One of the major goals of the Soviet Union today is to expand substantially its foreign trade—particularly with the Western World—and a rapidly growing maritime establishment is a vital ingredient in that program. For these and for other reasons, the Soviet Union is in the process of developing a large and effective merchant marine.
At the present time, Russia has a relatively modest fleet of ships with approximately 25 per cent of the tonnage committed to intrabasin service—principally in the Black and Baltic Seas and the Pacific coasting trade. The foreign trade fleet probably carries substantially less than 50 per cent of the expanding Soviet commerce, and the Soviet Union is heavily reliant on chartered non- Communist ships to move foreign trade cargoes.
Plainly, this trade and the competitive position of the Soviet Union in world markets are vulnerable in the event these chartered vessels are attracted to other trade routes or if world charter rates increase sharply from their present low levels. The Soviet Union is aware of this situation and is committing large domestic resources and a substantial portion of its foreign exchange to enlarging the Soviet flag merchant fleet. The continuing Soviet agricultural crisis necessitating large purchases of Western grain may retard the pace of future maritime expansion by requiring reallocation of foreign exchange reserves, thereby lessening purchases of vessels built outside the Soviet sphere. However, Russia and her associate COMECON powers are determined to attain an important position on the trade routes of the world, and they have an excellent chance of succeeding in that purpose within the next decade.
Maritime Objectives. By present-day standards, the owned fleet of the Soviets does not yet pose a real challenge to the supremacy of the merchant marines of the Western World. Certainly, by comparison with the United States, having about 900 active, privately- owned ships in operation aggregating some 14| million deadweight tons, it is a relatively small factor But the important fact is that the Soviets are committed to a large expansion of their merchant fleet because they have realized, perhaps as this country has forgotten, that when trading with the world, trade and continued market accessibility are reliant upon a nation’s merchant marine. They are determined to engage in a great trade offensive, but concurrently, they are increasing the mobility, the size, and the competency of their merchant fleet. In furtherance of this purpose, they are dedicating large amounts of hard- earned foreign exchange for which there is extreme economic competition within the Soviet Union. The precise amounts expended for ship procurement in non-Communist countries are difficult to estimate because of price and credit terms, but seem to fall in the range of $100,000,000 to $150,000,000 per annum. Commitment of these important resources of foreign exchange is striking evidence of Soviet determination to become an important, perhaps a dominant power, on the sea trades in the world.
Aside from military considerations, other factors which are involved in the determination of the Soviet Union to expand its maritime establishment are: the desire to maintain the presence of Soviet ships in the ports and on the sea lanes of the world; the leapfrogging of Soviet interests from contiguous land masses to areas which are reliant on sea transport, i.e., Cuba, Indonesia, Ceylon, the United Arab Republic, India, and others; the need to minimize their present extreme reliance on chartered Free World tonnage; and the desire to conserve foreign exchange by shipping foreign trade in Soviet bottoms.
In addition to a competent maritime ministry, bestirred by a sense of mission and a large ship procurement program, other potential elements of strength in the Soviet maritime establishment lie in the maritime educational plant, the organization of its research and developments efforts, and in its ability to increase labor productivity both ashore and at sea through application of technological improvements.
In the eyes of the Soviet planners, an expanding foreign trade and U.S.S.R. maritime objectives are indivisible. For this reason, a brief characterization of Soviet foreign trade is fundamental to an understanding of some of the compulsion behind the Soviet maritime expansion.
Soviet Foreign Trade. The foreign trade of the Soviet Union has expanded rapidly during the years from 1958, but a major surprise has been provided in the changing proportions of this commerce as between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. The relevant data are shown in the following table in billions of rubles at the nominal official rate of one ruble equals $1.11. (Source: Annual Economic Indicators for the U.S.S.R., Joint Economic Committee of the Congress, February 1964, p. 104, U. S. Government Printing Office.)
|
1958 |
1959 |
1960 |
1961 |
1962 |
Total Trade |
7.8* |
9.5 |
10.1 |
10.6 |
12.1 |
With Communist nations |
5.7 |
7.1 |
7.2 |
7.1 |
8.5 |
With non-Communist nations |
2.1 |
2.4 |
2.9 |
3.5 |
3.6 |
Exports, total |
3.9 |
4.9 |
5.0 |
5.4 |
6.3 |
With Communist nations |
2.8 |
3.7 |
3.7 |
3.6 |
4.4 |
With non-Communist nations |
1.1 |
1.2 |
1.3 |
1.8 |
1.9 |
Imports, total |
3.9 |
4.6 |
5.1 |
5.2 |
5.8 |
With Communist nations |
2.9 |
3.4 |
3.5 |
3.5 |
4.1 |
With non-Communist nations |
1.0 |
1.2 |
1.6 |
1.7 |
1.7 |
* Figures represent billions of rubles.
The record of the three years ending with 1961 makes it plain that Soviet trade with other Communist countries remained virtually unchanged, while its commerce with the non-Communist world has risen to almost 70 per cent above the 1958 level. Whereas earlier in the postwar period, the share of the non-Communist world in Soviet trade was often below 20 per cent, in 1961 that share was almost one-third, the highest fraction in well over a decade. In 1962, however, a reverse trend was established, and trade with the Communist bloc grew (with Cuba as a major factor) while non-Communist trade stabilized.
Two sets of forces have played a role in this development. One influence was derived from the very serious internal economic difficulties of Communist China and the growing political differences which have been reflected in a dramatic and drastic decline in Soviet- Chinese trade. The other is that the steadily growing volume of Soviet trade with Eastern Europe has no more than balanced the steady decline in trade with Communist China.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union has enjoyed rapidly increasing success in its longterm effort to increase its trade with key sections of the Free World—Western Europe, Japan, and many of the underdeveloped countries. Italy and West Germany particularly have increased their Soviet trade at a rapid pace, a fact reflected in the abrupt rise of European Common Market sales to Russia from $245,000,000 in 1959 to $450,000,000 in 1961. In that same three-year period, Soviet and Eastern European exports to Japan jumped from $37,000,000 to $150,000,000, while imports from Japan increased from $23,000,000 in 1959 to $65,000,000. The length and severity of the current Soviet agricultural crisis and the extent to which long-term credits are supplied by the Western world inevitably will have a major effect on future trends.
In general terms, the Soviet import/export pattern is as follows:
To the Free World: Exports are principally raw materials, consisting in large measure of petroleum products, supplemented by timber and other forest products, ore, concrete, and other unprocessed building materials.
Imports represent a wide range of manufactured products and capital goods including machinery for entire factories, purchases of ships, fabricated steel, machine tools, and a variety of other productive equipment. Few, if any, consumer goods are imported.
To Communist nations andfriendly neutrals: Exports to these areas consist of Soviet manufactured goods including arms and military export cargo as well as economic materials. The latter category includes a substantial quantity of flour, sugar, aluminum, concrete, lead and zinc pigs, trucks and vehicles, earth-moving equipment, cranes, and other types of processed and semiprocessed cargo. In recent years, petroleum products have played an increasingly prominent role in exports to certain of these areas such as Cuba.
Imports from these areas consist mainly of raw materials such as sugar from Cuba, cotton from the United Arab Republic, rubber and tin from Indonesia, and jute from India.
On balance, the export/import trade of the Soviet Union consists principally of bulk cargoes and a rather limited tonnage of general cargo. Soviet penetration of the world’s petroleum markets has resulted in about a six-fold increase in tonnage of Soviet oil exports during the period from 1956. Large increases have also taken place in the export of timber and forest products from the Northern Sea Route area and more variable changes in tonnage of grains and ores. Because of this imbalanced growth of foreign trade, the Soviet Union has not yet faced the real growing pains involved in large movements of general cargo.
Ministry of the Merchant Fleet. The Soviet State organization of the maritime establishment is organized along the lines of a state- owned corporation. The Minister, as well as most of the senior executives of the Ministry, have risen through the ranks and have had practical experience in the field of ship operations, port administration, or other operational functions. Most members of the Ministry staff are competent, dedicated workers aware of their growing role as an instrument of Soviet commercial and National policy.
The organization of the Ministry which is outlined in the accompanying chart follows generally accepted lines of Western World organization, and there are relatively clear areas of demarcation between staff and line functions. Actual field operations are conducted through the 13-state steamship lines which control and manage the assets of the entire maritime establishment within the geographical area assigned to them. These so-called steamship lines are the operating divisions of the Ministry.
Wage and rank incentives and other benefits are common in all levels of the Ministry of the Merchant Fleet.
While there are built-in disabilities inherent in state-owned and state-operated industry, the sense of mission prevalent in this expanding, high-priority industry minimizes these inhibitors at the present time.
The Ministry of the Merchant Fleet of the Soviet Union is an all-union ministry under the direct control of the Council of Ministers who provide over-all maritime policy guidance and objectives. The Ministry directs the activities of the steamship lines and, through them, the shipping fleet, icebreakers, servicing and auxiliary ships, ports, terminals and loading operations, ship repair yards, planning and construction organizations (other than shipyards), maritime educational institutions and a number of lesser functions related to the maritime industry. The Ministry’s work is co-ordinated with the Ministry of Railroads, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Ministry of Inland Waterways, with the joint goal of obtaining an effective and efficient transportation system.
In addition, the Ministry co-ordinates its main activities with the Ministry of Transport Construction, State Committee for Shipbuilding, Ministry of Higher Education, State Planning Committee (GOSPLAN), and State Committee for Co-ordination of Research. Co-ordination problems among all ministries and committees are referred to GOSPLAN for consideration and resolution.
The Ministry of the Merchant Fleet was reorganized on 25 August 1954, and it is today the Ministry which supervises sea transportation in all territories of the Soviet Union. In terms of Western world corporate organization, the Ministry operates as a holding company with headquarters in Moscow and major subsidiary operating companies in the various basins. All of the physical properties of the Ministry are in a sense owned by the individual steamship lines which are the operating line organizations of the Merchant Fleet Ministry.
The function of the staff organization in Moscow is therefore primarily restricted to co-ordination of the various line organizations and over-all planning, organization and developmental responsibilities. In this sense, therefore, the headquarters organization of the Ministry performs the many and varied staff functions of a large corporation in the United States.
The Ministry of the Merchant Fleet is directed by a Minister and four Deputies. The Minister is assisted by a Collegium consisting of himself as Chairman, his four Deputies, and seven other Ministry Staff Chiefs. The members are recommended by the Minister and approved by the Council of Ministers. The Collegium is a policy level group comparable to a board of directors which meets approximately three times a week to consider and act on major maritime problems and projects under consideration. Decisions of the Collegium are effectuated by the Minister. Differences in the Collegium’s findings are resolved by the Minister who can overrule the Collegium. On the other hand, if the Collegium is in disagreement with the Minister’s ruling, it can appeal the decision to the Council of Ministers.
The 13 state steamship lines are the operating groups of the Ministry.
There are substantial differences between Soviet steamship lines and typical steamship lines in the United States. In addition to performing normal carrier functions similar to those of U. S. steamship lines, each of the Soviet lines has complete area responsibility for all commercial maritime functions such as operation of repair yards, port facilities, including loading, discharging and terminal operations, maintenance of tug and lighter service, navigational aids, salvage operations, operation of intermediate training schools for seagoing and related personnel, and a varying degree of responsibility for the housing and social activities of the workers.
Size of the Present Fleet. The total present size of the owned fleet of the Soviet Union and allied powers is approximately as follows (ships of 1,000 d.w.t. and over):
|
Ships |
D.W.T. |
|
(in thousands) |
|
Soviet Union |
1,000 |
6,000 |
Poland |
175 |
1,250 |
East Germany |
40 |
400 |
Czechoslovakia |
10 |
103 |
Bulgaria |
25 |
175 |
Rumania |
12 |
76 |
Hungary |
8 |
12 |
|
1,270 |
8,016 |
This table is based on a June 1962 statistical analysis and has been updated to the present by estimating deliveries less retirements. As an over-all figure, it is probably correct; however, any direct and meaningful com
parison with merchant marines of other nations is hardly possible due to the paucity of reliable information on Soviet shipping.
Present shortcomings of the Soviet merchant fleet are being supplemented by chartered Free-World tonnage, and eventually will be completely overcome by their heavy building and purchase program. The following comment on Soviet domestic shipbuilding was made by Mr. Yosamatsu Matsubara, President of Hitachi Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, who was in Leningrad during August and September of 1962.
At a shipyard in Leningrad, the keel was being laid for a 65,000 d.w.t. tanker when the mission visited there. This shipyard has two building docks for the construction of 100,000 d.w.t. ships.
Before going to the Soviet Union I was told that the Soviet Union’s shipbuilding capacity was 500,000 tons a year. But it seemed to me that the Soviet Union is capable of building 700,000 to 800,000 tons.
The Soviet Union plans to build 1,500,000 tons a year. Since the country’s capacity is only 700,000 to 800,000 tons, they have to order the rest from Yugoslav, Italian, and Japanese shipyards.
Mr. Matsubara’s figure of 1,500,000 tons seems high. I estimate that the current annual addition totals about 1,000,000/1,250,000 d.w.t. of new tonnage, including Polish, East German and other COMECON production and purchases from non-Communist nations.
Soviet-Built Ships. The U.S.S.R. merchant fleet requirements far exceed the present capabilities of the Soviet shipyards. As a result, large numbers of ships are being purchased from foreign countries such as Japan, Finland, East Germany, Poland, West Germany, and others. While these foreign purchases and the flow of hard currency out of the Soviet Union will continue for several years, it is evident that the Soviet shipbuilding capacities are being expanded and that they have the ability to build modern and effective ships.
Discussions at the Ministry, various research institutions, and other offices, combined with visits on board Soviet-designed and built ships, lead one to the conclusion that the Soviets have technical and design capabilities which in certain areas may equal those of the United States, Japan, and West Germany, countries which lead in the development of new ship systems, equipment and features.
Most Soviet ports have draft and other physical limitations which seem to limit construction of extremely large bulk carriers and tankers. In the case of general cargo carriers, emphasis is on speed of cargo handling rather than ship’s speed, and this had led to use of ship’s cranes and open, multiple hatches. Large-size diesel engines are generally imported from Western Europe, and this may also inhibit speed of ships built in Soviet yards. Most ships’ hulls are strengthened for work in ice.
Typical of the latest Soviet ship designs and production are: the Pekin-class tankers (18.5 knots, 27,000 d.w.t.), the Sofia-class tankers (17 knots, 40,000 d.w.t.), the Leninskiy Komsomol-class dry-cargo ships (18 knots, 13,000 d.w.t.), the new Poltava-class dry-cargo ships with bridge aft, cranes, and large holds (16.5 knots, 12,500 d.w.t.), and the new Sovetskiy Azerbaijan-class Caspian Sea railroad car ferry (16 knots, 2,600 d.w.t.). All these ships embody modern and useful technical and construction features.
A brief description of selected ship types
Dry-Cargo Freighter |
|
Leminiskiy Komsomol |
|
Length over-all |
557 ft. |
Beam |
71 ft. |
Depth |
42.5 ft. |
Draft: |
|
(fully loaded) |
31.4 ft. |
(general cargo) |
27.9 ft. |
Cubic (metric) |
20,000 cu.m. |
Turbine |
13,500 s.h.p. |
Speed |
18.5 knots |
Range |
12,000 miles |
Self-sustaining |
40 days |
This is a double deck, single screw, turbine ship with an elevated forecastle and poop deck, flared bow, and cruiser stern. The ship is longitudinally framed on main deck and bottoms, and transversely framed in sides and the lower deck. She is strengthened for work in ice. Bridge decks are fitted with wood. There is also a great deal of wooden joiner work throughout the quarters. The ship has a 15,000 maximum s.h.p. geared propulsion plant. It is a conventional compound turbine
with articulated reduction gear. The cargo handling gear consists of 16 five-ton, four ten-ton and two 60-ton booms rigged on burtoning principle on four bipod masts and four kingposts. The heavy lift masts are equipped with steps so that the heavy lift boom can be used either aft or forward of the mast.
The ships of the Leninskiy Komsomol type are the most powerful and modern dry-cargo vessels in the Soviet merchant fleet, and they could be considered to be the counterpart of our Mariner type ships except for the 18-knot speed and the single ’tween deck. At least a dozen of these ships have been built and are in operation. The prototype visited was built in Kherson in 1959.
Dry-Cargo Freighter Poltava |
|
Length over-all |
510 ft. |
Beam |
57.5 ft. |
Draft (loaded) |
29.5 ft. |
D.W.T. |
12,500 |
Diesel |
8,750 b.h.p. (max.) |
Speed |
17 knots |
The Poltava is a prototype ship, developed and built in the Soviet Union by the Nosenko shipyard in Nikolayev. Her exceptionally long No. 4 hatch makes her particularly suited for transportation of bulky military hardware, such as ballistic missiles. Sea endurance can be high because of large ballast tanks convertible to carriage of fuel oil.
The ship is a single-screw, double-decked, twin-hatch motor vessel. The engine rooms, the bridge, and all living quarters and service area are located aft. A longitudinal center- line bulkhead and low freeboard are typical for this type ship. Also typical for this ship are the dual hatches which permit cargo to be lowered by means of ship cranes directly into stowage position. Hatch openings are 62 feet wide, the space between them being approximately 10 feet. The double shell makes the hold of rectangular shape with vertical sides and without any protruding framing. The entire framework is inside the double hull, which facilitates cargo stowage and the cleaning of holds.
The main engine is a six-cylinder supercharged diesel of the B&W type which develops 8,500 b.h.p. at 115 r.p.m. It uses marine diesel fuel; the ship is not being equipped to burn bunker C. Auxiliary boilers are oil fired, no exhaust heating being utilized. Three Soviet-built diesel-driven 300 kw., 380 v., 50 cycles, 500 r.p.m. generators are located in a separated water-tight compartment on the port side of the ship. Additional ships of the Poltava class have been added to the Soviet merchant fleet recently.
Budapest—Tanker of the Pekin Tanker |
|
Length over-all |
656 ft. |
Beam |
85 ft. |
Depth |
45 ft. |
Draft |
35 ft. |
Main turbines |
19,000 H.P. at 105 r.p.m. |
Service speed |
18.5 knots |
Ballast speed |
20 knots |
Cubic |
39,800 cu.m. |
D.W.T. |
31,000 tons |
Gross tonnage |
28,000 tons |
Cargo capacity |
27,000 tons |
Tankers of this class, six of which are now in operation, were orginally designed for operation between the Black Sea and the Pacific Far East, but the building of the new, larger Sofia-class tankers may displace them from this operation. The Budapest is a single screw, turbine ship with an all-welded hull, and rounded shear strake.
The arrangement of the pump system permits loading and unloading of three different kinds of liquid cargoes from each side of the ship, or the transfer of cargoes between different tanks. The capacity of each of the three turbo-pumps is 3,300 gallons per minute. The stated cargo discharge rate is 2,000 tons per hour using all three pumps.
The vessel is a fast, modern tanker of conventional design. Such a vessel would be excellent for refueling naval ships and supplying military bases.
Education and Manpower. In the case of the maritime educational establishment, great efforts are being made to sustain and increase qualified manpower available for manning the expanding fleet. While at the higher levels, the educational processes designed to develop ships’ officers are generally comparable to our King’s Point and State maritime academies, the Soviet training of unlicensed and sub-officer seamen has no counterpart in the American scene. This factor, coupled with the attractiveness of seagoing employment within the Soviet economy, contributes to the development of a pool of qualified maritime personnel. Similar development is taking place in the shoreside Soviet maritime establishment.
Productivity. Of special import is the Soviet drive and interest in increasing productivity of the maritime establishment and the apparently complete co-operation between labor unions and the Ministry in seeking to attain this end. This worker attitude seems to be one which not only permits, but welcomes the introduction of labor-saving devices either on board ship or in cargo handling and other activities ashore.
Technology. In certain respects, Soviet technical accomplishments in the maritime field may be equal to developments in the United States and elsewhere. Soviet research and development activity is channeled through two institutes: The All-Union Institute for Planning, Design and Scientific Research on Maritime Transportation (Moscow) and the Central Scientific Research Institute of the Merchant Fleet (Leningrad)- Scientific personnel are well acquainted with technical maritime developments in the Western world, and their interests are wide-
Currently, great emphasis is being placed on shipboard automation and on the development of mechanical devices intended to increase productivity in cargo handling. Other worthwhile activities lie in the design of new types of ships and in the experimental development and construction of large industrial gas turbine units which are intended for shipboard installation.
The All-Union Institute is a scientific research agency, with key staff members directing the research of students who come to the Institute for dissertation work. The Institute concerns itself primarily with port facilities— port structures, repair yards, and cargohandling problems and systems. Emphasis is placed on planning and general economic evaluation of port projects, but pier and terminal designs are also undertaken. The range of interests is quite broad, and this Institute also concerns itself with the long- range economic needs of the entire maritime establishment. Related to this problem is the Institute’s interest in the utilization of ship’s time and the optimal capacity and stowage of ships, as well as proper utilization of ship types for efficient management of the fleet. Cargo-handling studies are made at the Institute, with increasing emphasis being placed on the unitization and containerization of cargo.
The Institute initiates research problems and projects, and concerns itself also with problems referred to it by the steamship lines. The staff includes personnel recruited from the steamship lines. It is contemplated that each of the steamship lines will organize scientific councils to direct problems to the Institute.
The Institute has a staff of about 750 in Moscow, with additional staff personnel totaling 500 stationed in various field areas as observers. Approximately 7 to 10 per cent of the staff are administrative and clerical workers, with the rest ranging from technicians to professional personnel.
The basic aim of the Central Scientific Research Institute, a technical institute, is to improve the design and performance of the merchant fleet, thereby lowering the cost of transportation. In its work it also attempts to modernize the rules of the Registry of Shipping of the Soviet Union.
From 1956 through 1962, the research work of the Institute is said to have grown three and one-half times and the Institute is said to have been criticized for not utilizing available appropriations. The Soviets admitted that one of their major problems is a shortage of professional personnel in the research and development area.
The scope of work undertaken by this Institute covers topics such as methods for determining the principal characteristics of new types of ships, methods for increasing the economic life of ships, and research on corrosion, fuel oils, power plants (such as turbines, diesels and gas turbines), auxiliary equipment, navigation equipment, ship arrangements, and hatch arrangements. In investigations of possible new shipboard features, the Institute consults with the merchant fleet and demonstrates the suitability of new developments by shipboard operations.
The Institute has a stated Leningrad staff of 500. Additional salary is given as an incentive to improve education and training. Substantial field staffs are maintained at Odessa and other important locations so as to insure close co-ordination with the fleet. Design specifications of the new prototype cargo ship Poltava and other special types of ships have been developed here. The Institute presently is emphasizing automation of ships. Other areas of special studies include: the strength of structures, design calculations, stability, safety of life at sea, international signals, field of navigation, methods of navigation, and turn-around time.
The Institute publishes its conclusions, studies, and proceedings. Actual work programs are given to various sections and laboratories, with each project being headed by a group under a project engineer who is appointed by the Soviet or Collegium of the Institute. Periodic reports are submitted on each program to the department head supervising such activities. These reports as well as the results of the finished projects are evaluated by the Scientific Board, which also makes recommendations for practical applications to the Ministry for specific applications of such projects.
Soviet Ports. As was mentioned earlier, responsibility for construction, maintenance and operation of commercial seaports of the Soviet Union falls within the functions of the State steamship lines. In the normal organization of these lines, a deputy chief is generally appointed with primary responsibility over all ports falling into the geographic area controlled by the steamship line.
Local port administrations, reporting to this deputy, are responsible for the operation of the port and supplying of necessary ancillary services and welfare functions. This responsibility extends to including maintenance and operations of piers and wharves, transit sheds, warehouses, cargo-handling equipment, bunkering facilities, harbor craft, and similar services. The stevedoring work force and responsibility for housing of stevedores are also functions of port management.
Most ports have only limited installations of transit sheds, warehouses, and terminals for the handling of general cargo. Because of this shortcoming, the Soviet Union is committed to load and unload ships directly from railroad cars and other domestic transports, thereby often creating congestion and problems of co-ordination. Under the best of circumstances this direct loading or discharging method is extremely efficient, but under less optimal circumstances it becomes inefficient and costly.
The provision of adequate port facilities is not keeping pace with the rapid expansion of the Soviet merchant fleet and Soviet foreign trade. Because of limitations of covered storage space, for instance, general cargo may be stored in the open weather for considerable periods of time. In the event that movements of general cargo continue to expand rapidly, port facilities will be inadequate and long delays will occur in the handling and dispatch of such cargo.
Because of the nature of Soviet trade, priorities have been given to expansion of facilities for the handling of the important bulk cargoes such as petroleum, grain and ores. Almost without exception the Soviet Union uses the European system of handling all non-bulk cargoes by means of shore-based gantry cranes. The extensive use of these cranes is also forced by the direct loading and unloading of railroad cars with the consequential long reaches. Soviet crane capacities run larger than those prevailing in Western Europe, with these cranes predominantly in the 5, 10, and 15-ton range, but with some in the order of 25 tons. Most cranes are of relatively recent manufacture and seemed reliable and adequate.
Efforts are being made to improve cargo handling productivity with extensive use being made of fork-lift equipment and similar mechanical aids. Of the ports visited, Leningrad, Odessa and Novorossiysk were the best. In each instance, however, even moderate increases in the volume of general cargo movements will tax these ports to their capacity.
Labor shortage seems to exist in most Russian ports with competition in certain areas for utilization of such labor being aggravated by railroad needs for car unloaders. The railroads, river barges, and coastwise steamers provide practically all of the connecting carrier functions. Very little cargo appears to be moved into port areas on highway equipment.
Port construction relies almost entirely on concrete or masonry, with attempts being made to innovate standardized types of construction conforming to the design criteria of the all-union ministry.
A major inhibitor in the rapid expansion of Soviet port facilities is the lack of natural port basins. Almost without exception the major Soviet ports in Europe are forced to install breakwaters and moles. These artificial ports restrict facilities and tax connecting carriers. Further limitations lie in the ability of the Soviet rail and barge system to move cargo to and from port areas rapidly and efficiently.
In any case, it is plain that expansion of Soviet port facilities will remain as a major problem for years to come and will, aside from bulk cargoes, detract from the possibility of using sea transport to its greatest efficiency.
Conclusions. At present, the Soviet merchant marine is capable of handling only a part of the Soviet Union’s foreign commerce. Accordingly, the carriage of their foreign trade and foreign exchange position is vulnerable to increases in world charter markets and in world-wide ship procurement prices.
As the Soviet fleet expands, it will become less reliant on foreign sources of maritime strength. This growth will have political and military significance as well as commercial implications. There is little doubt of the ability of the Soviet Union to create during the next decade a large and effective merchant marine, supported by an ample maritime establishment and designed to act as an instrument of Soviet national policy.
This maritime instrument and its bridge of ships can either help further Soviet ambitions outside the Eurasian land mass or, together with the continued growth of foreign trade, it can help stabilize international relations.
In future years, the new Soviet merchant marine will necessarily become part of the great international pool of shipping. If guided with proper consideration of its vast international responsibilities the Soviet merchant fleet can, by co-operating in world-wide shipping matters, help demonstrate the sincerity of the announced Soviet policy of co-existence.
In the future international atmosphere, it is to be hoped that communication and cooperation in the maritime field can become one of the first tangible steps in the opening of more normal trade relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and in a lessening of international tension.