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By Colonel W. Hays Parks, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
occurred within a few weeks:
aval ta
Moammar Gadhafi drew his line of death across the Gulf of Sidra, but it was his crossing of a moral line—by sponsoring terrorism—that prompted a U. S. response.
In the early months of 1986, U. S. leaders - ^
take limited military actions against Libya s n ^oll. Moammar Gadhafi in response to his continue ^ sorship of international terrorism. Two separate op
► During a four-day period in late March, a na - force of 30 ships, including the aircraft carriers c (CV-43), Saratoga (CV-60), and America (CV-6t>h ^ ducted a freedom of navigation (FON) exercise rjal Oirat* f/\ T 1 h\/0 S -
Reiat-
Lted s0'°ns between Libya and the United States deterio- Nly SeniUcb that, from 1972 until President Reagan for- ^!ates enVered diplomatic relations in 1981, the United 3u|tanJ<>yed no ambassadorial relationship with Libya. ^°viet Ln°US^’ Libya took a pronounced shift toward the C°W jn iq1!111’ following a visit of Libyan officials to Mos-
f Gadhafi’ ;
°reign infatuation with terrorism as an instrument of ^aken ,P°*'cy began early—with four purposes: to ^*ddle i; 6 r°L °f Western (Christian) democracies in the
er$;
,heMi,
SaPp
0rt f°r dissident factions, terrorist groups, or in-
In respom.ISS'*e Patro* boats to attack U. S. surface forces. °ne ipisnS,e’ NavY aircraft attacked the radar controlling thwarted It? S'te’ anc* Navy aircraft and surface vessels Van cra^t e rr,iss*le boat attacks, sinking at least two Lib- ^erric, ' ^Pter four days of continuous operations, the ► Fo£ Was included.
in tyest^lng.a terror^st attack on the La Belle discotheque Lilian ^at two LL S. soldiers and a Turkish
Anieric ^ an<^ ^29 others wounded—including 78 of terror^ ^resident Ronald Reagan directed the attack Me evi<j1St~r„atetf targets in Libya, citing “incontroverti- 15 Apri]61'^!6 op Libyan complicity. On the night of 14— attacked f Nayy an^ Air Force aircraft successfully
These 'Ve seParate targets in Tripoli and Benghazi. sponSe (()Wcre n°t the first uses of military force in re- era that f tCrror'sm’ and are not likely to be the last. In an kins char°riTler *“Lief of Naval Operations James D. Wat- c°me a acterized as “violent peace,” terrorism has be- hafi hasPri.rnary tool for challenges to democracies. Gad- Planninp P a^et* a maj°r role in the training, financing, United s’,3"*1 tPrec-tion of many terrorist attacks. And the a es has been one of his primary targets.
Relati
^eteriorateS ^etWeen the United States and Libya began to MriS()n .e when Gadhafi overthrew the Sanusi leader irideperi(, _ number 1969. From the time Libya gained its fe'ations hnCe *n Unt^ Gadhafi’s coup, U. S.-Libyan eCon0lTlj a.^ been good. Libya had received substantial enj°yec] ?ai(L ’n return for which the U. S. Air Force had ^hips Qj. e Use of Wheelus Air Force Base near Tripoli.
A|| 0f Tf- S. Sixth Fleet made port calls on Tripoli, tended 'tdlS cbanged abruptly under Gadhafi. He de- e^u'Pnientlrned'ate ^eParture °f all LI. S. personnel and ^rsortalit fr°m Wheelus. Displaying his Machiavellian "'as eva' oourted the United States until Wheelus '"'een t^Uatec*> then declared that friendly relations be- b'nite(j Pj, tvv° nations would be impossible as long as the any militUtes c°ntinued to support Israel. Those opposing t'H So aar_V resP°nse to terrorism assert that the problem *bis |gno ay °nce a Palestinian homeland is established. Srael. res Gadhafi’s obsession with the destruction of
~~~ yycsicill ^lUIalldli; UtlllULiaLl^a 111 lilt
and t0St’ t0 destroy Israel; to attack Israel’s support- ^iddl CXPanc* Libya’s role, particularly in Africa and ar e Last. Gadhafi turned to terrorism, subversion, Fo\Ver intervention immediately after he seized beaten . atlhafi has a long record of illegal actions that Gariu„!.nt^rnational order.
1 has provided economic aid, training, and logis- surgent movements in Senegal, Mali, Nigeria, Mauritania, Cameroon, Sudan, Benin, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Morocco, Ethiopia, Chad, Lebanon, Tunisia. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Argentina, Uruguay, Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru. Simultaneously, Gadhafi joined with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to provide praetorian guards for the murderous regimes of Emperor Bokassa in Central Africa and Uganda’s Idi Amin; he also provided Amin refuge following his ouster. Gadhafi established strong ties with such terrorist groups as George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and began a long, close relationship with Ramirez Sanchez, the Venezuelan terrorist known as “Carlos.”
Gadhafi provided the funds, arms, and training for the terrorists who committed the 1972 Olympic Games massacre; those terrorists, in fact, departed for Munich from Libya. Libyan connections were found to the Black September attack on the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum on 2 March 1973 in which U. S. Ambassador Cleo A. Noel. Jr., and Charge d’Affairs George C. Moore were murdered. He established terrorist training camps at Sirte, Sebha, Az Zoouiah, and Raz Hilal that attracted members of the PFLP and other factions of the PLO, as well as representatives from virtually every other major terrorist group, including the Japanese Rengo Sekigun (Red Army), the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Basque Euz- kadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), West Germany’s Red Army Faction, Italy’s Red Brigades, Nicaragua’s Sandinistas, Argentina’s Montoneros, Uruguay’s Tupamoros, Peru’s Shining Path, and the Ecuadorian Alfaro Vive, Carajo. On 28 March 1973, the Irish Navy intercepted the SS Claudia carrying arms to the IRA; Gadhafi admitted the arms had come from Libya. On 17 December 1973, Palestinians attacked a Pan Am flight in Rome’s Fiumicino Airport, killing 31 passengers. Italian authorities determined that the terrorists had obtained their weapons and money from Libya and had traveled from Tripoli to carry out the attack. Gadhafi’s reliance on and support for terrorism have continued unabated through the years; in 1983, an arms shipment disguised as medical supplies was intercepted en route to guerrillas in El Salvador.
At the time of his takeover, Gadhafi began a massive arms buildup. In 1972, the United States began reconnaissance flights outside Libyan territorial waters, to monitor the influx of military supplies. On 21 March 1973, two Libyan Mirages fired on a U. S. Air Force RC-130 83 miles off the Libyan coast, in international airspace and substantially above the so-called Line of Death Gadhafi subsequently imposed at 32° 30'; the U. S. diplomatic protest was ignored. On 11 October 1973, in response to U. S. resupply of Israel during the Yom Kippur War, Gadhafi declared that portion of the Mediterranean Sea south of 32° 30' known as the Gulf of Sirte, or Sidra, to be Libya’s internal waters.
For purposes of navigation and overflight, the world’s seas have been divided into three categories: internal waters, the territorial sea, and the high seas. Internal waters are areas of the sea that lie landward of the base line from which the territorial sea is measured. The territorial sea is
In supporting U. S. participation in UNCLOS
have recognized Libya’s claim.
tairt°(
Throughout the 1970s, the United States ma1^
policy of challenging excessive sea claims
otrt'
declined to authorize further challenges to Libya 3, j^ya
tizens in ^
Carter also feared that any challenge to Gadha ^ ^0
■lit
did not,d5.
suade Gadhafi, however. On 2 December 1979, d1® ^
a belt of water immediately adjacent to a nation’s land- mass. Territorial seas and internal waters—and the airspace above each—are part of a coastal nation’s sovereign territory. Ships are entitled to innocent passage through territorial seas while aircraft are not. There is no right of innocent passage in or over internal waters.
The high seas and their airspace are international. International law states that they belong to no nation but may be used by all, as long as such use is reasonable. Among the rights afforded all nations in the use of the high seas are navigation and overflight, even if they are used for intelligence-gathering purposes. In attempting to declare the Gulf of Sidra part of Libya’s internal waters, Gadhafi was endeavoring to prevent surveillance of his arms buildup.
Gadhafi made two arguments to support his claim. Initially, he claimed the Gulf was a bay. This argument failed, owing to a substantial error in mathematics. In order to be considered internal waters, a bay may not exceed 24 nautical miles in width; at 32° 30', the Gulf of Sidra is more than ten times that width. His second argument was that his claim was historic. However, such a claim must be long-standing, open, and notorious—with effective and continuous exercise of authority by the claimant—and one to which other states acquiesce. Libya’s claim was not made until 1973, and the United States and other maritime nations have a long history of operating in the Gulf of Sidra as part of the high seas. Though Gadhafi’s attempt was couched in international law terms, it is not supported by that law. In a demarche dated 11 February 1974, the U. S. Department of State characterized the Libyan claim as “unacceptable as a violation of international law.” The note continued:
“The United States Government views the Libyan action as an attempt to appropriate a large area of the high seas by unilateral action, thereby encroaching upon the long-established principle of freedom of the seas. . . . The [U. S.] Government reserves its rights and the rights of its nationals in the area of the Gulf of Sirte affected by the action of . . . Libya.”1
The United States was concerned about Gadhafi’s claim for several reasons. The Gulf of Sidra is a cul-de-sac away from the main shipping and air lanes in the Mediterranean. To avoid undue interference with the navigation and overflight rights of other nations, the United States and other nations—including the Soviet Union—historically and routinely have used the Gulf of Sidra for naval and air exercises. Acquiescence to the Libyan claim would force
these exercises into heavily traveled shippmS lanes, at great risk and inconvenience to their u t There was the danger of Gadhafi setting a P1! c jn- Claims to extended territorial seas abounded. ^ 5, creased the difficulty of timely deployment 0 efse forces. Gadhafi’s claim had the potential of an . tj0nS impact on the third and final session of the Unite |n Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS ^ 1973, the United States entered into UNCLOS that unilateralism in territorial sea claims was crea c[aitf> danger of international maritime anarchy. Gadha 1 s(aie would merely exacerbate that which was already 111 of disarray. ^c ^ tN
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were interested in PrcsC;ir0und of maximum operational mobility and flexibility^ ^|- the world, at minimum political and economic ^ 3 though UNCLOS III extended territorial sea liiTiH^ 0f the to 12 nautical miles, it also recodified those port10 ^ t(ie 1958 High Seas Convention and the Convention Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone viewed aSrnnve"ti0! international law. The 1982 United Nations reSs°f on the Law of the Sea contains no recognition, e P ^ie, implied, for Libya’s claim to the Gulf of Sidra- ^1? only Burkina Faso and the Sadek Mahdi regime 0
d 3
Administration continued this policy during th° 1 gjjn5' tion of UNCLOS III. Three challenges were Libya’s claim between 1973 and 1979. In 1979, ^b'
Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski formal y lished a FON program. However, President Jinmo
citing his concern for the safety of U. S. citizens ^jgl
cause the loss of support of moderate Arab nation ^ th° were acting as intermediaries with Iran for relea U. S. hostages held in Tehran.
President Carter’s moderation toward Libya ^
embassy in Tripoli was sacked by a Libyan was described as a well-organized action, vVl1 Insecurity forces watched. On 16 September 1980, 0$ -
yan MiG-23 Floggers made an unsuccessful atta
U. S A .
space "" Force RC-135 operating in international air- 198q ’ p® * outside the area Libya claimed. On 22 October V'ya P'aced an advertisement in the Washington “reCona ,'n^ uPon the United States to stop sending its and f0113-SSance P*anes to spy across Libyan borders” The a([ Vlrtua* U. S. withdrawal from the Middle East. Cfaft w WaS an 'niJ’rcct acknowledgement that U. S. air- mati0nere *n *nternational waters, legally collecting infor-
Suggest^Va'^ahle to any and all. With earlier events, it le . that r ik,,„ i r *■ *
c°mposition and size of the force were dictated
'V the
Evenf°,tent‘a^ threat posed by the challenged nation. ^e§Un i^iq3^'11® t0 tFe confrontations of 1986 may have Gulf nfwhen a FON exercise was proposed for the , r ^idr;
a- As with other FON actions, the exercise
* 1 wim lhiici rui> aL-iiuiia, me CAciList
, Peaceful assertion of U. S. rights; mere presence cnallr
to 3tif aarms
’hgggr^' ^ FON assertion in the face of a credible threat r'ght of l“"Si.deration °f another legal right: the inherent
^gers
,nt . ——. v.» ......_^— ~~o— —--------------
'etof ,SeIf-defense, as codified in article 51 of the Char-
finite xt’ •
acetim d'rected a study to standardize the worldwide
"'tent f.Ilned c°mmon terms, such as self-defense, hostile time, 0stile act, and imminent hostilities, for the first The •
Ve f(j'"^ °f self-defense authorizes armed response to an a threat: an actual use of force, or hostile
act;
gitimat ^at was prepared to use force to prevent forth k C’ peaceful intelligence-gathering activities, as 2) j„ ]g^ea ^ad *n 'ts se*zure of the USS Pueblo (AGER-
1° 1981 p •
f°r ^ p ’ ^resident Reagan published program guidance national ^ Program. Its purpose was to protect U. S. claittis p,eCUrity interests against excessive maritime SinCe th 3'IT1S suc^ as Libya’s are but one category, asserted ^ ,^n‘ted States implemented this policy, it has than 4Q 'tS r'^ts against the objectionable claims of more small n.atl0ns- FON exercises have not been limited to eXcessivtl0nS °r nat*ons unfriendly to the United States; ance rnaritime claims of partners in the NATO alli- Sovjet k£en challenged, and U. S. warships entered Marc^ i^r’torial waters off Sebastopol as recently as case, tu ^to challenge Soviet Black Sea claims. In each
Ca'led
‘He, _ _
ttafi’s rg lenged area is sufficient. However, given Gad- W’as necPCaled threats against U. S. ships and aircraft, it 'tself a,„ ssary to assemble a force capable of defending ^as aplnst a possible full-scale attack by Libya. It also >ha,PfroPriate for the commanders to begin to ask questions in the event of a Libyan resort
The - ynited Nations. lent bug'!!” erent r*ght of self-defense” has been a persis- C()nlni._ U. 00 to commanders. The phrase does not tell a h^rtie in ,pr wFen he may fire. The problem is at its exited bv m USe °f military force short of war; it is exacer- r^d in i ^act lFut very few of the complementary terms h *979 l°s 0r guidance have an agreed-upon definition.
■ RayVvtaen'f'hief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas
^ dlTPPtpH q cfnH\; tr\ ctonHorHiTP thp u/nrlHu/lHp niaritime rules of engagement (ROE). That of f rn‘n*nent use of force; and a continuing threat of strike ag.rCe' The last was the basis for the U. S. Navy air Hber )(lnst Syrian antiair positions in Lebanon on 4 De- b'l4 °T, following Syrian missile launches at Navy cat reconnaissance flights supporting the multinational peacekeeping force in Beirut the preceding day, and would be the basis for the 1986 air strikes against terrorist-related targets in Libya. Responding to a hostile act is understandable. Imminent use of force has always posed great difficulty; yet the threat posed in terms of quickness, accuracy, and destructive capability of modern weapons leaves no choice for a commander but to preempt a threat where indications and warnings clearly suggest hostile intent and an imminent attack.
The Navy Regulations provide that force may be used ‘‘to counter either the use of force or an immediate threat of the use of force.”3 In addition to standardization, the new ROE would endeavor to convey a word picture of this mystical world of self-defense for these commanders. Finally, through a lengthy list of supplemental measures, the rules would provide a commander with a “shopping list” of rules from which he could select ones to fit the precise parameters of a particular mission. The Worldwide Peacetime Rules of Engagement for Seaborne Forces were approved. The FON exercise in the Gulf of Sidra would be their first test.
Led by the Forrestal (CV-59) and Nimitz (CVN-68), the Sidra FON exercise began on 18 August 1981. Allowing for a 12-mile territorial sea, the exercise area was more than 40 nautical miles from Libyan waters and airspace; less than one-third of the exercise area was below 32° 30'. On the first day, more than 130 Libyan sorties were flown against the task force. Hostile intent was evident, but U. S. forces refrained from firing. Each aircraft was intercepted and escorted to the perimeter of the announced exercise area, at which time the intercepting U. S. aircraft would break contact.
It is now apparent that the Libyans were preparing their trap by establishing a pattern of activity, hoping to lull U. S. pilots into relaxing their guard, thus providing Libyan pilots with an element of surprise, as well as an opportunity to escape once an attack was made. Gadhafi decided to take that shot the following day. Two Libyan Su-22 Fitters were intercepted by F-14s as the Fitters penetrated the exercise area. The Fitter was not the best aircraft in the Libyan Air Force (LAAF)' and may have been selected to enhance the atmosphere for a surprise attack. In the final phase of the intercept, one Fitter launched an AA-2 Atoll air-to-air missile without provocation or warning. The F-14s maneuvered to avoid the attack, then downed the two Fitters with AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles.4
At the time of this attack, ten other Libyan fighters were in or near the exercise area. Each gave clear indications of hostile intent, as did a Libyan Osa missile patrol boat within the exercise area. Although his ROE authorized him to fire, the task force commander elected not to do so. Just as damage to or loss of any part of the task force would be translated into a Libyan victory, it is likely that Gadhafi would have turned the loss of a missile patrol boat and a dozen fighters into a “victory” by a martyred David against a bullying Goliath. The commander’s response was proportionate to the immediate threat. His judicious application of force suggests the nature of ROE implementation in peacetime: however carefully articulated, and notwithstanding international legal rights of self-defense
tion and its ROE, as provided by JCS MeIT1°r‘| g()£ 59-83 (MJCS 59-83). Although the 1981 Peacet^en id' for Seaborne Forces remained in effect, it had „u|es proved and unofficially supplanted by the Peacetim p0p of Engagement for U. S. Forces (PROE).7 The P ent.
docutf1
ient>
ai«
authority during the FON exercise. His request w to national command authorities through USCm the JCS and received unanimous support. ,-ng the The President approved the FON exercise, *nClU-nteiit t0 requested ROEs, on 14 March. A notification oj'} \U5
conduct naval and air exercises in the Gulf of -51 j aif filed in consideration for the safety of maritime
ch
traffic.
M“rl
and a clear designation of authority, there is no substitute for the training, experience, and judgment of the on-the- scene commander.
This FON exercise concluded the following day without further incident. During the next four years, U. S. forces would enter the challenged area four times. On the night of 25-26 July 1984, for example, F-14s from the Saratoga penetrated the Gulf of Sidra on two separate occasions, reasserting the U. S. right while taking advantage of the LAAF’s poor nighttime capabilities to avoid unnecessary conflict.
During that period, relations between the two nations continued to deteriorate as Gadhafi further embraced terrorism and the United States took steps to thwart his territorial ambitions. Late in 1981, it was determined that Gadhafi had dispatched a five-man team to the United States to assassinate President Reagan, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and other senior U. S. officials. On 10 March 1982, accusing Libya of supporting international terrorism, the United States imposed an embargo on Libyan oil imports and curtailed the export of high technology to Libya.
On 16 February 1983, President Reagan dispatched four E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to Egypt in a presence mission and to monitor efforts by Gadhafi to overthrow President Mohammed Gaafar el-Nimeiry of Sudan. Simultaneously, he deployed the Nimitz off Libya. The following day, Nimitz F-14s intercepted two LAAF MiG-23s as they approached the carrier. Gadhafi announced that the Gulf of Sidra would be filled with “blood and fire” if the Nimitz crossed 32° 30'. Five months later, the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-60) was directed to stand 150 miles off Libya as Libyan forces invaded Chad. On 1 August, the Libyan press agency, Jana, announced that the LAAF would “destroy” the Dwight D. Eisenhower, F-14s turned away LAAF fighters as they attempted to approach the ship. Joined by the Cora! Sea, the two carriers, together with Air Force F-15 Eagles, provided a MiG CAP for two AWACS aircraft following Libyan activities in Chad. French and U. S. actions curtailed Gadhafi’s overt military actions against Chad but did not curb his appetite for mischief. In July 1984, 18 merchant vessels struck mines in the Suez Canal and Red Sea, apparently laid by the Libyan cargo ferry Ghat.5 On 5 July 1985, the Department of State announced the expulsion of an administrative attache with the Libyan mission to the United Nations after the FBI linked him to a plot to assassinate Libyan dissidents in the United States.
Other actions attributable to Gadhafi occurred during the latter part of 1985. On 7 October, the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro was hijacked by PLO terrorists led by Abul Abbas; an American was murdered in the process. On 27 December, Abu Nidal terrorists attacked El A1 counters in the airports in Rome and Vienna, killing 20 civilians, including five Americans. Gadhafi publicly described the attacks as “heroic” and provided a safe haven for the raid’s mastermind. Moroccan passports found on the gunmen had been taken from Moroccan laborers in Libya by Libyan officials, for use by terrorists.
On 7 January 1986, President Reagan ordered all ^ ^ citizens to leave Libya and severed all remain! S nomic ties between the two nations. Five u. -ness
nies were allowed six months to conclude their ^ there. Concurrent with his announcement, Presl<T jjterra- gan dispatched a second carrier group to the M nean and directed the JCS to prepare a list ot ^ ^ options for possible action against Libya. High 0 ^ lengthy list of military options was a naval prescn ^ flf sion, which would include a FON exercise in the Sidra. attain
Operations in the vicinity of Libya, nick-name ^ ^ Document, commenced in late January. Initial p _^ce 24-31 January; II: 10-15 February) were routine ^ and flight operations in the Tripoli flight informa ^ gion (FIR) carried out by the Coral Sea and SatoD ^ rier battle groups (CVBGs).6 They were joine March by the America CVBG for the third phase- Document III was to be a deliberate FON operat'0 of 32°30' in the Gulf of Sidra to challenge the illeSa ^nlle of internal waters and airspace by Libya, and to to demonstrate U. S. resolve and capability- vje\V^ In anticipation of the FON exercise, planners T1 at t1,e their mission statement and ROE. Military lawyer Sixth Fleet, U. S. Commander-in-Chief, Euf°P i CinCEur), service staff, and JCS level were const* 0pef3' garding aspects of international law relevant to tn^ Luln
lows the same philosophy as its predecessor a
while extending the ROE to all forces, wherever located; clarifying certain areas; and reducing ping- cation level to facilitate discussion in routine The intent remains to permit the commander re P' j3te maximum flexibility to respond to threats with apP Jc0n- options, to limit the scope and intensity of any an11 frontation, and to discourage escalation, while ter ueto hostilities quickly and decisively and on terms fav° ^ an); the United States. The PROE further provides .^l response must be proportionate to the threat. Vice ^a1 Frank B. Kelso III, Commander, Sixth Fleet, belie ^ pjs certain supplemental ROEs were necessary to c a ted
an"
FON operations commenced at 1701 EST on 2- when Navy aircraft crossed 32°30'—Gadhafi s Line of Death. A surface action group (SAG) comp ^gti the Ticonderoga (CG-47), Scott (DDG-995),
(DD-970) moved south of 32°30' at 0600 on 24 ^ s,3- covered by a MiG combat air patrol (CAP) °n-iianCe 0 tions, and a surface CAP to provide armed survei
“ • ^ Surt, on the Libyan coast. Apparently directed
the ma:; fining MiG CAP station # 1, they fell wide of tercepted 0 *ate morn'ng> two LAAF MiG-25s were in- b^ck un aS t'1C^ Penetrated the exercise area; they turned to confr°n lnterccPtion. They were the only LAAF aircraft j.. ont U. S. forces during the FON exercise. Two
additi
*aratol°y °f darkness. At 1847, two A-7Es from the vated/'
Ceased
rOto,, , u<uK.ness. m 10^/, iwo vated launched two HARM missiles at an again-acti- '5 Square Pair radar at the Surt site. The radar
"'as
flic 0r(jSCrvc(l dead in the water, with life rafts near by. "as anleerHt0 re8ard all Libyan military vessels as hostile
tv\L to nprmit th#* I ihvcrnc tn rnnHiirt legitimate
Search;
Ceased ^ rescue efforts, which were undertaken. Libya that - °tfens' thn
resi
atta b nsiVe operations against U. S. forces following ' Task force aircraft flew continuous missions
,lts Position had been established. A second mes- 1 ought to be equally clear: the United States was to respond with force if Gadhafi continued to
Marincgace t^lreat- Navy E-2C Hawkeyes and Navy/ po^ w ^ ^ Prowlers providing electronic warfare sup- At Qe|Lau^mente<l by other assets.
Were 1- 0n ^ March, two SA-5 Gammon missiles aunched from a Libyan missile installation in the
at aircraft
Sup D • . '^s and an SA-2 Guideline were fired by the launchedUl0nS 3t ^5; another SA-5 was probably Ubyan f Fased on continuous hostile acts by
Olivary <°rCCS’ Admiral Kelso declared that any Libyan space I °,rCes ^eParting Libyan territorial waters or air-
^hortl°U ^ re§arc*ed as hostile. equippe7 after 1430, a Libyan La-Combattante missile- fatah in 7atro* boat was detected proceeding from Mislay (j d*rection of the SAG. She was attacked and tw0 ^ , amaged by two Harpoon missiles launched by 15(X) th ntruders from the America. At approximately target a 6 n7ssde installations at Surt again activated their UP°n pjC3Uls'tion radars with the evident object of firing 'aUncheri a'rcra*1' Two Saratoga A-7E Corsair II aircraft tiissjiej, *W0 ^GM-88 high-speed, antiradiation (HARM) both we 3t tbe Square Pair radar supporting the SA-5s; Ubyan out of service. At 1630, an A-6E attacked a cluster k anucbka-class patrol boat with Rockeye Mk-20 Patrol b °mbs- A second attack was thwarted when the vessei sought refuge alongside a neutral merchant Under 0 arna8ed, the patrol boat returned to Benghazi
At 020nerati°n for the duration of the FON exercise- *rorp ti^ ’ 0n 25 March, a Saratoga A-6E and a second
Patrol bo °n^ ^ea attacLed a Benghazi-based Nanuchka at as she entered international waters. The vessel to permit the Libyans to conduct legitimate
!p°oSgUt ibe designated exercise area without Libyan s°uth of’,altlrnately flying 198 day and 177 night sorties SC, °30' , some up to the 12-mile limit of Libyan bcal t^j, Waters. Maximum SAG penetration was 42 nau- The SAG conducted what evolved into 75 drew t0 C°nt>nuous steaming below 32° 30'. The exercise Schedmea t°SC at °900 on 27 March, three days ahead of Staternem early conclusion was consistent with public task f0 s uaade at the time the exercise began: the naval as Oadh 6f *ntended t0 exercise below 32° 30' only as long Lnchallea 1 'ns'sted on his illegal claim. After 48 hours of elievecjn?ed Use °f the Gulf of Sidra, the United States resort to terrorism. But as the naval task force departed the area, Gadhafi directed his People’s Bureaus around the world to commence attacks on U. S. installations and citizens. U. S. embassies and overseas installations were under increased surveillance; other intelligence indicated Gadhafi intended to strike back.
Reaction within the United States was strong and supportive for the FON exercise. The criticism that arose was insignificant and limited to the President’s failure to inform Congress prior to commencement of the exercise, as (it was alleged) required by the War Powers Resolution.
The administration did not agree that the War Powers Resolution was applicable. FON operations were merely a naval exercise in international waters. Moreover, since deployment of the task force and commencement of the exercise was widely reported, Congress need not be informed about something that was public knowledge. Although no War Powers report was required under the circumstances, a report on the operation was forwarded to Congress.
Gadhafi’s response was not long in coming. On 5 April, the La Belle discotheque was bombed. Two days earlier, a bomb had exploded on board a TWA flight en route from Rome to Athens, killing four U. S. citizens. Although that bomb appeared to be the work of Syrian-backed terrorists, Gadhafi congratulated them on their work and warned that, “We shall escalate the violence against American targets, civilian and non-civilian, throughout the world.” With the La Belle discotheque bombing, Gadhafi had made good on that promise.
The list of targets the JCS began following the December terrorist attacks in Rome and Vienna continued to be developed even as the decision was made to limit the U. S. response to a FON exercise. This list of targets was an
index of confirmed, suspected, or possible targets for planning purposes, but they were not validated for attack. The terrorist attack on the La Belle discotheque brought that list to the fore as the President again reviewed his diplomatic, economic, and military options. Whatever the response, however, it would be consistent with presidential guidance issued earlier for terrorism counteraction: The U. S. Government would resist the use of terrorism by all legal means available. Withholding his final decision, President Reagan directed military planning to continue, subject to certain overriding criteria: every reasonable effort should be made to minimize collateral civilian casual
ties and risk to U. S. forces. , j£S.
Planning began again within USCinCEur and t ^ ^ using the procedures of the Crisis Action System ^
ume IV of the Joint Operation Planning System
. As m l Admi'
ral
March exercise, USCinCEur designated Vice -0ll Kelso as the officer in tactical command for the op 0 (nick-named Eldorado Canyon) to coordinate ^ joint planning and deconfliction efforts, to integr ^ jf command assets, and to conduct the actual °P^a eand authorized. Consistent with the presidential gm a ffajn
MJCS 59-83, military lawyers at appropriate
levels Hr
were consulted throughout the planning process-
into play another area of international law war. Although terrorists are not protected by the ‘^e C>' war, the tendency of terrorist organizations to use ^jof vilian population as a shield from attack places -0n t^ such as the United States under a law of war obhu- (0 if' take reasonable efforts to minimize collateral ^ J, is °b' nocent civilians in responding to terrorism; it wa -^0^' ligation that President Reagan referred to in his gu This is the distinction between a U. S. response 0
on the indiscriminate attack of innocent civilians, onaft*11111^ Wou*d emphasize discrimination and pro- Cjv-,.^' ^t no time was Libya’s civilian population '"tention 'f11 °^Jects) considered as a possible target for ija attack by U. S. military forces.
Edition 1 ° poss*^e targets was extensive. In addition to facilities3 t3r^et categories, such as military and industrial feetly re,’ 3 new category was established for objects di- Althou3^ l° <^’acfhafi’s terrorism program, ties, SUcj^ tae *avv °f war establishes certain responsibili- Casualtie 3S -*16 °hhgation to minimize collateral civilian (• als0 est hi'S ne*ther a suicide pact nor a one-way street. ^anninpSf ^fishes certain rights that serve as important ^ ^ logitiaCt0rs ^or any combat operation:
hrne .render a target immune from attack. At the same
M areas.
1Not all i
"V of t^e c°*lateral civilian casualties are the responsibil- 'lf an a . attacker or defender; some simply are the result
render r 1 °f War~
plan°raltackcr.
and nners
at all levels weighed the law of war obligations
-
,egard i,U to he proportionate to Libyan actions. In this the r ’ uowpAm- *u. , _ j- _ u:
Wh0 r C°nsider, but also the U. S. and foreign nation-
e aUacL dltlonal “real war” targets, and would permit °f targets outside populated areas, a sizable por-
r°r*sm is at^^a^'s reliance upon terrorism: Whereas ter- ians, thean use op *orce that targets innocent civil- Self-defe ' response would be a legitimate act of ^Pends onCth^'reCte^ at 'aw*u' targets. While terrorism
Pottii (nor
it ; . - target may be attacked at any time, wher-
>NoV located-
rately f03tlOn Posscsses the means or capability of accu- Siyen tarrecast'ng likely collateral civilian casualties at a ^ ^he inget’ under all circumstances.
?8nizC(j Vltability of collateral civilian casualties is rec- . The obr rCgrettable but nonetheless often unavoidable. 'S ’^e reslgatlon t° minimize collateral civilian casualties ^Pulatio^p-^dy °f ah parties, including the civilian so at ^reilians who choose to remain near a target
- With re" assumed risk.
c°hateral ^6-Cfto attacker, the obligation to minimize Caat'ons casualties is limited to taking those pre-
w0tTlplish eernec^ feasible and consistent with mission ac* The deT6nt 3nc* t*le sccur'ty °f the attacking force. 0rder tQ ender cannot use the population as a screen in ’'^e, it jsenc*e.r a target immune from attack. At the same
NlUn not thegal for a defender to place his positions in
- M ap areas.
-beyond the control of either the de- ^rit the rnber of other factors that normally would not
Cctcd h,jarTle consideration in a “real war.” Targets se- teo- nad to ua . , T_ *u:„
: final s Wever’ the La Belle discotheque bombing was p'her (hStravv >n a long string of illegal actions by Libya hadhaf|, n,^ sole reason for a U. S. armed response, ^tantn safiltT|i slice” use of terrorism had led to a , The ^3.stack °f salami by this time.
^yanc 3lted States not only had the lives of innocent
jPt Wei„La ly- This required giving certain factors differ- I at the than would be expected in wartime. The fact ra^Crnited States was responding to Gadhafi’s terror- Values •j,!' fhan waging war with Libya also skewed target le$. =>-- Us’ while economic targets, such as oil refiner- tion of the work force at the refineries consisted of Italian, British, and U. S. nationals; substantial casualties among these foreign nationals would undermine domestic and international public opinion. Moreover, although such an attack would damage Gadhafi’s already weakened economy, the link to terrorism was abstract at best.
Military targets are always legitimate targets. But the professional Libyan military, although a past and potential adversary, was not necessarily an enemy. The Libyan military was annoyed by Gadhafi’s repeated calls for its replacement by a “universal peoples’ militia.” Gadhafi’s false claims of victories in Chad and the Gulf of Sidra had also upset the military. Revolutionary committee members had been inserted into army and air force units to ensure loyalty to Gadhafi; they held the keys for the weapons and ammunition to lessen the chance of another coup d’etat attempt. Attack of military targets outside populated areas, while likely to minimize collateral civilian casualties, would detract from the intended focus of the attack— the continuing threat of Libyan-backed terrorism. Attack of terrorist-related targets not only would be a direct connection to Gadhafi’s export of terrorism but would constitute recognition of the distinction between the terrorists and the Libyan military. Although some terrorist-related targets ultimately selected for attack also served the Libyan military, facilities exclusively associated with the military were not regarded as the most desirable targets.
Undoubtedly noting the reluctance of U. S. officials to authorize the attack of legitimate targets in populated areas in the air campaigns over North Vietnam, and the success of the North Vietnamese in screening targets from attack by placing them in densely populated areas, Gadhafi had located some terrorist-related facilities in populated areas, offering his own population as a shield from attack.8 At least one important terrorist-related facility was not selected for attack owing to its proximity to densely populated areas, including diplomatic residences. Ultimate selection of two terrorist-related targets in populated areas correctly recognized that the law of war obligation to minimize collateral civilian casualties is mutual, and that a nation that uses its own population to shield legitimate targets from attack does so at its own peril, and with full responsibility for its illegal actions.
The following target nominations of USCinCEur were endorsed by the JCS and Secretary of Defense, and approved by President Reagan:
- Tarabulus (Aziziyah) Barracks: Located in Tripoli, it was the principal command and control center for Gadhafi’s worldwide terrorist program.
- Murrat Sidi Bilal Terrorist Training Camp: A combat swimmer and naval commando school in the Tripoli area where PLO and other terrorist organization frogmen were trained.
- Tripoli Military Airfield: 11-76 Candid transports used to support Gadhafi’s export of terrorism were the primary targets.
- Benghazi Military Barracks!Jamahiriyah Guard Barracks: An alternate terrorist command and control headquarters. Like Aziziyah Barracks, it was a billeting area
low-level approach below the Libyan air defenses
envelope. Also, few civilians would be on the - ^ night, substantially lowering the risk to the genej_.,j| lation. Finally, given the LAAF’s limited caPa^0roH1'
for Gadhafi’s elite Jamahiriyah Guard. It also contained a warehouse for storage of MiG components.
► Benina Military Airfield: Although not directly related to terrorism, Benina Military Airfield was selected for attack to ensure that its MiG fighters would not intercept or pursue U. S. strike forces.
Concurrent with target selection, the nature and size of the strike force were considered. Concern for collateral casualties and risk to U. S. personnel, a certain desired weight of attack, coupled with availability of assets, quickly narrowed the field to a strike by tactical aircraft. Thus, while Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships have returned to the fleet and have the capability of offering considerable weight of attack, no battleship was immediately available.
Major Targets in Libya During the April 1986 Attack .
"7^
Sardinia J
Mediterranean Sea
2. Aziziyah Barracks(Gadhafi'squarters at the time of the attack):Bombed by three F-111Fs; moderate damage.
Although each target selected for attack was within range of a battleship’s 16-inch rifles, attack of five widely separated targets in one night would not have been possible. Any damage to the battleship or her support vessels would be a major psychological and propaganda victory for Gad- hafi. Finally, when the New Jersey (BB-62) was used to support the Multinational Peacekeeping Force in Beirut, she demonstrated that the battleship lacks the precision for attack of small targets in heavily populated areas, particularly where there is no overhead fire direction capability. A similar evaluation ruled out employment of special operations forces.
Mission forces are seldom selected on the basis of a single factor, such as accuracy, but on myriad political and military considerations. Tactical air offered the ability to place the greatest weight of ordnance on the targets in the least amount of time while minimizing collateral damage and providing the greatest opportunity for survival of the entire force.
The most recent experience with the use oftac^ jay- craft was the bitter memory of the 4 December 1 0[1
light airstrike against Syrian antiaircraft sites in .|ot That raid resulted in the loss of two aircraft and °neJjn f, Five months after the raid, Secretary of the Navy ^ Lehman, Jr., a Naval Reserve A-6 bombardier-naH^.^ warned that the hard lessons learned in Vietnam rf.^jjpped the misapplication of technology apparently had s j^0f into memory,” as the all-weather/nighttime capa*51 j.-cetj the A-6E were shunned for a daytime raid that sac ^ the element of surprise and provided Syrian gunn clearly visible targets. pesp'te
A night strike was attractive for many reasons. £(j news headlines announcing that an airstrike aP"
imminent, the possibility for surprise remained an be enhanced by the cover of darkness. Much °^t"tolildef air defenses would be hampered by darkness; s ajnief fired SAMs would not be able to acquire a target could not see, and radar-directed antiaircraft gUIlS suf& radar would be thwarted by electronic counter11 ail) (ECM) and other means of deception would nf targfj frustrated with respect to visual acquisition 0 Gadhafi’s incessant fear of a coup d’etat had P ^ rr him to strip his military of their small arms, virtu^atalt0 moving the risk of the small arms fire which 'vaS 1 manv low-flvina aircraft in Vietnam. This would P^jSSj|e
nighttime operations, darkness and a low-levei r C|H.- minimized early warning and intercept while e the possibility of unfettered egress from the targ
11)661 the p P*anners established certain criteria in order to Ura,eLih res'^ent s guidance. To maximize surprise, sat- targetJan c*eReuses, and minimize risk to U. S. forces, authori be struck simultaneously; forces would P°sitive]^IZ^ a sin8le Pass over the target; targets not ',J'S(erJls , * |Cntified would not be bombed; all weapon Sb; ancj3 h t0 °Pcrat'onat f°r any aircraft to
S'°n ROEs^ere wou^ be no re'attack of any target. Mis-
were based on the PROE and were similar to
^available on board the America and Coral Sea. r “U1°ad ‘ * s auuny to carry a considerable lve targp,’ ,se aircraft were not adequate to strike all
2 rtn'S° available was the GBU-10 Paveway II ^Q-2() p, b''h laser-guided bomb, directed by the AN/ tr§et (je Ve Tack electro-optical target acquisition, laser Htite §nation and weaDons delivery svstem. which
*K)$£ f -- V11 lIlv A ,,, ,, , Ullvl »» VJ V/ J111111U1 vv/
^ttental^6 ^arcb PON exercise with appropriate supped hv IJ)easures required by the mission, as deter- Pararneter hC ^0rce commander. In surpassing wartime uniqUe s> these criteria and ROEs recognized the- H tw ofthis peacetime mission. abilitv° tact'cal aircraft in the U. S. inventory possess an.| O attack with precision at night—the Navy’s wtth t^e Hje Air Force’s F-lll. The A-6E is equipped r^AM) , argel Recognition and Attack Multisensor Hed (p>^Stem’ giving the Intruder forward looking inWeather ah r 'maging capability to enhance its all- Huracy . ly> and laser designation for enhanced strike Hft w/r USln§ iaser-guided munitions. Only 18 A-6Eair-
DeSpjt avails______ i___ j ^i.. * • __ i s~< i c*_
!*S6dca|L S slmultaneously. If the U. S. Navy had just 0 attach f* borne A-6Es, they would only have been able ^■fed °Ur °f the five targets, which would have re- ^hiie ° s.trike missions.
J? the yrcv'ewing alternatives, the F-111F aircraft based Hi IF nited Kingdom were considered. Use of the .A-(jp S Particularly attractive, given its munitions. Heater' Si VVere to homb with CBU-59 antipersonnel/ *HvP°se tpDC'USter munitions and Mk-82 500-lb general- o ,b Gp h bombs- The F-llls had available BSU-49 Hr the» ba*ute bombs that permit a high-speed pass
V.'26 Pave
^..... ni ------------- ..............................................
ght or adverse weather, low-level, high-speed
The F-111F, here armed with GBU-lOs, is able to conduct a long-range, high-payload, low-level, high-speed mission, delivering precision-guided munitions—good reasons for selecting it to attack Libyan targets, despite their distance from the air base at Lakenheath.
accurate delivery of bombs of a greater weight necessary for successful attack of certain of the targets.
Myriad factors were weighed in considering use of the F-lll. The F-l 1 IF was desirable because the aircraft possessed unique capabilities to conduct a long-range, high- payload, low-level, high-speed mission delivering precision-guided munitions. F-lll employment was not considered to “give the Air Force a piece of the action,” as critics were wont to say after the mission; Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force aircraft had worked together in the three phases of Attain Document, and all three services were already supporting the mission at the time the F-lll was first considered. The F-lll was considered because it was an asset available to USCinCEur for accomplishing the assigned mission. Use of the F-l 1 IF was the desired option if permission of the British Government could be obtained to launch the F-lllFs and their supporting aircraft from bases in the United Kingdom.
An erroneous assumption frequently found in contingency plans states that “Necessary basing, port/entry, and overflight/transit privileges to support this plan will be obtained.” Only if the plan involves U. S. assistance to the host nation in responding to an open and direct threat to that nation’s national security interests is this assumption likely to have any validity. A brief review of some deployment limitations during the past two decades suggests the fallacy of this assumption:
1973: Air Force use of U. S. air bases in NATO nations for transit or support of military resupply flights to Israel was prevented by host nations’ limiting the use of their bases to defense of NATO only—and each nation’s reluctance to grant permission in the face of the threat of an Arab oil embargo against any nation supporting Israel in
navi uiv^ i iksAiuniijr IVJ UCVC1UJJ 1UIUC -y
attack plans, including weapons selection. The P tial guidance, combined with the necessity for the neous attack of five geographically separated suited in a highly demanding mission for the a ^ w Navy A-7s and Navy/Marine F/A-18 Hornets provide air defense suppression, while F-l4s an ^1- would provide MiG CAP for the entire strike *° staiid' though Air Force EF-111A Ravens were to serve ^ off jammers for the F-llls, they were augmente^,68 and thus worked closely with—Navy/Marine ^oU)d Prowler crews in mission planning. Other Prowle ■ tor
support the Navy strikes. Joint planning and coin' command interface took place at every possible
,.maa0
level,
iony
non Walters met with several European leaders ‘sVi ditch effort to enlist support for nonviolent step ps0 Libya. But time was of the essence. Amid press tak impending airstrikes, Gadhafi announced that he ^ u’ ing all foreigners in Libya hostage and moving j. key military bases to shield those bases from 3
the Yom Kippur War. Air Force flights were delayed until agreement was reached for use of the Azores.
1973: A-4 Skyhawk replacement aircraft flown from the United States to Israel were delayed for the same reason. Ultimately, they were flown to the Azores; refueled by tanker aircraft from the John F. Kennedy (CV-67) in the Atlantic near Gibraltar; refueled on board the Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV-42); then refueled one final time by tanker aircraft from the Independence (CV-62) before landing in Israel. Both the Air Force C-141 Starlifter/C-5 Galaxy transports and the A-4 replacement aircraft flew routes exclusively in international airspace in lieu of more
During a news briefing after the April attack, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Robert B. Sims displayed a photograph showing the booster stage of a Soviet-made SA-3 antiaircraft missile—to refute a Libyan fabrication that the object was part of a downed U. S. aircraft.
direct routes, owing to denial of transit rights through the airspace of nations en route.
1979: Planning for the helicopter phase of the Iranian rescue mission was complicated when planners were advised that political or operational security (OpSec) factors precluded use of Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Yemen, or Turkey as staging bases. Launching from an aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea became the only feasible option early in the planning stage.
1980: Air Force AC-130H Spectre aircraft deployed to take part in the Iranian rescue mission were routed across the Pacific and Indian oceans because of OpSec requirements and landing/overflight restrictions in NATO nations, doubling the distance to their staging base.
1985: Delay in gaining landing/staging rights precluded a U. S. rescue attempt of the hijacked Achille Lauro.
In these and other cases, each nation exercised its sover- • p in ^
eign rights to deny use of its territory or airspac ^ cordance with what it perceived to be its national ^ It is a raison d’etre for sea power, and for the U. • program: to protect the international legal right o ^ tion and overflight of the high seas where other ro not possible. baSes
Gaining Great Britain’s approval for use ot ^njS. depended on its interests. Earlier in the year, ^rlIJieretalia- ter Margaret Thatcher had condemned any pure ^tjo0ed tory use of force in the war on terrorism; she co they
her approval on review of the targets. Satisfied (0f
were terrorist-related and that U. S. strikes were a uS|y self-defense against a continuing threat, she colira^liently assented. Secretary of the Navy Lehman subset observed: “The United Kingdom came through 1 busters.” Other allies were not supportive. Fwnce jjs- overflight permission, substantially increasing [C-
tance the F-llls had to fly and the tanker supP' 0f
quired, and very possibly affecting the ultimate ,0
success. For OpSec and political reasons, Perrnl^aS no' launch the F-llls from nations closer to Libya regarded as feasible. . , ^0
Coral Sea A-6Es would strike Benina Airfi^ ^ ^jli- Intruders from the America would attack Beng a ^ for tary Barracks. The Air Force F-llls were reSP°n.S -pripoh attacking the Aziziyah Barracks, Sidi Bilal, an jrCre^s Military Airfield. As the primary strike planners, had the flexibility to develop force packages an
,alta- ie' ws-
___________________________________________ t
highly professional atmosphere free of the acrl[j1lT)ilit3^ interservice rivalry frequently attributed to sue operations. .. aji re3'
But the mission would not be authorized unh sonable efforts had been exhausted to dissuade from his embrace of terrorism. In the nine days strjke- the bombing of La Belle discotheque and the a ^t- U. S. officials made repeated attempts to persua ^5 ern European nations to go along with peaceful -jiti65 to isolate Libya, and to enhance antiterrorism ca^a&\t\2 ^ in order to deter Libya and other nations from en- ~l0 th1 terrorism. During the weekend immediately Prl. Ver' airstrikes, U. S. Ambassador to the United Nah13 a \$\
EF-1 j*ie? route to the target area. Six F- Ills and one baSes ;l(1/CS'gnated as spares returned to their respective
viCe p nine key House and Senate leaders met with Shu,t^Sldent George Bush; Secretary of State George WiUiam pCretary °f Defense Weinberger; CIA Director Cf0vve Gasey; Chairman of the JCS, Admiral William J.
1 ’ r,: and National Security Adviser Vice Admiral
Johi
trip
air-
nched her
Slx A-7 strike support aircraft; the Coral Sea
°etvvee . -------------------- „-----------------------------
Provide ^ and 1820. Other aircraft were launched to ^ejoi ip GAP and perform other support missions. lhe ^ GF-111/EA-6B jamming commenced at 1854 as sions u ■ and P/A-18s began their SAM suppression mis- received'n8 ^ARM and Shrike missiles. Inbound F-Ills and the a n 'nf°rmation update from Navy E-2C aircraft In a e§'s cruiser Ticonderoga.
Navy a Ecctacular feat of mission planning and execution, hit the: A'r Force assets based almost 3,000 miles apart time-on-target of 1900. Within 12 min- feet w k^Sets had been struck and all strike aircraft were strike Ct’ outbound and over the Mediterranean. Navy refue|j lrcraft had been recovered by 1953; after two °He thaf u’ tkc I7-His had returned to base by 0310, less gine ,:lad landed in Rota, Spain, with an overheated '. ne F-l 11 was lost. Although initial reports sug-
Europg6 ^!Ce °E Gadhafi’s threat and the intransigence of of the 30 caders, President Reagan authorized execution I35 S(mission- Twenty-eight KC-10 Extenders and KC- anh RAaFto'Unkers began taking off from RAF Mildenhall 1236 24 A1’rE°rcE commencing at 1213 on 14 April. At Parted of the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing de
Tactical ra ^akenheath as five EF- Ills from the 20th Using f 1§kter Wing took off from RAF Upper Heyford. oiiSs^nrenc*1 airspace would have called for a 3,000-mile m°re th r°Unc* tr'P; its denial increased the distance to ducte(j aa ^,000 miles. Four silent refuelings were con-
1
At 1600 6 flrst refueling- iriefe(j ' Poindexter. The congressional leaders were had bee°n tke m*ss‘on- There were no objections. If there and cann’|t*le iTesident was prepared to recall the force The a the mission-
•he <"*** and Coral Sea were above the Tripoli FIR,
U45 anjr to dle west and the latter to the east. Between
craft , , *815, the America launched six A-6E strike ai I a and ■ lau.
strike force of eight A-6Es and six F/A-18s
eti
lasted th ■“ ■ iiuiuu6ii uuuu,
acti0n at the loss may have been attributable to enemy °CcUrr’e Subsequent investigation indicates that the loss Extensj Cn route to the target. The plane crashed at sea.
The C search ar>d rescue efforts were unsuccessful.9 ^tsClCkwas a success. Surprise was evident; runway Alth0u thCre 0n and continued to burn during the attack. Ported) , ant*aircraft fire and missile launches were re- >arknes, . vy at each target, the element of surprise, the Ifipoij h’ jarnming by the EA-6B/EF-T11 force against the a|r def e*enses and by the EA-6Bs against Benghazi, and a'rcraftenSe suPpression by the A-7 and F/A-18 support Craft rC| rcndered the Libyan defenses ineffective; all air- c0nsiSteUrned without battle damage. On 15 April, a report 1() Cn„ nt w'th the War Powers Resolution was forwarded -regress.
avy strikes were highly successful. The Benghazi
Military Barracks was struck by six A-6E aircraft, each armed with Mk-82 bombs. The warehouse associated with MiG assembly was heavily damaged. Four MiG shipping crates were destroyed, and a fifth was damaged. Two of the Coral Sea A-6Es were forced to abort, but the remaining six struck Benina Airfield; five were armed with CBU- 59 (APAMs), while the sixth carried Mk-82s. At least three, and possibly four, MiG-23s were destroyed. Other aircraft known to have been destroyed include an F-27 Friendship transport, one small straight-wing aircraft, and two Mi-8 Hip helicopters. Two other straight-wing aircraft were significantly damaged; one Mi-8 was heavily damaged; at least two Boeing 727 transports and one propeller- driven transport, plus other fixed-wing aircraft, received minor to moderate damage. Other aircraft, possibly MiG- 235, were believed to have been damaged, but were towed into adjacent hangars before post-strike reconnaissance could observe the area. The hangars themselves received some structural damage and a storage and support building was completely destroyed, as were three smaller structures and more than a dozen vehicles or pieces of ground equipment. Equally significant, the LAAF was unable to launch any planes from Benina during or immediately after the attack.
The full weight of the F-l 1 IF attack was not brought to bear on the targets. To minimize collateral casualties and damage, precautions not required by the law of war nor necessary in wartime were adopted. The ROE for the F-lllFs required target identification with both its radar and Pave Tack FLIR—a verification redundancy to ensure positive target identification. Of the F-lllFs attacking Aziziyah, only three were able to reach the target, make positive target identification with both systems, and bomb; a fourth reported bombing long. The three placed their GBU-10 bombs onto the target, causing heavy damage. All three of the Sidi Bilal F-lllFs were successful, dropping GBU-lOs on that target. The swimmer/diver training complex was damaged, along with an adjacent dining hall and classroom building, and an administration and support building. A number of small training craft were destroyed. The Tripoli Military Airfield was targeted by six F-l 1 lFs, each carrying BSU-49 high drag bombs. One aircraft aborted owing to a loss of its terrain-following radar. The other aircraft’s bombs destroyed two 11-76 transport aircraft and are believed to have caused substantial damage to three others.
Libyan air defenses also suffered substantial degradation. Sixteen HARM and eight Shrike missiles were launched at Tripoli air defense targets in support of the F-l 1 IF strikes; twenty HARM and four Shrikes were fired to suppress Benina air defenses. SAM/AAA, nonetheless, was heavy in both target areas, and included SA-2 Guideline, SA-3 Goa, SA-6 Gainful, and French-built Crotale surface-to-air missiles, and ZSU-23-4 AAA fire. The pride of Gadhafi’s air defenses, the much-vaunted SA-5 Gammon used in March, did not respond.
Despite the great care the strike forces exercised, there was collateral damage and injury. Only 1% to 2% of the bombs struck civilian areas. The bombs from the one F-l 1 IF whose crew reported bombing long impacted in
not of the
come to pass. Stirred by U. S. actions, members ^ European community of nations have undertaken j ber of significant measures to strengthen thetr ^ against terrorism. Finally, there lies the canard of L ^
W. Rovine, Editor. Digest of United States Practice in 1974. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1974, PP- ^ - -
109.L ofthe
second believed to be that of the pilot washed ashore on a remote luni:”^ons f°r { 29 June. Law of war treaties to which Libya is a party establish obl'S^ con1 ^
treatment and return of the remains of members of the military who <•
. .. ... insteadw,Irtted
operations. Libya has failed in its adherence to these obligations, ips ^ Un'lL ing a ransom and other concessions prior to the return of the rernainS lcnt.s. ]t. States has announced that it will make neither concessions nor Pay “’Executive Order 12333 adopts a policy against assassination, and 1 ^jon- b
;i o*
speculation as to whether the airstrike represented a policy eX^e^jiafi
/.f fVtrt /,*,fii„ l.nr fV,t~. * r.An/,n" nonUS . fill*^**
press
not. Part of the confusion lies with the “violent peace” period, as
the vicinity of the French Embassy. Two other bombs were near misses from the Benghazi Barracks attack. Those bombs damaged two civilian houses and some adjacent walls and outbuildings 700 yards off target. Libyan Government officials announced that 37 died and 93 were wounded or injured. These figures do not indicate how many of these individuals were military personnel manning the Libyan air defenses, which individuals were in the targets attacked, nor how many of these deaths or injuries are attributable to the Libyan air defenses. Such individuals are not regarded as collateral casualties by the law of war.
Libyan officials tried to establish otherwise, but failed. One reason was Gadhafi’s conspicuous absence. He had been in Aziziyah Barracks at the time of its attack and was seriously shaken and possibly injured.10 Scheduled press conferences with Gadhafi were cancelled. A post-raid propaganda tour for newsmen organized by Libyan officials was poorly orchestrated and badly handled; Libyan officials were frequently antagonistic toward their guests. During a tour of a high school for naval cadets allegedly damaged by U. S. bombs, officials refused to answer any questions regarding the adjacent Sidi Bilal naval complex, to permit a tour of it, nor even to confirm its existence. A discrete investigation by some reporters revealed that the damage at the naval cadet facility was caused by a fire ignited by a butane gas cannister, but laid by Libyan officials to errant bombing.
But journalists are limited by their sources, and it would have been dangerous to permit Libyan allegations to stand without response; our experience during the Vietnam War was that disinformation promoted by the enemy solidifies into irrefutable fact if not immediately rebutted.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Robert B. Sims, believed that official sources had to be as forthcoming as possible in order to permit an accurate picture while refuting Libyan fabrications. This required review of Libyan allegations and an aggressive response. In one case, wreckage pulled from a house was represented as parts of a downed U. S. aircraft. Secretary Sims was able to identify the “aircraft” as the booster stage of a Libyan SA-3 missile. He made maximum effort to respond to press inquiries and to provide as much detail regarding mission planning and execution, including candid admissions of collateral damage. His efforts paid large dividends. Polls ten days after the attacks showed a 71% approval of the raid, media support by liberal newspapers such as The New York Times and The Washington Post, and bipartisan support in both houses of Congress. This experience reinforces the need to consider the role of public affairs officers as essential members of planning staffs.11
Domestic criticism following the March FON exercise and the April airstrike was limited, undoubtedly, partly because of the success of each and the highly professional— and discriminate—manner in which force was applied. Critics followed familiar paths. Resort to force has no effect on terrorism, some said, while others predicted dire circumstances in our relations in the Middle East and with the Soviet Union. The first is not borne out by history, and the “sky is falling” predictions of the nay-sayers have
itability of counter-escalation. Taking no action 0 ^
years has not stopped Gadhafi, and unquestiorw encouraged his reliance on terrorism; so long as n ^ his attacks to U. S. citizens overseas, Gadhafi was the United States would not respond. He has ee vided incentive to rethink his position. ^ttajn
Few wars are won by a single battle, and neitne ^ Document nor Eldorado Canyon were underta ^ any illusion that they would put an end to terr f. Gadhafi or anyone else. But the heart of terrorism0 ^ <j action is a credible response. The credibility oft °.(injfi- terrorism counteraction program was enhance cantly in the spring of 1986.
,0!&■
2Cdr D. R. Neutze, USN, “Whose Law of Whose Sea,” Proce^‘n^ oi January 1983, pp. 41-48; Cdr F. B. Swayze, USN, “Negotiating a Sea,” Proceedings, 106,7, Jul. 1980, pp. 33-39. tj0nal Hp'
3U. S. Navy Regulations (1973), article 0915. See G. Bunn, *nte pirst H*1, and the Use of Force in Peacetime: Do U. S. Ships Have to Take t e Naval War College Review, XXXIX,3, May-Jun. 1986, pp- 69- 4For a lengthier analysis of the 1981 incident, see Cdr D. R- Neutze' '
Gulf of Sidra: A Legal Perspective,” Proceedings, 108,1, Jan. ^,, proCec^S' 5See S. C. Truver, “Mines of August: An International Whodunit,
115,5, May 1985, pp. 95-117. Aug-i98
6See LCdr R. E. Stumpf, “Air War With Libya,” Proceedings, 1' pp. 42—48. |9g6. _
7The PROE were approved by the Secretary of Defense on 26 ^nne fle^e ’ 8See W. H. Parks, “Rolling Thunder and the Law of War,” Air Unive ’n Ro^n XXXIII,2, Jan.-Feb. 1982, pp. 2-23. A principal difference beiW, civil,iJJ Thunder and Eldorado Canyon is that in the former, avoidance of co nageir>eIlt. .j. casualties was paramount in National Command Authority mici^113® and ^ that campaign, often operating to the exclusion of mission accompli to U. S. personnel. >s pefeflC
9S. O’Dwyer-Russell, “Libyans ‘did not shoot down F-lll*
Weekly, 5,20, 24 May 1986, p. 931. A body alleged to be that o ^ ^iby3 ^ officer was reported to have been found on 6 May near al-Zavviy ’ ,eachl
3 Tunis^
be a lawful target in time of war. But he was not regarded as a tar^jVjdual planning. His whereabouts were unknown. Death or injury of an 1 tjnie o* result of being present in a known terrorist/military installation at legitimate attack is not assassination.
‘‘Libyan propaganda dusted off many of the issues of the Vietnam py,.. to discredit the airstrike. The Libyans displayed some unexploded clus mjjeS avV^v which they had moved from Benina Military Airport to a beach sever pj//• apparently for ordnance disposal. This prompted CBS correspondent on civ'^ to report on the 21 April CBS Evening News that “Use of cluster bo ^ ians is banned by international law (sic.).” The intentional use 0 ^.eI1tly- ^ against a civilian not participating in hostilities is prohibited. ApP ^\js ^ ^ Pizzey was endeavoring to suggest that CBUs are illegal; they are not- ^ 1 ^ criticized by North Vietnam and its supporters as being “illegal du ^ Linebacker I campaign. The legality of CBUs was considered during ^at C? United Nations Conventional Weapons Conference, which conclut^ u*e' were lawful weapons, and no special restrictions were placed on t
Colonel Parks is a frequent contributor to the Proceedings. He * 0f tl1^ International Law in the Office of The Judge Advocate ^ellL'onal U" Army. He occupied the Charles H. Stockton Chair ot Internal1 at the Naval War College for academic year 1984-85.