Since 1941, more than 85% of the ordnance expended by U. S. naval forces has been against land targets. One can only speculate on the need for sea-based land bombardment in the future. One must question, however, the capability of the Navy to contribute to land combat operations (invasion or withdrawals), as was the case in the Marianas, at Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Normandy, Sicily, Salerno, and Hungnam, in view of the paucity of major caliber guns on today’s ships of the line.
Even naval aviation’s most enthusiastic proponents are no longer claiming that aircraft can provide adequate support for power projection. For various reasons, including continued development and proliferation of air defenses and the high cost/ vulnerability of sophisticated aircraft, projected Navy tactical air (TacAir) forces can hardly be considered capable of sustaining the volume of accurate fire required to support an invasion or withdrawal against modern forces. The value of fire support is a function of reaction time, sustainability, and insensitivity to time and weather conditions, and TacAir does not score high in these areas. TacAir should no more be considered a replacement for naval gunfire (NGF) than it would be for artillery in land-based operations. Air forces may supplement, but not replace, artillery or NGF in support of land combat operations.
An important role of naval forces in support of national policy is "intimidation.” A show of force, however, is only intimidating to the degree that the element on display can demonstrate destructive power and its ability to persist. Naval forces must be clearly capable of supporting the projection of forces ashore and providing cover for an orderly withdrawal. It is not evident that U. S. naval forces are capable of these functions against a modern, well-equipped army.
The purpose of this treatise is to rejuvenate a meaningful power projection (or intimidation) mission and to describe a sea-based interdiction system to support it. The main components of the system are aircraft carriers and interdiction/assault ships (IASs).
The carrier aircraft should be properly proportioned among antisubmarine, all-weather interceptor, and fighter types. The aircraft would be devoted to protection of the total force from submarines and enemy aircraft. Carrier air would sanitize the airspace near the land mass where the interdiction/assault ships would be working. Carrier assets would also provide spotting and reconnaissance aircraft. If vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft are available, they could be used for spotting and would have the option of staging from the aft deck of the IAS.
An important theme of this sea-based interdiction concept is that carrier aircraft are relieved of land-attack mission obligations, thus permitting them to concentrate on the missions which they do best. This philosophy reduces the carrier's logistics, manpower, and space requirements, as well as the training burden associated with the present “all-purpose” objective. A contingent air-to-surface capability for attacking enemy shipping could be provided by the F-14 or F-18, armed with such weapons as HARM, Harpoon, Maverick, and cannons. Air defense and antisubmarine warfare assets could be increased, thus improving the effectiveness of air defense, ASW, and interdiction missions while providing a genuine potential to support amphibious landings or withdrawals.
The creation of the interdiction/assault ships can be accomplished for minimum cost by using the four existing Iowa-class battleships which are in mothballs. Three (interdiction ships) could be oriented to the interdiction and fire support mission and the fourth (assault ship) to assault and withdrawal operations.
In each case, the third battery of 16-inch guns would be removed, thus freeing a large volume in the aft portion of the ship for the insertion of appropriate apparatus to support the missions of interdiction and/or assault. The existing air defense guns would be replaced with new forms of cannons requiring less manpower. (The Phalanx 20-mm. close-in weapon system would be a prime candidate.) It might be wise, initially, to retain the New Jersey (BB-62) in her present form since she was modernized in 1967–68, thus creating an early NGF capability while the other three ships are undergoing more extensive modifications.
The aft volume of the interdiction ship could contain a vertical launch system for deployment of highly accurate versions of ballistic surface-to-surface missiles (a derivative of Pershing II would be a candidate) with conventional payloads appropriate for such targets as airfields, railheads, bridges, power plants, etc. Should the Army/Air Force assault breaker concept yield useful antiarmor payloads, these weapons could be considered for incorporation into the vertical launch system. The cruise missile is an alternative, although it may be less attractive from the standpoint of time of flight, survivability, earth penetration, and mission-planning requirements.
The range of the forward main batteries (a total of six 16-inch guns) is about 22 miles. These guns hurl a 2,700-pound projectile which can penetrate 30 feet of reinforced concrete at four miles and are devastating against heavy shore defenses. Air burst options are effective against mechanized forces, particularly where the goal is multiple mobility kills against supporting infantry, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and mobile air defense units. Existing technology can extend the range of these guns, with varying forms of projectiles, to 50 miles. Also, guided options are available for surgical operations and “forward pass” (mid-course guidance) concepts. And the existing capability of these 16-inch guns is not sensitive to time of day or weather.
The concept of operations for the interdiction ship involves working inside the ten-fathom line (less than 60-foot depth) where she would be relatively immune to interference from submarines. The draft of the ship at 55,000 tons is 35 feet. The aircraft carrier providing air cover will operate from a station 50 to 200 miles at sea to minimize exposure to enemy air and shore defenses. Air cover and spotting sorties can easily be provided from such proximity.
The question of the IAS’s vulnerability to shore-based defenses has been investigated. The lowa-class ship is, by a wide margin, the most survivable ship ever developed. The armor arrangement, compartmentation, and systems redundancy account for her ability to operate in the face of heavy fire. Of course, if left unsupported by naval air cover, to be continually mauled by enemy aircraft, even the IAS could be sunk. The potential to "intimidate” the enemy was demonstrated by the New Jersey: as she moved unchallenged from one location to another close along the coast of South Vietnam, enemy resistance within 20 miles of the coast evaporated. The mere “presence” gave U. S. land forces relief from enemy pressure. The constraint on the ship’s deployment off North Vietnam was in consonance with U. S. policy during 1968–69, not because of any concern for safety of the ship. As a final note on this subject: if one is concerned about the survival of an lowa-class ship, then the Navy’s other ships must be in serious jeopardy.
The proposal to use existing hulls for the creation of the interdiction/assault ships stems from the need to minimize the near-term investment and to avoid a ten-year development cycle. The choice of the Iowa BBs is based on a review of their characteristics relative to other alternatives.
- Least vulnerable of all surface ships from a survival standpoint because of armor and basic arrangement and space for defensive systems
- Least vulnerable from an operational standpoint because of systems redundancy
- Fastest rough water major surface combatant in the world
- Long-range cruise and sea-keeping qualities
- Available size/space for proposed systems
- Available space for crew comfort/ safety
- Most stable platform for a VTOL staging option
- Most accurate operational gunnery system
- Heaviest gun system with most firing options
- Demonstrated capability for shore bombardment
An appreciation of the potential of the interdiction ship may be developed by reviewing the decade of struggle by our air forces to interdict North Vietnam. Over the years, the determined effort to destroy the Thanh Hoa Bridge cost the United States approximately 50 aircraft and many pilots. It, along with 80% of the targets of interest, was within range of the New Jersey's guns which could have doubtless destroyed the bridge in less than an hour. Surgical destruction in Hai Phong harbor facilities would have been a piece of cake for the 16-inch batteries. Unfortunately, this naval solution was not applied to the problem.
|
Battleship |
Carrier |
---|---|---|
Method of Delivery |
Gunfire |
Strike Aircraft |
Personnel Allowance |
1,500–2,978 |
5,000 |
Tons per Salvo or Strike |
12–15 |
70 |
Maximum Tons per Day |
17,496* |
210 |
Salvo Rate |
2 per Minute |
— |
Strike Rate |
— |
3 per Day |
Time to Deliver 210 Tons |
9–80 Minutes1 |
12 Hours |
* Theoretical maximum (exceeds magazine capacity). |
|
Battleship |
Carrier |
---|---|---|
Crew Pay per Day @ $35 per Man |
$52,500 |
$175,000 |
Ship Operations (less fuel)* |
$250,000 |
$50,000 |
Combat Losses: |
||
Ship |
— |
— |
Aircraft (1%) |
— |
$2,028,000 |
Fuel Costs |
$ 15,000 |
$ 102,000 |
Cost per Ton on Target |
$ 1,511 |
$ 12,156 |
*Although the same operations costs (less fuel) are assumed for both the battleship and the carrier, it is likely that carrier costs will be higher due to scale (size) as well as complexity of equipment. |
Ship |
Displacement |
Crew |
Tons /Hour |
Tons/Hour /Personnel |
---|---|---|---|---|
Virginia |
11,000 |
442 |
76.56 |
.1732 |
Spruance |
7,800 |
296 |
76.56 |
.2586 |
Forrest Sherman |
4,050 |
292 |
114.84 |
.3933 |
Coontz |
5,800 |
377 |
38.28 |
.1015 |
Des Moines |
21,500 |
1,803 |
948.6 |
.5261 |
Nimitz |
91,400 |
6,600 |
17.5 (Alfa) |
.00265 |
26.67 (Cyclic) |
.00404 |
|||
New Jersey |
59,000 |
1,700 |
1,458 |
.857 |
* Although the same operations costs (less fuel) are assumed for both the battleship and the carrier, it is likely that carrier costs will be higher due to scale (size) as well as complexity of equipment. |
These observations are not meant as a condemnation of tactical air or the suggestion that the interdiction ship could replace the carrier. It is an attempt to reveal an opportunity for the two to be combined in a total weapon system concept which can be more effective than either alone. It is axiomatic that the interdiction ship needs the air cover afforded by the carrier’s all-weather interceptors and fighters. It is just as true that neither sea- nor land-based TacAir can provide interdiction more effectively than the interdiction ship.
A variation of the interdiction ship is the assault ship (also for withdrawal) wherein the aft deck/hull is modified to accommodate marines and helicopter transport aircraft. The same qualities of the Iowa class which make it attractive for interdiction are even more important for the assault version where safety and comfort of the human cargo are paramount.
The cost, crew size, and time to accomplish the modifications have not been addressed except to note the experience of rejuvenating the New Jersey. The cost was approximately $50 million; the modification required one year. The size of the crew was the subject of some debate during the planning stage. Estimates varied from 1,200 to 2,500 men. The ultimate crew which manned the ship for the fire support missions in South Vietnam was 1,556 enlisted men and 70 officers. An estimate of the cost and time to create an interdiction ship from one of the remaining Iowa-class ships is offered as:
- Rejuvenation: $150 million
- Addition of ballistic missile armament: $350 million
- Time required: 36 months
The time and cost to produce the assault version would be more on the order of two years and $200 million. Merely returning the New Jersey to an operational status should require no more than six months and $30 million. These programs should bypass much of the time-consuming steps of the normal acquisition system.
In summary, the potential combat effectiveness of the sea-based interdiction system appears attractive enough to warrant serious consideration and in-depth analysis. Further, without it, future forced entry or graceful withdrawal against a defended foe is hardly feasible.