Leading the Leaders

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Several years ago a message on combat readiness was received by t

Leading the Leaders

By Lieutenant Powell Alexander Fraser, U. S. Navy, Surface Warfare Officers School, Coronado, California

ships of a fleet task group. The mes sage discussed the many problems in hibiting readiness and concluded wit the observation that the problems were basically caused by division 0 cers who "were not doing their jobs- This message came as a depressing shock to many division officers, espe dally those who at the time felt they were doing the best they knew how Resolving to do better, these junto officers made an additional effort 1 the following months, but many the problems persisted—and still P^e*^ sist. Retrospect indicates that part the problem was correctly identi ie > but the solution of telling division 0

fleers to do their jobs better was

not

not

answer. Why they were

—or could not P^el” up to expected standar should have been the problem ^a dressed.       _

With Personnel Qualification Stan dards (PQS) off the port beam, ^{c e} Planned Maintenance System (PMS) ⁰ the starboard beam, the Propuls¹⁰ Examining Board (PEB) behind hirm the surface warfare qualification

the performing form

front of him, and weapons insp¹

iecti°ⁿ

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teams hovering over his head, the vision officer of today wades forth t^ battle combat unreadiness with ^c ^ Golden Anchor Award

hanging.

around his neck. And in the course

this modern battle he,

hopeful^

learns the most difficult lesson-

h°*'

of a

to lead men without the catalyst national crisis.        .

Whether this initially enthusiast^ junior officer comes out of the ba ^ with his PMS quarterly schedule ^>n

ho*¹

stead of on it depends partly °ⁿ he develops his own leadership sty and partly on the help and leaders ¹ his superiors have given him dur his initial years of service. Thr°uf>^ the years much has been written, cussed, and taught concerning leadership of enlisted men. In D then Superintendent of the Academy Rear Admiral Henry ^

Wilson noted in his Foreword Naval Leadership (Annapolis,

1939) ^that!

U.S. Naval Institute, .                                .

“Since the founding of the Academy, all fundamentals of ^c

tty ^Schi

^ese officers had been commissioned ^ ⁿⁱn the previous six months and ^{re a}H headed for duty aboard Pacific ^eet ships. Fifty-three percent of

,^euty Surface Warfare Officers ^l0°l students in San Diego. All

% Yes % No

Do you favor a volunteer

expand the leader- cover leading the

°^aval profession have been stressed, ^except the most important—handling ^en- He consequently established a j^urse on naval leadership. In 1924, ^ayal Leadership with Some Hints to Junior Officers was published by the • S. Naval Institute as a textbook for ^c at course. Since that time leadership ^c°urses have continued to provide a good foundation on which the new of- ^cer can build with experience. Historically, leadership courses and ^art*cles have tended to emphasize J-adership and its development on the ^lvision level. Such an emphasis is P^r°per and contributes significantly to lunior officer’s successful completion his fi_rst tour of leadership duty. °Wever, in this day and age when ⁿ°t every junior officer owns a sword, when retention rates of junior of- ^er surface year groups fall signifi­^Cantly below the desired goals, the j"ne has come to ? *P emphasis to leaders.

Lieutenant T.B. Grassey, in his ar- r'cle “Outcome, Essences, and Indi- ^V|eluals” (First Honorable Mention dinner of the 1976 Leadership Contest Polished in the July 1976 Pro­^Ceedings), stated that “to be better ^ders, ... we need to know more °^ut those whom we want to follow us, ” ^atl<i so the next part of the essay will ^e5tamine this fundamental leadership o?^{P by} discussing today's junior • ^1Cer—the guy whose reason for l°‘ning was not because he was avoid- the draft. In an effort to depart °^m the broad generalities that infect ^°st leadership essays, this essay also ' address the specific problems ^lch inhibit the ideal professional ^^r°wth of a junior officer—but which J^dership within the immediate chain ^c°rnmand can solve.

Just who is this newly commis- p'^0r|ed officer? Is he really any dif- ^erent from the junior officers of years Sty^{06 by}^ ^orc^^{er t0} P^rov*de some an- ^efs to these questions, the author „ ^ducted a survey of one hundred

those officers were married; on a 4.0 scale, their average college grade was 3.05; 46% indicated that they in­tended to make the Navy a career, 45% were undecided, and 9% were against a naval career even before re­porting to their first ship! Other ques­tions and answers which help en­lighten us to the junior officer frame of mind are listed below:

asked for a list of reasons, in order of importance, that influenced these in­dividuals to enter the armed services. The overwhelming majority answered that the type of work performed by a junior naval officer had the greatest in­fluence. They felt that, by providing a high degree of responsibility and chal­lenge at an early level, the duties of a new officer offer a rewarding sense of satisfaction that private industry can­not match. The immediate opportu­nity of providing leadership and of doing “something worthwhile” has a strong appeal to these young men. They eagerly seek all the challenge and leadership opportunities the Navy can provide.

The next most frequent answer given to the motivation question was one which, in this decade particularly, is surprising—patriotism. Many of the responses apologized for sounding “old fashioned,” and then went on to say that a sense of patriotism, love of country, and a desire to protect our democratic way of life were all major

reasons for their joining the military. If, as Admiral Arleigh A. Burke wrote in "Naval Leadership in Action,” (To Get the Job Done [Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976]) “men with honorable purpose will remain the one essential ingredient" to suc­cessful operations, then based on these responses, the Navy has an encourag­ing future.

Existing economic conditions, job security, travel opportunities, decent pay, the retirement program, adven­ture potential, and job prestige were other motivators rated in that order. Ranking lower on the scale were fringe benefits, advancement opportu­nity, the military system, and a chance to mature.

The answers to this question and others indicate that the major motivators of today s junior officer re­flect closely what Dr. Frederick Herzberg called, in his article, “One More Time: How Do You Motivate Employees” (On Management [New York: Harper and Row, 1975]), “job satisfaction motivators” instead of “hygiene factors,” the latter including such things as pay, status, security, and working conditions. Job satisfac­tion is sought in the areas of challenge and responsibility, not in the more tangible areas of money or retirement.

Therefore, does today’s division of­ficer differ greatly from his predeces­sors? Probably not. Financial consid­erations remain as a secondary service motivator today as they most certainly did prior to the recent decade of pay raises. What is surprising, however, is that with 46% desirous of a naval career and with 45% undecided at the start of their first tours of duty, a sig­nificant percentage will be impressed enough to remain in the service after the initial duty obligation. Allowing some room for those who are not suited to a naval career, or for those who find going to sea incompatible with their family lives or real estate operations, there remains a sizable number of officers who resign who could make significant contributions to the Navy. How can enlisted reten­tion rates be improved if retention of junior officers is so low? If we ignore the reasons these officers move to civil­ian careers (which can be easily done under the excuse that higher ranks need fewer officers) then we perhaps ignore areas that could not only im­prove the professionalism and dedica­tion of those officers who have already chosen a naval career, but that could also improve the same qualities in those who have yet to decide on a pro­fession.

The requirement for commissioning a given number of new ensigns each year is developed primarily from a comparison of the number of depart­ment head billets that must be filled with the current retention rate of junior officers. Such a policy is obvi­ously statistically necessary, but the emphasis appears to be quantity in­stead of quality. Despite this apparent emphasis, the need for quality reten­tion of junior officers is well-known, and in recent years several major pro­grams have been developed as steps toward improvement of that quality. These programs, such as the estab­lishment of the Surface Warfare Community, were vitally needed, but they have not been the complete an­swer to the problems of low junior of­ficer retention or the need for an increase in the quality of those re­tained.

In searching for the wisdom to im­prove those areas which we can, our attention is focused on the leading motivator—the responsibility and challenge a new division officer seeks in his job. A division officer’s im­mediate chain of command can do lit­tle about his pay, retirement program, etc., but it can do a great deal to help a new officer successfully complete his first tour and gain his needed job satisfaction. Perhaps if we can concen­trate some thought and discussion on this one leadership area, then both the junior officer retention rate and the quality of the junior naval officer corps will rise. What can a division officer’s immediate superiors do that their previous leadership training and experience has not already taught them? The first step is understanding some of the problems which often prevent a new junior officer from ob­taining the challenge and satisfaction so eagerly sought. This step is simple, apparently deceivingly so, since it too often is forgotten. Anyone with expe­rience in the ways of the world realizes that too often we humans tend to rush in with solutions without ever defin­ing or becoming fully aware of the problems. Some major areas which a new division officer faces in which his department head, executive officer, or commanding officer can give some help and leadership are knowledge ap­plication, time management, priority development, professionalism, and general enthusiasm. If some deliberate attention is given to these areas in ad­dition to the normal professional edu­cation and the semi-annual fitness re­port interview, then perhaps the chances of a new officer’s viewing his first tour of duty as rewarding and satisfying, instead of frustrating and chaotic, will be enhanced. Good lead­ership begets good leadership. Poor leadership by a superior leads to poor job performance by his subordinates and, thus, poor retention.

The need for professional knowl­edge, self-confidence, and pride in a naval officer has been often empha­sized. It also can be said that an offi­cer with these qualities will be highly motivated toward a naval career be­cause he is attaining those objectives which he sought upon being commis­sioned, thus he is satisfied with his job. Knowledge and self-confidence are closely related, for self-confidence does not exist without knowledge as a foundation. Pride develops from doing a needed job well—an achievement hard to accomplish without adequate knowledge and confidence. The knowledge factor has been greatly ex­panded in recent years by the estab­lishment of the Surface Warfare Offi­cers School, which can provide as good a knowledge foundation as pos­sible in a classroom. But since exten­sive shipboard training is not possible at any school, the task of continuing basic instruction and the providing of necessary shipboard experience falls back on the junior officer’s first tour of sea duty. If knowledge, self­confidence, and pride are keys to bet­ter junior officer retention, and if re­tention levels are low, then reason dic­tates that knowledge in some area is lacking. Either the required knowl­edge is not being successfully taught, or else the successful application of an adequate knowledge is not being ^aC complished on the job. In most cases the latter is the problem, and this ^lS basically due to a lack of experience and inadequate guidance.

Once a newly commissioned officer has graduated from the Surface Wat fare Officers School Basic Course an his prospective billet school, he has been exposed to most of the basic technical and procedural aspects of hi* job. What he is not prepared for, an what no school can ever adequately teach, is how to best manage his time in order to correctly fulfill his respon sibilities in the manner in which believes they should be performe ■ Almost everyone who enters any P^r°^ fession is at first unsure of where an when to perform the different aspects of his job correctly. Today’s junior ⁰ ficer, while trying to have his division do its PMS, PQS, corrective mainte­nance, and other jobs correctly, must attempt to integrate this division P^ef formance with his own personal edu cation revolving around Surface Wat fare Officer PQS. He has a time prob­lem, as everyone everywhere does, but he does not have the experience ^t0 quickly and correctly decide what ^lS best done now and what can be best done tomorrow. Caught between the numerous daily crises which deman immediate attention, the need to de vote time to getting to know his mem and the requirement for planning an developing training and maintenance schedules, he most often puts out the daily “fires” first and gets to the ^reSt when the time is available.

The solution to this problem ^lS closely related to the solution of th^e second problem of priority develop ment. Setting priorities would apP^e‘^ir to be easy since the mission of th^e Navy is to win. That objective is cleat in wartime; it becomes obscured peacetime when the objectives are m stead a set of criteria that will ensure combat readiness for war. Confronted both by the many perils mentioned ^|fl the beginning of this essay and th^e daily routine problems, a new office^ can easily become confused, frustrate at real and apparent shifts in com mand priorities, depressed that he not doing all of his duties as he kno"^s they should be done, and thus gradu

new officer is closely monitored, and he realizes that he will be faced with time and priority problems but that corrective advice and specific sugges­tions will be quickly forthcoming when frustration or depression sets in, then not only will direct help be given to a new officer striving to meet the challenge and fulfill his goals, but the frequent discussions will enable the senior to ensure that he himself is con­sistent in priority setting.

The development of professionalism and enthusiasm in a new officer is en­tirely in the hands of his seniors. If a division officer is working for a de­partment head who is enthusiastic about his job, enjoys his work, and is dedicated to his profession, this officer likely will acquire his senior's en­thusiasm. Enthusiasm is the key that leads to professionalism, for an individ­ual who is enthusiastic is one who strives to see his job done as it should be done and, with proper support, is successful at doing so.

Enthusiasm also is enhanced if the new officer is made to feel a part of a very selective group—a “band of brothers” as Admiral Lord Nelson called it. Wardroom camaraderie, the pride of belonging to a group which meets difficult challenges together, and the fulfillment of the basic human desire to "belong” or be accepted by a group can all be the results of en­thusiasm. Generation of this en­thusiasm must come by example; it must first be present and displayed by more senior officers. The term “pro­fessionalism” should not just be as­sociated with formality or the correct use of naval phraseology, instead it

is important to that command as ^as he and his division are con- j. ^ec>. If his requirements can be ^ted in writing in order of impor­

all the better. Personal, formal °w-up discussions between the new

? ^ *^oses the enthusiasm with which ^e saluted his first quarterdeck. _r ^meh°w. through the flack of fuel ^reP°rts, human resource training, and ^{11 e}^tedness letters, the new officer ^II1Ust he continually reminded of the j^^,0r priorities: PQS, PMS, PQS,

ca ^^{eSt Wa}^ ^t*^{lat t}*^{le com}mand ,^an help the new officer is by provid-

f ^g him a basic leadership _s ^{n arr}>ental—letting him know the ^Pecifi_{cs 0}f _w|_lat j_s demanded of him j '^{n w}hat order. This should be _r ^{ne w}*thin the first several weeks of Erring aboard so that as the new of- _Sf^Cer begins to manage his time, he ^0ut with a full understanding of

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_e *^{Cer anc}f his department head and ^ ^ecutive officer should be conducted ^ ^^Uently and should cover such areas jf^^brmance, tips on how to do his _Soj^ ^Detter, suggestions on how to ^{6 CUf}rent problems, application of Management by objectives ap- _Sj °^ach> etc. It is during these discus- the ^{S t}^^{lat ex}P^er‘^{ence can} he passed to ^c0n ^lnexP^er'^ence<f. For instance, the struct ion of a plan of action and _cj ^est0ne system can be taught in a _Sy_s ^Sro°m, but the application of the _tio ^{erri anc}f the need for follow-up ac- ^only be fully taught in the tg_e ^e °f a real shipboard environ- h_e|j^C' Such discussions usually are ^view ^{3t semi}‘^annual fitness report re- of_te Mterviews, but these meetings ⁿ deal only in generalities. If a

also must be associated with en­thusiasm, camaraderie, and pride. Such forms of professionalism cannot be taught in a classroom; they must be displayed by seniors who con­sciously attempt to imbue their sub­ordinates with the same traits by example. Today’s leadership problem may be that the seniors’ enthusiasm is not readily apparent to junior officers.

Much of the preceding discussion has not revealed many unique ideas. Such was not its purpose. There is no need to develop new leadership traits; instead, time-proven leadership rules must be given more conscious thought. This discussion has at­tempted to focus on specific leadership points which an individual command can do something about, for the over­all analysis reveals that what a new of­ficer wants most—challenge and satisfaction—the ship itself is well able to provide.

Perhaps the problem is that we as­sume too much when we consider the capabilities of a newly reported offi­cer. We forget that most of these young men are stepping out of a class­room environment into a very com­plex and demanding naval environ­ment. They need help in applying all they have learned, and they need this help continuously and in a construc­tive manner, which does not include the use of the “in hack” technique, which reflects more on the leadership failure of the senior. Today’s ensign entering the fleet knows, or has been exposed to, far more information con­cerning his job than his predecessors in their initial tours at sea. This means he can do the job better if he is guided, monitored, and enthused.