Comment and Discussion

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Comment and Discussion

Contents:

Liberty

EXTRA: Terrorists Attack USN Ship

Maritime Strategy from the Deckplates

Is NavAir Combat-Ready?

Can The Coast Guard Save Itself?

Organizing Ships for Battle

To Fly Safely

Does NFO Mean Non-Flying Organization?

Rickover and Proceedings

Accountability Afloat More Green Needed

Clay Barrow Retires

Beyond Technology

You Are the Republic

Evaluating Sail Training

Rebuilding the Merchant Marine

Needed: A National Interdiction Operations School

ENTER THE FORUM

We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, mari­time, or military interest for possible publi­cation on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.

Fitness You Can See

Nuclear Torpedoes Sailor Talk

“Liberty”

(See H. Serig and J. Carroll, pp. 49-61, September 1986 Proceedings)

“EXTRA: Terrorists Attack USN Ship”

(See C. Staszak, pp. 33-39, June 1986; W. G. K. Bowen and P. O. Gammage, pp. 19-26, August 1986; J. K. Gruetzner, J. L. Sams, p. 17, September 1986 Proceedings)

William T. Brockman—I wonder how many readers related the lower left pic­ture on page 58 of Mr. Serig’s and Mr. Caroll’s article—which appears to be the quarterdeck watch of the Italian tall ship Amerigo Vespucci—with Commander Staszak’s June article.

It seems that the Italians have made it a practice to follow Commander Staszak’s recommendation to arm the quarterdeck watch with something a little more effec­tive than a .45 pistol.

Editor’s Note; The September Proceed­ings cover photo of the Coast Guard’s Eagle leading tall ships into New York on 4 July was taken by Howard W. Serig, Jr.

“Accountability Afloat”

(See G. B. Powell, pp. 31-35, August 1986;

P. J. Doerr, M. S. Smith, E. E. Marlatt, M. E.

Duffy, pp. 12-15, October 1986 Proceedings)

Hospital Corpsman First Class Lawrence A. Griffin, U. S. Navy, Medical Depart­ment Representative, USS Excel (MSO- 439)—I was moved emotionally and pro­fessionally by Captain Powell’s article. The cases he mentions happened during my training at the Advanced Hospital Corps School, San Diego, from October 1984 to September 1985. These unfortu­nate and preventable “human disasters” reminded us time and time again that, as independent duty corpsmen, we must be guided by a combination of sound medi­cal training, common sense, loyalty to both patient and command, and the awareness of our professional limitations.

After graduation, as I proceeded to my next duty station, I wondered if I would be able to remember, at a moment’s no­tice, the vast and varied amount of infor­mation that had been disseminated during

he la^st *¹°^S”

my 48 weeks of training- Asto ^ pital corpsman second class ( . _partm^eri1 assigned duty as a medicsi              _c0rnb^at'

representative on board a surta ^ ^ ant, I grew more and more n®^rVj_ien that reporting date approached. B" date arrived, I could clearly _t ^ b> the advice of my instructors. ^ to ^re‘ every experience. . • ■ Con ^tybe¹ learn day by day. . • . Always _ego your limitations. . • • Don t ^e ^ an cloud your common sense. • •                                                      ,,

MO [medical officer] for ^a<^^V1 _c0ptin^en' Captain Powell provides a re^ ^ dation along the same lines. ,_ete afl“ for the corpsman is to keep ^e°ⁿ ₀pe^s thorough records, to ^aPP^reC1_e|_UCtan^{l 10} own limitations, and never be r ^ ^ seek medical advice or help- ^j-C^- more members of my common' ^_c\c- 8425) will read Captain P°^we ‘_tive °^ul' and gain a positive and ^c°^nstrU . _tory to look from it. Let us not allow

More Green Needed

General Wallace M. Greene.

Marine Corps (Retired),                 -pie^

the Marine Corps 1964-19_ciass- issue of Proceedings was ^^S.,_ten’s^it' especially liked Commander ^r -.

tide “Ideology: The Bear s ^a ,|_tj₀n W I liked your breaking with tr^a,_s fie- publishing Commander Bad go^ tional story “Scratch.” It ^wa*_hutiofl ^ot> to see Major Helle’s contn port* training Marine Corps Secur units in defeating terrorism- j yt'V I certainly hope that you g° , your idea of a quarterly historic: -_{s a}ii zine—if the April 1986 slippy jo. example of what you intend jdah¹¹¹' would also like to see more on t ^ o"

but *2

, ,._c story

Corps. Commander Mersky »

ye

John Glenn was well done,

id

SSI"*

Corps voices and pictures '^vere^_noft^ or very much in the minority 'ⁿ on Naval Aviation’s 75th y^ear'

Editor’s Note: We’re 8^e,,"’^_s ifi¹¹ General—as the contents of ft demonstrate. But we are still a few more good Marine Corp jja'' for Proceedings as well os J History.

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“Maritime Strategy from the

Deckplates”

(See H. C. Mustin, pp. 32-37, September 1986

Proceedings)

Commander Michael B. Edwards, U. S. Navy—As the commanding officer of a shuttle oiler involved in Ocean Safari 85, I share Admiral Mustin’s enthusiasm for the Navy’s efforts in this first critical test of the Maritime Strategy on the Northern Flank of NATO. Although the view from my bridge was certainly limited, the ex­ercise successfully demonstrated that our training of the previous months was good. We pumped several million gallons worth of fuel, which included topping off the entire force in one 36-hour period. One afternoon, HMS Invincible refueled from us while recovering Harriers; the next morning, the USS America (CV-66) took her turn alongside while launching combat air patrols to far-flung intercepts. All of this took place within or near the confines of the Norwegian fjords per the Maritime Strategy.

I hasten to point out, however, that the sustainability of all that striking power can and should be questioned. One oiler, of course, does not a support force make. My ship was a very thin grey line, stretched a very long way, and far too weak a link upon which to base the re­plenishment of the entire NATO force. Yet, at times during Ocean Safari, such was the case. Granted, there are other oil­ers and other underway replenishment (UnRep) ships from every NATO nation which could and would be called upon in a war. And, as Admiral Mustin points out, quantifying the logistics support nec­essary for such operations was a key ele­ment of Ocean Safari.

Still, not enough emphasis is placed on sustainability. The Arleigh Burke (DDG- 51) is building, but what about the AOE- 6, the proposed fast combat support ship? Does a Henry J. Kaiser (TAO-187)-class replenishment oiler or a “jumbo-ized” Cimarron (AO-177)-class oiler really replace a multi-product AOE? Can a re­plenishment oiler (AOR) replace an AOE as the on-station battle group replenish­ment ship? Hardly. In fact, the numbers of available UnRep ships can be crunched in many ways, but the results, at least to this writer, always come up short. This is particularly true for the kind of offensive scenarios called for in the Maritime Strat­egy. Given normal transit times to safe restocking points (especially in the Pa­cific and Indian oceans) and even only minor attrition of replenishment ships, the sustainability of all that striking power must be questioned. And this situ­ation does not even take into account the

requirement to escort the mostly less UnReppers.

The answer is to build more support ships. To sustain the - _b)e forces on station we need a tmo __[eaIIi- multi-product ship (like the AO )^ _at ing in company with the battle g all times, with all that that imp^ ^_nc

cornb^at

_strikin?

antiair and antisubmarine

escorts¹

ei*

\ We fl^e‘

transits and replenishments). ^ _sj,_uttlc

full complement of single-pi

ships (oilers,

irodud s

and

ammunition ^s^^s_;’_ntajp-

combat stores ships) capable

of man

of

fuel­

ing the continuous pipeline ^.^__(ecti

sti"

stores, ammunition, and those^-- ^^ing

spares so critical to the modern ₀„ forces. By almost any estimate the scenarios called for in the ^ the Strategy, we probably need ¹ ^ wave­number of logistics ships we ⁿ°^_artinie Consider, for example, th^e g_trat- Maritime Strategy (“The Mari'¹ [_nStitU^te>

egy Supplement,” U. S. Nava ¹¹ January 1986, page 36—Table ’ calls for ten underway ^reP^e ^.₀rld' groups—one for each battle S^r°ⁿ

wide. Yet, the fleet has just °^q_Sinl­and, as noted earlier, an AOR °^r^ _capabl^e ply cannot substitute for the ⁿ!?^r j,_aps, ^ multi-product support ship- ‘^e _„cs0'

cess

the end, given the undeniable su ^tiu

the striking force which

Admiral

............... _o_____ ____ . _st pf

lauds in Ocean Safari, the ^toUtj_vj_ariu^fllfi of the equation is not doing JJn₂aa^dsUS' Strategy mission, but support' & taining it.

“Is NavAir Combat-R^ea(^' „

,                                                 * ucus¹ .

(See B. J. McMahon, pp. 90-91* _ceeft - l9oo ‘

D. J. Carroll, p. 16, October -

V-

5-

Vice Admiral Robert F■ ^^U'^U ’ fod¹' Navy, Commander Naval ¹ yK U. S. Atlantic Fleet-

Lieutenaf' ^

.......... ..........  >

scribing why, in his exp^er>^ent^'_De cO¹¹¹

|Ji'

Mahon answers his title ques^t'°^I1_NlaV.A^ir

is not combat ready. As the N _{rea‘ mander responsible for the com ness of naval aviation in ₍₀ Fleet, I am compelled to resp°ⁿ of his basic criticisms.  _ejnF

► The wrong training goals ^a^_ng g¹""

,lif-

There is only one _a,

be ¹ , .yjr

sized.

for any Navy line officer: to — ^ $

fight and win at sea. For th^£^^a ₍₀ re^a‘

tor, that can be adjusted a . _re el^se fight and win at sea, and anyw j tub well, from a ship at sea or a co (in the case of forward-depl⁰)^’ ^t tP and maritime patrol [VP])- ¹ ₀p •-*' win includes exploding weap⁰^ get. If anyone understands °^u .^p, differently, then we have done^ ^ _aCceF

ibly bad job of leadership- ³¹ the blame.

ibe^f'

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It’s true that in the past much emphasis was put on the things Lieutenant Mc­Mahon lists. Many readers will recall observers with stopwatches timing carrier recoveries and green-eyeshade people manipulating data only remotely con­nected with getting weapons on target. In Naval Air Force, Atlantic (NavAirLant), that sort of evaluation has all but disap­peared—there has not been an opera­tional readiness exercise for two years. Other exercises are graded only to give the participants a reference as to whether or not they’re improving, and how they compare with their contemporaries. Most emphatically, those data are not consid­ered when awarding the Battle E, the Clifton, McCluskey, Thach, or Isbell tro­phies. (Some of it does enter into the con­test for the Chief of Naval Operations [CNO] Safety Award.) We have dis­carded the old ways of data generation and brochuremanship, and now we select the most combat-ready units through con­tinuous sampling of aviation performance by carrier group commanders, functional wing commanders, air wing command­ers, the Naval Strike Warfare Center, and my staff—recognizing the best individual unit performance without detailed re­ports. In every case, the overriding crite­rion is ordnance on the target, missiles on the bandit, or torpedoes on the sub.

Granted, that method is sometimes dif­ficult because targets, airspace, and fly­ing hours are in limited supply. It also opens to criticism those who do the se­lecting when they cannot back up their selection with mountains of data—but frankly, I can live with that.

• Safety considerations compromise training.—But what no commander can live with is relaxed safety consciousness. We used to pay less attention than we do now, but we were no more ready. In the year I earned my wings, the Navy and Marine Corps had 2,229 major accidents, destroying 714 aircraft and killing 402 people. The accident rate was 51.2 acci­dents per 100,000 flight hours. Apply those data to the cost of today’s aircraft and of training today’s aircrews, and you get an inkling of why safety is important. Still, Lieutenant McMahon is correct that safety is not the bottom line; combat readiness is. We achieve combat readi­ness by training as realistically as we can, but we attempt to preserve our assets as we do. On a selective and carefully su­pervised basis, such as at Fallon and Nel­lis, fighter crews can work the lower- altitude regimes. But the fact is that we cannot return to the “halcyon”—but tre­mendously expensive—past.
• We are not training as we will fight.— Consideration of safety may be construed

^{Wil1 fi}H^hct e^^clly

truth is that no one can P^redl

as not training as we

how we will fight, only that ^we P _e(jid will not fight the next one the w y ₀f the last one. So we practice everything. If we had more mon ^_gets- aircraft, more airspace, and ^°^_e[y0iS' we would practice more of ^e _s0lne Some things we practice are _{a tr}e- are boring. But naval aviation _and'^ve mendous spectrum ot capabi i)” _s get- must practice all of it. That^inC. _raftaJ>“ ting off the ship with a full-up ^a ^jssi⁰¹’ weapon system, performing ¹ with°^ut or missions, then recoven

making the ship steam longer than necessary,

into the ’

aif'

^sPⁱⁿⁿⁱⁿffort^{e and}

craft quickly for the next ^e^_nSvve^,fe doing it all over again. This m ^ training like we’ll fight, at *^ea

far a

we can predict.

‘hole

W

of

Yes, there are boring and ■ j_t ing” flights once in a while- _traj_ning- not, that surface escort ^nee, _aCOn s°ⁿ’| too, to be ready to save your _aSjoi'^jl day. Don’t begrudge him an _surface chance to polish his skills- .j you^d guy might be a real friend j_sSjofl^ci airborne with a less than fun pable (FMC) bird.            ^

► Material—FMC—indexes & i _js

The question of what is and _{j rnI1}ccp^I.

wha' *

■od cone ^_ft

FMC is a widely misunderstood _aj_rcr^a: It may be true that a part'cu          ₀₍₁e o'

will be counted FMC even it¹¹ ^ _beCaU'‘ more systems inoperable.

FMC, as reported on the daCf ^1$ ’ Maintenance Readiness Repod _ajrcf^a is the number of full ^s^^ste.₀ the ^"n which can be made available _nCy.

mere (_tak

pi®^-

group commander in an ^eIj. (jon would often require canniba '^z ,,

ing parts from operable

aircraft

..._fe       ---- “t---- --- neacetiU¹, .1,6

cedure we try to avoid m V ^ ot¹ herculean deck moves on the P _bj_e 4 air department. Full-mission-c P ₀f tifl^j tus is not phony—over a P^en° uy ^ the FMC profile tracks extne^

with another, less known but - _sS, rate, measure of aircraft rea ^ (gd , Selected Component Item ^^eP _a0ce

developed from aviation ^n,a'^^tCj_ata- material management (3M1 j_n cO¹'¹',. though it is too time consum'ⁿr _aj ^c° ₀{

lation to be useful to the ope^ra ₍jon mander, it is a good ven       |₀gis^£‘_£

AMRRs and is critical to             -_flg

intern⁵ m

system. In any case, it’s im--^q _to

isth^f-

iClP

were used, Air Wing-13 °ⁿ _eed^¹- Coral Sea (CV-43) always ₀n ’ CNO-aircraft readiness stan i 1986 combat cruise. The U

SCIR data for FMC run aboui

below AMRR. The difference^ ^ nibalization which would ft^aVc^j8 fected. Whether AMRR °^r d

(CV

.66)

(CV-60) and the USS

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by the “operators” are vital in P _tfj_n ■ -

if we are to be ready to fight war. And these talents are exclusive: Even today there combat leaders who are themselves as peacetime managers.       _aSy to

At the junior level, it is ⁿ° . p₃pe^r' how the division officer toil ^a ,₀ getti^ work of a junior officer relates i^ufl

vit'Z

leaded'

c/&

ordnance on target. Yet, f^rorn^_erS

ir\r rtffir'Are mnct rnmP thC ^                                   < ,

ior officers must come the morrow who can lead manage in peacetime

of¹⁰;

,d

in ^con,bl #

.mg¹?^-

Seeming do

would be nice for the junior

nothing but study his Naval ^ ^

■did'

and Operating Procedures tion and tactical manuals, and 7

put

don’t have and can’t afford th^e ^ sU^c( pounders” to provide aviators^

opportunities. Congress is i increase our numbers—in f^aC ’“_e w'0^u^

is the reverse. More important- u[p

('.ifnrc lean „ |

be sacrificing the future f'- jjioS^e * naval aviation by not training -

tential leaders how to lead

peo^

yes, manage the paperwork-

The current system of trai

tion safety, material account'^® ^₀<t

achieving combat readiness ^lS _vjeW^e‘

perfect. It must be continually ^ ^_epts

revised, and re-focused. Recen¹

the Gulf of Sidra indicate

that ^

track. Nevertheless, inputs f^r0^ _a pet¹ and everyone who might h^aV^jt’s jn idea are more than welcome ^ fit.

only way things will g^et

bette^r;_IoPut

__                     _o_           _ ‘rr]C^lur I

Lieutenant McMahon took the)¹ ₅jgU

his thoughts on paper is a p°^sl for the future. It’s just great-

itive •

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“Can The Coast Guard Save Itself?”

(See J. C. Clow, p. 134, September 1986

Proceedings)

Chief Radioman Monte L. Simpson, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve—I can answer Commander Clow’s question: Yes, the Coast Guard can save itself—if we initi­ate a good public relations program, and a good education program within the Guard. The Guard’s latest assignment from “Mission Impossible” is antisub­marine warfare (ASW), mine warfare (coastal defense), and drug enforcement. Ojur recruiting programs must be honest and upfront with applicants, and basic training should be mission oriented. Fi­nally, cross training between officer and enlisted personnel of the Coast Guard and Navy would provide interservice training and foster a teamwork spirit between the services. Being good at ASW and coastal defense will enhance our ability to rid the sea lanes of drug traffickers.

Letters and votes can be very effective in gaining support from our lawmakers. We regular, reserve, retired, officer, and enlisted can save our Coast Guard. Thanks, Commander Clow, for evoking thought in this area.

• A T QLlC^’k

deed a sad state of affairs, an j_e for

whether his COs, who are ^resP° • _e off¹'

^{and exeC}H oral' onsible

fighting their ships,

cers (XOs), who are ^resP°ⁿ ^jngthei¹ aspects of training, are really _adron^s jobs. Are the ships’ P^arent finis' really helping them by relieving rep^air trative burdens, expediting cn , $ parts, etc.? Or, are they "^he!^P_un„_eede^d ships by making unwanted "'ereco^' assist visits, inspecting ^serv __enter^reC' security clearances, 3M work ^vc ords, and all those other ^ar®^aS _aCjin^esS' little or no impact on battle , qq let If the squadron commander a ^ ^ir it be known that battle readme ^ in prime concern and the key dete _e< it evaluating their ship’s P^er*° _rnIna('^di;r will happen. My squadron c qq N has done just that, and so has .^g I^s the XO I make sure the ship s _._Ap [tie

operationally oriented and P^jties leadership and training opp⁰

make it happen.

its"¹

Unlike the ships referred to ^ia ₀ut Appleton’s article, if the ^war _day>^e tomorrow, we were ready y^es _he USS Boston (SSN-703) has won ^ye

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“Organizing Ships for Battle”

{See D. S. Appleton, pp. 30-37, July 1986

Proceedings)

Commander P. J. Ryan, U. S. Navy, Executive Officer of the USS Boston (SSN-703)—Captain Appleton’s ap­proach to improving the battle readiness of our ships is to revitalize the Standard Organization and Regulations Manual, although he readily admits it is “seldom directly consulted on board ship.” I be­lieve that the solution to the problem is less a matter of administrative (re-) organ­ization and more a matter of leadership and training. Also, Captain Appleton’s generalities about the poor state of train­ing and battle readiness certainly don’t apply to any submarine in which I’ve served. Since submarines account for one-fourth of our 600-ship Navy, his generalizations should apply, at most, to the community he knows best.

Captain Appleton states that “the abil­ity of ships to train for battle has declined so much that each ship now requires sev­eral weeks of externally assisted refresher training . . . before every scheduled overseas deployment.” He then refers to a respected commanding officer (CO) who devotes the majority of his time to material readiness because “there are no ‘points’ given for maintaining or improv­ing overall ability to fight.” This is in-

Development Squadr° tvW Battle Efficiency “E” f°^{r 1} _rade ⁰ years, and has received “above average” on tactic® ^ evaluations for the last three ^

My ship is ready, and the force is ready. I hope the rest⁰ takes the cue, new SORM °^r

“To Fly Safely”                   _l9g6; v.

(See R. Rausa, pp. 69-73, A^uS^us* ..^j) Fagan, p. 12, October 1986 Pr°^c ^ y

Gunnery Sergeant W F.                  t

Marine Corps (Retired) ¹ . _re<,tea

_                                  . b^{e l0} f _aviat

the findings of another showed that aviators go        _are fl¹⁰'

pro-

‘                                      •                                       x” ' fl

ceedings readers might be ⁱⁿ‘ „_viati° ter naval _#

safety survey from the mid ₅e^v'^efJ,

stages in their careers when t ^e susceptible to accidents.            pilot ^

The first stage was when t ^ ) only about 250 hours flyJf   se^c°^fl

flew like a real “hot shot. h^oUt stage occurred at 1,200 j,_abi* when the pilot got careless in _(r0u If he survived that, he g^ot * j,e again at 5,000 flight hours, w ^ o^ve

careless and over-confident ^a»              a

estimating his ability to han piU^c craft in any situation. When \l$ accomplished pilot reache      fj

15,000 hours, he sometimes o occupied or troubled by ⁿj^iatte_tudy d^ld _(]t,

Aircraft maintenance is ^a_cced s'¹¹¹

to his flying. Of course, this sW take malfunctioning aircratt ^ ^

has never been suitably ^a<

iddres^se°

,bf ‘

^chanic ^ ^nava* ^aviation. Service ^s° they n! ^{are se}^^om adequately trained, ^ence and rh^St '^{6arn 0n} -l⁰*³ ^ experi- icati_0n t i.^0U^ ^ttle'^{r own} personal ded- ^traini_n; '^akln8 advantage of any extra % own ^^ortun^^es that come along, five aiondf⁸⁶ *^{S 3} ®^00c* ^examPl^{e: 1} had Machinist’ schooling at Aviation in 1942 ^S J^^ate School, Jacksonville,

'n the next on ^{n0t another} day of training many _tj years despite applying for it *° lose a ^S ^ ^commanding officer hates

^retired in 19°fiT^{etent mechanic}- ^{when 1}

^cou_rse ,.        ' > I took a two-year civilian

Nation a i ^^ua'ified me for the Federal and Powp l^Tllni^stration (FAA) airframes ^Cense. j ^ ^ants (A&P) mechanic’s li- ^c°^Urse i_n ?° ^COmpleted an 18-month As _an ^{6 ectro}nic technology.

Mines at '^nstructor in both these disci- ^⁰undth_at ^Ur,*°^ca' ^comrnunity college, I basically ^mi '^tary service technicians are '⁵ⁿ°'^vIedp P^arts~replacers, with little Polices ^{6 0}P^erati°ⁿ and maintenance ®aps tw₀ ^ana Principles. Very few (per- ^Craft mech^Ut °^ne hundred) service air- ^lraining ^S '^lave the knowledge and Written ana ^Pass ^AA A&P mech’s !^he license ^Practical exams to qualify for pnowied„^{e exam}ple of this lack of n°stag_e ® occurred during the Iranian ^ scue attempt, when civilian technicians were required to service the CFI-53 helicopters used. And then, the flight crew members knew so little about their aircraft and their systems that sev­eral became disabled en route—one when a crew member stuffed his un­needed flight jacket under a troop seat where it cut off the flow of cooling air to the hydraulic fluid supply of the rotor assembly control mechanism. The pilot­ing also left a lot to be desired.

American military maintenance per­sonnel are specialized technicians, capa­ble in their specialities, but plane captains and crew chiefs who are expected to know about all phases of maintenance are sadly lacking in what they must know.

Perhaps the Department of Defense should develop a corps of highly trained maintenance personnel with training equivalent to that of A&Ps, with addi­tional training for maintaining particular aircraft models. Such personnel might be those with ample service experience and mature outlooks, persuaded to extend their service careers with special consid­erations. A warrant officer A&P could be assigned to the top technician’s job in an operating squadron where the aircraft maintenance officer (AMO) is usually an aviator with no special technical qualifi­cations. The AMO could head the depart­ment as its administrator and test pilot for repaired aircraft, while leaving technical matters, including technical training, to his assistant AMO—the aviation techni­cal officer.

“Does NFO Mean Non-Flying Organization?”

(See K. B. Sherman, p. 104, February 1986;

J. R. Avella, pp. 21-25, April 1986; K. B. Sherman, p. 83, June 1986; R. W. Beauchamp, p. 30, August 1986 Proceedings)

Captain Richard S. Zeisel, U. S. Navy (Retired), ex-P-3AIBIC driver, now em­ployed by Lockheed-California Com- pany—Although Commander Sherman makes a valid point, some of his observa­tions are not only erroneous and mislead­ing, but could be dangerous—if be­lieved. His point is that today’s naval reservist-NFO is being spawned by an all-P-3C regular Navy antisubmarine pa­trol (VP) force.

When the regular Navy’s evolution from P-3A/B to P-3C first began, the an­tisubmarine warfare (ASW) fundamen­tals and tactics that served so well were, basically, sets of manual processes. Today, tactical data manipulation and smoothing, and the provision of decision

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aids, record-keeping, and sensor-operat­ing cues are but a few of the advantages achieved in the newer computer-assisted “Charlies.” For the new reserve NFO, the transition to manual means is imprac­tical from an operational/time sense and almost impossible because manual meth­ods are no longer taught in most cases.

Exacerbating this situation is the lack of a training squadron to retrain him. I, too, decry this loss of experience, talent, and money. (It takes a lot of dollars to train and mature a modem tactical coor­dinator.) If this were not enough, the loss of VP operational capability in an ASW world marked by significant quantitative and qualitative advances in the Soviet submarine force is irresponsible. Com­mander Sherman goes on to say that: “There is no discernible difference be­tween the performance of active duty and reserve VPs.” And he states: “Because there are no more tactical coordinators or navigators coming from the active fleet with P-3A/B experience, there seems to be no ready solution to this problem.” Yet Commander Sherman’s solution in­volves the retention (in a flying status) of currently qualified (and senior) NFOs.

While Naval Reserve aircrews may match the performance of their active- duty counterparts, the total effectiveness of aircrew and aircraft is a significant and measurable quantity which is totally sup­portive of the P-3C/Update I-IV design and procurement decisions made through the years. If Commander Sherman is cor­rect, then we need not modernize the ac­tive fleet at all. Perhaps this savings could fund the extension of the older Naval Reserve P-3A/B NFOs on flight status until their airplanes wear out; but it still doesn’t address what to do with the large numbers of P-3C-trained NFOs coming to the reserves.

Contrary to Commander Sherman’s belief, there is a solution; it just isn’t hap­pening fast enough to prevent the loss of trained talent and capability. I refer to the outstanding new concept of the master augment unit (MAU), which is (and has been) flying “new” Update II P-3Cs. With only two Update II aircraft (and two old P-3As) for landing, takeoff, and in­strument training, the MAU in Bruns­wick, Maine, will be hard-pressed to meet the demand of 12 operational squadrons for trained reserve augmenting crews. Worse yet, the 13 “hardware” Naval Reserve squadrons will not see P-3Cs in any form for the foreseeable fu­ture. Many of the old “As” and light­weight “Bs” will reach the ends of their useful service lives before they can be replaced, and then Commander Sherman will have nothing to fly.

The Naval Reserve Association and active duty ASW personnel began years ago to solve this dilemma. The obvious solution is to increase production rates of new aircraft to replace older aircraft. While it is true that a transition period will exist in which the older, experi­enced, and more senior NFOs like Commander Sherman should be kept flying, to suggest we perpetuate this problem is as irresponsible as the loss of the P-3C-qualified NFOs was in the first place. Of course, congressional funding and approval are also required for this solution.

Unfortunately, it isn’t true that no more P-3A/B experienced NFOs are coming from the active fleet. Because of the premature reduction in the purchase of P-3C Update Ills for the Pacific Fleet, at least two active-duty squadrons at Bar­bers Point will continue to fly P-3Bs. Furthermore, the timing, scope, and budget uncertainty of the Update IV and P-3G programs do not leave a comforting promise for the future.

It seems the ultimate irony that in an era of Soviet submarine quieting, further advances in force levels across a broad spectrum of new types and capabilities, strategic implication cruise missiles, and the like, that the U. S. Navy would con­sciously reduce its land-based ASW as­sets—in numbers or quality.

Let’s beat the drums for more new Charlies—not more flight pay for old “A” drivers.

“Clay Barrow Retires”

(See Secretary’s Notes, p. 7, September 1986 Proceedings)

“Rickover and Proceedings”

(,See C. R. Barrow, p. 93, September 1986 Proceedings)

Captain Keith Oliver, U. S. Marine Corps, Instructor of English, U. S. Naval Academy—I was sorry to see that Clay Barrow is retired, although the fact that you still have a Marine as your Managing Editor is comforting.

Clay’s insightful piece on Admiral Rickover, presumably his last as a Naval Institute staffer, prompts the question: Were you able to extract a promise of more stories to come?

(Continued on page 88)

Comment and Discussion

(Continued from page 31)

“Beyond Technology”

(.See K. A. Lamb, pp. 38-46, September 1986

Proceedings)

Commander Stephen M. Andres, U. S. Naval Reserve—Dean Lamb’s grasp of the academic side of midshipman life over the last 30 years is impressive. However, even though “things are hap­pening,” I notice that my alma mater still thinks of midshipmen as a bunch of num­bers (in this case, ratios of technical to non-technical majors). It was perceptive of Proceedings to juxtapose Admiral Moorer’s recollection of his free-thinking classmate, Jack Cygon, with Dean Lamb’s article, in which the Dean notes that, “ . . . prudent midshipmen concen­trate on getting the grade, rather than developing a critical understanding or permanent assimilation of the subject matter. ’ ’

To speak from my experience, I have followed U. S. Naval Academy matters closely since 1963, when I first entered the Academy, with my verbal SAT score exceeding my math score. Four years later, my GRE scores reversed the rela­tionship, and I was on my way to nuclear power training. In addition to my politi­cal science major (minor, actually), I had overloaded reactor physics and advanced engineering mathematics to prepare for Admiral H. G. Rickover’s basic school. (Dean Lamb is wrong on one point: Admiral Rickover’s axiom that, “The smartest must work as hard as those who must struggle to pass nuclear power school,” is true. I didn’t see any humani­ties majors coasting through nuclear training.)

My interpretation of how the Naval Academy accomplishes its mission is that it places midshipmen in an intense envi­ronment by exposing them to a broad spectrum of leadership, ethics, military, academic (technical and non-technical), and athletic challenges in which there is never enough time to get it all done, thus letting each mid sort it out the best he or she can. Small wonder then that creative pranks are cherished by the Brigade, and non-conformists like Jack Cygon, be­come anti-heroes. Cal Tech, one of the most challenging technical universities in the country, officially encourages intel­lectual pranks among its undergraduates.

I believe that there is no lack of ability or intellectual curiosity among the members of the Brigade. As “Uncle Charlie” Kirkpatrick, the beloved superintendent in the early 1960s, continually reminded us, “You guys are the most talented 4,000 undergraduates in the coun­try. . . . You can do anything, if you only set your mind to it!” Too quickly, Admiral Kirkpatrick passed on, and the Naval Academy slipped back into the system: “Give them too much to do and see who comes out on top.”

To Dean Lamb, I say that as long as the Naval Academy continues to take a mac­roscopic view of the Brigade academi­cally, midshipmen will continue to “con­centrate on getting the grade. ...” The Brigade contains 4,100 individuals, and my experience indicates that when you recognize their individuality, the creativ­ity and intellectual curiosity pour out.

The Naval Academy gave me a fantas­tically broad and deep education, which I could not have obtained at any other in­stitution of higher learning in the country. The Naval Academy forced me to strengthen my academic weaknesses. This experience could be shared by most Naval Academy graduates, instead of just a few, through an effective academic advisor program. Educational psycholo­gists tell us that the first step in develop­ing a learning program is to compare students’ starting knowledge with the objectives of the program. If each mid­shipman received effective counseling based on college board aptitude scores and classroom performance during his or her first two years, there would be no need to worry about the ratio of majors.

Each year the Naval Academy gradu­ates nearly 1,000 individuals who each receive orders to a service specialty and who are each evaluated on their fitness for duty. Let’s stop thinking about ratios and start thinking about individuals.

“You Are the Republic”

(See W. J. Crowe, pp. 40-42, September 1986 Proceedings)

Anthony Harrigan, President, U. S. Business and Industrial Council—I was struck by Admiral Crowe’s remark that “Now I am the last one of my class—826

,                                „ _{This r}emi^nds

strong—on active duty. ¹¹       _aI1(| ti­

me of how we waste knowle g ^to perience in our armed forces. ^_{sS 0}f believe that only one man in ^a^_n„ an

vice at this time.    . u,_ract^er'^s"

This up-and-out routine is ^c _ua-

tic of all our armed services. _{s t0} train

derstand why we spend vast sum- ^ _]0 people for leadership positions ^ ^ turn them out into civilian life a p|e of their powers. It is so sad^t0 * _w] ed?^e with important, specialized _v forced to take up some relative g⁰*¹' ingless civilian employment or P in Florida to pass the time. .u_ejrk^sd’ Our adversaries don’t waste ership cadres in this manner- 76-' S. G. Gorshkov served until j_S 5^ his successor, Admiral Cherna _niany and likely will serve in his P^^oien¹ years past the normal U. S- t j di^j age, unless he encounters ^p„ ,!f extr^' culty. Occasionally, a person _e(js^ef” dinary talent is retained in our ^a ._uty for³ vices, or brought back to active ^ _tj_iro'^v special post. Overall, however, out people who have the most 1 _c0n- skills and who can make tremen united tributions to the security of ¹

“Evaluating Sail Training ^ ₄j.

(See D. S. Bryce and R. M. Evans, PP September 1986 Proceedings)                       J

n S-^^a

Lieutenant P. Kem Siddons, ^u ■ ^ (goP^r Reserve—It was a pleasure to re' -_c\c of mander Bryce’s and Dr. Evans _ced f Navy sail training. Having ^eXP^e _aI) af® grey-hull cruise as a midship^_cef of having served as the sailing ⁰ ^S''" board the 44-foot sloop Conqu^e 2), I can relate to their observat During my three-year tenure ^ _ati Conquest, I witnessed more S^r° j₀[ifP maturity (personal and P^r° _n among “sailing” midshipmen t participating in traditional summ^ 0. evolutions. And to top it off- ^ll _saj)iP? As a junior officer with little P^rl_rtooity^IL' experience, it gave me the °PP°|_earfl command a small craft and to pleasures of sailing.  ot⁰-^

Navy sail training is a viable P

that provides midshipmen (and staff) with invaluable hands-on experience and the chance to really “feel” the sea— opportunities rarely found on grey-hull cruises. One is an integral part of the crew, not just an observer. I encourage all midshipmen to consider augmenting their summer cruise experience. Sail Navy!

“Fitness You Can See’’

(.See D. Huber, pp. 97-98, August 1986; A. M.

Ratner, pp. 15-16, October 1986 Proceedings)

Lieutenant (junior grade) Douglas Franklin, U. S. Naval Reserve— Commander Huber provides a dim view of the Navy’s physical fitness program. Although Commander Huber must be a fine marathon runner, he misses the boat with his analysis of the physical fitness test (PFT).

I have a B.Ed. and M.Ed. in Physical Education and more than 12 years of ci­vilian professional experience in recrea­tion, physical education, and fitness. I have helped implement the Navy Physi­cal Fitness Program since my affiliation with the Naval Reserve in 1982. I served as the physical fitness petty officer and officer of Fleet Intelligence Rapid Sup­port Team, European-Atlantic, for the last four years. I am now employed by the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston as Director of Recrea­tion and Intramural Programs, where development and supervision of the university’s Health Management Pro­gram are my responsibilities.

Commander Huber states that the cur­rent PFT is “totally inadequate.” Al­though some of his ideas for improving the PFT are sound, others, including his understanding of a total fitness program, are erroneous and unfounded. His con­tention that the run should be lengthened merits consideration, but not because the Marines run three miles. It should be in­creased to conform to Kenneth Cooper’s two-mile run test so the Navy can benefit from established evaluation criteria and standardized norm tables.

The sit-up portion of the PFT is ade­quate as a measure of abdominal muscu­lar endurance. Sit-ups are not a measure of “anaerobic fitness,” and by decreas­ing the distance between the feet and the buttocks, the abdominal muscles are iso­lated and the sit-up becomes a more accu­rate test of muscular endurance than that of the “Marines’ bent-knee ^slt_fl^up'_jbiijty

The sit-and-reach measures    ^

of the lower back and ^hamstf^f juffet proximately 80% of all America ^ of from lower back pain from a       fo

causes, one of which is       _be3 di*'

“do away with” this test wou ₍ part service—flexibility is an imP⁰, ^ ₀rnit of physical fitness, and rather _u|,jbe this test, more stringent criteria adopted. . _tbe ppT

Measurement of body fat ⁱⁿ ^ the will continue to be a problem ^_c0Jite Navy employs skin calipers ⁰ ^ gjjess measurement, and trains P^¹^ _upper- coordinators in their use. A ^s ^ ^a- body muscular endurance ^fflUS _sts ^ sured. Commander Huber sugc _eSt- the Navy adopt the Marines P^u g_ut a ing procedures for this P^urp°* _bj_e iriea' timed push-up test is an accep _enC)ur' surement of upper-body ^mUSCU_anage^a^^e ance, and it is also a more m ^c procedure.

The Navy Physical Fitn^eSS p_f0ce- must provide more than ^teStl rais^⁵ dures. Group and individual Pjjjgls should be included to provide m ^y_Sj. with constant evaluations of ¹ for cal fitness levels. Responsi

suggestions for improve-

Other” ““ ^particiP^ants-

0%° v^U

quality h ^elements in developing a °mitted • ^ea*^t*¹ maintenance program ment ^m - ^{e art}'dc ^are stress manage- the _Cq ^nutrhion, smoking cessation, and In add'y^'^{011 dru}8 ^and alcohol abuse. element^{1011 t0 l}^^e fi^tness program, these

^educ,

Hal

^lents ^:ational and

_rem_a^aininS Physical fitness standards u_ns ’^{ns w}hh the individual. But regular, th_{e r}^Penf^lsed- individual appraisals, with w_ouij^{SU ts} nionitored by the command, th_e j ^COnstantly remind the individual of fit_ne P^ortance of maintaining a regular m„ ,^{S rc}J^ut*ne. Group appraisals and test­ers _D°^{U d Used as} behavioral reinforc- niti’ej ^r°^Vld'ⁿS P^art'^c'pants with opportu- dj_Spl ^c°mpare fitness levels and ^c°nd/ ^t"^e'^r unities, and they should be all t_es?^{te<d on a} quarterly basis. Results of uted v,^{S an<}^ ^aPP^ra'^sai^s should be distrib- off,_Cer^{y t}*^le command physical fitness

should be integrated into an al program, including individ­ual " ®^rouP counseling sessions, gen- briefs ^ ^ training informational nes<: J ^ltness libraries, and regular fit- P_{h s}^eWsletters-

sary ^₀^Sl^^a* Witness programs are neces- ucvelop a “lean and mean fight­ing force.” Although the Navy PFT lacks essential elements, it has provided the initial impetus for the development of a quality program by providing initial guidelines for command physical fitness coordinators.

Master Chief Bernard R. Kellish, U. S. Navy—While I agree with most of Com­mander Huber’s recommendations, I dis­agree with the run included in our physi­cal fitness test. I can think of few instances where a sailor would be re­quired to run two miles, let alone at a six-minute-per-mile pace. Eliminate the run, and replace it with a 50-yard under­water swim (including the “surfacing in burning fuel” that used to be required in boot-camp), followed by 30 minutes of simply staying afloat. That would be a test that fits the job.

Incidentally, I am 55 years old and re­cently completed a physical fitness test with the following results:

• % Body Fat—13.8
• Push-ups—96
• Sit-ups—109
• Run—9:48

“Nuclear Torpedoes”

(,See N. Polmar and D. M. Kerr, pp. 63-69,

August 1986 Proceedings)

Captain D. A. Paoiucci, U. S. Navy (Re­tired), and Captain J. H. Patton, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)—There is no case for nuclear torpedoes in our Navy. In fact, the U. S. submarine force wisely gave up the Mark (Mk)-45 nuclear tor­pedo when it proved that the conventional Mk-48 torpedo would have much greater effectiveness than its nuclear counterpart. Incidentally, the U. S. Navy, in an era of nuclear arms control, never did take any credit for this unilateral and most wise decision. Since Mr. Polmar and Dr. Ken- raised so many other issues besides nu­clear torpedoes, we would like to address these issues to set the record straight.

• On insertable nuclear components: This notion would require highly portable fissionable material, greatly increasing the possibility that it could fall into the hands of tenorists or be accidentally dis­persed into the environment.
• On kill: Kill is a post-detection phe­nomenon. The evolving Soviet subma­rine threat is characterized primarily by decreasing probability of detection,

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^requir_e ^ ^not’ ^{as stat}ed in the article, U. S. wpJ^{1 lncrease} *n the lethality of ^Subrnarin ^°^nS' ^^ew knowledgeable anti- ^cl^Uesti_0n ^e,h ^Watdare experts seriously ^vanced J, .^letha% of a Mk-48 ad- ► °n ex ?^{ablhty tor}P^edo- ^taiio” is a • ™^{io: The} “exchange ^lo large ^ ^slaiPlistic measure applicable ^render .^Umoers and unconditional sur-

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!^ave the ~h'!ⁿ P^roduct'⁰n, or that they bes ₀f ^a 'lty to produce large quanti- *^{ers a}t stn ^mar'^nes- The Soviets are mas- >>T3_4ta^Pr_g ^at “good enough,” e.g., i atar b ^3nC*^tbe badger bomber. Mr. ^arge _nu ^af repeatedly pointed out the ^laVent^—           ^er °f Soviet submarines in

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^tilatera]?^{1 tbe s}b'P commander would ^lwce_n a fj' decide to fire missiles be- ?^reat stra^ ^3nd subsequent attack places v do a*/ °^{n t}b^e authors’ credibility. ^^Crr p_r ^{11 e}-hulls: Mr. Polmar and Dr. Nation t*"⁰¹ d^<)ublc-hulls as a Soviet in- d^vabiii_t,° ^1IriP^rove their submarine sur- '°ited St’ ^{3 course} abandoned by the ^t'^Uclear _s|^;u^{CS s}*^nce the advent of modem ^Ca*ly tnarines. Single hulls dramati- ^Pr°^vide ^Pr°^Ve silencing capabilities, and ^sP®Ce _an?^l0rc efficient employment of ^ivabir ^V°*^Utne> which also increases div_e(j,, ^{1 y}- If the authors ever ^Pa*last ,r,°^r inspected—a submarine

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A

^United                                   ueuci. me

signed to _n ^S| ^{now see}ks a strategy de- ^‘aatin^{f0dUCe early} i^everaS^e for “war ^env'^r°nm ⁿ °ⁿ ^^avorable terms.” In this ^s<de i_s ^t*^{le rate} of losses on each ^real p_aj_n ^{C mor}e important in inflicting ^Ce‘^vabl_{e s}°^{n tbe enem}y, and every con­oid be f ^enar'° suggests that the rate ' hr ^aV°^rab*^{e t0} die United States. Afferent ^ ⁽l^Uan>iiies of submarines of Soviet [^S' ^{bls not a}ii bad news that '’^ubrriarin ^{S bave seve}n different types of have ,u ^{s ln} F ability t ^{d th}e lint ^the °^{Utset of World War 11} ote Sovi'. ? ^{tbat was} done ^wdb them. ^again t₀ ^{6 S w}iHingness over and over r^f'^a'^cIas_s^{aCCept exce}Ptionally high first­'s are _n^exf^>enscs and associated prob- ^quap;^nma f^ac‘^e testimony to the in- ^2^S0fthe Soviet fleet ¹¹ ■ For th₀^,,,,<m hulls: They’re not worth ^a los _A ^{Se w}b° agonize over the cost of r^^es (SSN-688)-class or the !> can K;l?^e breakthrough in subma- ^wi>^en cn_m ^{l lty}b that cost would pale j?ta] 15^2 P^ared, for example, with the i^St Aif_a ^year investment to launch the d°g, b_llt ’ ^a dog of a submarine—a fast * On _CQ ^nonetheless a dog.

\n-A_n^^,arllnentalization: Please, no ^tipartm ^{t0 be} 'ⁿ any submarine with a dead. £j,i^^nt hooded. That submarine is ^rec,cdt_{0 K}^Cr ’b^e Typhoon has been di- ^Ca,a- ¹¹⁰⁰¹ missiles or not. The impli-

^ta°k, they would find critical ^mB^s / November 1986

equipment, pipes, air bottles, electrical wiring, etc.—all necessary to the subma­rine’s functioning, yet all at risk by a hit which “only blows” the ballast tank.

• On quieting of Soviet subs: Quieter Soviet subs are not surprising. What is surprising is that it took the Soviets so long to realize how important silencing is and that their subs were inferior in this category. Silencing is not difficult; it is simply extremely costly and painstaking. The Soviets are in for a difficult tail chase, and U. S. submarine leaders have plans and programs ready to keep them there indefinitely.
• On submarine depth: Deeper is not better, so long as our weapons can go deeper than their submarines.
• On secondary propulsion systems: The “spinners” on some Soviet submarine stem planes must be an incredible noise liability and must give fits to Soviet sub­marine commanders working alongside piers and ice in their base ports.
• On bastions: The United States ap­pears to have won a virtual strategic vic­tory if the Soviets have indeed concluded that they have no choice other than to “bastion” their forces in their own wa­ters, thereby increasing the density of tar­gets available to the United States. Our superior sensors, weapons, and tactics provide us with the opportunity to take the initiative in creating the necessary high loss rate that contributes to “early war termination” on favorable terms.
• On nuclear torpedoes: With the level of performance available to the U. S. Navy from current and evolving sensors and weapons, there is little rationale for changing to nuclear warheads. Just as with the old nuclear Mk-45 torpedo, if one can place it close enough to ensure a kill, then a modem conventional homing weapon can be placed close enough to detect, attack, and kill, with no worry about C³ problems of control and release, onboard radiological considerations, unduly hazarding one’s ship, unknown effects on the sonar environment, and the dispersion of fission products from the sunken submarine. (A conventional weapon is unlikely to breach the contain­ment of the fission products on the at­tacked submarine.)

Nuclear torpedoes are not required for assured lethality against Soviet subma­rines. Their effective delivery requires at least the target localization accuracy of the Mk -48, whose area-sweeping capa­bility is at least on an order of magnitude greater than the effective lethal area of even a large nuclear warhead. Even if a first “hit” against a submerged subma­rine is non-lethal, that submarine’s sus- ceptivity to more hits is incredibly high.

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struction of the ships. The U- '      ^

ment could then lease the ship³^ jired consortium and avoid substan overhead costs. cofa¹⁰^

In attempting to avoid                   ^ poO^f

turpitude (such as stealing ‘^r0 _a) aS' to aid the non-poor j, the P^r _aSSjst- sumes that the recipients of p^u . labor ge, untapD^e° drafted

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ance represent a large, ^un*?*^:,p_t0 wh³*' source waiting to be drafted_^^_o0tjng

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ability to train and then e ^ manpower pool. Instead of we ^ re»' wrights, and technicians, one s

Sailor Talk

(See M. Adams, pp. 20-24, July 1986

Proceedings)

Captain George L. Raring, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I strongly support Com­mander Adams’s efforts to restore tradi­tional nautical language, which binds together all sailors—be they Navy, Coast Guard, Merchant Marines, or yachtsmen. It is vital to the preservation of pride of service and pride of profession.

Commander Adams’s examples of the lubberly language used by naval officers from captains on down are almost unbe­lievable. In my day, those junior officers would have been the object of amused contempt and the butt of ribald jokes in the chief petty officer and general messes. There would be no captains call­ing the ship’s galley a “kitchen,” or say­ing they were “going downstairs” sim­ply because those people would have failed selection for promotion while still in junior grades.

However, Commander Adams himself is lubberly on one count. He uses the term “vessel” three or four times in his comment. That word is very repulsive to me. It should never be used, particularly for ships as beautiful as the Iowa (BB- 61)-class battleships, 1812-era frigates, the clipper ships, the SS United. States, the Fletcher (DD-445)-class destroyers, or, for that matter, the old flush-deck four-pipers.

I remember very clearly a briefing for Admiral Arleigh Burke prior to his going to the Tank for a Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting. A briefing officer used the word “vessel.” Admiral Burke interrupted the officer to tell him that a “vessel” was a thing that used to be kept under the bed for the less hardy people who could not brave the weather to go to the outhouse.

“Rebuilding the Merchant Marine”

(See M. Guralnick, pp. 74-77, August 1986 Proceedings)

Commander Rolf Marshall, U.S.Navy— Contrary to Mr. Guralnick’s assertion that “objections to this plan would be indefensible,” the only aspect of his pro­posal which is defensible is his statement of the requirement. Failure to ensure the availability of strategic sealift and the in­frastructure necessary to support it places our national security at risk.

It is indefensible to even consider the creation of a workfare project for naval architects, shipyard managers, and their associates at the expense of the most dis­advantaged members of our society. Long before the first retrained public as-

■                                                    et

sistance recipient received his or paycheck, those groups and           j Al­

ness associates would have p^oc j_nto lions of dollars. Instead of teac P_wel- the public till for this shipbm .^jjjial fare program, why not have and business communities ^ai-j_r benefit Let them divert some of th , ^gpreci' generated from large accelera e ation allowances into a poo Upbuild' the continued employment ⁰ ers, and subsequently the desig g_oVern- ever program comes along- _rSjon such issues as geographical disp ^ _#l population—i.e., how to ensu , j_n the fare manpower pool is aval ^a ^ b«' locale of the contracting ^s‘l’?_arjly g^e° cause such individuals are P^rim_woUid & graphically immobile—there main serious concerns reg-

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her’⁹*⁶ / Nove"”*

^c°niDet^Ce ^^ernonstrated an inability to niarket^{6 e}£^fective|y in the shipbuilding

ers ^ ^exP^ect the pool to yield sweep- l_ab;_rp^material handlers, and general

The’ ^{lf £Ven that}'

siehtpa⁶ [^{S somet}hing deceptively short- S_lnce ®hoiit Mr. Guralnick’s proposal, capadt ^{6 Currentl}y ^acti^ve shipbuilding mo_re eff ^{C3n assumec}*^t0 represent the larger ^ect'^ve surviving assets of a once- the ^capacity, the proposal argues for less-eff^lVenat^^on (^at P^uhlic expense) of ^ective production resources. Hav- perf_0rrn ^W^y should we expect a better With th^{nCe t}*^{1S secon}^ time around? trausp ^e. shipbuilding and maritime What _h^{nation mar}ket now hull-saturated, Active ^ec°^raes of all that marginally ef- the _Pr ^Capacity after the three years of ^Co,tlPet^^OSet* P^ro§^ram? Since it can’t goverp^{6 m a} saturated market without a agai_n ^{m6nt do}'^e’ '^l either disappears ^c*^aim's f^{r W£} be faced with new _{An cv}^0r P^ermanent public support, had the^h ^{0 m}°^{re C0}8^ent question is: If we lift r_e(. ■ ^u"^s required to support the sea- ^Cnced m^lreiTlent’ ^we b^ave the experi- ing ^ariners to man the ships? Assum- triean _a ^mar'^ners per ship, that would notav_;i^I|^P[^0Ximalely 12,000 seafarers. If them * ^a”'^{e on} the shelf, how do we find ^ready' ^anc* *^10w bo we keep them as a esource while their ships swing idly at anchor in the reserve fleet? With another permanent publicly supported program?

Unfortunately, the kind of thinking demonstrated in Mr. Guralnick’s article, i.e., “Let the government do it,” is pre­cisely what created most of the problem, because when government has other pri­orities, programs collapse. We need new proposals to generate and maintain self­sustaining maritime resources in order to support national security requirements, not tired claims for public subsidy. And we certainly do not need proposals which would pull more rope from our already questionable safety net for the disadvan­taged, for the purpose of creating cargo nets to allow even more people to climb on board the public vessel.

“Needed: A National Interdiction Operations School”

(See C. A. Abel, pp. 117-119, September 1986 Proceedings)

Lieutenant (junior grade) John M. Felker, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve—I agree with Lieutenant Abel that we need an interdiction tactics school. I have first­hand experience in the “hard knocks” school he mentions. Though I was pre­pared quite well at the Maritime Law Enforcement School to handle the legalities and policy requirements of boarding, inspecting, searching, seizing, and arresting, when I relieved a patrol boat commanding officer (CO), I was in the dark regarding how, when, and where to patrol, surveil, and interdict. I was briefed by the man I relieved, and also by Customs and the Drug Enforcement Agency, but I still had no real grasp of tactics. I read the only printed informa­tion on tactics I could find, but it was prepared by a Straits-of-Florida-area pa­trol boat CO. It was well written and made some excellent points, but I was not able to apply much of it to my area of operations.

After about nine months of hit-and- miss and many mistakes, we finally got a bust, through word-of-mouth tactics. A curriculum on interdiction tactics would be a godsend, especially for a new CO like me coming from a Great Lakes buoytender, with no law enforcement experience. It doesn’t have to be as large as Surface Warfare Officer’s School, but it should be detailed and practical enough to enlighten the neophyte commander. Until such a school is formed, we should bring commanders together to discuss tactics on a formal basis, and also, infor­mally, swap stories and do a little hangar flying. It can improve our interdictions efforts.

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