norway’s Contribution: Hardened permanent facilities are being constructed to shelter the MA ^Re­positioned equipment in Trondelag province. The _gnt, gians provide security and maintenance for the ^eCj^ gjrpot¹ and are responsible for transporting troops from the ^ of entry, and the equipment from the storage ^slte’_ce|[ent area of employment—in this case, Troms. The ^ _and

will

will

Norwegian civilian transportation system (air,

land,

400

ini'^e

sea) should be capable of accomplishing the Tapped move, even during combat conditions. Logis^0ca ^ (N

for the MAB will be enhanced by the Norwegians ^ addition of two motor transport companies (18° _refuel^er one ambulance company (35 ambulances), °^ne ^ip- section (six trucks), specialized heavy engi^0eer ment, and recovery vehicles. Swedish Bandvago - ^ BV-202/BV-206) will contribute over-snow mob' _Qtle thus will provide a reliable resupply capability’

MAB battalion.²¹                                                          depf⁰^

Operating in the Arctic Environment: A rapid jo ment capability and modem prepositioned equip¹¹¹^^- not in themselves make a unit combat-ready in ^[h^e jjjs Survival during extreme cold weather operations ^jtli extensive and specialized training. Familiarizat' basic survival techniques and specialized equip¹¹¹² be completed before combat training begins. lack The U. S. Marine Corps has been criticized f°^r^ p₀w of experience in Arctic warfare. Critics must reahz^e’ _g[1t, ever, that experience begins with a mission requj _alld progresses through individual and small unittrain¹ culminates in large-scale exercises and opera⁰⁰^^^! evolution that takes time and resources. In 1981-

d cd^d

John Scharfen lamented the inadequacy of outda ^ _to

weather clothing, compared the “snow-shoed’ ^ ^jjjed the more mobile, more capable ski-equipp^ed ^ N forces, and predicted that heavy Marine forces w ir­relatively immobilized, protecting the defiles ^a*°ⁿ^_ed >ⁿ way’s north-south artery, E-6.²² But lessons l^ea _£ I^a one exercise are incorporated into the next ^exer^,_eatt^ief 1984, more than 14,000 Marines underwent cold ^ <jjj6

training at various bases throughout the ^Un.rf^din!’tr^ai^flif1' Marines are continually assessing and modify¹¹¹^ ¹

Proceedings

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and

^lrnp_ro'"'^t.^J‘^nent' and their proficiency in Arctic warfare has "ith _t^^{e 1} Compare Colonel Scharfen’s 1981 prediction M/\g ® ^reality of exercise Cold Winter 85, when the ^ements were airlifted into central Norway, and

_ie: ^and a strong and effective deterrent signal to the ^union

^ecl^uipme

- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  ---  ^ .

"'ay               equipment was transported to northern Nor-

^try, artii|^{ln five da}y^s- Combined U. S./Norwegian infan- 'Hfantrv f ’ ^and helicopter training took place, and all P^rep_0sjf ^{0rces w}ere on skis, supported by helicopters, ^ci$e _CU] ^l0ned artillery, and over-snow vehicles. The exer- attac^ ^'aa^d with the “combined” MAB defeating an Sovi_ef ³ ^^rh'sh/Netherlands amphibious force. fofc_e^ ^c°ncern for the sanctuary of its strategic SSBN ^SuPp₀rt f¹¹^ *^tS °P^erat'ng areas in the Arctic Ocean and its logical ^aCd'des on the Kola Peninsula—make Norway a into thi^^0lnt °f Soviet expansion. But a Soviet incursion Prev_en(^{S cr}hical area on NATO’s Northern Flank can be

^rent^      _a^e d the Soviets are faced with a credible deter-

^and deterrent that demonstrates Norwegian resolve Pabilit* ^3r'^{ty wit}h NATO, and a credible warfighting ca- kettve ’ ^sd°uld deterrence fail. The 1981 bilateral MOU ^St°^ckao ^tae United States and Norway, governing the pre- ^•errp , ^and reinforcement of Norway, provides such a D_e^{a an}d capability.

"'ay_{> t}.^lte the warfighting capabilities of the MAB in Nor- ^l)ot j_n ^{e re}al strength of the prepositioning agreement is ^ ^e.troop fist, but rather in the political statement of ^et)uipm^1Si°ⁿ *^tself. The decision to preposition U. S. Sto^{6nt 0n} Norwegian soil was a commitment to

‘Joseph H. Alexander, “The Role of U. S. Marines in the Defense of North Nor­way,” Proceedings, May 1984, p. 186.

²Ibid., p. 182.

³Ibid.

⁴Tomas Ries, “Defending the Far North,” International Defense Review, July 1984, p. 876.

⁵Ibid., p. 874.

⁶Ibid., p. 879.

⁷Ibid., p. 878; John Berg, “Soviet front-level threat to northern Norway,” Jane's Defence Weekly, 2 February 1985, p. 169.

⁸Ries, p. 878.

Alexander, p. 183.

¹⁰Richard C. Bowman, “Soviet Options on NATO’s Northern Flank,” Armed Forces Journal International, April 1984, p. 90.

“Alexander, p. 184.

¹²Erling Bjol, Nordic Security, Adelphi Papers, no. 181 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 25.

¹³Bjol, p. 25.

^,4Unknown author, “Facts on Norwegian Defence,” Press and Information De­partment, Royal Ministry of Defence.

¹⁵Alexander, p. 184.

¹⁶Bjol, p. 25.

“Ries, p. 879.

^l8George R. Hofman, “Reinforcing North Norway: The Marine Amphibious Bri­gade’s Contribution,” unpublished paper, 1984, p. 9.

“Bjol, p. 26.

²⁰Alexander, p. 189.

²¹ “Memorandum of Understanding Governing Prestockage and Reinforcement of Norway,” United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (Washing­ton, DC: U. S. Department of State, 1981), p. 3.

²²J. C. Scharfen, “Cold Weather Training: The Absolute Necessity,” Marine Corps Gazette, February 1981, p. 41.

Lieutenant Colonel Schopfel was commissioned in 1968 from the Uni­versity of Texas. He instructed at the U. S. Army Field Artillery School and the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, and commanded the 1st Battalion 10th Marines at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. He re­cently graduated from the College of Naval Warfare and is currently assigned to the Advanced Amphibious Study Group, Headquarters Ma­rine Corps.