“NavCad or College Grad?”
(See J. E. Williams, pp. 49-53, April 1972 Proceedings)
Captain Edwin L. Ebbert, U. S. Navy—Captain Williams poses the question of whether flight training qualification must include a college degree. He cites three social forces which act upon the college graduate, flight-trained young officer—forces which tend to be inimical to retention: matters relating to home life; anti-military attitudes to which he has been exposed on the college campus; the attitude of his wife.
I acknowledge the prevalence of these forces, but I question that there would be a significant retention gain if the requirement of being a college graduate before entering flight training were relaxed. (If there are gains, then perhaps we should re-examine that requirement for all our officer candidates.) My experience dictates to me that at least two of the social forces cited will be operating regardless of whether the officer candidate is a college graduate.
It is true that “insufficient home life,” “deterioration of home life,” or some similar reason is often cited by young officers as their reason for deciding to leave the naval Service. It is nearly impossible to counter such an argument, for the person attempting to do so finds himself in the position of saying either that there is sufficient home life, or that home life is not all that important.
I am not convinced that the young officers who cite this reason really mean it. Many believe that they are sincere, but do not realize that they are dissatisfied with the naval Service for other reasons. They may be unable or unwilling to articulate those reasons, and so fall back on the standard complaint. Others may not be so sincere, but offer this reason because it is an acceptable and (they think) unanswerable one.
The other social force is the woman in his life. I will leave it to a woman I know fairly well—my wife—to comment on that.
My observation is that more of the problem is related to what we do with the young officer when we get him, than it is related to when we get him.
As has been said repeatedly in this forum and elsewhere, the task is to actively engage and skillfully “turn on” that young officer. We have to work harder at showing him the “fun and zest” that come from being a part of a living, well-disciplined organization in which everyone pulls his oar (wives included). When we can present him with a genuine challenge to become a professional, when we can convince him that there is adventure enough for anyone’s mettle in becoming part of that team, then we are promoting the positive aspects of Service life and he will want to prepare himself and his wife for the contingencies of deployments. We know that cruises are rewarding experiences, not just “separation from the family.” I believe that he can also become aware of this and so direct his attitudes and those of his family toward the positive aspects of a career which includes sea duty.
I know how difficult it is to engage and “turn on” the young officer. When I was a junior officer, I looked forward to the day when I could, as I thought my seniors were doing, sweep the desk clear of the “trivia” and get down to “settling the big issues.” Unfortunately, it has not turned out that way, for I find myself constantly feeling as if on the edge of a whirlpool. It is an endless struggle to find the time to get “out with the troops.” I accomplished this when I was a squadron commanding officer, but in two subsequent tours as a staff officer, I have been less successful in this regard, and I see no relief to the problem. My contemporaries appear to have the same problem, so we continue to have insufficient involvement between the seniors and the mid-grade officers, and between the mid-grade and the junior officers. The juniors continue to leave the ship because they are not “involved.” This, in turn, leaves them with an inadequate “psychic wage” for their day’s work. That is why for them, their home, besides being the place where they can relax, rest, and recreate themselves for what should be the rewarding tasks of the next day, may also become the only place where they truly “turn on.”
Not that home should not be rewarding and a challenge too—it must be, since that is where that woman is!
Mrs. Edwin L. Ebbert—With conspicuous gallantry, Captain Williams states that American women are highly desirable and prized. Now, there is a true officer and a gentleman for you! Let me assure him that quite a few American women feel the same way about naval officers, and some of us are particularly partial to the gold-winged variety. So it comes as no surprise that when members of these two desirable groups get within shooting distance of each other, the result is apt to be a sharp increase in the ranks of ex-bachelors. Captain Williams acknowledges that marriage is also desirable, but notes that it is “. . . an unmitigated catastrophe in its impact on the retention of young naval officers.” He is probably right.
What a pity! It implies two sad truths. One is that the young men did not thoroughly understand the nature of the career they were embarking upon, and therefore their commitment to it was less firmly based than it should have been. Secondly, it indicates that the young wives are calling the shots on their husbands’ futures, and to a degree that is dangerous for both of them. And that is a dreary comment on how well those young men have been trained for leadership. Maybe there is a point here that I am missing, but it seems to me that if a young husband cannot lead his wife, there is some question as to how well he can lead a division.
I see three areas of remedy. First, in our recruiting. Let us not pussyfoot around the subject of cruises, as if it were somehow indelicate. Let us tell the prospective candidate for a commission, “Yes, we go to sea. It is the name of the game. If the thought of anything like that is intolerable to you, maybe we ought not to waste any more of each other’s time.” But, before he gets to the door, we might point out that many civilian careers will involve nearly as much time away from home, as much separation from family, as a naval career. Let him ponder that truth for awhile before he signs our dotted line—or anyone else’s.
Secondly, let us level with our young men during flight training (or any other training) about the wiles of women. Maybe our syllabi need more emphasis on the “Stand by to repel boarders . . .” theme. I concede that this will be very difficult to pull off. For one thing, young men tend to think they know all about women. Even if they privately suspect they do not, they surely will not admit it. They are not apt to listen attentively to advice on this subject because to do so might reveal that they are less wise than they care to let on. For another, it will be sticky for the naval aviators who instruct them, for they will somehow be implying that those lovely creatures out there are aggressors. Of course, they are, in a sense, but who wants to say so? Naval aviators may be fearless, but are they that fearless?
Finally, I think a part of the answer lies in the post-training period, that first squadron tour. Once again the senior aviators must lead the way, show the nugget that it is possible to be a naval aviator and a decent husband, too. Who says a married man should not take a remain-overnight-flight (RON)? As Grampaw Pettibone might say, “Great jumpin’ jehosophat—he’s the one who needs it!” I know the seniors can do this, for did they not teach their wives awhile back that it was quite all right for a naval aviator to go off and do his thing? Simultaneously, those of us who married them were learning to do our thing, which was—and is—to be secure enough to let them go, to be happy to welcome them back, and to prefer having a whole man part of the time, rather than part of a man all of the time.
Pictorial—“Submarine Memorials—‘For Those Who Served’”
(See G. M. Hagerman, pp. 77-92, March; and p. 107, June 1972 Proceedings)
Clinton Orr, Historian, Nebraska Chapter, U. S. Submarine Vets WWII—When the National Office of U. S. Submarine Vets put forth the idea of each state to honor a submarine, the Nebraska Chapter immediately asked for the Wahoo (SS-238) because two Nebraskans—one from Wahoo and one from Humboldt—went down with the submarine.
Despite the small membership, we erected the pedestal ourselves, brought the Mark 4 torpedo from San Diego to North Bend, Nebraska, in sections by truck, assembled the “fish,” and hauled it to Wahoo at our own expense and labor. Since the memorial is located on the court house lawn, the county built a walkway to and around the memorial. The Wahoo memorial was dedicated on 9 September 1962—the first state to complete its submarine memorial.
We have a memorial service every October on the Sunday nearest the date that the Wahoo was lost.
Dr. W. R. Bush—Another submarine memorial not mentioned is the chapel on board the U. S. Naval Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut . . . the stained glass windows [are] magnificent.
Commander Richard P. Sullivan, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Following two aborted attempts, the former German U-boat, U-995, was lowered into her cradle at Kiel, Germany, in March. She will be used as a museum and memorial for the more than 700 German submarines lost in action during World War II.
The U-995 was commissioned in 1943, and after World War II, was put into service with the Royal Norwegian Navy along with several other U-boats. Norway returned the submarine to the German Navy last summer, and two previous attempts to lower the submarine in place at the memorial had failed because the cranes had tilted.
The U-995, which has an overall length of 67 meters, and a 6.20-meter beam, could cruise on the surface at 17 knots and submerged at 7 knots. Her normal complement was 50 officers and men.
The Small Craft Gap—Not Again
Chief Boatswain Charles W. Bond, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—This discussion addresses a number of areas which are small, by comparison with the problems confronting the overall defense establishment, but are, by no means, unimportant. The decrease of U. S. involvement in Southeast Asia, the immediate commitments of the Armed Forces, as a whole, and the U. S. Navy in particular, clearly leaves us with problems which are never resolved satisfactorily during the high degree of involvement such as in Vietnam. These residual matters, coupled with other problems which went without resolution during that period, present the United States with some sobering realities vis-á-vis [sic] the state of the world’s naval technology and the state of Soviet technology.
The United States is presently critically deficient in a number of specialized technical areas, which, when taken together, can best be described as, “a small craft gap.” In our concern over aircraft carriers, antisubmarine warfare, air-defense missile systems, and the tools of the strategic type of war threat, we have neglected small combatant vessels and virtually all aspects of their technology. As a result, we do not have effective or capable small vessels or adequate powering systems for them, the weapons suitable to their use, nor a body of tactical doctrine for the effective employment of such vessels. There is not, for example, a single U. S.-manufactured, high-speed diesel engine which may be realistically contemplated for use in a high-speed, small-vessel main propulsion application. There are no modern, automatic weapons, which are manufactured in the United States, that are suitable for ranges over three miles. There is no surface-to-surface missile of any description in the weapons available from U. S. manufacturers, while the Soviets, as well as many other countries, continue to develop this class of shipboard weapon, some now in the fourth generation. The ramifications of this lack of development on the part of the U. S. Navy are clear—our small Allies must turn to other nations for this class of naval equipment. Many already have done so. Military Assistance funds cannot be spent in the U. S. marketplace, because our shelves have no wares for sale.
The history of our naval warfare development in Southeast Asia indicates that we were not prepared for the several shallow-water naval activities that were encountered. The U. S. Navy had ample warning as to the nature of the problems. There were a few voices crying in the wilderness of the Navy bureaus between 1960 and 1963, but they were not regarded seriously in the other clamors for equipment and operating funds.[*]
We spent a great deal of money in those cost-effective days of Secretary Robert MacNamara [sic], some of it, in the billions of dollars, down rat-holes like the F-111A, the DASH antisubmarine system, and others. We failed, however, to see the Soviets developing missile-carrying vessels at a high rate. We entered the arena of Vietnam without proper craft for the coastal patrol operations, inshore patrol work, riverine and estuarine patrol and assault, and coastal interdiction. We used DE-type ships, ocean minesweepers, sampans, and converted landing craft. Later, we were able to get the stop-gap “Swift” boats (PCF) and the river patrol boats (PBR). While far from optimum, they were able to adapt to the situation, and their crews performed magnificently to accomplish their tasks. But there is no question that good men were lost, engagements were left in an inconclusive state, and hazards unnecessarily increased by the fact that the craft were simply not good enough for the job at hand.
Where are we now, since we have handed over these craft to the Vietnamese Navy? Right back where we started, circa 1948. Our craft, weapons, machinery, and equipment, are all back at that point in time, save for a few modern variations in materials and small weapons. Our only saving grace remains that we now are aware of the crisis that unpreparedness created, and have a small band of people fairly concerned that it should not happen again. The Strike Warfare Command of the Navy and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations are closely concerned with the problem of small vessels as is demonstrated by the creation of a Naval Combatant Craft Program. This program is largely concerned with small craft in the category of “non-commissioned craft.” This still leaves the larger patrol vessels in limbo, as it were. The patrol gunboat (PG) type falls into the hands of the “big-ship” people, which may be a mistake. We stand in danger of receding into the “peacetime” trap of letting our Navy degenerate.
It should be pointed out that the United States has treaty and military assistance commitments with a great many nations. We are affiliated by treaty with about 70 countries, including many which are small, inadequately-funded, and susceptible of Sino/Soviet pressure. These same small countries have many legitimate security problems, even without overt pressures of the Communist bloc nations. Thailand, Cambodia, Korea, Indonesia, Burma, and others all have a continuing problem of Communist infiltration, much of it by way of their seacoasts. Latin America, particularly Central America, has the continuing problem of clandestine infiltration of Cuban agents. The African nations are a continuing market for sales of small gunboats and patrol craft, such vessels comprising the bulk of their navies.
These countries cannot find equipment in the U. S. marketplace, and are turning to the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia, for the type of small vessels they need and can afford. Areas such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Latin America, and the Southeast Asia mainland coastal nations are extremely vulnerable to seaborne operations by insurrection-bent groups. In shallow coastal areas and limited-sea areas of the several archipelagoes involved, small, fast, and heavily-armed vessels can constitute virtually all the naval presence that could really be effective in that type of area. Many European naval powers, both large and small, have developed high-performance vessels ranging generally in the 90- to 150-foot range, heavily-armed with missiles and modern types of automatic weapons.[*]
It is therefore evident that, together with a development of the smaller vessels in the naval tools spectrum, we must quickly come up with solutions in surface-to-surface missile defense, as well as the surface-to-surface missile systems themselves. It will not be enough to achieve parity with the European nations and the Soviets, since they are already years ahead. We must come up with a real “hat trick” and go beyond them. This has, in the past, involved some massive spending of money and compounding of problems. The sheer complexity of handling, launching, and guidance systems alone, has had a profound influence on the design of our guided missile-carrying ships. The increase in cost and complexity seems to be an American solution to nearly every problem. It is time to “think simple” for a change. A little sophistication may be good, but a lot is ridiculous as well as costly, particularly when it usually results in a restriction to the capability of the weapons system. One example is the Mark 45 5-inch/54-caliber naval gun. It is the very latest in U. S. Navy destroyer guns. Its initial rate of fire is 20 rounds per minute. The Italian OTO Melara 5-inch/54-caliber gun, very similar in size and design, has a rate of 50 rounds per minute, and could be installed in about the same space, or less. Yet, it took us 25 years to evolve the Mark 45—and it is obsolete.
We do not have any modern weapons below 3-inch which are suitable for use on a small, high-speed vessel—no automatic cannon, missiles, or semi-self-guiding rocket weapons. There have been various proposals involving the use of stabilized tank-guns, and Rube Goldberg adaptations of recoilless rifles, but these promise to contribute to, rather than solve the problem. At this point, our best prospect for these weapons would be to buy them from Europe. This, of course, is an untenable idea, and it is clear that the U. S. defense establishment must have an unrestricted source for its equipment. The Naval Ordnance Systems Command has occupied itself with the large problems of ASW weapons, missile, aircraft defense, and the like, and has virtually ignored the small ship and craft problems.
It is with the general subject of small craft and equipment for them, that the Naval Combatant Small Craft Program is occupied. In this general field, there are some very old and knotty problems, having to do with maintaining high speeds in rough seas, light weight, high-output propulsion systems, and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of shooting accurately from high-speed small craft in a seaway.
In order to maintain the skills learned in small craft combat, programs are planned to maintain the doctrines and skills so painfully learned under fire in the Mekong Delta and Vietnamese coast areas. These are not yet fully underway, for they are hampered by lack of funding and equipment. No type commands, nor larger contributory groups presently are able to support such activities, even though their money requirements are quite modest. Yet, this area of development is vital if we are to remain viable, or if we are not viable, to become so, in the naval combatant craft field. As things stand at this moment, we are faced with the reality that we have no truly capable small craft in the cost range below several millions of dollars. Our hydrofoil technology is excellent, and our state-of-the-art in this regard is actually leading the world technical community. But hydrofoils are quite expensive, and are limited in application. In a cost-effective sense, they are beyond the normal reach not only of our small allies but of our own Navy, on the basis of cost-effectiveness for many missions. The plain facts are that we do not have any workable patrol craft capable of coastal operations in rough sea states, nor do we have any coastal patrol craft capable of effectively dealing with the many high-speed types developed by the Soviets. Many of the class of vessel once called “torpedo boats” are today missile-armed. This is a natural match; a high-speed, light vessel, and a low, or no-recoil weapon capable of accurate guidance, independent of the motions of the firing platform. The United States has neither the missile nor the platform, and unless we bring a concentrated and efficient effort to bear on these problems we shall never have this sort of highly cost-effective weapon for the coastal war.
Despite the present feelings of “no more Vietnams,” our own long coastline still remains, as do the coastlines of nations involved in our Military Assistance Programs. Of all the assistance funds, the Navy’s portion is about 8% too low to provide realistically anything to our allies but cast-off vessels and a few spares to keep them going. The few (and there are very few) exceptions have provided vessels which we could very well have used in our own, block-obsolescent forces. The patrol gunboat, referred to earlier, has turned out to be embarrassing—17 of them, in fact. This vessel is expensive, and has some fragile machinery. She is too large for efficient use against small coastal smuggling craft. Her speed is good, but not good enough to counter bona fide torpedo boats, and her seakeeping, particularly at medium speeds, is abominable. She has insufficient weapons-carrying ability to engage a ship in the escort destroyer category. Indeed, she is out-ranged by the Soviet P-6 Komar derivation, using the now-obsolete Styx missile. This vessel concept is generally excellent, as the numbers of fine patrol boats of other nations will attest, but the execution of the original good idea went astray.
This does not mean that they cannot yet be valuable and useful vessels, but it will take some changing to accomplish this end, mainly in the engineering plant and modifications to improve seakeeping. These modifications are now in development. The point is, however, that the problem areas of these vessels have hastened the potential buyers into the shops of our naval hardware competition abroad. Great Britain, Germany, France, Sweden, Italy, and others, including the Soviet Union, offer goods which have less initial expense, higher capabilities, and better records in many cases. Not all the foreign items are highly durable, but they are easier to buy. When our customers go to other sources, it works a double, or triple, ill on us. The balance of payments suffers, our U. S. contractors suffer a loss, and our development languishes because of lack of demand for the product, penalizing our progress. A lack of preparedness for the coastal, riverine, estuarine war has not prevented such wars in the past, and it will not prevent future wars.
Our growing dependence on air-support for surface operations in our doctrines of warfare is acceptable only as long as conditions will permit having air cover or tactical support on every engagement scene. In semi-tropical Vietnam, the monsoon weather often prevented aircraft from operations in close support of surface actions, and Vietnam is certainly not unusual in this respect. Korea, the Western Caribbean, East Africa, Alaska, the Bay of Bengal, and a host of other locations can also fall into this situation. The unit on the scene must be able to handle its missions without a host of supporting forces. Neither we, nor our allies can always afford such luxury in combat. Therefore, our combatant small craft must be as capable as possible in every predictable respect. Reason must be exercised, of course, and there is no reason to hamper a high-speed craft with the weight of heavy weapons which will limit her performance to the point where no weapon would serve in any case, when the target escapes. In like manner, there is no point in using 50-knot craft under conditions where speed is not required, as in minesweeping, for example. Yet, we have sometimes been guilty of this, very often as a result of not having tools for the job at hand, and making-do with what we did have. Resourcefulness is a virtue, of course, but lack of foresight and reason may be, and has been, a blunder of serious effect.
Presently, one serious lack in the Navy’s small craft spectrum is that of a really first rate coastal patrol craft; capable of 40 or more knots in rough seas (say State 3 or 4) and weapons to go with it. This sort of vessel, which we may call a coastal patrol and interdiction craft (CPIC) is in common need by all our small allies, and ourselves as well. The “Swift” boats are too slow and unseaworthy. The U. S. Coast Guard 82- and 95-foot cutters are too slow, and the PBRs are not seaworthy, while the Nasty PTF types are too few and cost-ineffective, and the various hydrofoils are too expensive. This really leaves us, and our military assistance program allies with nothing to use. Aircraft cannot solve this type of problem, although they can sometimes help. Small craft are the answer to the coastal-smuggling operation, not a multimillion-dollar joint air-sea task force. Money spent in small craft is easier by far, to amortize, than is equivalent money spent on large vessels to do the same job.
But, lest we forget, the vessels that incurred the most contact with a hostile enemy in the past years, the craft that traded gunfire with actual opposition, the forces that took casualties, the forces that we needed for war, were the small craft of the “Brown-water Navy,” the ones we did not have when we needed them. To go back to sleep, and let this happen again, will be tragic, especially since we can prevent it from happening again. We could have prevented it from happening in 1964, but not enough people thought it was important. As history has now shown us, small craft were important, and they still are.
Richard J. Weader, II—It is apparent that the size and cost of our destroyer designs have reached the point where we must re-think our philosophy. The DD-963 Spruance class, compared to the DDG-2 class, has achieved a reduction in anti-air and anti-surface capabilities, some improvement in antisubmarine capability, and a large increase in hotel qualities at the cost of 2,500 tons displacement. The 963s are clearly too large (and expensive) to be of general use.
One possible step is to return to a more moderate hull size and work in the maximum possible capability. The British have followed this course with the Type 42 DDG, as the Type 82 turned out too big and expensive.
If a DDG-2 hull were equipped with a gas turbine engineering plant, OTO Melara Compact instead of Mk. 42 guns, a Mk. 26 combined launcher (simulated if not immediately available) instead of the Mk. 13 launcher and AsRoc pepperbox, and fixed instead of trainable Mk. 32 torpedo launchers, considerable weight and volume would be saved and manning requirements reduced. The weight and volume saved could be used for sonar improvements, naval tactical data system (NTDS), and an extended superstructure completely across the ship at maindeck level as in the Edsall-class DER conversions. Room might even be found for a helicopter by rearranging the superstructure above the main deck level, and the reduced crew and increased superstructure volume must increase habitability.
The result should be a ship which could match or exceed the DDG-2 and DD-963 classes in all respects, and be much smaller and hopefully cheaper than the 963 type.
“A Future for the Destroyer?”
(See W. J. Ruhe, pp. 33-38, August 1971; and pp. 86-87, January 1972 Proceedings)
Commander Frederick S. Adair, U. S. Navy—Captain Ruhe’s destroyer is appealing and would be a formidable ship. Quite surely she would be a powerful hunter, but likely she also would be hunted—because she would be a high-value target. The medium-range missile system could have a $25-million price tag all by itself and the complete ship might cost twice that amount. Even a repeat-build of DE-1052s—less capable ships—might amount to $50-million a copy today.
It might be that our recent Vietnam War experience is exerting undue influence on our shipbuilding plans. We did not have meaningful seapower opposition there. We do not need the most powerful ships we can build to combat an insurgency, but we need nothing less in order to stand up against the first-class naval forces which could face us today.
In our increased emphasis of the sea control mission, the need to be able to support a projection of ground combat forces might not be receiving the consideration it should. We cannot overlook the latter because of our national interest overseas. We should not degrade our capability, currently unusual in the world, wherein we can move our airfields and their first-line aircraft where they are needed. These aircraft carriers provide considerable political leverage. Our overseas land bases are diminishing in number, and there is no indication that this trend will reverse.
In seeking to maintain the ability to control sea lines of communication we are contemplating larger numbers of less costly ships. Definition of these ships is an intensive ongoing effort. I would only observe that incorporation of a medium-range, surface-to-surface and/or surface-to-air missile system in the escort ship may exceed cost parameters and, therefore, I would recommend consideration of fitting the shipboard helicopters with an adaptation of air-to-air missiles for use against small missile craft as a less costly alternative. Control of certain sea areas will require nothing less than our most powerful strike forces, protected by our best AAW and ASW units. The deliberations necessary to arrive at what fraction of available dollars should be devoted to first-line ships and what fraction to the cheaper, less-capable ships is beyond the scope of this discussion. It seems, however, that resolving uncertainty in favor of the first-line ships would be safer in that it would create a concentration of equal or superior forces which, especially with nuclear propulsion, could move rapidly to an area of concern. Unless an enemy has a continuous, worldwide tracking system which is foolproof, he would be faced with an ominous factor of uncertainty in his planning. An error in the other direction heightens the risk of destruction of our lesser ships in detail by an enemy concentration, which could consist of only one powerful ship.
In first-line forces, there must be aircraft with superior or at least competitive performance characteristics for strike and distant air defense roles. This, of course, necessitates the large aircraft carriers of the sort we are building today. In response to the air and submarine attack threats, we have built a number of frigates in recent years. I find these to be compromise ships which attempt to be both cruisers and destroyers. I think we could get more for our money by building a limited number of cruisers and a larger number of destroyers instead of building frigates.
We can afford only a few cruisers—perhaps only one per carrier or even less. They should have the best AAW and ASW capabilities we can build into them. They also should be equipped for long-range surface combat. Their command and control facilities and accommodations should provide for a Fleet or task force commander, and would allow removing control of force defense from the carrier so the latter could concentrate on strike operations. This extensive capability would justify armoring and finely compartmenting the cruiser. The destroyer obviously would be a lesser ship, but still large and fast enough to escort strike forces even in moderate seas. Her ASW capability would be the best, but there would be compromises in her AAW systems in order to hold her cost down and allow building in quantity. She must also have a surface- to-surface capability so both cruisers and destroyers could be sent on independent missions. The destroyer would not merit armor.
All of the first-line ships must have the mobility and freedom which nuclear propulsion affords. Nuclear propulsion is costly, but it should be remembered that during a ship’s lifetime her propulsion plant rarely is modified. On the other hand, the other characteristics of a warship are changed in a major way at least once—usually twice or more—in her lifetime. In the last 25 years, almost every destroyer-size and larger warship has had more Navy shipbuilding and conversion money spent on modifications than in the original purchase.
One flinches at the cost of first-line ships—especially carriers and the cruiser described. There is, however, no short cut. We must provide adequate forces if we are to keep peace. These costs can be held down by making long-range plans and remaining with them. This does not mean a 20-year build of a class of ships, but a 4 to 8-year program involving from three to 15 major ships (destroyer and larger). We should avoid vacillation such as that associated with the CVAN-70, which has driven her cost from about $600 million to over $950 million. Adjustment of procurement rates to keep the workload in shipyards as level as possible might also help.
Ludwig C. R. Hannemann—Captain Ruhe has indicated, with remarkable candor from our German national standpoint, in his treatise, the problematic future for destroyers with respect to aspects of other navies. He has stressed, among other things, the progressively-constructed concept of the hull below the waterline of the German cruiser Prinz Eugen during World War II.
During World War II, I served in the Admiral Hipper, sistership of the Prinz Eugen, and would like to comment that in the years 1935 and 1936, the Prinz Eugen was considered to represent a superlative shipbuilding achievement in view of the knowledge recognized at that time. However, as is known, where there is light, there will also be some shadow. This erstwhile achievement in ship construction more than compensated for the many disadvantages inherent in and characteristic of this entire class of cruiser ships. The cruisers of the Hipper class, for example, had relatively many poor seaworthy qualities, reduced radius of action, and high fuel consumption, susceptibility to defects in the machine installation, lack of shoring between the turbine rooms two and three, thereby creating the possibility of complete failure or a two-thirds shutdown of the generating power.
German naval leadership was cognizant of the good and also the bad qualities of the cruiser classes. Paralleling the experiences in the U. S. Navy described by Ruhe, German naval leadership also failed to draw the required conclusion from the results with reference to the construction of the destroyers. It may be that the German leadership took account of only the most obvious of the defects in order to replace, as fast as possible, Germany’s destroyers lost in Norway. This made their failure to eliminate other defects understandable, but certainly not excusable in view of the small total number of German destroyers.
In this connection, attention is called to the fact that, for example, the German destroyer Z-34 still possessed relatively good seagoing qualities, but as a consequence of her approximately 3,600-ton weight and 15-cm. armaments, had too much windage, and therefore could only be maneuvered very moderately. The same was true also of other German destroyers. Even when, in the face of increasing Allied air attacks, it would have been obviously necessary to diminish the heavy seagoing-armament (four 15-cm. guns, of which two guns were located in a gun house on the forecastle) in favor of greater anti-aircraft armaments, no conclusions were drawn.
When they were drawn, they were in a diametrically opposed direction, in that, despite the great weight of the seagoing artillery, the number of antiaircraft armaments was also increased.
Unfortunately, the same mistakes seem to have repeated themselves already in the present German Federal Navy, although the recognized defects have been removed successfully, after an obviously long time, on destroyers of the Hamburg class. If one follows the critical statements of Captain Ruhe, one can wait, with some skepticism, to see how destroyers of the Charles F. Adams class built in U. S. shipyards will prove themselves in the long run. These ships are sailing under the flag of the German Federal Republic as the Lutjens (D-185), Moelders (D-186), and Rommel (D-187), and are at the same time, the first rocket-destroyers of the German postwar Navy. Seen as a whole, Captain Ruhe should be thanked for his well-founded critique since it is, without doubt, not only of contemporary importance for the future of the destroyers of the U. S. Navy, but also for the future of all the principal navies of NATO.
Commander Thomas D. Wilson, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired), Naval Architect and Marine Engineer—The ASW capability of a destroyer will continue to be limited by the capability and the reliability of the sonar system itself. Treating the symptoms by quieting the ship or by changing her hull form will only alleviate the illness—it will not cure it. Spending the Navy’s limited funds on the symptoms reaches a point of no return in combat effectiveness since a simple casualty to a piece of machinery that is essential to operations can negate the effectiveness of the entire program. Performance of any shipboard sonar must be compatible with a reasonable environment.
The destroyer and destroyer escort have traditionally been called upon to escort both combatant and merchant type ships providing both antisubmarine and anti-aircraft search, detection, and destroy capability. They were given an anti-ship capability comparable to their expected opposition. Are today’s ships effective and worth their cost?
The Fletcher-class, World War II destroyer was 377 feet, displaced 2,750 tons, carried five 5-inch guns, ten 40-mm. guns, ten 21-inch torpedoes, hedgehog, and depth charge antisubmarine weapons. They cost about $7 million dollars and would cross the Atlantic at 15 knots. Their top speed was over 37 knots. They could and did perform their mission, and some are still in service today. The Knox-class destroyer escort is 438 feet long, displaces 4,100 tons, and carries one 5-inch gun, four antisubmarine torpedoes. AsRoc, and, someday, two helicopters. She costs $50 million, and can go 4,000 miles in a dead calm. The Spruance-class destroyer is 560 feet long, displaces 7,000 tons, and carries two 5-inch guns, one Sea Sparrow missile launcher, four antisubmarine torpedoes, and, someday, a helicopter. She is gas turbine-powered, costs $90 million, and can go 4,000 miles at 20 knots in a dead calm. Her top speed will be less than 37 knots. She is unarmored and jammed with electronics.
Twenty knots is a significant figure. It is the threshold above which a submarine cannot launch a reliable attack in a surface ship. It is also the threshold above which a surface ship cannot reliably detect a submarine. Each plays a game of chess to get into a position where they can accomplish their mission with a speed through the water that will give them the greatest chance of success—less than 20 knots. Twenty knots was a significant figure. It was greater than the sustained sea speed of our merchant marine fleet. Today, it is less and, because of size alone, the merchant fleet can outrun their “escorts” in a seaway. Their escorts would run out of fuel in crossing the Atlantic. Twenty knots is an irrelevant figure when compared to the speed of an attacking aircraft or missile. Maneuverability is what is needed.
It is problematic that today’s destroyer and destroyer escorts have an adequate ASW, AAW, or surface-to-surface capability in calm weather. It is certain that they do not have an all-weather capability which is what the submarine and shore-based aircraft do have. The destroyer helicopters have an even more severe wind-across-the-deck limitation than do aircraft carrier fixed-wing aircraft. The winds precede the seas and can render a destroyer helicopter functionally ineffective long before the ship’s motion does. Today’s destroyers are the size of yesterday’s cruisers, and World War II ships of comparable size would have displaced several thousand tons more, because of armor. Today’s ships cannot be armored against conventional weapons nor strengthened for nuclear attack. Today’s ships are inferior in firepower, endurance, and survivability. The unarmored Spruance class could be stopped with a hunting rifle since the gas turbine does not have the inherent protection of a steam turbine. From a structural standpoint, these ships have to be inferior to previous designs. As ship size has increased, the portion devoted to the pay load or the ability to fight has decreased. More ship and more people have been put on the problem, while letting technology sit dormant. Today’s ships can out-talk yesterday’s but I doubt if they can out-fight them. Do we have two times? Three times? Or how many times too much electronics on board? Navy studies in years gone by have shown that installed electronics could be greatly reduced. Why are we still increasing it when the first thing that we will have in wartime is communications silence?
I do not think that the question is whether or not we should have destroyers and destroyer escorts since the names were just applied to ships of a given size. I think that the question is, what functions should be performed by what size ships? If the merchant marine can outrun their potential escorts, why not give them mission packages capable of performing the required tasks? Why cannot room be found in a 90,000-ton aircraft carrier for the required guns and missiles for self-protection? If it can be, give them to them. If it does not cost any more to maintain a sonar on a merchant type, then make provision for installing them on the numbers required. The same is true of the carriers. If we need more escort and patrol forces in the vicinity of our coasts, they need not be the size of an ocean-crossing ship.
Today’s destroyers and destroyer escorts are functionally inadequate, and tomorrow’s look worse. I think that it is time for the Navy to fall out and fall in again after they find out what the problems are that need to be solved.
The Air War in Southeast Asia
Captain William C. Chapman, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Readers of the Proceedings may be interested in the following excerpts from an article published in the Jahrbuch der Luftwaffe (The Almanack of the Luftwaffe) in 1967, on the air war in South East Asia, not because of any special wisdom shown by the author, who happens to be myself, but because they demonstrate once again that interpretations based on experience and a historical view are often a better basis for decision than the tinsel and transient calculations of systems analysts, however elevated in the hierarchy of the Department of Defense:
It is interesting to speculate that threats of in-country inflation and problems of gold flow, as well as political settlements with the enemy, may dictate removal of in-country forces. Carriers can be expected to be the primary source of air power in South East Asia after peace comes.
We would seem to be well down this road now in 1972, five years after the article was written.
The conclusions of the article are also pertinent, I believe:
It is necessary to sum up. The United States has unchallenged command of the air over North as well as South Vietnam. It can conduct, air attacks almost at its own discretion. Its air forces have delivered an unprecedented weight of bombs. Still, direct military results not subject to substantial argument are difficult to state. Certainly, the ineffectiveness of the air war, except where it has been conducted in the direct support of troops, has been a disappointment even to its most ardent advocates.
Even more than in Korea, the bombing effort has been circumscribed by political decisions. The primary military principles of shock and surprise have given way to totally unproved theories of escalation and measured force which may be proving as ineffective as aerial bombardment. The air weapon has, in fact, not been given the kind of test which supports a valid evaluation of its potential. The question will long be argued whether in fact the ineffectiveness of the air war results from the political limitations imposed or from the very nature of air power itself. One can certainly interpret the air war in Vietnam either way.
Still, the history of the air war in Korea and in World War II indicate that removal of political limitations would not make the air war a decisive factor in itself. A concurrent surface action of some sort, denying to the enemy a portion of territory, ground or sea, vital to him, has historically been an essential concomitant to any successful air campaign.
I am not so sure of my assessment of the lessons to be derived from introduction of SAMs into the air war, but perhaps comment by those who fought them off so successfully—and still continue to do so—would be appropriate. What I said in 1967 was:
The enemy introduction of surface-to-air missiles into the air defense of North Vietnam must certainly be termed a tactical success although it has been a strategic and possibly a political failure. The ability of American forces to devise equipment and tactics to circumvent the SAMs has provided an accurate measure of the considerable limitations which plague the SA-2 Guideline system, if not SAMs in general. . . .
The SAMs depend for their survival on their mobility, which has been found to be less than desirable. As a cost effective weapons system, the SAM must be a disappointment to the Soviet Union, but perhaps the greatest bonus factor of all to the Americans and to the Free World has been the acquired confidence that aggressive and imaginative air tactics are a match for Soviet SAM installations.
Taking a lesson from Mark Twain, who noted long ago that “. . . we should be careful to get out of an experience only the wisdom that is in it—and stop there; lest we be like the cat that sits down on a hot stove lid. She will never sit down on a hot stove lid again—and that is well; but she will also never sit down on a cold one anymore.” My article carried a word of warning which I think is still pertinent:
The air war has also driven home certain lessons which will inevitably guide American strategic thought, which will shape the weapons base of future American air power, and which will dictate the form of initial tactical employment of aircraft in whatever conflict, if any, that follows Vietnam. There are here distinct dangers, for a repetition of the unique political, historical, and geographical circumstances that characterize the Vietnam conflict is most unlikely.
One could, in fact, be skeptical of some of the apparent successes of the airmobile operations because of the unique circumstances of the war of which they are a part. Such a force, is, like the DC-3 (gunships) dependent on friendly command of the air. No modern army can survive without command of the air, but the airmobile division is more vulnerable to loss of control of the air objective area than any force fielded heretofore.
One of the additional lessons of the recent past should be, and the U. S. Air Force seems to have caught a glimpse of it already, that a separate Air Force is fast becoming an anomaly in the days of strategic deterrence, disengagement, and limited war. The Army and Navy logically share the strategic land/sea deterrent. Without in-country bases in readiness, tactical air forces are helpless. The Army and the Navy can handle their own air support quite well in any case.
The recent appearance in the press of a suggestion that the Air Force operate off carriers reads to me like a drowning man looking for a straw. It has even some carioca quality about it, for those air power historians familiar with the power struggle for air power in Brazil. But, realistically, when we seemingly cannot afford the necessary, we must be prepared to dispense with the superfluous.
“They Are Not Expendable”
(See A. E. Weseleskey, pp. 106-107 October 1971 Proceedings)
Ensign James E. Schmidtkunz, U. S. Navy—The USS Passumpsic (AO-107) was deployed to the Western Pacific, when the need for extended helicopter operations arose. In our particular situation, we experienced several problems, problems which illustrate the importance of further research and effort at coordinating and improving ship/helo operations. As officer-in-charge of the helicopter detail, six points were apparent to me:
(1) Although our ship is not certified for a helo support role, we operated continuously for a period of nearly three weeks, most of it in moderate or severe heavy weather.
(2) The suddenly-embarked helo detachment had never operated with at-sea units.
(3) Most of the ship’s personnel assigned to the helicopter detail were inexperienced at operating with naval aircraft.
(4) On-board repair/maintenance facilities for the helo were virtually nonexistent.
(5) The ship’s helicopter refueling capability was very inadequate.
(6) Much frustration developed because of an apparent lack of coordination by those responsible for the operational commitments of both the ship and the helo.
The fact that we did not have more serious problems was due in large part to the outstanding effort of a second class boatswain’s mate. While I fully realize that our situation was necessary because of a special operational need, it never-the-less underscores the importance of Commander Weseleskey’s argument for improving and updating the present day ship/helo relationship.
(See R. W. Hunter, pp. 104-107, January 1972 Proceedings)
Lieutenant George J. Lappan, U. S. Naval Reserve—Lieutenant Commander Hunter points out a very real problem with below-the-zone selection. He states that although the large size of present year groups has made acceptable the reductions in absolute numbers promoted, there will be problems when the relatively small year groups of the early 1960s come up.
In restricted line categories, there have often been small year groups—in some cases, very small. For example, one restricted line category had only four officers in its 64 Year Group. The 65 Year Group for that designator will be about eight officers. In these instances, any preconceived decision to promote from below the zone could carry significant impact—the type of adverse impact that Commander Hunter describes.
The author did not wish to criticize the Navy’s promotional system and neither do I. I believe that below-the-zone selection is a valid incentive and an adequate reward for those who perform exceptionally. Nevertheless, let us look at a year group the size Commander Hunter uses in his chart—1,000 officers.
I think it is within the realm of probability that there will be a percentage of any group of 1,000 officers who have not performed exceptionally or perhaps even adequately. In the latter instance, fail-select or passover is justifiable and below-the-zone selection certainly in order. It is also possible, of course, that one or two from a year group of four officers may not have performed. I submit, however, that owing to the smallness of the group there is a better possibility that all four may have performed well and are qualified for promotion.
Let us assume that all four in this group are qualified and that the selection percentage from [O]-3 to [O]-4 is 90% this year. In this case, four officers will be selected for promotion and the selections will come from the primary year group, the year group above and two year groups immediately below the primary. If the board selects one from above the zone (which it probably will), and selects one from below the zone on a decision to early promote, the simple fact is that 50% of the primary year group will be promoted and 50% will be passed over.
Qualified officers in the primary year groups have been and can continue to be passed over. In my opinion, any promotional system which can objectively fail to promote a qualified man or woman on time leaves something to be desired. I feel that below-the-zone selection should only be considered after all qualified officers in the primary year group are selected for promotion.
I strongly concur with the writer’s suggestion that there be a return to actual overall percentage of opportunity that existed before it was arbitrarily reduced by the effects of early promotion. The only point on which we differ is this: he sees it as a problem in the future when the smaller year groups come up—I see it now.
What’s in a Name
Commander John J. Gelke, U. S. Navy—I consider the Navy selection board system one of the fairest methods of determining those who should be promoted, those who should command, and the like. Like most systems, however, I feel that it could stand some improvement.
Why is it necessary for selection boards to know either the name or the face of those who are being screened? Selection board members, no matter how hard they resist, are subject to impressions made by certain well known names (i.e., the halo effect, the famous family effect). If our system is designed to evaluate each individual on his performance, why do we have to know his name? A simple numerical identification system should suffice, and would, I am almost sure, negate any temptation arising from the halo effects of certain names and faces.
It seems to me that any system or recommendation which helped reduce any possibility of favoritism, no matter how inadvertent, would have merit; especially to the man who fails of selection to balance the numbers.
(See G. S. Morrison, pp. 14-17, August 1971 Proceedings)
Captain Andrew G. Nelson, U. S. Navy—Since we publish selection board lists for every rank up through CNO, why not publish all other selection boards? The rich may get richer and the poor may get poorer, but methinks that any board list ought to be published. A cynic might say that publishing every board list keeps the Bureau of Naval Personnel above-board.
If the Navy rightly expects special trust and confidence from its officer corps, cannot these be entrusted with acknowledging and accepting open publication of each and every board selection list? Secrecy only produces scuttlebutt about how such impartial lists might later be manipulated. If no manipulation, why not publish major command—or any—selection list? If not published, then some will always wonder how good old—a great flag secretary to many but a genuine accident-prone—suddenly emerged from seagoing obscurity with his major command.
My point is this: of all the Services, we in the Navy have far and away the most fair and impartial selection system for promotion. If our other selection systems be as effective—and Rear Admiral Morrison’s article, and also Vice Admiral Malcolm W. Cagle’s November 1967 article on the same subject, formally bear out what we all would like to believe—then why not openly publish all the results?
“P.O.W. Treatment: Principals [sic] versus Propaganda”
(See J. H. Chafee, pp. 14-17, July 1971 Proceedings)
Philip C. Bolger—Mr. Chafee’s account of Hanoi barbarism is good and proper as far as it goes, but treats of less than half the matter. The universal silence on the other half is amazing and rather discreditable—where are the ARVN prisoners? Do the northerners take no prisoners of their own race? If they do, what has become of them? Either way, the facts ought to be established and publicized, and if no facts are forthcoming, inferences should be drawn and acted on.
“At Sea—Where We Belong”
(See R. C. McFarlane, pp. 36-42, November 1971 Proceedings)
Major James J. Stewart, U. S. Marine Corps—The Navy is in the process of installing highly capable, generalized information management systems on board key vessels of the amphibious force. Properly employed, these systems will provide considerable support for command and control decision-making, and, because they are truly generalized in potential data base content, they can he as useful to the embarked landing force commander as they will be to his blue-uniformed counterpart.
The first of these systems, which has been named the Amphibious Support Information System, is already in service on board the two newest LCC-type ships. A somewhat improved version is being placed in each of the five LHAs now under construction, while a study to define a possible LPH system is now in progress. All these systems can store, manipulate, and retrieve, under computer control, any type of operational data. That is, the structure and content of their files are completely under user control. Storage applications thus far developed include supporting arms target information and embarkation/debarkation data. It further appears that these systems will have utility in the formulation of combat and landing plans, as they are particularly capable of quickly retrieving, formating, and printing the voluminous data often found in the annexes to such plans.
The sea-based landing force commander and his staff can certainly find use for these generalized information management systems. System outlets are planned for many of the shipboard command and control spaces, such as the Supporting Arms Coordination Center and Military Operations, in which they will work. Fortunately, Marines have been in attendance at the initial training courses on the use of the LCC system. It is also true that Marines assigned to amphibious force and group staffs have been actively participating in the ongoing definition of a standing configuration for LCC files.
If the landing force is to make any significant use of these shipboard systems, it must, rather than should, be based afloat. This is required because no automated means of transferring system data ashore has been developed. On board ship, there are a healthy number of system outlets, typically cathode ray-tube displays and teletypewriters, installed in command and control spaces. To get information off the ship, however, it must first be extracted from the information management system and then either carried physically, as by helicopter courier, or entered for transmission into the ship’s communication system. Some first thoughts for an automated interface ashore have been broached, but no concrete steps have been taken to implement such a capability. Thus, for at least the near future, if landing force command and control elements move ashore, they perforce divorce themselves from active use of these capable information systems.
The third advantage which sea-basing provides, from a command and control viewpoint, is rather a negative one. It is difficult, at best, to provide ashore the electrical power and maintenance support required to operate the landing force’s own automated command and control systems. We should, therefore, make maximum use of systems available on board ship, and where these do not suffice, we should attempt to install and operate our own equipment afloat.
All this occurs because, for the present and immediate future, electrical power for automated landing force systems will be furnished primarily by large, heavy, noisy engine-driven generators which require considerable maintenance and appreciable amounts of fuel. These generators, once ashore, add measurably to the landing force’s logistic burden and impede its tactical mobility. From my own experience, not only in tactical systems development but also as a Marine data processing platoon commander in Vietnam, I can add that the adjustment of these machines to provide the quality of power required by a computer is a major, continuing problem.
Conversely, the Navy seems to have solved, long ago, the problem of generating adequate amounts of consistent electrical power in a shipboard environment. In fact, on the newest amphibious vessels, such as the LHAs, there is provided extra generation capacity to allow some future increase in requirements. We Marines can use this power when we sea-base.
Finally, if seven-month sea-based deployments from a stable home base were to replace the present 12- or 13-month unaccompanied overseas tours. Marine families would not have to displace themselves quite so often. Currently, dependents occupying base housing at the husband’s old station must vacate such quarters upon his departure. Then, since a second permanent change of station is involved in his return one year later, nearly all families move at that time. Such frequent moves are costly to the government and, together with the longer periods of family separation, scarcely enhance a military career. This situation can be improved if sea-basing and the seven-month deployments advocated by Major McFarlane are implemented.
“Authority: The Weakened Link”
(See B. C. Dean. pp. 48-52, July 1971; p. 101, April; and pp. 109-110, June 1972 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Robert A. Fliegel, U. S. Navy—I frankly see nothing wrong in having a chief petty officer at one’s side when describing a complex, technical problem to the CO, so long as the discussion of briefing does not deteriorate into a conversation between the captain and the chief. The chief can be the officer’s ready reference library, standing by to assist his superior when the questions get tough. In this increasingly complex technology, it is foolish to continue thinking of the unrestricted line officer as Renaissance man. To be sure, he must strive to assimilate as much technical know-how as he can and to develop a facility for its expression, but in the end he remains a generalist. The fact that he may on occasion resort to immediate reliance on his subordinates should not be automatically viewed as a flaw in his professionalism. It is often wearisome to count the number of times an officer says to his captain, “I don’t know, but I’ll find out, sir!” as he scampers from one end of the ship to the other getting answers to questions which he may not have reasonably anticipated.
There is a relative incompetence among middle management officers; it is the Peter Principle at work in the Navy. Our fitness report system (another topic) causes harm by its insistence on superlative phraseology to describe an officer who is probably not so superlative. (I recently heard a totally unsupported statement that 90% of all officers are in the top 10%.) It is time we publicly recognize the fact that a significant number of our officers are simply average performers, that we must, at times, modify the chain-of-command principle to enable a job to be done well in spite of the average officer’s performance.
Robert S. Browning’s statement, “. . . a man’s reach should exceed his grasp, or what’s a heaven for?” certainly applies in the Navy, but these should be considered to be normal, human shortcomings which even the U. S. Navy cannot always train out of its officers.
“The Last Days of Peace in Pearl Harbor”
(See L R. Schmeider, pp. 85-88, December 1971 Proceedings)
Commander Malcolm C. McGuire, U. S. Coast Guard (Retired)—Reverend Mr. Schmeider has stepped on a very sore toe. Having helped build the USS Saratoga (CV-3), and having put her through her entire shakedown plus two more years, I can inform him without fear of successful contradiction that the Saratoga was the fastest ship in the world at that time. The record then was held by the USS Milwaukee (CL-5), but the “Old Sara” could back down as fast as the Milwaukee could go at flank speed. To have to secure the galley to make 20 knots is, of course, pure malarkey. She could develop 216,000 h.p. on only seven boilers, carrying nine in reserve. I also served in the Lexington, and she did make a speed run to Honolulu which set a world’s record, but the only reason the Saratoga did not hold that record is simply that she did not make the run. I would like to have a nickel for every hour I have ridden on board her at 30 knots.
I had little chance to see the Saratoga in action, but men who were in her when she was first hit said that even after being torpedoed, she was able to proceed to Pearl Harbor under her own power. And, of course, it was a sad end for the greatest of them all when, at Bikini, she sank beneath the waves after the initial blast.
1 GENERAL PRIZE ESSAY CONTEST
If you have thoughts of constructive value for a professional Navy audience, start planning your essay now. Topics selected must relate to the mission of the Naval Institute, “the advancement of professional, literary, and scientific knowledge in the Navy.” Essays will be judged for their analytical and interpretive qualities by the Board of Control. The 1st Prize is a Gold Medal, $1,500, and Life Membership in the U. S. Naval Institute; the 1st Honorable Mention Prize is a Silver Medal and $1,000; and the 2nd Honorable Mention Prize is a Bronze Medal and $750. The Board of Control usually purchases for publication in the Proceedings, at its standard rates, a number of essays which are not among the prize winners. This year seven essays were purchased. Any person, civilian or military, is eligible to enter this contest.
1. Essays must be original and may not exceed 5,000 words.
2. All entries in the General Prize Essay Contest should be directed to: Secretary-Treasurer, United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland 21402.
3. Essays must be received in the Naval Institute on or before 1 December 1972.
4. The name of the author shall not appear on his essay. Each author shall assign to his essay a motto in addition to the title. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title, in lieu of the author’s name, (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope containing the name and the address of the essayist, the title of the essay, and the motto. This envelope will not be opened until the Board of Control of the Naval Institute has made its selections.
5. The awards will be made known and presented to the successful competitors at the annual meeting of the Naval Institute on Thursday, 15 March 1973.
6. All essays must be typewritten, double spaced, on paper approximately 8½” x 11”. Submit two copies, each complete in itself.
7. Essays awarded the “Prize” or an “Honorable Mention” will be published in the Naval Institute Proceedings. Essays not awarded a prize may be selected for publication in the Proceedings. The writers of such essays, shall be compensated at the rate established for purchase of articles.
8. Attention of contestants is called to the fact that an essay should be analytical or interpretive and not merely an exposition or personal narrative.
2 ENLISTED PRIZE ESSAY CONTEST
The Board of Control is pleased to announce the continuation of the annual essay contest open to enlisted men and women in the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard on active duty.
A prize of $700.00, a Naval Institute Gold Medal, and a Life Membership in the Naval Institute will be awarded to the author of the best essay of prize caliber submitted on any subject pertaining to the naval profession, the naval services, or the maritime environment.
Second and third prizes, as may be awarded by the Board of Control, will be $500 and a Silver Medal, and $250 and a Bronze Medal. The winning essays will be considered for publication in the Naval Institute's monthly professional journal, the Proceedings; all essays will be considered for publication at the standard rate of payment for articles.
This Enlisted Prize Essay Contest is separate and distinct from the Naval Institute's annual General Prize Essay Contest, which is open to anyone. Enlisted members of the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard on active duty are eligible to enter either contest, or both, if different essays are submitted in each contest.
1. Essays must be original and may not exceed 5,000 words.
2. All entries in the Enlisted Prize Essay Contest should be directed to: Enlisted Prize Essay Contest, U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland 21402.
3. Essays must be received in the Naval Institute offices on or before 1 December 1972.
4.The name of the author shall not appear on his essay. Each author shall assign to his essay a motto in addition to the title. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title, in lieu of the author’s name, (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope containing the name, duty station address, and home address of the essayist; the title of the essay; and the motto. This envelope will not be opened until the Board of Control of the Naval Institute has made its selections.
5. The awards will be announced during the annual meeting of the Naval Institute on Thursday, 15 March 1973.
6. All essays must be typewritten, double spaced, on paper approximately 8½” x 11”. Submit two copies, each complete in itself.
7. The attention of contestants is invited to the fact that an essay should be analytical or interpretive and not merely an exposition or personal narrative.
3 NAVAL AND MARITIME PHOTO CONTEST
A prize of $100 will be awarded to each of the ten winners of the contest and the winning photographs will be published in a 1973 issue of the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Anyone may submit not more than five photographs to the contest. Each photograph must pertain to a naval or maritime subject, and is no longer limited to the calendar year on the assumption that many fine older photographs have missed well-deserved recognition. Entries must be black and white prints, color prints, or color transparencies. Minimum print size is 5” x 7”, minimum transparency size is 35mm. (No glass mounted transparencies.) Full captions and the photographer’s name and address must be printed or typed on a separate sheet of paper and attached to the back of each print, or printed on the transparency mount. Use no staples, please. Entries must arrive at the Naval Institute by 31 December 1972. Photographs not awarded prizes may be purchased by the U. S. Naval Institute at its usual rates. Those photographs not purchased will be returned to the owners. Naval personnel should check OpNavNote 3150 regarding photography.
THREE U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE CONTESTS • 1973
[*] See W. F. Searle, Jr., “The Case for Inshore Warfare,” Naval Review 1966, U.S. Naval Institute, pp. 2-23.
[*] See A. D. Baker, III, “Small Combatants—1972,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Reveiw [sic] 1972, May 1972, pp. 240-263.