In most marriages, the seventh year, if not exactly a time of crisis, is, at the very least, a time for reflection. In the naval officer’s career the end of the seventh year is also a suitable time for some solid thinking. Many articles have appeared in the Proceedings in recent years analyzing the loss of junior officers, but none has wrestled with the problem while the author is still a part of that group. What are the problems and experiences that influence this particular officer? I shall attempt to describe them as objectively as possible.
As a basic premise the assumption is made that I am analyzing a group that is “Navy- motivated,” a group that has survived the first decimation of resignations from officers that were unsuited for a naval career. Perhaps “Navy-motivated” is not a strong enough phrase to convey the desired impression. I mean motivation in every sense of the word. Foremost, I mean a group that is basically interested in the future of the Navy and in ways to better improve the Navy of the present. By “interested” I mean active effort in attempting to change things that need changing either as present methods or future concepts. By no means do I mean “Navy- motivated” to be synonymous with content. However, I do imply a certain fundamental personal adjustment to certain phases of the Navy that will obtain as long as a ship goes to sea. The separations from family, demanding working hours, and many other well known characteristics of Navy life are not considered in this paper to affect this group, not because they are not important, but because by and large a certain number will always be unwilling to accept the fundamental fabric of Navy life and will resign as soon as possible. This article deals with the problems of those that remain.
The Future of the Navy
The Navy has in a remarkable renaissance from the bad publicity days of the B-36 captured the public eye as an effective weapon of national policy. By a combination of planning, nuclear power, the Sixth Fleet, and some luck, the Navy stands high in the public esteem. The problems of how best to use the awesome weapons and forces of our new age is one of the great problems of our time. With the exponential increase in the cost of weapons, the fundamental problem is not only one of weapon employment but one of weapon procurement. It is becoming increasingly obvious that we as a nation cannot afford the luxury of crash programs in several different directions at once. Consequently, in the Navy, the problem of where to push the hardest is going to be of major importance in the next few years. Concepts and weapons, both old and new, must be constantly re-evaluated not only in terms of our own national resources, or enemy capabilities, but also in terms of the capabilities of other branches of the service. Junior officers of today hold key positions at the ground level in several ambitious projects for the Navy of tomorrow. How well they understand these new weapons and concepts will in large measure determine the reliability of the information that more senior officers at the policy making level must use in making decisions as to which are the best. Thus the junior officer of today cannot help but look toward the next ten years as being one of the most dynamic periods in naval history.
The Changing Status of the Civilian
The last few years have caused an even greater change in the United States as a whole. The tremendous economic impetus caused by a combination of unprecedented peacetime spending and our burgeoning population has aided in furthering our position as a nation of tremendous world influence. We stand now as the acknowledged leader of the free world with an almost unbelievable number of pacts, treaties, and agreements with those nations that are our friends; for those areas where we lack friends, we have promulgated doctrines or executive declarations. There is no area of the world that is not in some manner influenced by our policies.
In these days of the threat of guided missile-hydrogen warhead type warfare, the concept of a strictly civilian populace is outmoded. The loyalty, dedication, and effectiveness of those that produce our increasingly complicated military hardware is every bit as vital to the United States as those same qualities are in the armed services that will use these weapons. Not only is the civilian population greatly concerned with the advancement of the technology of war but now as never before it stands in greater immediate danger, should war come.
Therefore, it is now possible for an officer to leave the Navy and, if he chooses employment in any of a great number of endeavors that are related to this country’s defense effort, to demonstrate that his particular contribution is just as great or greater—as a civilian.
This may appear to be a very small point, but to me it seems of vital significance. There has always been in most naval officers a feeling of altruism or dedication that has been a very real part of their careers. They have been able to feel that they have been in large measure the only members of our society engaged in actively preserving and protecting that society. The civilian was in a sense regarded as an inferior, as one who thought no more than of getting as much as he could get in a basically materialistic society. Thus a resignation from the Navy was an ethical problem. It was not a simple change of jobs, or even a way of life, but in large measure a change of status of the individual in the manner in which he identified himself in the structure of society.
Now, for the first time, there are a large number of positions in the civilian world which can offer to the naval officer that same sense of satisfaction that comes from knowing that your work is important not only in itself but in that it furthers the preservation of our free society.
Promotion
The junior officer in the Navy is being promoted rapidly up through the grade of lieutenant. Certain outstanding officers have been selected one to two years early for lieutenant commander. The trend for the years to come, however, is clearly one of greater total service to attain the grade of commander and captain.
The problems caused by the lieutenant commander and commander wartime “bulge” affects all those junior to them. Some very sound proposals have been made to cope with this problem; however, it is safe to say that it can never be solved to the satisfaction of both those in the group and those to follow. Even an amelioration of the problem calls for a great deal of time in which to gain the necessary legislative authority. Thus, for the foreseeable future, the bulge dilemma casts a pall over the whole promotion structure.
Irrespective of this, however, is the fact that promotion is more time-dependent than ability-dependent. I am sure that junior officers would accept the risk of having more passovers if there were a greater number of early promotions. The number of early promotions is now so small as to cast doubt on their efficacy. If a larger percentage of the outstanding officers could be promoted early, it would be a far better advertisement than the token number of those that have advanced so far.
Command
One of the unfortunate consequences in the phasing out of promotions is the length of time to attain command. Probably the most common aspiration for the junior officer is command of a combatant ship at an early age. The idea of command and all that it connotes is frequently cited by junior officers as one of the most desirable immediate goals of a naval career. In fact, in comparing, for example, the head of a small business with the commanding officer of a ship (with a similar number of men involved), a naval officer sees the latter as an occupation of much broader scope. During the war and afterwards, commanding officers of destroyer types had in some cases as little as five to six years experience. Thus it was possible for these officers to exercise the broad scope and influence of command relatively early in their careers. Now, as command of destroyer and submarine types comes at about the 13-14 year service level, there is no opportunity for the prospect of command in the near future to influence younger officers to remain in the Navy.
A recent article in the Proceedings analyzed why officers with four years’ experience were leaving the service.1 The author was a destroyer commanding officer of one of our newest destroyers. At the time he himself was at the experience and age level of the officers he was discussing, however, he was about three years away from command of a destroyer. Now certainly, this was a result of a particular set of circumstances which would not happen again short of war. What is really important here was not the realization of the title of command but an understanding of the concept of command at an early age. Most officers regard command as the first level in the Navy where they have any real opportunity to exercise creative initiative. Unless officers are fortunate enough to serve under a command where a great deal of latitude is given, this conclusion is frequently true. If officers knew that there were certain types of “command concept” jobs available, e.g., staff billets with real responsibility at the 7-12 year service level, it would constitute a positive influence similar to an actual sea command during this vital period of their career. What is probably more important, these jobs would develop the junior officer’s ability to think. Late command no doubt provides a ship with a mature, experienced commanding officer who is finally given the opportunity to exercise initiative. It seems to me, though, that the longer the officer has served as a subordinate surrounded by numerous orders, directives, and instructions, the less eager he is to do something new when given a degree of latitude.
The situation is cited as one which makes the junior officer wonder how far he might progress as a civilian in the next 6-7 years in command type responsibility. I think he feels that the opportunity, even in civilian life, is probably quite small. The fact the opportunity, however slim, exists is very important as a motivating factor. 78
Thus, command type responsibility which is certainly one of the major goals of a naval career remains in the distant future to the junior officer as another time-dependent part of a naval career and is not likely to be an immediate influence as a factor in remaining in the Navy.
Pay
The pay of junior officers in the first few years of service is adequate to meet the challenge of industry. Most officers have managed to acquire those things that our standard of living has made us regard as necessities. The fundamental question becomes not, “Where are we?” but, “Where are we going?” Looking forward ten years to where we may expect to be in the Navy’s rank structure, we find that the increase in pay is so small as to warrant serious doubt as to whether in view of our increased family responsibilities we will be able to live as well as we do now.
That this problem is a real one may be confirmed by reading the recent resignation statements of distinguished naval officers as to their inability to assume the financial responsibility for the higher education of their children.
It is, of course, trite to point out that junior officers realize that service compensation can never compete with civilian compensation at high responsibility levels. I refer again to the basic premise of the article—an analysis of a Navy-motivated group. Those that regard money as a major goal obviously have an impossible adjustment to make and have probably left the service by now. I don’t for a minute envision or encourage the point where officers will remain in the Navy solely because of money, but a system is badly needed that will stop officers from resigning from lack of money to insure that future family responsibilities can be met.
The Cordiner Committee has done a remarkable job in analyzing the service pay structure. It was an expert study that was the first real critical appraisal of the pay structure in relation to the modern armed service. Their recommendation to greatly increase the compensation in the higher officer ranks was carefully considered and well documented. In spite of the reputation of the committee members and the fact that they were above all taxpayers, the Navy has been very reluctant to advance their recommendations at all.
A few years ago the Congress needed a pay raise for its members very badly. Over the years it had become increasingly difficult to attract the kind of young men into politics that the nation deserved. With a great deal of soul-searching and hesitation, the Congress finally passed a law giving itself a relatively tremendous pay raise. The reaction of the country was such as to confirm the intrinsic common sense of the American people. The pay raise was accepted with the realization that it was commensurate with the responsibilities of the Congressmen and would probably result in the long run in better government. Is it inconceivable that the country will not see some logic in paying our higher military leaders a larger measure of what they are worth? If we in the Navy don’t believe this ourselves, who will?
There is no doubt that a general pay raise is inflationary, as the Administration has been quick to point out. The pay raises advocated by the Committee for the higher ranking officers are not, however, inflationary. The lower ranking officers who make up the greater number would receive little or no additional compensation, but they would be able to see a future which would allow them to be able to assume their increased financial responsibilities as they attain higher rank.
Benefits and Privileges
The legislation passed in the last few years has left little to be desired in the field of survivors benefits, medical care, social security, etc. There is no doubt that a junior officer is worth (in one sense) a great deal more dead than alive. But, seriously, the services have done a tremendous job in filling the gaps left by a great deal of conflicting and discriminatory legislation in putting forth a workable comprehensive program.
After a decade of cutbacks in almost every traditional officer privilege, a certain resurgence has taken place. A notable article in Proceedings2 was no small factor in articulately expressing the feelings of almost every officer regarding the manifold petty degradations of the concept of officer.
A great deal can be done by the junior officer himself in this field by insuring that certain traditional rights and privileges which fall within his scope are upheld. Certainly, if the ones most concerned do not take active measures to correct certain items as they occur, they have no one to blame but themselves.
Certain other items of such broader scope cannot be changed except by legislation or department order. The policies of a particularly dynamic CNO have done a great deal to correct the broader situation. So, at the very least, the pendulum appears to be swinging in the other direction.
Summary
This, then is one junior officer’s impression of the Navy of today as it influences officers of my age, rank, and experience. Problems of promotion, command, and pay have existed and will always exist in the Navy. Their importance is compounded, however as we realize that the new status of the individual in civilian life is attractive to the type of person who requires more than money or position to satisfy his inner self. This new challenge of civilian life is one of long term duration, for as long as we stand as the defender of the free world and continue to spend billions on defense. To meet this challenge, we must be sure that our policies of promotion, command, and pay are the best possible.
1. See February, 1957, Proceedings: “Why We Are Losing Our Junior Officers,” by Commander Russell S. Crenshaw, Jr., USN.
2. See May, 1956 Proceedings: “Special Trust and Confidence,” by Lt. Col. R. D. Heinl, Jr., USMC.