The Leadership Challenge of the Poticalized Navy

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The Leadership Challenge of the Politicalized Navy

Today’s leadership challenge is ¹ ^ confrontation between traditi⁰⁰^ American values and the so-called ^ne values.” The young leaders of to must resolve the problems associat with dynamic social change and within the shifting framework o modern Navy. Their personal and p^r° fessional conduct must reflect those ues which guide them in their decisio and strengthen them in their dedication They cannot have it both ways; ^f must opt for integrity, responsibi 1 ;> and individual excellence or for mater

By Lieutenant Thomas S. Sher, U. S. Navy

alism and expedient politics

of th^e

"value-free social order.”

To understand the challenge we ®^U j look at the nature of social turmoil an ^ examine its effect on: (1) the Navy an institution; (2) the individual, ^an (3) the relationship between the o ^c ^ and his men. Then, we must sugg a response that will enable our lea young and old alike, to fulfill then sponsibilities to the nation, the NavY’ and to themselves.

The forces of modern technology expanding government, and econo growth have combined to create a so<n ety based on bigness. Physical and p^s) chological self-reliance and mutual spect that were the basis of the ^on£ⁱⁿ. "American order” have been diminP ^ ing since the end of the nation’s fr°^nt | period. The advent of true continen economic interdependence at the c of the last century was the beginning of the end of individual physical auto¹¹ omy. The progressive government form programs of this century h^a' . resulted in the "explicit recognition

the government as a social wel • agency.” Theodore Roosevelt heral e^ the end of individualism when he to "ordinary individuals” that in resp⁰¹¹^ to socio-economic inequity they shou "act in their collective capacity throug . . . the government ... in their °^wl1 defense.” We have accepted the supP⁰’ sition that modern industrial society ■ too big, too complex, and too P^owel_. to be faced on an individual basis, thus appeal collectively through °^uf institutions to the government for * adjustment of social and economic im balance. Religious groups, labor unio°^s’ racial minorities, and other special-in^ter

gto_u

^medi;

^:rnment. The interaction of these

^‘gnifi,

e,IlPhasis Passi potv,

cant events are reported with an on the tumultuous, all-encom-

^c°m_e

s                 •

own interests, the individual is

Ijj " mtrinsically political. To further °bli.

Pol

realization has also taken place in Navy. The same forces of turbulent

th,

^s°cial

don

, These pressures _t^^Ve been magnified by the handling of

e_st

to ^^r°^uP^{s now} employ political action _ac ^atta*ⁿ their goals. Problem-solving is _tj_Qri^raP ^lshed by government interven- ^sUte ^{lfl res}P^{onse to} institutional pres­. ’ ^not by individual initiative.

^at was once known as the _a , ^erican order” has ceased to exist on ^shif^{Uman sca}^^e- ^^ts emphasis has been sti ^^r°^m P^ersonal fulfillment to in- just'^tl0na^ ^stabmty ‘^{n tbe} name of social _aiJlo^Ce' The traditional equilibrium _stat°ⁿS men, and between man and the l ^e bas been put into imbalance by lit' ^SP^ec'^ab'^nterest groups acting po- through various institutions g_Q^^{er c}ne "management” of the federal

P^s has become the focus of mass *^a and a staple of "mass culture.” ^,lng sweep of institutional political ^{er t}bat accentuates the real or per- ⁽h u- *ⁿⁱP^otence °f the individual in _So^C ‘8 society. The individual is deper- _tQ ^all2cd to the extent that he ceases . *^^rc*se—or even to try to exercise— 0\v ^^en<^^{ence an<}f responsibility for his

Tk                                                           •

^and ^{nC fesub} °b this depersonalization ₀j. . ^che appeal of the apparent utility i ,!^nst'^tutionaI political action is that ⁿ b’iduals seek to fulfill their needs J'rtUrily through the "system.” Mean- ^lle> the distinct embodiments of the ^tem within each institution have be-

Jgcd to adapt to these institutional ^ 'deal systems. When he turns from ^.nal solutions to institutional rem- ^es the process of politicalization is ^plete, and the dilution of individual ^esP°nsibility is a fait accompli.

^politi

change, bigness, and depersonaliza- that have acted on society have ^Pctated on the Navy.

'tetnam war and the trends toward p ^ertlocratization” of the armed forces. °bticalization in the Navy has aggra- ^ed the conflict of individual values

<m j

, , made constructive, effective leader- 'P more difficult.

The Navy traditionally was better

suited than most institutions to resist the process because of its nominally apolitical status, small spans of personal control in a precise chain of command, and a tradition of delegation of authority with commensurately high standards of individual responsibility. Yet special-interest group demands for governmental reforms in the Navy were implacable, and the glare of publicity was unrelenting. The time permitted for change was so short that the natural inertia of the "feudal structure” had to be circumvented. This was accomplished by a variety of special programs that have indeed ameliorated, but not com­pletely rectified, certain conditions of inequity. The result has been a modifica­tion in the ideological tendencies and physical structure of the service.

After a long period of "no comment,” commanders of all grades now acknowl­edge that special-interest groups exist within the Navy. These commanders have to respond to these groups as well as to individuals. This is what the "politicalization” of the Navy means: the acceptance by the command struc­ture and individuals at all levels—wholly or in part—of the processes, priorities, and utility of interest group politics.

The spirit of direct, personal respon­sibility that is the traditional nature of the Navy chain of command has been altered in response to internal and ex­ternal pressures for the advancement of rights and benefits. While there has been no apparent diminution in the effectiveness of the operational chain of command, numerous new links have been added: those boards, committees, and individuals tasked to improve inter­nal conditions. Indeed, these new links seem to have become chains of their own, having explicit or implicit access to various higher levels of command that by-passes the normal sequence. With no operational responsibility or authority these heretofore missing links are strictly political in nature having been developed in response to political pres­sure. Their existence creates occasional uncertainty for the individual—whether to address his problems to a political representative or to a regular administra­tive superior. The solution by the collec­tive, political means can generate a con­flict of values for the individual and may result in the deterioration of his self­reliance and responsibility.

The individual and his values are at once the foundation and victim of a politicalized institution. Although the Navy as a part of the military establish­ment is by definition a collective enter­prise, it has traditionally stressed indi­vidual excellence, responsibility, and initiative. The perpetual redefinition of the military ethic has continued, but in every case personal responsibility has remained a basic assumption. The Navyman has always relied on the "sys­tem” for support and direction to the extent required and demanded by mili­tary organization. However, this reliance has not stifled the individual’s vitality and adaptability or that of the institu­tion. The individual has generally been spared many of the uncertainties that bedevil his civilian counterparts and has been correspondingly more free to de­vote himself to his professional duties. The politicalization of the Navy, how­ever, has produced a measure of institu­tional instability, hence individual un­certainty, by weakening the emphasis on personal responsibility through the in­troduction of a political alternative.

If, indeed, there are two distinct chains in today’s Navy, the individual with what he considers to be a pressing problem will choose the one that seems to offer the better {faster?) solution. On that black day which now seems certain to come, when all those with problems choose the political chain, the individual and the Navy may both find that the cure is far worse than the disease. For the price the individual will pay for his quickie cure is the loss of control over his own destiny. The Navy’s price may be greater; it may find itself the victim of the classic case wherein the operation was successful, but the patient died.

The convenience of political solutions and the pressures to use them also weaken the relationship between the officer and his men. The officer’s respon­sibility for the welfare of his men ceases to be uniquely his. Whether he likes it or not, other problem-solving groups present alternate solutions to his per­sonal reply. As he becomes increasingly aware of the collective, political option to individual response, the inclination

and the

of the

to forego his responsibility acts on him even as it acts on his men.

The men are conscious of these alter­natives to responsibility, both for them­selves and their superior. The political option becomes even more inviting when participants on both sides of a difficult question seek to avoid a difficult decision. In this situation the two-way, man-to-man links of responsibility, ac­countability, and authority are dimin­ished to the degree that a political solu­tion is envisaged. If such occasions are frequent and lead, sooner or later, to a political solution, the result will be the eventual dissolution of an effective rela­tionship between the officer and his men. The self-reliance and personal re­sponsibility on which the Navy is based is undermined as individuals are tempted toward a political solution to their difficulties before all other avenues may have been exhausted.

The proper response to this challenge requires a profound shift in the empha­sis of leadership. The Navy is already politicalized and will remain subject to all types of political pressures. Although this is not necessarily bad, a subtle but dangerous threat to our traditional val­ues exists. We may control our politi­calization by re-emphasizing individual excellence, responsibility, and integrity in all facets of Navy life.

Our leaders must clearly stress that the first approach to the solution of any problem is personal involvement, not referral to a review committee. The committee recourse must be the least acceptable solution. The leaders must point out that over dependence on col­lective institutional action is the re­sponse of a weak individual. They must also demand that their men address themselves to each problem as a ques­tion of honor that requires they resolve the difficulty at their level, using their resources, and according to their princi­ples.

The authority necessary to facilitate the development and reinforcement of individual responsibility exists in the Navy. Response to the challenge com­pels the young leader to become familiar with the options available to him within the system. It demands that he not

permit himself the dangerous luxury increasing reliance on institution problem-solving. While he may ^se^ guidance, realizing that there is no s stitute for personal involvement, a Pf sonal demonstration of responsibi¹ and self-reliance will be his most va ua ble leadership tool.

In today’s world the Navy nation are fighting the challenge conflict of values to preserve stabi rty^. continuity, and the traditional basis American freedom. This is a strugg ^ within each man, within the institutio^ of which he is a part, and within nation itself. This conflict will only resolved by a return to those solid, ^tl!n less values which give meaning, eha ter, and purpose to the individual, ^st bility and vitality to our institutio¹¹ > and strength and endurance to the tion. The key for success is the indb¹^ ual. Ours must be a faith in the ^w°^r* of man and his ability to prize liberO and honor and act responsibly. The ^ whose talents include leadership ha^s special responsibility and challenge-