Retention: Our #1 Goal

 

CePt the retention challenge as ,^ners’ then any efforts to solve the I ^{ern at} the individual command will be greatly hampered, dmiral Hayward has stated that, ^retention goal is to retain every

good St;

At a command where

^axi

fete,

com-^on problem, the entire chain of _tj₍₎^^rnand will reflect a positive reten- ^ Posture. In such an environment, _CaR^tban 3% of the sailors would re­tire ^ein8 counselled by their division utficer^ ok             • ■

a annnr career opportunities.

service must be

M,

just lip

es the

people in key positions. Offi-

c«rs

oflfi,’

fc

of

eMr

fhose

petty officers who have re-

tii;

■str,

Navy have to offer me?” The feed-

"My

Wan and woman in the United _av*^tes Navy.” What priority has the _t ^ra«^e division officer placed on re- suf^tl0n? ^ 140 sailors polled in a _Co^rVeV ^by one West Coast group th^l-^lrnan<^^er’ ^onN ^^our *ⁿd*^cated that ^^eir division officers had talked with j^^erri about career possibilities in the ₀/^Vy- This is not to point the finger Responsibility at the division officer, Use the responsibility lies with the

^COrtunand.

'tnum attention is devoted to the

about

Pal'" ^tha"

Qr fo retention counselling, though,

r ^any attempt to build a climate for tuition is lost.

sj ⁿy leadership action program de­_c ^ ^t0 promote retention within a fUand must first start by educat­chief petty officers, leading petty ^1Cers, and those in the career in- , ^{atIOn team} must understand the

importance ₀f the retention effort and

‘ftipact on the Navy.

lis^ble 1 depicts the FY 1978 en-

^fc'd retention data for the U. S.

RR Rising numerical quotas for

aj| ^rate, based upon needs, the over-

Soal/attainment level was set. In all ate_as r-

fee r ^tlrst>term through third-term

ffhstrnent rates reflect a failure to 'neet -c

tn-g ^ttle goal. The second-term fig- ₀r ^S (reflecting the reenlistment data

^^ted once already) are particularly ask ^essin8- These first-termers are ^lng the second -termers, “What does the^ ^t^^le y°^ung P^etty officer reaching ^end of his first enlistment receives

^ l

q °e very encouraging.

Po ^{ne tbe most} discouraging p_e|^nts about retention figures is the hi_e^Ceritag^e of sailors declared ineligi- °^r reenlistment. More often than

not, in the first-term category, the number of sailors not eligible for re­enlistment exceeds the number of re­enlistees. Table 2 depicts the retention results of the Naval Surface Force Pacific during FY 1978. Overall fig­ures indicate that during the 12- month period, 31% of the first- termers in the force were not eligible for reenlistment. This compares to a 23% gross retention rate. In real fig­ures, 1,770 first-termers reenlisted while 2,398 were declared ineligible for reenlistment. This trend must be reversed. With such a large number of sailors being administratively dis­charged prior to the completion of their service obligation, one would think that a greater number of those who do make it through their obli­gated service would be qualified for a naval career. The fourth quarter of FY 1978 did see the figures transposed, with a smaller percentage of sailors being declared ineligible.

It is in the area of ineligibles that one of the greatest casualties of leader­ship is evident. By the end of a four- year period of service, if a sailor has received the proper incentive, en­couragement, professional guidance, and direction, he should be a third class petty officer eligible for reenlist­ment. Granted, there are some hard­line discipline problems. The Navy, in an effort to reduce the number of ineligibles, has relaxed some of its previous restrictions on reenlistments. As of January 1979, an enlisted man no longer has to become a petty officer to be qualified for reenlistment. In­stead, 20 years can now be spent in the service, never rising above E-3.

Various programs now exist at the command level which should help abate the second-term reenlistment problem. Command authority to frock certain personnel, or advance them meritoriously under the Command Advancement Program, can become powerful tools in a well-organized re­tention effort. The command that is successfully able to combat the second term reenlistment problem should enjoy a substantial upsurge in the first-term rate.

When one evaluates all the studies directed toward retention, one distinct point constantly emerges. It will be the overall personal and professional satisfaction that one derives from one’s job that will make the difference in the retention game.

The importance of one’s job to the safety and security of the nation, and one’s contribution to the national de­fense must be understood by today’s sailor. It is an expansive concept for many to fully grasp, especially when it is tempered by the more immediate myriad of crisis management programs that many commands mount in an ef­fort to pass what is seemingly per­ceived as an unending assault by in­spection and assist teams. But the per­sonnel cannot lose sight of the overall goal, the ship’s mission, and crew’s importance. The Mayaguez incident is an excellent example of the Navy’s usefulness and importance in the con­duct of national policy. Every sailor must believe he is making a contribu­tion. (I gave some of my radiomen a copy of the June 1978 Proceedings arti­cle which described the plight of the USS Liberty (AGTR-5) and highlighted the areas dealing with the crucial per­formance of the communication’s team. The positive comments it solic­ited were quite unlike those I some­times hear about the mundane job they perceive they do.)

The Navy has moved to increase professional accomplishment and, thus, satisfaction, by implementing the new Enlisted Surface Warfare Spe­ciality. Wide latitude has been given in establishing the program at the command level, and it will be those commands that establish a successful qualification process that will reap the rewards. The command’s concern, as perceived by the crew, will be readily gauged by the way it handles this new program.

As we all know, the first few days at any command are the days in which a new sailor may very well set the tone for his enlistment. If an individual’s first impression of the command is negative, it is difficult to overcome that perception. The “I” division orientation program must be vigor­ously pursued with all the efforts going toward assimilating the new crew member into the ship’s company with a minimum of difficulties. The

Table 1 FY 78 Enlisted Retention

First Term Second Term Third Term

20,438	14,458	11,320
17,924	10,208	10,530
2,514	4,250	790
87.7%	70.6%	93.0%

negated.                                          _ntj₀„

Another very distressing tete^_cet problem is evident in the 0 community. For surface warfare cers, aviation officers (with the ex

------------------------------------  X

tion of naval flight officers).

munity a retention rate

irio°

Goal

Attainment Short % Goal

Bureau of Naval Personnel (26 January 1979)

command leadership displayed at this juncture is crucial. The newly report­ing sailor must have something to work toward, and must be made to feel an important part of the crew. If he is non-designated, he should be encouraged to appear before the Pro­fessional Development Board as soon as possible. Positive leadership, di­rected toward an individual’s personal accomplishment will aid overall morale and become an investment in retention.

The time has come for the division officer to start considering one of his top priorities to be retention. To do this he is going to have to learn the game and become a player. The op­portunity for individual leadership on such an intimate level usually occurs only once in an officer’s career. Too many division officers are not accept­ing this retention challenge and thus greatly damaging retention efforts.

It is not my purpose to present the multitude of programs available for enhancement of a career in the Navy. The command should be well aware of these, keeping abreast of the ensuing changes. The hitch develops in the commutiication of these opportunities to the crew. Full-time career coun­selors were a shift in the right direc­tion, but they should not relieve the counseling responsibility from any of the personnel in the chain of com­mand, especially at the chief petty of­ficer and division officer levels. A con­stant flow of communication within a work center, division, department, or a ship is a signature of good leader­ship. The interest a chief petty officer

or a division officer shows in an ⁱⁿ ^ vidual’s professional developing strengthens the bonds of trust confidence, increasing individua P ductivity, morale, and overall com readiness for the ship.      , •

Although I could espouse leaders qualities that aid crew retention analyze various retention P^r0S^ra ^ the challenge is in implementing^ total program and making it ' Total involvement by all in the ^c of command, from the comman ^ officer and executive officer to mand information team and the c< counselor, is essential for ^su When everyone recognizes the ^I[11P^ tance of the retention pr°g^rarn peer pressure which debilitates ^ tion efforts can be minimize

fld

nuclear-trained submarine offi^cej’^s^_ort retention figures are falling we* ^ of goals. In the surface warfare ^

J0'

Table 2 Natal Surface Force Pacific FY 1978 Retention Data FIRST TERM

Quarter	Eligible	Not Eligible	Not Eligible %	Reenlisted	Gross %	Nf£_%
1st	1,298	582	31%	303	16%	23%
2nd	1,443	730	34%	471	22%	33%
3rd	1,422	681	33%	491	23%	35 %
4th	1,241	405	24%	505	31%	41%
Overall	5,404	2,398	31%	1,770	23%	33%
		SECOND TERM
1st	242	36	13%	147	53%	61%
2nd	359	68	16%	189	44%	53%
3rd	316	49	13%	183	50%	58%
4th	239	29	10%	138	51%	58%
Overall	1,156	182	13%	657	50%	58%
		THIRD TERM/CAREER
1st	557	16	3%	256	59%	46%
2nd	410	23	5%	200	46%	49%
3rd	504	34	6%	262	49%	52%
4th	249	21	7%	164	61%	66%
Overall	1,720	94	5%	882	54%	53%
ComNavSurFPac Quarterly Retention Reports to NavSurFPac

10-45% is required. The reten

action is fueled. The need to cut

sh,

ttive retention atmosphere. But, i_riA.^{ne e}nd, it will be the leadership Win^atlVes at the national level which determine whether the retention

Table 3 Reasons for Officer Separations

Major Issue____________ Navy FY 77 NavSurFPac (Mar-Dec 77)

24%	3%
11%	28%
10%	29%
5%	29%
ing units.

historica,ly experienced is about ^c> however, it has taken some dives. During the first quarter of

the ^{1978 iC fan at 23%}' ^{In FY 1978} aviation community enjoyed a 2%

fj ^rP^^us of officers above the goal. In l9^^reS P^roi^ected as of 1 October k . ’ the community is looking at '⁷% below goal in FY 1980. ^s resignations are continuing at ^UnPtecedented levels.

tea ^UrVC^^S designed to evaluate the tan°^{nS an} °^'^cer leaves the Navy In ₁p^ro<d^uce some interesting results. ^ March 1978, the Commander, s^^aval Surface Forces Pacific, released a

NavT^ °^{f a} comparison between aval Surface Force data and Navy-

Wtdp >                                                  1

jyj ^aata provided by the Bureau of ^s0ri Personnel. The summary of rea- _t:  8*ven by officers electing separa-

t* is outlined in Table 3.

Pos' °^{Se cornman}d^s which create a ^enli'^{tlVe retent}i°ⁿ atmosphere for _tirr|^Sted personnel will at the same pi ^create a healthy retention atmos- _tj_oJ^e i°^r junior officers. Job satisfac- f_e ^ls again the primary key. With Pos ^{r S}^°^{tS ava}‘Mble ^t0 officers for sh ^t^^rad^uate opportunities, and in°^rter’ ^^ess detailed schools for train- o the enlisted technicians of the ted ’ . ^e retention problem is abet- ₀ ' *-°upled with longer deployments ttiore frequent rotations for certain

tes of ships and squadrons, dis- ^at«sf_ac •

a °^re duty tours short to make officers p_et ^{ab e} f°r sea duty creates an im- j ^Us f°^r many officers to resign. The r_e$ ^aCt °f this policy causes the same ^rea ^tS *^{n t}^^{lc er}*iisted ranks. These the^{0flS For} dissatisfaction are outside , ^COr|troI of the local commander, ^nc basically helpless in dealing tvh' ^t^^lern- These are broader policies tff  ^severely debilitate the retention

}p and must be examined at a do ^Cr ^^eveb All the commander can Pol '^S tooderate the effects of these p_fc^^tles and encourage the other as- for a pro-retention atmosphere. s_u ⁶ 'odividual command’s actions Vai ^POrttng retention and leadership

<uu_es •                                *

a        are important and encourage

'ⁿ th.

Family Separation Civilian Occupation Advanced Education Job Dissatisfaction

efforts of the U. S. Navy succeed. No action by local commanders will be able to overcome what is perceived, on a grand scale, by today’s Navy men that they are rapidly losing their sa­cred benefits and professional pride. The only way this trend can be re­versed is through a commitment to a strong national defense by the Presi­dent, Congress, and the American people. To accomplish this, it will be the responsibility of the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO to present forcefully to the President and Con­gress the Navy’s retention needs, most of which are manifested in the quality of life of naval personnel and their families.

Uncertainty over the future of mili­tary retirement also affects retention. Prospects have brightened since the staff director of the President’s Com­mission on Military Compensation made his infamous statement urging dissatisfied military personnel to vote with their feet. A new, more accept­able Department of Defense recom­mendation concerning overhaul of the military retirement system has re­ceived the President’s support over the Commission’s less appealing proposal.

Other areas which presently serve as a detriment to the retention effort are:

►  Lack of basic allowance for quarters for single officers and enlisted person­nel assigned to ships. Many of these ships are old and habitability condi­tions are poor.

►  Problems with CHAMPUS contrac­tors around the country and problems with other aspects of Navy medical care.

►  Lack of dependent dental care.

►  Annual pay caps imposed by the President which have brought the military man’ earnings far below his civilian counterpart's.

►  A drop in fleet assets with no ap­preciable drop in commitments which has placed an extra burden on operat-

While most commanders at the unit level are doing their best to create the retention environment necessary, it is imperative for the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO to push for reform on Capitol Hill and at the White House. In testimony before Congress, Secretary Claytor and Admiral Hay­ward have forcefully presented many of the issues which damage our reten­tion effort. Their testimony, besides stressing to Congress the important changes that must occur, demonstrates to those in the fleet the sincerity of the Navy’s leadership to solve the major problems. These efforts will do nothing, though, unless their urgings are heeded and words are translated into appropriations and actions.

While job satisfaction is a major point in retaining our military per­sonnel, it is not measured by just personnel-related issues such as money and working hours. Continual attacks on the stature of our military estab­lishment greatly defray overall job satisfaction. The President’s decision to push for construction of a 60,000- ton carrier instead of the Navy’s pro­posed follow-on 90,000-ton carrier is an example of the Navy’s ineffective­ness in influencing presidential policy and is felt by all naval personnel. The situation is made worse when the pri­mary consideration is fiscal, not mili­tary, and the dictums of the Office of Management and the Budget take pre­cedence over the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Congress.

In FY 1978, the Navy fell short of its goal in another area besides retention—recruiting. With the right leadership at the command and na­tional levels, the retention problem should be resolved. When we solve our retention problem, we will solve our recruiting problem, because the favorable factors keeping people in will also bring them in.