Cuba's Place in U. S. Naval Strategy

Fifty years of Cuban independence—fortified by repeated enunciations of the Monroe Doctrine that no particle of American soil should be allowed to pass into the hands of a non-American nation—had inclined U. S. military planners to the luxury of regarding the island of Cuba as a shield for American interests in the Gulf and Caribbean.

Now all that is changed. As of approximately May Day, 1961, Cuba placed herself in non-American hands, the Monroe Doctrine notwithstanding. The shield has become a salient.

Cuba is as surely the key to the Gulf of Mexico as Gibralter is to the Mediterranean—

Alfred Thayer Mahan.

The strategic situation, as Alfred Thayer Mahan interpreted it before the Spanish- American War, has been restored.

Time and time again, in lectures delivered at the U. S. Naval War College and in his writings between 1887 and 1911, Mahan expressed concern that Cuba might fall into unfriendly hands. Repeatedly, he stressed the advantages that would accrue to the United States from the occupation of naval bases in Cuba.

The Mahan quotation on the previous page, taken from Naval Strategy, gives a clue to the depth of his concern for Cuba. But it is only a clue, because Mahan’s views on Cuba’s strategic position went far beyond the relationship of that island to the Gulf.

It has been many years since strategists have felt called upon to examine Cuban affairs in the light that Mahan saw them cast before the Spanish War, when Cuba was the possession of Spain, and immediately afterwards when her status as an independent nation was in doubt. Perhaps for that reason, it is difficult to find recent analyses of the strategic significance of Cuba as far as the United States is concerned.

For naval officers today, who must revise their strategic thinking in the light of recent developments in the Caribbean, Mahan’s works are a good departure point for this disagreeable task.

The importance of a friendly Cuba was magnified in Mahan’s mind by his conviction that the Caribbean Sea occupies a preeminent place in U. S. maritime strategy.

“One thing is sure,” he declared to his students early in the 20th century, “The Caribbean Sea is the strategic key to the two great oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific, our own chief maritime frontiers.”

This conviction led him to spend much time studying the geography of the Caribbean— and also the Gulf of Mexico, for he viewed the two bodies of water as closely related “as Siamese twins.” In all of these studies, Cuba emerged as the position of chief concern to the U. S. Navy.

Recognition of Cuba as a land whose interests are closely bound to those of the United States was by no means original with Mahan. Long before he was born, U. S. statesmen— indeed a substantial part of the informed general public—were aware of the desirability of taking permanent steps to prevent Cuba’s becoming a base for unfriendly operations in an area of vital concern to this country.

In 1823, Thomas Jefferson, wrote to his friend President James Monroe, then consider-, ing the declaration afterwards known as the Monroe Doctrine:

I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of states.

The control which with Florida . . . this would give us over the Gulf of Mexico ... as well as all those waters which flow into it would fill up the measure of our political well-being.

Jefferson thought that Cuba could not be made part of the United States without employing force. He was opposed to using force. As the next best thing to annexation, he was willing to accept independence from European rule.

Other U. S. statesmen, however, had no such reservations. Beginning in 1849 and continuing into the 1870’s, a series of so-called “filibustering” expeditions were launched against Cuba with U. S. support. These expeditions failed but their failure did not settle the status of Cuba.

The deep concern of some elements in the United States with Cuba during this period is vividly illustrated by the attitude of President Franklin Pierce, who took office in 1852.

In his inaugural address, Pierce declared an aggressive foreign policy. He promised not to be controlled “by any timid forebodings of evil from expansion.”

Pierce was talking about expansion to include Cuba. He deemed its acquisition essential to U. S. safety and commerce.

The United States proposed to buy Cuba from Spain. Spain, clinging to the glories of her vanishing empire, was unwilling to sell.

Spanish reluctance led to a conference in Ostend, Belgium, between the U. S. ministers to Great Britain, Spain, and France. These diplomats, all keenly interested in promoting the expansion mentioned by President Pierce, were James Buchanan, Pierre Soule, and James Mason. They prepared a remarkable ; document which became known as the Ostend 5 Manifesto. It declared that if the United States t were unable to obtain Cuba peacefully, then “by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power.”

This instrument was widely regarded as imperialism with a vengeance and it was accordingly unpopular at home. In response to popular indignation, Pierce later disavowed the action of his ministers. The incident, however, was perfectly in keeping with the feelings of a large number of influential U. S. citizens of the time.

From the point of view of the military strategist, the words of the three envoys are those of wisdom. In straightforward language they drew attention to the significance of the island of Cuba:

“From the peculiarity of its geographical position and the considerations attendant upon it, Cuba is a necessity to the North American republic as much as any of its present members.”

To the strategist in a position to disregard political considerations—which is seldom the case—this statement has a proper sound. To him, Cuba appears as an extension eastward of the Florida peninsula. Nothing seems more sensible than that it should be in the possession of the United States.

Historically, however, the question of annexation has been settled by politicians, responding. to public opinion. Voters in this country have, by and large, taken a dim view of annexation by force.

As Mahan wryly remarked, “In democracies, policy cannot long dispute the scepter with sentiment.”

Still it was sentiment in the United States more than policy which eventually decided the nature of U. S. relations with Cuba by bringing an end to Spanish occupation.

U. S. discontent with the oppressive Spanish government led to war and the establishment in 1902 of the Cuban Republic. Before conceding independence to Cubans after forcing Spain to evacuate, the United States took practical steps to promote political stability and protect the military advantage which she had gained in the war.

Politically, she reserved the right to intervene in Cuban affairs. In years to come, she exercised this right on a number of occasions, by military or financial means.

Militarily, the United States confirmed by treaty her tenure of Guantanamo Bay, the magnificent deep-water harbor at the eastern end of the island, seized early in the war.

Efforts to bring genuine political stability to the volatile people of Cuba were never successful. After the early 1930’s, further overt influence by the United States was unnecessary, however. Unfortunately, the political stability which manifested itself during these years was largely the product of the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista.

With relative stability in Cuba came a declining interest in Cuban affairs on the part of the United States. Interest was not widely revived until Batista was overthrown by Fidel Castro and it did not become intense once more until Cuba suddenly showed up as an overseas member of the Soviet Satellite system.

From time to time, as the Castro-led revolt against U. S. influence in Cuba has progressed, the question has arisen whether developments in weapons and altered conditions of warfare during the last half-century have decreased the strategic importance of Cuba. Is Cuba the strategic prize today that Mahan, for one, conceived it to be in the past?

Judging from the actions of the Soviet Union, the answer would appear to be yes. Judging from the behavior of successive administrations in Washington, the answer would appear to be no.

The Soviet Union has spent time, money and energy while incurring substantial risks in order to possess an outpost almost on U. S. shores. The United States on the other hand, has been unwilling to spend either energy or money and has accepted virtually no risks in order to defend its position in Cuba.

Part of this reluctance to take decisive action to preserve Cuba as an ally appears to stem from confidence that in time of war, the immediate presence of U. S. air strength will make Cuba untenable for an enemy. Be that as it may, U. S. air power has not deterred the Soviets from making a Cold War conquest, and the value of air power against a Caribbean neighbor in any kind of war remains uncertain to date.

What is certain—and should be self-evident to any one who can read a chart—is that developments in weapons and tactics have not altered the importance of the great avenues of sea communication.

Now, as in Mahan’s time, the sea lanes around Cuba are lifelines of U. S. commerce. As of today, therefore, the advent of Soviet influence in Cuba with its attendant military establishments, poses for the United States a threat quite similar to that posed by Spanish occupation—and for essentially the same reasons that Mahan cited 60 years ago.

Mahan’s analysis of the strategic value of a place boiled down to three principal conditions. They may be briefly stated as:

(1) Position, or, more precisely, said Mahan, situation. One must take into account not only geographic location but proximity to a probable theater of operations.

(2) Military Strength, which includes both offensive and defensive strength. It does not refer exclusively to the amount of firepower available. Broadly, it means the defensibility of ports and harbors, either by natural or artificial means. It also includes the capabilities of those ports and harbors for sheltering naval forces and for launching them safely and easily upon the offensive.

(3) Resources, by which Mahan meant the ability of a place to provide the wants of a fleet, either by drawing upon the natural resources of the surrounding country or by supplying itself from stockpiles. The important thing was that supplies need not be brought from great distances through unfriendly territory.

“Where all three conditions—situation, intrinsic strength and abundant resources are found in the same place,” Mahan declared, “it becomes of great consequence strategically and may be of the very first importance ...” The conditions which require the formulation of a sound and comprehensive strategy in the Caribbean have not changed appreciably since Mahan’s time. It seems reasonable, then, to accept Mahan’s principles as a basis for estimating Cuba’s modern strategic value.

Position

Generally, Mahan taught, the value of a position in naval strategy is reckoned according to its nearness to an important sea route.

Communications are probably the most vital and determining element in strategy . . .

It is from their potential effect upon these lines of communication that all positions in the Gulf or Caribbean derive their military value.

Of the three principal conditions, the first, situation, is the most indispensable, because strength and resources can be artificially supplied or increased but it passes the power of man to change the situation of a port which lies outside the limits of strategic effect.

If the position be on two routes at the same time, that is, near the crossing, the value is enhanced. A crossroads is essentially a central position, facilitating action in as many directions as there are roads.

The value becomes more marked if, by the lay of the land, the road to be followed is very narrow.

A simple chart exercise will suffice to show very clearly how completely Cuba meets all of Mahan’s requirements for a strong position.

Draw a triangle upon a chart of the Caribbean Area (see pages 38 and 39.) Let the apex of one angle rest approximately at the mouth of the Mississippi River, gateway to the heart of the North American continent. Let the point of a second angle rest upon Colon, Panama, gateway to the Pacific. Let the third point of the triangle rest upon the ocean a few miles east of Martinique.

The boundaries of our triangle include all the points of strategic importance in the Gulf and Caribbean—ports, passages, and land masses.

From this elementary construction it is easy to see why Mahan called Cuba the key to the Gulf and how it dominates the principal entrances to the Caribbean—the Yucatan and Windward Passages. These entrances, together with the Mona Passage, the points of destination of shipping and the routes connecting the points of destination are the main objects of military control in the Caribbean.

The two great “points of destination” in the area bounded by our triangle are the Gulf Coast in the vicinity of the mouth of the Mississippi and the entrance to the Panama Canal at Colon. These are the two great focal points of commerce which make the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean of vital concern. The ocean highways which connect and traverse the two bodies of water make them inseparable strategically.

To Mahan, the Gulf and Caribbean formed an inland sea.

“The two . . . taken together, control or affect the approaches on one side to these two centers (the mouth of the Mississippi and Colon) of commercial and therefore of political and military interest,” he said.

It was because he recognized the value of the commercial sea routes which they encompassed—they are even more valuable today-—that Mahan concluded that control of the Gulf and Caribbean was essential. Cuba, lying athwart the inland sea and flanking the Yucatan Channel and Windward Passage—the “narrow roads”—is in a position to insure or deny that control to the United States depending on whether she is the property of a friendly or unfriendly power.

Military Strength

When Mahan wrote, Spain-in-Cuba was corrupt and militarily weak, but her strategic position was nevertheless strong. This paradox existed because strength did not depend exclusively on numbers of soldiers or warships.

Size and terrain in Cuba are important dements of strength to the power which controls Cuba, in this case Soviet Russia-in-Cuba.

As Mahan pointed out, Cuba is not so much an island as a continent. It is narrow throughout but more than 600 miles long from Cape San Antonio on the west to Cape Maysi on the east. A large part of the interior of this semi-continent represents fairly easy country for military operations, but much of it is mountainous and well-adapted to defense. Some of the best of Cuba’s deep water harbors lie at the eastern end of the island, cradled in the protecting arms of the Sierra Madre mountains, which ofTer a haven for irregular troops. In this terrain, Castro held out against the best that Batista could bring against him. Using it as a springboard for operations, his “militia” eventually triumphed against government forces that were superior in numbers and equipment.

Santiago and Guantanamo are among the harbors thus protected by nature. Favored by topography and hydrography, they are admirably located for defense and well-adapted for offensive submarine operations. Thus in a broad sense, they may be said to meet the most stringent of Mahan’s definitions of what makes a strong position.

Resources

At the present time, Cuba does not appear to have developed the resources she requires to serve as a first-order base for the operations of a fleet—surface or subsurface. Much of the progress toward self-sufficiency which Mahan anticipated has not yet been realized. There is no reason to think that this lag will not be overcome with the guidance and under the leadership of Soviet technicians sent to Cuba for that purpose.

And it should not be forgotten that Mahan was not talking of natural resources alone when he spoke of self-support. Self-support, with the consequent ability to contribute to the support of a fleet could be achieved “either by its own products or by the accumulation of foreign necessities,” Mahan said, and he called attention to the great extent of the Cuban coast with its numerous harbors and the many directions from which an approach can be made that would tend to minimize the dangers of blockade.

In her ability to serve as storehouse for imported war material, Cuba would, of course, be first-rate. Her size and terrain would contribute to the dispersal of storage facilities while her roads and railroads and, above all, her narrowness would make it possible to concentrate material speedily at a given point.

To sum up then, we see that Mahan developed a picture of Cuba as a position which:

(1) Is superbly located to dispute U. S. control of sea communications which link all of the sea frontiers of North America one with the other and the disruption of which cannot be permitted without the most serious consequences.

(2) Is of great intrinsic strength defensively because of her size and terrain; offensively because of her abundance of harbors.

(3) Possesses great potential resources.

As a result of this strong combination of position, strength, and resources, Mahan taught, Cuba is the most important single strategic feature of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean.

Much has been written in U. S. journals recently of the political calamity which is accepted as the outcome of the 1961 failure of exiled Cubans to gain a beachhead on their homeland with U. S. support.

One factor that keeps our record in Cuba from being written off as a total strategic disaster is our insistence upon maintaining our treaty rights to Guantanamo Bay.

From a strategic point of view, U. S. possession of Guantanamo goes far to negate Soviet gains elsewhere in Cuba. Guantanamo is a position of strength for the United States for the same' reason that control of the rest of Cuba offers a position of strength for Soviet Russia-in-Cuba.

Obviously, of course, by holding fast to Guantanamo Bay, the United States is in a position to protect the Windward Passage, an extremely important feature of the Caribbean “landscape.” Although there are many other entrances into the Caribbean, none offers as much relief from what Mahan called the “onerous circuit” as the Windward Passage. Too, our Guantanamo Base is also nearer to Panama than any other.

But there is more to it than that, said Mahan. The power which has the might to control the Windward Passage, he added, “lies in the rear of any force (Soviet submarines?) that may be operating at the Isthmus of Panama and flanks the lines of communications of that force.”

“Should contention for control of the Isthmus arise between the United States and a European state, the possession of. . . Guantanamo and Puerto Rico constitutes a formidable line of control affording great support and protection to routes from the Atlantic to the Isthmus and Canal Zone and almost perfect security to those from the Gulf ports.” In World War II, U. S. naval planners utilized this strategic line to permit the Navy to protect the very shipping routes for which Mahan showed so much concern long before.

For those who believe that the ultimate misfortune may not come to pass, Mahan had a word too. He said: “It is impossible to keep the storehouse of the mind too full of resources against all contingencies.”