On 25 November 1969, Richard Nixon reaffirmed the renunciation of first use of both lethal chemicals and incapacitating agents. He further renounced all use of biological warfare and stipulated that the only U. S. research in this field would be for immunization and safety measures. Subsequent to his public statement, President Nixon submitted to the Senate for formal ratification the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. This protocol, although signed by delegates of 28 countries, including the United States, had never been ratified by the U. S. Senate. The document was ratified on 16 December 1974.
While President Nixon’s statements were merely a restatement of established U. S. policy, seldom has a chief executive’s proclamation been so widely misunderstood by the armed forces. Many surmised incorrectly that the president had abandoned both chemical and biological warfare. This misinterpretation dealt a severe blow to chemical warfare research because many military planners began to believe that both strategic and tactical retaliation would be based upon the nuclear arsenal if conventional weapons failed. The resource requirements of the Vietnam War dictated that deficiencies in chemical warfare, offensive or defensive, be accorded low or no priority. Furthermore, the chemical threat then presented by the Warsaw Pact nations, if one was perceived, was given little attention.
As a result, the U. S. armed forces in general—and the Marine Corps in particular—do not possess the capability to survive, fight, and win in a sophisticated chemical warfare environment. The basic chemical warfare deficiencies facing all marines are a lack of adequate equipment, a shortage of qualified specialists, and inadequate training.
To identify the steps necessary to build a satisfactory chemical warfare defense posture, one should become familiar with the basic chemical warfare capabilities of the Warsaw Pact nations. Chemical munitions are mass destruction weapons which the Warsaw Pact countries consider logical extensions of conventional weaponry. Chemical attacks can be anticipated against nuclear-capable units, offensive forces, and logistic facilities. Warsaw Pact forces have the capability to rapidly cross contaminated areas in pressurized vehicles to exploit any penetrations. The threat capability to wage chemical warfare can result in the contamination of hundreds, possibly thousands, of square miles. Although the Warsaw Pact forces are by no means invincible, they are the best-equipped and -prepared forces in the world in the area of chemical warfare. To enable the U. S. marine to survive and fight this threat, he must be provided with the equipment necessary to detect and identify agents, to protect himself from the toxic effects of the chemicals, and to decontaminate himself and his equipment so that he can continue his assigned mission.
In the next few years, the marine will be completely outfitted with a new universal protective mask and a two-piece charcoal-impregnated outer garment. The suit will be worn over the field uniform and will provide protection from liquid and vapor agents. The new mask will replace the four different types now in inventory. Self-aid capability for the man who has been exposed to toxic agents has been improved with the introduction of a new individual decontamination kit and a more effective nerve agent antidote.
Two of the most difficult tasks in chemical warfare defense are the detection and identification of toxic agents. At present, the only method a commander has for detection of agents, if suspected delivery is not observed, is by watching his men’s health. Once agents are detected, identification is made through the use of a kit which is difficult to operate when the user is fully dressed in protective clothing. The first of these problems can be solved with the introduction of an automatic chemical agent alarm, which continually samples the air and presents an audible and visible alarm when a chemical agent is detected. A new chemical agent detector kit which operates on a test card and litmus paper principle is on order as a replacement for the current multi-step air-sampling kit.
Although the introduction of new clothing and equipment will improve the marines’ ability to detect agents and survive in a toxic environment, serious deficiencies exist in rapid, large-scale decontamination capability. For years the mainstay of decontamination operations has been the M12A1 Decontaminating Apparatus. While the Marine Corps research and development community considers the system reliable, the system should be retired. It is too small and too slow, and it lacks mobility. The 500-gallon capacity and skid mounting are satisfactory if one assumes that a unit contaminated by toxic agents will be able to move to a clear area to decontaminate, but the potential threat makes such a case the exception rather than the rule. Transportation of the apparatus to the contaminated unit requires motor transport and drivers who must be taken from other tasks. This requirement places an additional strain on the Marine Corps’ limited vehicle assets. The Marine Corps should have a mobile, high-capacity (1,000 gallon or more) decontamination system capable of maintaining the pace of a motorized/mechanized force and capable of decontaminating tanks and self-propelled artillery weapons in minutes.
Present decontamination operations are also hampered by the nature of the standard decontaminants. Super Tropical Bleach (STB) and Decontaminating Agent DS2. These chemicals are highly corrosive and their use on alloys, electronics, and aviation equipment may shorten service lives of valuable resources. Both decontaminants give off hazardous vapors and form a flammable mixture which can ignite spontaneously if the agents are combined. Liquid mustard and STB also react violently with each other and may ignite. Use of the decontaminants is a slow, cumbersome process which requires 30 minutes to several hours for the chemicals to work efficiently. In the absence of a power-driven apparatus, the chemicals must be applied with the primitive swab-and-brush technique. Equipment must later be rinsed thoroughly to ensure complete removal of decontaminants. The pace of modern battlefield operations requires that faster decontaminants be developed for use with high-capacity equipment.
Two critically deficient aspects of the Marine Corps’ chemical defense equipment inventory are a lack of both collective protection shelters and specialized equipment for the treatment of battle casualties. Collective protection shelters are essential for providing contamination-free work areas for such vital facilities as command, control, and communications centers and medical aid stations. They also provide an area where personnel may eat, rest, and relieve the physiological and psychological strain of long periods in full individual protective equipment. For shelters to permit freedom of entry and exit in the toxic environment, they must be ventilated and have positive internal pressure to prevent the entry of agents. The two basic components of a ventilated collective protection shelter are the shelter enclosure itself and the gas particulate filter unit (GPFU), which supplies the overpressure of purified air. Present allowances do not provide adequate numbers of GPFUs to operate the combat operations centers, communications centers, and medical facilities required to support a division in combat. No shelter enclosures are authorized; commanders must improvise them from available material.
Although the new universal protective mask will be a significant improvement over existing masks, a head wound which prevents a marine from wearing his mask could prove fatal. There are two specialized systems for providing agent-free air to casualties who cannot wear a standard mask: an individual head-wound mask and a six-man hospital GPFU, which supplies purified air to individual patients. Presently, neither of these is in the Marine Corps inventory.
The philosophy that everyone can be equally qualified in chemical warfare defense when the need arises must be revised. Although the Marine Corps has some chemical warfare specialists, the numbers and levels of expertise are not up to the task at hand. Readiness and training requirements direct the organization of an NBC* defense capability down to the company/battery level. For units which do not have table of organization (T/O) NBC defense billets, assignments are made on an additional duty basis. Enlisted specialists are assigned by T/O primary duty billet down to battalion level. Officer specialists are placed by additional duty assignment at regiment and below. There are several shortcomings to this system.
For example, while most battalions rate one sergeant NBC defense specialist by T/O, artillery regiments and battalions and the motor transport battalion of the force service support group rate none. The requirement for artillery to provide close and continuous fire support, as well as the necessity for maintaining maximum mobility while delivering support, presents an urgent need for specialists to coordinate and supervise unit chemical warfare defense operations. The mobility argument is equally valid for the motor transport battalion when considered in light of the requirement to keep maximum assets on the move in support of operations.
The concept of assigning chemical warfare defense billets on an additional duty basis where none are rated by T/O is a poor approach to fulfill the required chemical warfare responsibilities. Although personnel filling these additional duty billets are expected to provide the commander with the same level of expertise as the specialists, often these billet holders are only marginally qualified. The specialists should be placed in these positions which should be identified as primary duty billets.
The third consideration for specialization is whether the Marine Corps needs chemical defense units within the force structure. The present concept of defensive operations provides for units at company/battery level to form monitor/survey and decontamination teams on an additional duty basis from assigned personnel. These teams operate under the supervision of the unit NBC defense noncommissioned officer, this approach gives the company a limited defensive chemical warfare capability; battalion chemical warfare operations depend on resources pooled from subordinate units. Although the battalion can conduct defensive chemical warfare operations on a moderate scale, the concept requires reinforcement.
The Marine Corps force structure should have chemical defense units to perform large-scale operations beyond organic battalion capability. The Marine Corps needs the capability (1) to rapidly decontaminate large numbers of personnel and quantities of equipment so that affected units will be out of action for the shortest possible time, and (2) to decontaminate large areas where its forces operate support facilities. A detailed force structure reorganization of such a nature is beyond the scope of this article and would certainly necessitate significant resource realignment. Nevertheless, the requirement to organize a unit of at least company size in each division is a subject which should receive thorough consideration.
The most realistic and effective training is with “hands on” performance-oriented evaluation, which has been employed by the Marine Corps in various areas for a number of years. Training requirements for chemical warfare have been adopted to meet the specifications of a NATO standardization agreement. This orientation is basically satisfactory but falls short of the mark in several areas.
Chemical warfare training requirements for the enlisted marine begin with lecture instruction and a protective mask confidence exercise in a riot control agent chamber during recruit training. Unfortunately, the recruit training does not extend to survival in a toxic environment. The marine learns only those immediate measures which would suffice in a battlefield situation where chemical warfare was used on a very limited scale. He is neither introduced to protective clothing nor required to execute routine tactical measures while dressed in the garb. The burden of training him in long-term individual survival rests with the commander of the marine's first tactical unit. All recruits should receive this individual survival training in boot camp.
Junior officer chemical warfare training during the Basic School parallels that presented to enlisted marines in boot camp. The problem is that the young officer is not prepared to fulfill his duties as a troop leader and trainer. While he is capable of teaching tactics and techniques appropriate to the unit’s mission, he is not qualified to survive in a toxic environment, let alone teach the necessary procedures to his men. The new lieutenant must be provided with knowledge and practical skills before he is assigned to a troop-leading billet.
The senior officer is on his own in chemical warfare. He must absorb the doctrine and procedures by individual research and study, supplemented by practical experience as his work schedule permits. The commander or staff officer who pleads ignorance of or who questions the importance of becoming proficient in chemical warfare defense is incapable of properly training his unit for combat. The job cannot be left solely to the operations officer or NBC defense officer.
Unit training is the vehicle by which a commander pools all his resources and molds them into a cohesive, technically and tactically proficient combat unit. In this respect, chemical warfare training, like other types of training, is subject to personnel turbulence and competing priorities.
If a commander introduces chemical warfare, all tactical operations require additional training. To meet established NATO standards, the commander must devote precious time to the slow and laborious procedures inherent in toxic environment operations. Since the physiological and psychological strain of prolonged operations in complete individual protective clothing can rapidly degrade mission effectiveness, the commander must weigh carefully the potential training benefit against the basic tactical objectives he must accomplish. He needs a detailed list of chemical warfare defense performance requirements which will meet NATO standards.
The Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System's (MCCRES) mission performance standards for chemical warfare defense reflect only elementary masking and attack reporting techniques. The development of precise tasks, conditions, and requirements has been hampered by a lack of chemical warfare defense expertise among the MCCRES program managers. Skill exists within the Fleet Marine Force to develop requirements and conditions to form a comprehensive mission performance standard. This capability should be exploited on a priority basis to provide commanders with a method to evaluate chemical warfare defense readiness accurately.
Although the Marine Corps’ history is filled with examples of "can do” spirit overcoming seemingly overwhelming odds, this spirit has never been faced with an adversary who has employed lethal nerve agents in staggering quantities. Such a threat exists today. To meet the threat will take time and money now, or unnecessary loss of lives in the future.
* Chemical warfare defense specialization is included in the nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense military occupational specialties.