“Shipboard Fuel Economy”
(See R. W. Tripp, pp. 98–101, April 1981; Editor’s Note, p. 88, June 1981 Proceedings)
James H. Cunningham, President, Marine Energy Institute—Commander Tripp’s article is a timely message and deserves serious consideration not only by the U. S. Navy but also by all merchant fleet operators. There is an emerging marine fuel quality crisis that demands action—worldwide—on fuel economy which in turn will result in conservation. Recent extensive studies on alternative fuels for maritime use find that conservation of petroleum oil is required to bridge the gap between increasing demand and decreasing supplies. Too, conservation will help buy time to make the transition to alternative marine fuels.
I would like to single out just one of the variety of fuel saving techniques that Commander Tripp recommends. Hull treatment is probably the oldest known and most simple method of increasing speed, reducing power, conserving fuel, and saving dollars. One-hundred-eighty-four years ago the USS Constellation had her wooden hull sheathed in copper. This increased the hull’s smoothness and protected against fouling. The Constellation s enemies called her the “Yankee Racehorse.” Even today, as she floats at her dock in Baltimore’s Inner Harbor, the Constellation is coated with a copper paint to prevent fouling.
A hull treatment can reduce the drag of friction and cut the power required to maintain a given speed. Assuming the propulsion system is efficient and the propeller is in good condition, a smooth clean hull can mean a 20% savings in fuel cost. The Maritime Administration estimates that the average oceangoing vessel spends $6,000,000 a year on fuel.
Today’s hull treatment is not sheets of copper but combinations of chemicals that work like time-release cold pills. Self-polishing polymers are used that leach foul-repelling chemicals as the ship moves through the water. The technique is so sophisticated that you must select coatings based on the speed of the vessel and her ocean routing. Such coatings remain effective for three or four years. After that time they must be reactivated.
This form of conservation will go a long way in bridging the gap between oil and coal.
“The Military Compensation Mess”
(See L. Pfeifer, pp. 24–32, February 1981 Proceedings)
Lieutenant T. Patrick Hannon, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve—Military pay scales have always bemused me. Commander Pfeifer’s article and his proposed pay scales were no exception to this.
Where are all those admirals and generals (O-7, -8, -9, and -10) with less than two years? Not even nepotism can account for such a meteoric career! Where do I apply?
“A Modified Operational Concept for the Surface Warship”
(See A. M. Brown, pp. 132–149, May 1981 Proceedings)
Lieutenant John C. Tate, U. S. Navy—The photograph on page 144 is incorrectly identified in the accompanying caption on page 145 as the Kiev. Rather, the photograph depicts the recently completed Kirov which is again pictured on page 171. Let’s hope the Soviets don’t know the difference between the Nimitz (CVN-68) and the California (CGN-36).
“A Sea-Based Interdiction System for Power Projection”
(See C. E. Myers, pp. 103–106, November 1979; M. C. Franklin, pp. 23–24, January 1980; J. F. Downs and T. W. Jackson, pp. 74–75, February 1980; H. W. J. R. Bergbauer and F. J. Koch, p. 85, June 1980; H. P. Pulver, pp. 86–87, July 1980; J. Stewart, pp. 131–132, November 1980 Proceedings)
Gene Anderson, naval architect—When I noticed Mr. Pulver’s excellent drawings of a modified Iowa-class battleship as a hybrid aircraft carrier-battleship, the thought that struck my mind was: where did I see that before?
On page 25 of the January 1979 Proceedings you published a comment on my work upgrading the recognition drawings of the Japanese battleship Yamato while I was with Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area during the final months of World War II. I had not only upgraded these drawings but also those of the hybrid battleship-aircraft carrier Ise which had her two aft 14-inch main battery turrets replaced by a flight deck for launch and recovery of Zero-type fighter aircraft scheduled for use as fleet air cover.
Immediately after the war, I was sent to Japan for duty with Physical Damage Team One of the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey to study atomic bomb damage at Hiroshima. Since the Ise was sunk up to her main deck in a bay nearby, I was able to study this hybrid warship at close range.
While with the survey, I had the opportunity to discuss this warship with members of the Naval Analysis Group. From this discussion, I learned that the Ise was reported to have never launched an aircraft in combat and that the conversion of a battleship into half of an aircraft carrier was at the time considered a failure. As one member of the group put it, “It was a silly waste of a battleship.”
There were many reasons given why this conversion failed. At the time, it was felt that the flight deck lacked length and area for the high-performance Zeros to be launched and recovered in spite of two catapults and a proven arresting gear system. The high massive “Pagoda” mast, the broad stack, and the main mast support superstructure just ahead of the flight deck all had combined to generate such severe wind turbulence across the flight deck that it made flying operations extremely difficult and unsafe while the ship was steaming at proper launch and recovery speeds. It was also pointed out that both the lack of highly experienced pilots and fuel late in the war also contributed to this failure. With the exception of the pilots and fuel, indications are that similar problems may arise in the use of the Iowa-class battleships as hybrid aircraft carriers for fixed-wing aircraft operations. Possibly the present state of the art may allow it with certain modifications.
Maybe this old naval architect with more than 40 years’ experience and a former flyer could offer a suggestion or two in the form of the accompanying simple, free-hand drawings to help overcome the Ise problems in developing the Iowas into a successful hybrid for fixed-wing aircraft operations.
To reduce superstructure wind turbulence, I suggest leaving the tower as it is with its range finder and smooth sides and removing the after stack. Duct this stack’s boiler uptakes forward to one large streamlined funnel similar to that found on the South Dakota (BB-57)-class battleships. As noted on the drawing, also remove any other unnecessary air turbulence-forming clutters on the sides of the main superstructure. A wind tunnel smoke test would be helpful here using various model configurations of the Iowas to determine the best wind flow over the superstructure.
By removing the aft stack, the flight deck could be extended another 100 feet longer than Mr. Pulver indicated in his drawings. Aided by a steam catapult, a canted deck, and arresting gear, this extension of the flight deck could allow the Navy’s latest fighters to operate from this ship. Restrictive takeoffs and landing flight tests on existing carriers could prove the feasibility of using front-line fighters off a hybrid Iowa. I believe that our Navy pilots are more than capable of flying on and off this converted ship in any kind of weather or visibility.
For reasons of logistics, maintenance, and hangar and deck space, it is not my intent to suggest that such aircraft be assigned regularly to this ship, but as a possible quick rearm and refuel backup system in a carrier task force. Occasionally, the hybrid could "borrow” a few of these birds from a carrier for some special mission for which an armored ship would be better suited than one of our expensive thin-walled carriers, such as in the battle zone itself.
The larger flight deck would also allow more helicopters of the Sea Stallion-size and AV-8A Harriers to be carried. To save fuel and to give these Harriers a quick launch responses, I added a ski jump platform on the flight deck’s starboard side. The flight deck control bridge is located aft of the stack.
It is my understanding that one of the big problems with commissioning a battleship is finding and retaining a large black gang to operate the steam plant. This can be easily overcome by taking a page out of the today’s merchant fleet’s book by employing automation which would require only a small maintenance crew to keep this system in operation. Another problem is out-dated equipment in the engine and fire rooms. Reflanging and rewiring for updated equipment can quickly solve this. If funds are available, possibly an automatic gas turbine-electric system could replace the steam plant, or nuclear reactors could be considered that would be compatible with the existing system. It has been said that the Iowas are tender and rollers and will be more so if burdened with a flight deck. This can be overcome by using light metals in the flight deck structure, flumed anti-roll tanks, or gyro-con-trolled stabilizers.
As I do with my clients, I leave the electronic selection up to them and so with the Navy in this comment. I have provided in my drawings a carrier-type foremast for electronic sensing gear as well as a pole mainmast for radio antenna, electronic countermeasures gear, and a gaff at the highest point to show the flag.
To give the gunnery department a greater selection of ammunition to use on specific targets, possibly a pair of 8-inch Mk-48 guns could be added to the list of weapons proposed by Mr. Pulver. To extend the range of the main battery, perhaps a number of 16-inch rocket-assisted projectiles could be slipped into the ship’s magazine. As I wrote in my earlier comment in the Proceedings, the battleship Yamato carried her shore boats in a hangar near the stern. Possibly a fleet of landing craft could be carried in a similar fashion on the converted Iowas. These landing craft would give the ship a second means of landing troops ashore, with the other being the use of helicopters.
To make these hybrid Iowas true Department of Defense ships, they could be crewed by a mix of sailors, marines, and possibly by such specialists as Army Rangers. When the situation calls for it, soldiers could replace the marines. Again as the situation demands it, the flag command could be Army, Navy, or Marine Corps. The ship and her gunnery and operations would be under Navy command. Her air department would be under both Navy and Marine control as missions require, with the associated housekeeping duties performed by marines or soldiers if they are present. Her primary mission is a helo-V/STOL-bombardment-troop landing ship with fixed-wing capabilities.
To make her a one-ship task force, installation of antisubmarine warfare gear should be considered for passive defense. Whatever, she would make a very impressive ship to show the flag or be capable of enforcing treaties or putting out “hot spots” wherever they should occur. She would be a substantial addition to a fast carrier battle group which could use some sort of bombardment and amphibious ship loaded with several thousand marines for immediate response. As said earlier. she could also serve as a backup, quick turn-around system for carriers.
Because the Missouri (BB-63) is a national shrine and should not be touched in order to preserve her historical appearance and the New Jersey has been recently rehabbed as a bombardment ship, possibly the Iowa (BB-61) and the Wisconsin (BB-64) should be considered for this major change as a battleship-aircraft carrier or simply known as a battlecarrier. With these two ships converted, the Navy could place one in the Atlantic and the other in the Pacific to provide for a quick-response capability.
I believe we Americans would prefer to have these beautiful warships active and guarding us rather than rusting away in mothballs, particularly since the Russian cruiser Kirov has appeared.
“April 1981 Proceedings"
Commander Robert E. May, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The April 1981 Proceedings should have been edged in black. On page 125, it is reported that nuclear submarines have apparently been perfected to the point where they can no longer be built. On page 116, it is reported that the newest Navy warplanes are inferior to their predecessors. And if we are to lend credence to Captain Outerson’s views on page 33, we no longer remember why we won World War II. In 1942, the U. S. Navy took a bad beating at Savo Island, et al., but in 1944, the tables were turned and the U. S. Navy annihilated the Japanese in the Suragao Straits. Better leadership? Baloney! The difference was radar; in more general terms, the difference was technical superiority.
Technical superiority not only won World War II, but it also brought the first nuclear-powered submarines. The period from technical breakthroughs in 1957 to the first Polaris operational patrol in 1960 was just more than three years of amazing technical development. Today, such a feat would be unbelievable. Based on the recent record, it would also be unattainable. Today, we have a new kind of engineer—they are the ones with the slick political approach, glib enough not only to sell a program inadequately researched but also to explain why the resulting failure was a “success under the circumstances.”
How did the Navy forget how' to build submarines? Years ago, submarines were built in naval shipyards. They were well built. More important. Navy technical personnel knew what was feasible to do and how long it would take to accomplish. Today, it appears that technical capability to build nuclear submarines comes third: after hassling contractors about change costs (page 125) and also after debating leadership techniques (page 83)—are these modern substitutes for technical excellence?
Should unsuccessful aircraft developments be blamed on the Defense Department or others? Hardly. The Navy learned about multipurpose aircraft from Mr. McNamara’s TFX program more than 20 years ago. The inability to act on a lesson learned years ago is an internal Navy problem.
Where did it all go wrong? Perhaps a major element of the problem is that the current technical leaders just do not perceive how badly they are performing. This is not only true for those in the military but those in such basic industries as steel and automobiles. Several fundamental changes, dating back to the 1950s, turned the Navy and the nation to this new disastrous course:
- The emphasis turned away from research. It was believed that there was little left to be discovered or invented. Funds went heavily into applied research where everything was scheduled and program managed in a way few pure research projects can flourish.
- The Navy decided that too high a percentage of officers with postgraduate degrees were being passed over and lost. The curricula were adjusted to permit all officers to attain satisfactory grades. Enter the pseudo intellectual to guide development projects, sans research, from the political approach.
- The Naval Academy relaxed its disciplinary traditions. Has this softened the steel minds of yesterday?
- Last, but by no means least, the budding computer industry started siphoning off brainpower from other fields of endeavor. Even those still working in other technical fields apply a significant amount of their mental effort to the application of computers to their primary field—at the expense of original thought.
One last reflection. How did Polaris come into being so quickly? One management concept was universal in the program: Polaris was a one-path program. Every technical phase was thoroughly studied before embarking on development. A path was selected, and that path was literally beaten into submission. There were alternate suppliers, but there were no backup programs. How does that compare with today’s programs where considerable effort goes into the backup programs which serve mainly to cover the lack of research study or whatever?
“Physical Fitness and the Naval Mission”
(See A. Webb and J. Pagani, pp. 95–97, February 1981 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Edwin H. Boutan. Jr., U. S. Navy—This article is both timely and innovative. The Navy promulgated OpNavInst 6110.1 directing the adoption of the aerobic points system on a personal level and the testing of all personnel for physical fitness at about the same time Webb/Pagani were writing their professional note. The OpNav instruction is a small step in the right direction, but we have a long way to go.
While the Marine Corps and some small Navy communities (divers, UDT) have recognized the importance of physical fitness for years, the rest of the service seems to take the view that unless the sailor is assigned to shore duty, there is not much that can be done. Most ships have an intramural program—often sporadic, depending upon a ship’s operating schedule, and some larger ships have weight rooms with Universal Gyms. However, the problem of poor physical fitness and poor health is not one of just facilities—it is an attitude problem as well.
The priority given to physical fitness has always been rock-bottom low. In fact, the shipboard “jock” may be castigated as a malingerer because of conflicts between working hours and team practices, competitions, etc. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that most regional level athletic competitions are conducted by Special Services personnel only during shipboard working hours, so that the person who desires to compete must first request leave or special liberty. Indeed, athletic activities are looked upon as man-hour drains in many cases.
Realistically, the commanding officer of a small combatant does not have the facilities or the time to promote physical conditioning of his crew. Further, good physical fitness habits start with the individual, and may be mandated by directive but will probably not be improved significantly by administrative measures. As with the dubiously effective and occasionally adhered to Weight Control Program, unless personal attitudes and habits are significantly altered, all we are presently doing is imposing another administrative burden upon ourselves.
Good personal habits and attitudes toward physical conditioning should begin in initial training (RTC, OCS, etc.) and should be carried through in general military training programs. Recruits are currently required to work out and run to get in shape—and have been for years—but are they given good instruction in lifetime health habits? Are they instructed that once they get out of boot camp or NROTC there will be no more required regular physical activity and that the responsibility for staying in good shape is theirs? More important, are the positive and beneficial effects of good physical fitness impressed upon them? Are they informed that once they are assigned to a ship they will often work 12-to 18-hour days when the main source of relief from the routine is the next meal?
Finally, are these sailors of the 1980s and 1990s told how quickly they may become overweight candidates for early heart trouble and many other problems in the process? Taking a look around our over-fed, sedentary Navy, the answer is obvious. We have a definite educational problem that cries for increased emphasis and enlightened leadership. And the problem is not just physical fitness—it is good health, of which physical fitness, weight control, drug and alcohol abuse, and stop smoking programs are all subsets.
“The German Navy Moves Out”
(See D. Alves, pp. 96–97, January 1981 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Victor Toyka, German Navy—As a former commanding officer of a “Type-206”–class submarine, it hurts to read that I was "to take advantage of the opportunities for hiding among the Danish islands.” This view indicates a sort of stationary concept of "hide and wait” which constitutes a clear contradiction to past and present strategy and tactics for attack submarines of all nations.
German submarines are to seek the enemy in areas where other German naval forces cannot easily operate and even penetrate the enemy’s own waters if necessary. Thereby they form the frontline of naval forward defense by operating in the relatively open waters of the central and eastern Baltic. Besides, the waters inside the Danish Straits and between the Danish islands are much too shallow and confined.
What Dr. Alves seems to misunderstand is last summer’s announcement concerning the extension of the German Navy’s area of operations. Until then, the line Dover-Calais and latitude 6l°N served as boundaries for the area of operations. These limitations, however, had not prevented German naval and naval air units from participating in maneuvers outside these waters on orders of NATO commanders after, in each single case, permission had been granted by the Federal Government. The partial lifting of these limitations with regard to 6l°N by the Federal Security Council merely gives NATO commanders more flexibility in planning and exercising command because special requests for the employment of naval units North of 6l°N are no longer necessary. It does give NATO and the German Navy a greater freedom of movement; it does not automatically extend the tasks for the navy which is already fully occupied with the present tasks in the defense of the northern flank. Therefore, neither a new shipbuilding program nor a new “focus on the resolution of new tasks” is to be expected.
“What If They ‘Pearl Harbor’ Our Merchantmen?”
(See C. W. Koburger, pp. 119–122, March 1981 Proceedings)
Edward J. Bender, Jr., National Security Planning Officer, U. S. Maritime Administration—Although I agree with Captain Koburger’s assertion that our merchant marine is highly vulnerable in any NATO reinforcement scenario, I cannot agree with his figures. As someone who works on the plans for the allocation of ships to reinforcement service, I affirm that we have many more suitable ships than the 50 to 150 that Captain Koburger believes that we have. Furthermore, we have negotiated arrangements with most of the NATO European maritime powers to supplement our merchant fleet for reinforcement support. The addition of these highly capable ships does not guarantee our success, but it does enhance our ability to get the job done.
“Thinking Offensively”
(See T. W. Parker, pp. 26-31, April 1981; T. Q. O’Rourke, p. 21, June 1981 Proceedings)
Commander Harlan K. Ullman, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS DuPont (DD-941)—Commander Parker is clearly an intelligent, competent, and concerned naval officer with his finger °n the pulse of a major problem. But a large part of that problem is reflected by the “traditional” thought which adjudged this essay to be a prize winner and contributed, unwittingly perhaps, to the malaise which always seems to favor problem identification (with some bemoaning) over problem solution.
Don’t get me wrong; there is nothing inherently sinful about “thinking offensively,” provided one is also thinking clearly and properly at the same time. Perhaps neither Vince Lombardi nor Karl von Clausewitz would have agreed with the sentiment which
always favored the offense (neither did!), and perhaps if Admiral Halsey could have refought Leyte Gulf he might have done things differently. But, historical examples can demonstrate anything except accurately predicting the future, and certainly, “thinking offensively” is a catchy phrase which, no doubt, will be with us for a while.
The problem is defining exactly what that phrase should and does mean.
If, by thinking offensively, one means planning and practicing to destroy or to neutralize an adversary at sea, that is one thing. If thinking offensively means focusing on the ability only to project power and reach, then it is off mark. The key is to balance the best of Admiral Spruance at Midway and the Philippine Sea (clearly called “defensive” operations and so criticized) with the best of Admiral Halsey’s aggressive spirit (Guadalcanal and the Formosan strikes) so that when and if one has to strike offensively, it is done at the proper moment, applied to the proper point (or points) and with sufficient force to ensure victory.
Commander Parker’s article fails to strike that balance. We are asked to believe that a national policy deterrence has led to the military application of defensive thinking, and for the Navy, the way out of this apparent constraint is through transformation of the surface force into a Harpoon-/Tomahawk-equipped battle group ready to steam in harm’s way. Well, maybe, but to do what?
The first point I would ask the Naval Institute readership to consider in thinking properly rather than only offensively is exactly what range of tasks we expect our Navy to carry out. There is nothing I would like better than to fit my ship with Harpoon and Tomahawk. But, that isn’t going to help me one whit against the Soviet Navy’s "Victor,” “Charlie,” “Alfa,” or even old “Foxtrot” submarines, nor are my capabilities improved against “Backfires,” various air-to-surface missiles, and even the old “Badgers,” unless, with my Tomahawk, I have land attack versions with large nuclear warheads and can use them against the Soviet homeland. Now, that really would be thinking offensively and probably expensively as well, because in a selfish sense, I’m not certain how good my chances of survival are in closing Soviet land targets to within the Tomahawk’s range (either 300 or 1,000 miles), particularly in conditions of a nuclear war.
Second, by thinking offensively, I would hope we would not discard the defensive aspect of conflict which Clausewitz, after all, believed was the strongest form of war. (I realize Clausewitz is extraordinarily silent on the subject of navies.) By that, one strategy
to consider might be luring or allowing the Soviets to overextend their lines of communications, as in the Indian Ocean where their endurance is certainly not good, and then severing those lines—while certainly not an inherently offensive plan, it is possibly a successful one.
Third, we ought to think more imaginatively about how we can operate what we have in today’s inventory besides automatically castigating the wicked programmers and budgeteers for coming up with too little, too late. For example, for all the talk of thinking offensively, when is the last time (or ' first time) we assembled a truly offensively capable force, say three or four carrier battle groups, and gave that force a go in coordinated operations?
The simple and easy answer, which H. L. Mencken used to say guaranteed one’s position invariably as being wrong, is not only to think offensively, but to just think a bit harder and with a bit more latitude before consigning ourselves to a strategic box of unduly confining proportions.
“Solving the Nuclear Submarine Officer Manning Problem”
(See A. H. Konetzni, pp. 89–91, February 1981; H. B. Estabrooks, pp. 83–85, June 1981 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander S. J. B annul-U. S. Navy, NROTC Unit, Virginia Military Institute—Commander Konetzni’s feature on submarine officer retention was both interesting and informative. At the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), we are extremely lucky to have one of the nine nuclear-trained junior officers assigned to NROTC duty on our staff and have enjoyed good success in providing accessions to the nuclear navy. However, this officer is scheduled to rotate this summer with a non-nuclear officer as his replacement. All the naval officers on the VMI NROTC staff realize the importance, and actively promote the nuclear program, and consider motivation of prospective nuclear officers as their highest priority. Unfortunatelym future student questions about submarines or nuclear power will have to be answered by surface officers or aviators who have little feel for submarines and nuclear power. In addition, the failure to assign a nuclear-trained relief may cause an NROTC student perception of Navy deemphasis of nuclear power.
This future lack of nuclear power visibility at numerous NROTC units interrelates with another problem only partially addressed by Commander Konetzni: midshipmen summer cruises. It is disheartening to have eight or ten qualified and motivated midshipmen request a submarine cruise and have only one or two so assigned. If, as Commander Konetzni states, midshipmen should only be assigned to subs which can provide individual attention, it appears safe to assume that billets for these cruises will decrease in the future.
This situation, however, may provide an opportunity to increase the nuclear/submarine knowledge of the non-nuclear NROTC officer and hopefully increase instructor responsiveness to students’ nuclear questions. If midshipmen cruise billets are not available because of restricted operations or conflicts with midshipmen cruise periods (most mid cruise periods are about one month in length), billets should be made available for NROTC officers. These billets would provide basic information on operations and procedures, require little preparation on the part of the submarine officers and, most importantly, not decrease midshipmen billets. The benefits to the officer, both as an NROTC instructor and in future fleet assignments, and to his students would be tremendous.
The submarine force can greatly help the NROTC units improve students’ perceptions of the nuclear/submarine program at minimal cost by increasing midshipmen summer cruise billets, improving midshipmen summer cruise training, and providing sub cruise billets for volunteer non-nuclear NROTC officers. An NROTC unit that emphasizes and provides correct nuclear power career information, combined with a submarine force that is responsive to the needs of the midshipmen, can go a long way in provides an answer to the submarine manning problem.
“Their New Cruiser”
(See J. W. Kehoe and K. S. Brower, pp. 121–126, December 1980; N. Polmar, p. 83, January 1981; E. J. Grove, pp. 71–74, February 1981; E. Bonsignore, p. 86, April 1981 Proceedings)
Captain J. W. Kehoe, U. S. Navy, and K. S. Brower—We have several thoughts regarding Mr. Bonsignore’s suggestion that the Kirov has a gas turbine boost plant. When a Soviet ship which uses diesel marine fuel lights off a gas turbine engine, there generally is a puff of white smoke lasting five to ten seconds. The Kirov was observed emitting five dark black puffs of black smoke, each of which was of 20-25 seconds’ duration, with about 60–90 seconds between puffs. This pattern is the classic signature of a steam-powered ship, which uses a low-grade oil for fuel, blowing her tubes. Furthermore, the Kirov does not have the large air intakes that are re quired for gas turbines. Also the Kirov's stack is not configured for temperature reduction, and it exhausts aft, not straight up. In summary, the Kirov is not configured like other Soviet gas turbine-powered ships.
Conventional steam and nuclear power can be used together several ways. It is possible to provide conventional and nuclear steam plants which power separate screws. However, since the Kirov apparently has only two shafts, this is unlikely. A conventional steam plant could also operate in parallel with a nuclear plant. In this case, each plant could power separate turbines. For twin-screw ships, the power of the nuclear and conventionally powered turbines could then be combined through a reduction gear. This would provide redundancy but would require a very complex machinery system. Alternatively, it is also technically feasible to use an oil-fired superheater to superheat the steam generated by a nuclear reactor. (See the accompanying figure.) This could theoretically provide about 50% to 55% more power than could be generated by the reactors alone. The fuel rate of an oil-fired superheater would be about one-half that of typical gas turbines. This concept does not provide redundancy, since the superheater could not provide propulsive power by itself. However, this concept does provide additional power in a simple way, with a very low specific fuel consumption rate. It is this type of system that we believe is used in the Kirov.
The most interesting feature of the Kirov’s propulsion plant—whatever the actual concept used—is the fact that the Soviets have combined conventional and nuclear propulsion in a surface ship for the first time. Combining a nuclear propulsion plant with either a superheater or a conventional propulsion plant may provide attractive cost benefits. This is an area worthy of additional study.
(See T. B. Buell, pp. 40–45, January 1981; R. A. Dun, p. 21, February 1981; J. R. McDonnell, p. 15, March 1981; J. T. Hayward, pp. 21–23, April 1981; J. E. Lacouture, pp. 77–79, June 1981 Proceedings)
Captain Alan T. Isaacson, U. S. Navy, NROTC Unit, The Ohio State University—As a graduate of and former Strategy Department faculty member at the Naval War College, I found Commander Buell’s article extremely interesting and would like to add my congratulations to those of Admiral J. T. Hayward for his fine job of exposing “the tip of the iceberg” as regards our Navy's position on naval education and professional development.
Although educational policies need reexamination at all stages of professional development, I will restrict my comments to problems at the senior service college level and use the perceived relevance, or irrelevance, of the College of Naval Warfare at the Naval War College as my primary example. It is interesting that the Naval War
College generally is regarded as the most rigorous of the five senior service colleges and has the reputation, at least outside the Navy, of being a first-rate graduate-level school. Tradition and the perceived need to pay lip service to the benefits of a broad education for senior officers have placed the Naval War College in the position of an estranged wife from whom a divorce is impossible: although not liked or appreciated, grudging support must still be rendered. What seems to be wrong here? Could it be that the Naval War College is thought to produce unpromotable officers? Could it be the Navy's policy is to send only those who are not really contenders for flag rank? Is the Navy anti-intellectual? It is time we discussed these questions.
Commander Buell properly points out the low correlation between attending a war college and subsequent promotions. But the situation probably is worse than even he realizes. For example, using flag selections for 1978 he noted that only 8 of 31 selectees had attended a service college of any type. Had he looked further, he would have found that only three of this group were graduates of a senior service college and that none were graduates of the College of Naval Warfare at our own Naval War College! Such statistics are sobering and show clearly that we are in an era in the Navy which puts a premium on the technical and tactical aspects of our profession but discounts the value of preparing the mind to cope with such important matters as strategy and force structure. The obvious conclusion for naval officers to draw is that while it is a good thing to be screened to attend a senior service college, it is not good actually to attend.
Because "hot runners” are thought to be "too busy” to “take time out” for a year of senior service college education, the naval officers found in such courses are capable and educable, but they are not the ones who ultimately will be in charge of our service and its policies. Perhaps we can justify the situation by assuming the graduates, if not destined for flag rank and the top jobs themselves, at least will make use of their educational experience by serving on the staffs of those who did not attend. While this might be true, it will not prove a source of motivation for those attending such courses, and it still leaves the problem of having our top leadership well trained but poorly educated. Along this line, I once heard a Deputy CNO comment that one of his biggest problems was having officers work for him who, although bright and technically competent, had their political educations end somewhere around the eighth grade. I fear the situation he described is worsening.
I see no solution to the problem at the senior service college level unless the “hot runners” are given some incentive to attend as part of their career development. To provide this incentive, it probably will be necessary to code some of our key policy billets as requiring a senior service college education or even take the drastic step of making attendance at such a college a requirement for promotion to flag rank.
For the present, those naval officers who do attend a senior service college will do well with regard to promotion to O-6, but I am convinced that this promotion is based on the prior record of performance and has little to do with attending a senior service college. Given present attitudes, it is even possible that attendance at best has a neutral effect on promotability and might even have a negative effect. This is an area which merits more study.
If graduating from a senior service college does not aid promotability or enhance the opportunity for assignment to desirable billets, it makes one wonder why so few naval officers exercise the option of declining the opportunity to attend such courses. No advanced degree is available, and about the only benefit derived by the student is the self-satisfaction of having broadened the mind. Now that the tip of the iceberg is exposed, it would not surprise me to see more and more naval officers perform a personal cost-benefit
analysis and decide to forgo the “opportunity” to attend a senior service college, and particularly one in an area such as Newport which necessitates an additional move. At least, National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces can be tacked on to either end of a tour in Washington and thereby avoid the problems associated with an extra move. For the hapless student assigned to the College of Naval Warfare in Newport, the additional move will be a necessity and will involve such things as placing one’s teenaged children in three school systems in three years, the probable loss of a spouse’s income, living in cramped temporary quarters for a year, and the knowledge that none of this will have benefit in terms of follow-on assignments or promotability. Typically coming from a rigorous command tour where dependents might have felt neglected, our student will find himself immersed in a demanding academic environment which, though valuable and interesting, leaves little time for ministering to the needs of disgruntled dependents. The picture is bleak, but that is the way it is. It is not a year to rest and “recharge batteries” as is so often perceived by our leaders who did not attend.
I am not against senior service college education. Instead, I call for it to be brought back into the mainstream of professional development and to have attendance associated with enhanced opportunities for follow-on assignments and promotion. I also am calling to have our own Naval War College be recognized as the fine educational institution it really is and for the Navy to make use of it by sending our very best people to it. The time has come to revamp our attitudes toward the role of education at all levels of career development, and making proper use of our own senior service college would be a good beginning.
“Asian Navies”
(See H. Sekino and S. Seno, pp. 52–59, March 1981 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander D. David Davies, Royal New Zealand Navy—There are some inaccuracies in the section of the “International Navies Issue” with regard to the Royal New Zealand Navy which I would like to correct. HMNZS Taranaki’s role has changed to that of a resource protection and training ship. In order that she should be better fitted to suit this role, the New Zealand Government has approved an extension of life/conversion program which will be carried out at HMNZ Dockyard, Devonport, Auckland. This work will include replacement of her steam propulsion system by gas turbine engines, the fitting of a helicopter hangar and flight deck, increasing accommodation and training facilities, and the redesign of the funnel to accommodate the air intakes required for the new propulsion system.
While the planned maintenance of the younger Leander-class frigates is of course an ongoing matter, there are, as yet, no plans to re-engine the Canterbury. However, the modernization of her weapon suite is being investigated by the Naval Staff.
A replacement vessel for the 21-year old HMNZS Otago is the subject of current considerations both by the Royal New Zealand Navy and the New Zealand Government.
“Counterinsurgency: Corrupting Concept”
(See W. F. Long, pp. 56–64, April 1979; J. C. Snedeker, pp. 86–87, July 1979; H. McCaffrey, pp. 94–96, August 1979; C. J. L. T. Kovacs, pp. 78–80, November 1979 Proceedings)
“What Future for Special Forces?”
(See D. Fitzgerald and F. A. Messing, pp. 21–23, November 1980; J. Courter, p. 67, February 1981 Proceedings)
Captain Phillip Howell, U. S. Army, Area Specialist Officer, Special Forces Detachment (Airborne) Europe—The counterinsurgency chimera described by Colonel Long appears to be raising its head again with the worsening situation and our involvement in El Salvador. If possible, the internal situation in that country is even less conducive to the conduct of foreign internal defense (the current term for counterinsurgency) by a third party then was the case in Vietnam. The unconventional warfare situation in El Salvador is much like a three-ring circus, with the junta headed by Jose Duarte as the much abused ring master. The leftist insurgents have recently banded together, because of pressure from Cuba, and control great tracts of the countryside. The rightist insurgents are headed and funded by the leading 14 families of the Salvadorian elite and fight not only the left but practice terrorism on the uncommitted masses as well. Standing in the middle of the guerrilla war is the Salvadorian Army, a fighting force incapable of defeating the left and often being used by the right to carry out terrorism in the rural and urban areas.
As Colonel Long pointed out, the history of foreign internal defense has been a long list of non-successes when the defense has been conducted by a third party. History further shows that even foreign internal defense actions conducted by external countries holding political power over the affected area have in the end been forced into eventual compromise with the insurgents. This form of second-party involvement saw the United Kingdom grant Malaysia its independence at the end of the Malaysian Emergency; as France was forced into the same compromise in Algeria. Admittedly, these counterinsurgencies were conducted by colonial powers, but the point of history is that even direct control over all aspects of the counter-guerrilla campaign did not produce a winning situation, and though never losing on the battlefield to the insurgents, both countries were forced from their respective colonies.
The United States would be better off following former U. S. Ambassador to El Salvador White’s line of reasoning by expending all efforts to work with the junta in El Salvador through diplomatic and economic means before it seeks an active military role in that country’s internal defense. The nature of the guerrilla war is so little understood at the moment that a viable plan for the foreign internal defense of the country cannot be formulated. The old and worn-out battle cry against Communist infiltration into Latin America has little reality in the leftist resistance movements of the region. The fact that the Catholic clergy is one of the most militant cadres in Latin America, vociferously calling for the downfall of all repressive regimes, militates for a closer look at the human factors behind the widespread leftist resistance movements than by simply viewing them as Communist and resurrecting visions of Fidel and Che leading the faithful to victory. The U. S. State Department should reread Pope John Paul’s statement made in Latin America during his visit there cautioning clerical involvement in anti-governmental movements. While Communism is a factor in Latin America, a successful U. S. foreign policy for the region must include an anti-rightist stance as well. In El Salvador, as well as other countries of the region, the extreme right is just as dangerous and conducts terrorism on as large a scale as does the left and is just as destabilizing to both the country and to vital U. S. interests.
A more viable policy option for the United States in the current situation would be the combination of Ambassador White’s prescription with Secretary Haig’s stance of keeping pressure on Cuba to stay out of the internal affairs of Latin America. Rather than direct U. S. military involvement in El Salvador, this approach would allow a cordon sanitaire to be effected by the United States around the country while allowing for economic aid, in conjunction with the junta’s reform measures, to take effect in the countryside where the leftist guerrilla activity is most pervasive. A purely military situation, with an anti-Communist rhetoric, will bring no laurels our way and would only further damage the internal situation. The guerrilla war there is based on economic problems, not ideology.
Coming to the aid of an ally suffering from internal resistance movements is a long and drawn out campaign which has no easy or quick military solution. It must be a delicate combination of the correct civil action operations linked with the counter-guerrilla ground campaign. This combination must also have the correct amount of political pressure applied on the host country to effect the necessary political reforms to rectify the human factors behind the guerrilla movement. The question is whether the United States is politically and militarily capable of going the entire route for an effective foreign internal defense. Recent history indicates it is not.
I agree with Colonel Long that counterinsurgency as a strategy is a corrupting concept, but it is still the only operative method of combating unconventional warfare available to U. S. decision-makers. The U. S. Army has attempted to rationalize this capability on a more realistic basis than in the past and has worked out some of the defects found during the long involvement in Vietnam. I take exception to Colonel Long’s view on the use of U. S. Army Special Forces in foreign internal defense. Though in the early 1960s the Special Forces was trained and equipped primarily for conducting guerrilla operations, it has since the end of the Vietnam War changed its operational doctrine. Special Forces now has three basic missions: unconventional warfare, special operations, and foreign internal defense. There have been significant changes in the doctrine of foreign internal defense since Vietnam, and the Special Forces role in such operations is no longer the old “A” camp concept denigrated by Colonel Long. In the early 1970s, the Institute for Military Assistance was formed at Fort Bragg. This command combines under one headquarters all of the assets necessary for the conduct of foreign internal defense short of massive ground force intervention. It combines civil action, psychological operations, and security assistance units, as well as the 5th and 7th Special Forces Groups, into a unified command that can function as a joint command with sister services on an as needed basis.
Foreign internal defense is now envisioned being conducted on the mobile training team concept, with civil action and psychological operation teams working with the Special Forces operational detachments conducting the actual defense training. The current doctrine stresses the training aspect rather than the advisory concept of the past. The Security Assistance Management Office, part of the Institute for Military Assistance, has the mission of configuring the internal security assistance training package. The form of this training package will take into account the internal situation of the host country as well as any peculiar cultural or historical factors the assisted country may have. The Special Forces Operational Detachment, the old "A" team of Vietnam history, is the training team of the assistance package. The new concept uses the detachment as an advanced, small-unit, training team to train the military personnel of the host country in the conduct of counter-guerrilla operations. A Special Forces liaison team may also be formed to assist and train headquarters elements in the conduct of these forms of operations on a larger scale. This concept does not envision using detachment members the way advisors were used in the past, because once the training mission is judged to be accomplished, the operational detachment is withdrawn. This concept is more rationale and workable than was the advisory concept used in Vietnam, and though it has never been tested in combat, it is more attuned to the internal situation of the host country through the joining of the training team with civil actions and psychological operations teams. This precludes much of the politicization of the advisor that Colonel Long described as happening in Vietnam. Unfortunately, as the feature by Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Messing on Special Forces in the November issue noted, the Special Forces is both undermanned and overlooked by the rest of the U. S. Army, and its role in foreign internal defense much misunderstood by the pundits in the Pentagon. The Special Forces, however, because it is an elite force, is up to the job, and if the United States does decide to become directly involved in El Salvador, the Special Forces will bear much of the responsibility for the military assistance training there.
“The F-18 Hornet: Did the Navy Get Stung?”
(See A. Hanley, pp. 116–118, April 1981; D. Holley, p. 24 June 1981 Proceedings)
John E. Jenista—As a proponent of the F-16, I take exception to Mr. Hanley’s opinion of the airplane as expressed in his article. In addition, when discussing alternatives for the Marine Corps’ F-4 replacement in the footnotes, Mr. Hanley makes a number of strong statements about the F-16 which I challenge.
To begin with, he calls the F-16 “very expensive,” when the facts indicate that it is by far the most economical of the current production fighter airplanes. Mr. Hanley refers to an offer to sell F-15S at a price comparable to the F-16. However, he has ignored all of the special conditions and caveats of that deal and is thus comparing apples to oranges. There are many ways to compare prices, but one that should be significant is what the customer pays when he is actually buying. According to Aviation Week, our government this year (1982 budget) is paying a flyaway cost of: $34.1 million each for F-i8s; $34.2 million each for F-14s; $27.9 million each for F-15s; and only $14.0 million each for F-16S. By what logic is half the cost of the competition “very expensive?”
For the claim that the F-16 is “less maneuverable,” facts show that the F-18 is limited to 8-G instantaneous load factor. The F-16 is allowed and can sustain 9-Gs, which is higher than any of the fighters mentioned above. Further, because of the unusual “heels high” seating position, a pilot in an F-16 can remain conscious and fight at a higher load factor than pilots in airplanes with a more conventional seating position.
The comment about the F-16 being “hard to land” is difficult to understand, since the flying qualities are built into the fly-by-wire control system. If Mr. Hanley means that it is hard to fly a carrier approach, he could be right, since that was not a requirement for the current system. Changing the F-16’s handling qualities, however, is no more involved than designing some changes to circuit cards in the flight control system.
The comment that really hurt was that the F-16 is “a daylight VFR-only fighter.” These words were the ground rules for the development of the YF-16 prototype, but the production F-16 is a fighter-bomber with a considerable capability at night or in weather. The F-16 radar is better in every respect than the radar in the F-4—and the Phantom has been "all weather” from the very
beginning. The F-16 carries AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles which, Mr. Hanley must admit, work as well at night as they do in the daytime. In the air-to-ground mode, the radar and the inertial navigation equipment provide a very good weapons delivery capability, including blind bombing. The radar capabilities are such that the U. S. Customs Service in recent years has been using F-16 radars mounted in business jets to track down smugglers trying to fly illegal cargoes into the United States. This is hardly daylight VFR performance.
A number of improvements are in the works for the F-16. Instead of the AIM-7 Sparrow, which has been successfully fired both subsonically and supersonically from the F-16, the F-16 is scheduled to receive the advanced air-to-air missile (AMRAAM) which is a generation beyond the AIM-7. The F-16 radar is being made even better with a dual-mode transmitter for increased detection and lock-on ranges, and a programmable signal processor which will add a target-sorting and classification capability, improve air-to-surface resolution, and pave the way (or synthetic aperture techniques" something just recently added to the A-6. The F-16 is also scheduled to receive a system which will add terrain-following, infrared, and laser target designator capabilities. With these improvements, the F-16 will have an attack capability equal to anything that flies today and an air-to-air capability that is surpassed by only the AIM-54Phoenix missile system in the F-14.
Mr. Hanley’s statement that the F-16 “is much less capable than the F-18” does not stand up to scrutiny' Beyond the capabilities already described, range-payload comparisons to the two airplanes show that with most payloads of tactical significance the F-16 has achieved greater ranges than the F-18 has been able to demonstrate thus far. The F-16 also features less fuel consumption and a smaller radar cross-section than the competition. Far from being “not a viable alternative,’’ the F-16 deserves a prominent place on the list of cost-effective candidates for the Marine Corps.
“Commitment . . . A Focus For Leadership”
(See M. A. Coleman, pp. 72–73, August 1980; R. S. Dearth, pp. 102–106, October 1980; R. S. Bloch, p. 82, January 1981 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) W. S. Devey, U. S. Navy—Having been in the Navy for more than 13 years and progressing from a Bluejacket pushing aircraft on the flight deck to the wearing of a gold chin strap, I get annoyed when people, particularly Navy people, suggest that “today’s sailor” would go the other way when “the going got tough.” Anyone who believes that statement is naive, an eternal pessimist, or ignorant of the capabilities and accomplishments of today’s fleet sailor.
Virtually every sailor has the ability to perform superhuman feats when required. Jobs are not accomplished through coddling or pampering but through discipline, leadership by example, and understanding. 1 strongly suggest to Lieutenant Bloch and other "disciples of doom” that if you’re not satisfied with your own little area of responsibility, change it!
I do find it encouraging to hear people say that they are going to be more professional and take more pride in themselves and in the Navy. Welcome back folks; many of us have been anxiously awaiting your return.
“Preserving the Atlantic Alliance”
(See H. D. Train, pp. 24–28, January 1981 Proceedings)
David Kenney-Admiral Train has properly focused on Europe as the nexus of our Navy’s military problem. No other region offers such potential for disaster. America could lose its national integrity on the north European plain in 72 hours of combat.
Although the admiral does remark that the Soviet Navy could not endure a lengthy fight at sea, he fails to note that Gorshkov’s ships are not meant to fight a long war. The Soviet Navy was designed to hold brief tactical dominance over a maritime area in order to attain a higher military or political goal—the safe passage of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.
The suggestion that an Indian Ocean task force protects our oil supply stands as wishful thinking. Many non-naval forces for hire by second-level countries or political entities can destroy the pumps, computers, power supplies, and people upon whom the flow of oil depends. No navy can stop a few dozen desperate persons from using sophisticated hand-held weapons, on land, to deactivate any refinery on the Persian Gulf. Then too, mines mock the best-intentioned maritime plan. Their rumored presence can delay the shipment of oil for months. The posture of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean has ceased to be a critical issue. This will remain true as long as no navy can assure the transport of oil to Japan and the West.
The admiral’s discussion suffers from an incomplete perception of the Soviet Navy’s origins. Russia’s aims differ from ours. Gorshkov has built a navy, centered on submarines, to meet Russia’s goals. He did not assemble the fleet many Western analysts believed proper for entrance into big-navy status. The author’s attempt to put the Soviet and U. S. navies into a balanced or rather unbalanced equation is fallacious. This misstep leads the discussion into an inadvertency about carriers; on the contrary, we do not hold superiority over the Soviet Navy because we possess the CVs the Soviets presently lack. The construction of more U. S. CVs will not increase our superiority.
It is seldom noted that Russia can be construed as a large CV deck. Soviet Navy “Backfires" can cover most operating areas from bases in the north and from Sevastopol. Russia’s interior lines permit the redeployment into battle of most Soviet Navy long-range aircraft far sooner than the U. S. Pacific Fleet CVs can swing to the North Atlantic. Now, long-range tactical aircraft can fly combat missions to the west of Ireland. Moreover, the nuclear-powered cruiser Kirov's 500-kilometer surface-to-surface missiles can keep Western CVs a respectful distance from high-value targets.
Recent political events render Admiral Train’s view on the influence of sea power far too sanguine. Naval power did nothing to prevent the takeover of a littoral state like Angola. Nor could ships prevent the disaster in Eritrea where Soviet naval forces were instrumental in consolidating a regime hostile to the West. Today, Libya is the most destabilizing force in Africa. Libya is a coastal country of little naval prominence but vast economic power which perpetrates its shenanigans under the helpless gaze of the U. S. Sixth Fleet. Libya’s role in the recent fall of Chad, a malignant event in Africa’s evolution, was in no way susceptible to naval influence.
Nasty spats in the Third World do not respond to the application of the kinds of strength navies bring to bear. The social and moral dimensions of conflict make up the largest part of armed strife. Ho Chi Minh and Admiral Stockdale knew this well.
The most distressing lack in this article is the absence of a clear link between national objectives and specific naval forces. We are not shown the telling logic which will compel doubting policymakers to weave naval power into the main threads of American foreign policy. This is what must be done.
The need for military strength is axiomatic. Its absence is manifested by the lack of a rationalized navy. This suggests a failure of national resolve to own a navy sufficient for self-preservation. That is the greatest truth in Admiral Train’s statement.
“U. S. Strategic Options in the Persian Gulf”
(See M. O. Johnson, pp. 53–59, February 1981; C. W. Bond, pp. 19–20, April 1981 Proceedings)
Captain Richard A. Stewart, U. S, Marine Corps—Major Johnson clearly indicates that the principal threat to the security of the Persian Gulf is direct Soviet military intervention. His solution to deterring a potential Soviet invasion of this vital region is the creation of a regional collective security system which would combine the military capabilities of the various pro-Western Persian Gulf states and be backed up by the rapid reaction U. S. Airborne and Marine Corps units that are part of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). While his proposal has merit, it also involves potential pitfalls and misunderstandings.
With regard to creating a collective security system in the Persian Gulf, it should be noted that the six Arab states of the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait) have already undertaken the first steps by establishing a Gulf Cooperation Council. This council is headed by a joint directorate which will determine a unified strategy for improving regional security. The Saudi Defense Minister, Prince Sultan, is viewed as the driving force behind the elaborate security program currently being designed. Three aspects of the Gulf defense strategy were outlined in a recent article by Patrick Seale in the Observer (London). These were;
- Improving and coordinating the land, air, and sea defenses of the oil fields and terminals to include installing expensive early warning systems and antiaircraft missiles, as well as manned perimeter defenses.
- Closely examining the vulnerability of existing facilities with the intention of placing some facilities underground and stockpiling critical items such as pumps and turbines that cannot be purchased “off the shelf.”
- Building strategic pipelines that bypass the Strait of Hormuz.
While such a joint strategy is within the capability of the Gulf Council members and would certainly improve security against potential air or terrorist attacks by some of the Gulf's more radical Moslem neighbors, the security pact is unlikely to deter a determined invasion by a large, well-equipped Soviet army.
The combined military capabilities of the various Gulf states are unimpressive compared with the types of forces the Soviets could muster. The various Gulf military establishments together possess only a few brigades and squadrons, along with a negligible number of small ships for coastal defense. Their military units are badly understrength in many instances (because of a shortage of manpower), are overequipped (with weapons often too technical for the personnel charged with their operation and maintenance), and, in many cases, inadequately trained and led. An extraordinary number of the officers, NCOS, and soldiers in these armies are expatriates from other Arab armies working essentially as mercenaries because of the higher pay offered by the wealthy Gulf states. To complicate the problem, there is little in the way of weapons and equipment interoperability because of independent procurement systems that acquire arms from a variety of sources. There are also problems of traditional tribal rivalries and distrust which must be overcome.
It would be difficult to precisely assess how such a disparate group of forces would react to the reality of numerous Soviet divisions advancing in their direction. In the case of the Soviet invasion of northern Iran in 1941, the much-touted Iranian Army of the late Shah’s father collapsed and fled without firing a shot. Consequently, the existence of a Persian Gulf collective security system cannot obviate the need for an increased U. S. presence in the region or a better ability to project power into the region.
In this regard, light U. S. reaction forces are probably not in themselves a sufficient deterrent to Soviet aggression. Major Johnson’s discussion of the RDF leads the reader to believe that the Marine Corps and Airborne forces constitute the bulk of the RDF. While this may have been true at one point, the RDF has been rapidly enlarged to include a significant number of heavy armor and mechanized forces from the Army. However, unlike the case with the Marine Corps and the Airborne, we have not yet adequately solved the problem of how these heavy forces would be rapidly deployed into the Persian Gulf region. Yet, these forces are vital to creating a credible deterrent because they are the only forces really capable of nullifying a large-scale Soviet advance. The combination of only disparate local Arab forces, light U. S. Airborne forces, and a limited number of Marine Corps units is neither a solution nor a credible option. Perhaps we need a larger and more capable Marine Corps wedded to a larger amphibious fleet or a greater capability to transport heavy Arm)' forces by merchant shipping and strategic airlift. In either case, what we need most, as former Under Secretary of Defense Robert W. Komer indicates, is a “bigger, better and more rapid response.”
Arthur L. Market—Mr. Polmar ably reviewed the problems associated with the Trident and MX programs. He also offers some options to these programs. I would like to propose another.
A hundred or more miles off our shores, beyond the continental shelf, lies the outer continental slope which drops rather steeply to the ocean floor several miles deep. This outer margin is ridged and canyoned in highly irregular contours and is a great place to hide a strategic missile. The area is not used by the fishing, oil, or surface transport industries. It is relatively unreachable by the Soviet military capabilities of today. Even their sophisticated oceanographic "fishing” vessels would fail to find a relatively small deeply submerged platform resting silently among the outcropped ruggedness of this unfriendly sector of the ocean.
To illustrate a point, last summer, a small group of well-equipped ocean scientists searched for the Titanic in deep water south of the Newfoundland coast. Using a highly advanced special-purpose sensor, attempts to locate and identify the 44,000-ton iron monster were unfruitful. After surveying several hundred miles of sea bottom, about 13,000 feet deep, the 900-foot long vessel remains hidden in the natural undulations and irregularities of the supposedly "flat” seafloor.
The progress made in undersea technology during the past decade illustrates that a deep seafloor mobile MX missile base system need not be developmentally prolonged or astronomically expensive. Selectively positioned and moored among the outer margin seafloor features, a deep submergence base should not require the expending of large amounts of its stored conventional energy for propulsion. Because it would rest on the seafloor, the size and capacity of the propulsive system could be minimized, thereby allowing concentration °n silent staying power for life support, missile systems, and other less energy intensive needs. A quiet seafloor-supported platform would require a much smaller crew and could remain “on station” much longer (perhaps well in excess of 60 days) than the shallow underwater missile (SUM) submarine mentioned in Mr. Polmar’s column. The "seabed deterrent” could change its navigational location precisely, discriminately, and stealthily, at will. Using buoyancy to adjust altitude of horizontal location, it could pop-up to perform logistics operations or launch missiles. There is no need for defensive weapons or constantly patrolling ASW umbrella forces which greatly boost the costs of the shallow underwater missile concept.
Of all our present deterrents, a deep submergence one should be the most survivable, even assuming a Soviet superiority in numbers of nuclear-powered oceangoing deeper-diving or faster combat submarines. A seabed deterrent is a land-based system underwater requiring no site hardening, major civilian defense measures, roadbeds, or new defensive networks. It does not use productive land or create fallout hazards to adjacent states. Its flexibility appears as good as the surface control of the seas, whether exclusively adjacent to our shores or deployed on other friendly continental margins of the world. Such a system would have the use of an infinite number of valleys in no man's land. The environmental impact should be about zero. There is no public interface. From a public point of view, neither friendly nor unfriendly missiles would be drawn to the heartland of our country.
To be sure, there are only a very few precedents in deep submergence capability upon which to evaluate the technical risk associated with this proposal. One precedent is the Reynolds deep submersible Aluminaut which is of an unconventional pressure hull design that appears well suited to economical scale-up to the size of the submersible hulls considered for the shallow underwater missile concept. The use of aluminum would maintain payload and deep depth capabilities. It is with the experience gained from operations conducted with this submersible that the deep submergence deterrent concept outlined here was developed. This vessel, whose hull approximates the size of an MX missile pod, could be made available to the Defense Department to allow the further investigation of various design, fabrication, and operational criteria of the concept should it be deemed appropriate and prudent.
There is no apparent reason why such a system could not be ready to provide an incremental deterrent capability in the late 1980s. 1 hope that it is not too late for the Defense Department to thoroughly investigate the real potential of this possibility.
“Future Antisubmarine Weapons”
(See T. B. Buell, pp. 104–106, November 1980 Proceedings)
Captain W. R. Rube, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Tom Buell mapped out the general specifications for the advanced lightweight torpedo (ALWT). The Navy has thrown the development of this weapon into the laps of competing contractors and said: “You put it together, and this is what we require of it.” But can it be done?
Here’s what the Navy says: It must be similar in size to the Mk-46 torpedo so it will be compatible with the P-3, S-3, and LAMPS-III; be significantly faster (about 55 knots?) than the fast Soviet nuclear submarine; be of sufficiently long-range endurance (about 8-10 minutes?) so it can catch a fleeing submarine in a tail chase if the target is detected at the outer limits of the ALWTs sonar; have a passive capability to detect target noise and a powerful active sonar for long-range detection of the target; be able to counter the target’s countermeasures; do its job with little assistance from the launch platform and finally “swoop in for the kill." The word “kill” is emphasized because, with all these givens, it doesn’t sound as though there can be enough remaining space and weight for a warhead which can produce a high, single-hit kill probability on a Soviet double-hulled nuclear submarine. (Even a “mission kill” seems improbable.)
The Soviets have made nuclear submarines “the main arm” of their navy. As such, they can be expected to be hard targets—i.e., difficult to kill with a single hit.
Perhaps the ALWT should be regarded in a different fashion. An initial ALWT hit might be designed to tear a big chunk out of a submarine's outer hull, creating great drag and slowing the submarine down to a
manageable speed. Perhaps at least two ALWTs would have to be used in each attack; one which might cause the submarine to flee away from it, the second to be dropped ahead of the fleeing submarine to attack it forward of the beam.
To ensure a “hit” might become the driving criterion for such a limited size warhead weapon. This would probably produce a different kind of warhead design as well as a different logic for the torpedo’s terminal attack.
As a former submariner, I would attest to the fact that the most worrisome and difficult to counter antisubmarine weapon was one which was covert in delivery and attack. If detections on submarines are made passively, why shouldn’t the ALWT be a very quiet weapon which can home passively on its intended victim?
Perhaps by going for a hit rather than a “kill,” the weapon can be designed for early realization.