The first of our Navy’s new destroyers stood up the channel to find her berth in the Navy Yard. Training completed, she was now going into the yard to have her few material deficiencies corrected before she joined the fleet as a fully operational ship. She was returning from an enjoyable shakedown cruise to South America (the first such cruise in many years). Her shortened training period at Guantanamo had been interesting and rewarding, and her future operating schedule promised to be filled with interesting duty.
The Skipper looked about him and was pleased with the quiet efficiency with which the officer of the deck conned the ship up the channel, and he noticed the professional snap with which the First Lieutenant directed the preparation of the forecastle. It warmed his heart to feel that his ship had come alive as a part of the real Navy: the Navy with efficiency, spirit, and high standards.
Filled with fascinating new equipment and with habitability “built in” throughout her air-conditioned hull, she was a ship to be envied. Her officers and crew matched her equipment—select, capable, interested. Reenlistment was near 100% and promised to remain at a high level.
The few officers who had not yet completed their obligated service were well integrated into the remainder and held important jobs in the ship. They had all demonstrated a deep-seated interest in their work and in the Navy. The wardroom was congenial and spirited, and the officers worked and played as a team. The tone of wardroom discussions of Navy life always reflected a sincere respect for the Navy and its institutions. The skipper felt confident that when these officers had to choose between the Navy and a civilian career, they would choose the Navy.
I was wrong!
The advantages and opportunities of a career as a naval officer had been carefully pointed out to each of them. Together we had explored their future and sought paths of advancement which fitted their individual talents. They were all advancing in the ship as rapidly as their experience allowed, and each opportunity had been grasped to reward them for tasks well done. It was emphasized that they had already served their apprenticeship as a naval officer, that they had an equity in a fine career, and that each successive assignment would bring more opportunity and satisfaction.
They were interested, liked the ship, enjoyed the duty, but when the time of decision arrived all three of my non-Naval Academy officers decided to leave the Navy. And as though this weren’t enough, one of my Naval Academy officers, having completed his required service, submitted his resignation. The efficient Officer-of-the-Deck and the snappy First Lieutenant were among them. I was batting less than .000.
This was a shocking situation. I discussed this with other destroyer skippers and found that their experience has been similar. I found no ship which had managed to retain a significant number of their more capable officers upon completion of their required service. The other skippers were as concerned as I. If officers couldn’t be attracted to the Navy in “Gold-Plated” Forrest Sherman, there must be something wrong with the Navy’s officer program.
In an era when the importance of the Navy in national defense is increasing daily, we can’t afford to lose the good junior officers just when they are beginning to fill the key billets in a ship. If our fleets are to be a cornerstone of national defense in the age of guided missiles and nuclear power, they must be manned by competent, aggressive, and thoroughly trained officers, and thus manned at the first moment of aggression! The junior lieutenants of today are an essential part of the fleets today and the life blood of those fleets tomorrow.
Feeling the importance of the situation, I discussed with the officers concerned their reasons for leaving the service. It was felt that it might be possible to distill from their thoughts the basic reasons why they, as a group, had made this decision. Not satisfied with the small sample in one ship, I explored the reasons why officers were leaving other ships. The results of this exploration finally formed into a pattern which should be of interest to the Navy as a whole.
In the first place, the officers leaving the service can be divided cleanly into two groups: Those leaving the service for preferred occupations; and those leaving the service because they find Navy life intolerable. In this second group we find officers who sincerely dislike going to sea: they suffer from seasickness; they can’t stand separations from their families for any duration; they are thoroughly upset by even slight changes in schedule. Another part of this group finds military life of any kind unacceptable: they can’t tolerate discipline; they do not feel comfortable under the responsibilities placed upon them. A few, though they like the Navy, find their home life made unbearable when they must make a cruise; in some cases, his wife has threatened divorce if the officer does not get out of the Navy. These officers of the second group should, for their own good, find another life. Happily, the officers falling into this second group are a minority, and the remainder of this discussion shall be about the first group; those who are adaptable to Navy life, could be successful in the Navy, but choose another occupation because they prefer it.
Preliminary to exploring the specific problems involved, we must realize that we are discussing a man’s life work. These officers are considering their careers for the next thirty years, and the conditions towards the end of that career are as important as the prospects for the immediate future. The Navy is competing against the entire complex of civilian life, and we must be able to compete successfully if the Navy is to continue to be effective. At present, it appears that we are losing that competition.
The first conclusion that could be reached from discussions with the officers concerned is that the present pay of junior officers is adequate. Not a single one of those questioned felt that his pay was inadequate and most are going to civilian jobs at a lower salary. On the other hand, they felt that the comparatively low salaries in the senior grades weren’t worth shooting for. “Look what a Navy Captain gets after his years of service and for the responsibility he shoulders!” said one, “I can do better on the outside with only average success.” Even when the Navy retirement benefits were completely considered, it didn’t change the picture. “The material rewards in the long run for the work and devotion required of a career officer are completely out of line,” was the belief of another.
To explore this facet of the problem a bit, I proposed a pay scale which left the pay in the lower grades as it is, but offered graduated and significant increases up to a level of $20,000 a year for a Rear Admiral. Though it was explained that only a limited number could be successful in attaining the rank of Captain or Rear Admiral, several officers indicated they would stay in the Navy if such were the pay scale for senior officers.
Probably more fundamental than pay is the fact that most of these officers have never, at any time, looked upon the Navy as a desirable career. It has been easy for them to become officers, consequently they do not value their position very highly. Most choose the officer program as a means of satisfying the Military Service requirement. Three years as an officer is preferable to two years as “G.I.”!
In officer school it was the popular thing to “knock” the Navy, and some went to ships- where this continued. Conversation continually centered on the Navy’s shortcomings, and their companions vied with one another in finding fault with Navy life. The popular hero at school knew how much obligated service he had to the minute, and the individual who defended the Navy drew the scorn of his fellows.
Even after these officers joined ships where the real Navy spirit existed, they did not change their basic feeling about the Navy. They had made so many commitments to family and friends that they were loath to change their minds. From beginning to end they had looked upon their naval service as a career interlude, and the Navy has been unsuccessful in changing their minds.
Many of these officers feel that the prestige of a naval officer has been lowered to an unattractive level. Both in and out of the service, his position is not highly regarded. On naval bases, as a junior officer, he scrambles with civilians and enlisted men for parking spaces and for most services. His entrance to the base and his transactions at most base activities are typified by “Identify yourself, Cash, and Carry.” As so well expressed by Lieutenant Colonel Heinl in “Special Trust and Confidence,” his word or signature is seldom accepted without further documentation.1
Away from Navy activities, the young officer finds the first question he is usually asked is, “How long do you have to do?” It seldom enters a civilian’s mind that being a naval officer is a satisfactory career to follow for more than a short time. To understand this, we must realize that our society is essentially a materialistic society where social stratum is generally determined by an individual’s income bracket. This is a byproduct of free enterprise and a part of the American scene. There are $5,000, $10,000, $15,000-a-year men etc., and men of similar income who congregate together and form social groups. Prestige and social acceptance vary almost directly with income. Against this background, it is easy to see how little prestige the naval officer can command with the public at large. The most senior naval officers are equated to minor executives in business or industry! Indicative of this condition is the fact that invitations to officers from civilian groups are seldom received today. Many of the young officers questioned have never received an invitation of any kind except in foreign ports.
Along with the general loss of prestige, many of these officers feel that being a naval officer no longer has the stature of other professions. They feel that professions such as law, engineering, and architecture are definitely more highly regarded by the public. In addition to evidence of lack of respect for their position, they cite the special promotion and pay of medical officers as a concrete example that the government does not regard their profession as being on the same plane as medicine. They resent this implication and do not choose to follow a second-rate profession.
Many of the young officers questioned were leaving the Navy to seek challenge and competition. The excitement of competition in civilian life combined with the opportunity to advance as rapidly as their abilities will allow appeals to them much more than the Navy’s system of “growing old together” with the occasional rejection of the less fit. If the Navy promotion system were an open selection of the best in a given rank for the next higher rank (i.e., all LTs on active duty considered by each LCDR selection board), some of these officers would elect to stay in the Navy. “Why should I stay in a situation where there is no reward for my achievements? Whether I am outstanding or just average, I will be promoted at the same time,” expressed the feeling of many. These officers are leaving the Navy to find a life where high performance is rewarded in a direct, concrete manner.
These officers also find much of their duty dull and unrewarding. Watches at sea, fleet operations, solving material problems, handling men, etc., are looked upon as interesting and enjoyable, but such activities fill only a part of their time. Surrounded by voluminous instructions in meticulous detail from every bureau and office in Washington and generally augmented by every echelon of command afloat, these officers spend a large part of their time looking up instructions, filling in forms, and preparing the reports which keep our paperwork blizzard howling.
Added to this administrative load is the burden of officer’s training courses, correspondence courses, inspection checkoff sheets, etc. Though they realize the necessity of a part of this, these officers often feel stifled by the overwhelming tide of administrative detail. Their initiative and intelligence is thwarted by the requirement of slavishly following instructions, and they don’t like it.
Operationally speaking, they feel much of the fun has been taken out of the Navy (this came mostly from officers in other ships which haven’t had the cruises of the Forrest Sherman). Opportunities to visit interesting places are seldom seized. They watched with envy when they met foreign warships, less burdened with never-ending fleet commitments, making extensive and enjoyable cruises simply showing the flag. Fleet athletics and sporting events are essentially non-existent for these officers because the pressure of fleet operations has prevented such activities from being worked into the schedule.
Though they wish to see the world, they also want a home port to which they return consistently and for reasonable periods. “I’d be glad to take my family to a European or Pacific base and operate from there for two years, but these four to five-month cruises away from home in peacetime are unacceptable,” said one officer. Bachelors as well as married officers feel a need for being settled somewhere, to have a single port to which they can expect to return after each few weeks of operating. They want a chance to meet people ashore and to get to know them, to return periodically to familiar surroundings, and to be able to own and use an automobile.
Training as it exists at sea today is felt to have become humdrum and boring. Whether under the Training Command or for type competition, there are dozens of little exercises which must be conducted and reported almost daily; some must be repeated interminably. An intelligent, capable officer becomes bored with filling in the same group of blanks time after time. He enjoys being a part of the team that takes the ship out and “tangles” with a submarine. He is keenly interested in matching wits and abilities with the fliers. He wants to shoot and hit, but he wants the opportunity to train his crew himself and to have his success measured in a showdown test at the end. The extent to which training is directed and supervised from “above” and the sheer quantity of exercises and reports required is burdensome to the aggressive and imaginative young officer.
An interesting result of this inquiry is the fact that the so-called “fringe benefits” play little or no part in persuading these young officers to stay in the Navy. As a matter of fact, several expressed embarrassment over the whole subject and wished the Navy would drop discussion of it. Navy retirement is considered excellent, but not without competition from civilian programs. Medical care for dependents is a problem that most of these officers don’t yet appreciate. From unsatisfactory experiences related by other officers, however, even with the new program, they place little more value on the Navy’s dependent care program than on the medical plans available in industry. Commissaries and Navy Exchanges are convenient, but not highly valued. Navy quarters just do not exist as far as these officers are concerned, and Navy housing is seldom available. In short, fringe benefits weigh only lightly in the scale of decision.
There you have it as well as it could be distilled. Each of these factors counted differently in each officer’s mind, but they continually reappeared in the discussions. These officers are not leaving the Navy because they lack spirit, are not capable, don’t look forward to adventure. They are generally not seeking security and safety. They are trying to seek satisfying and rewarding lives. They look upon the defense of this country as a continuing and important problem, but in the age of nuclear weapons and intercontinental bombers, they feel that the civilian of this country shares the defense responsibility and much of the “front line” danger with the armed services. As patriotic citizens they feel free to choose between military and civilian service in keeping the country ready to defend itself.
It is the Navy’s problem to meet the challenge offered by civilian life. From top to bottom of the Navy we must face the problem and find a satisfactory solution. We must hold a suitable number of these capable young officers or the effectiveness of the Navy will be destroyed.
What should we do to meet this challenge? From the discussion above, many steps are apparent.
First, our officer procurement and training programs should be re-examined. Candidates should be more carefully screened and those without distinct promise and strong career motivation should be eliminated. It is much better to accept fewer junior officers and absorb the load elsewhere than to accept lower standards. Eliminate the “easy way” to gold stripes. A commission should be hard to get, and the officer should feel that he has achieved something valuable and enviable when he is finally commissioned.
During training, the standards of performance should be rigidly high. The spirit of the candidates should be carefully nurtured, and the challenge and adventure of a life at sea should be stressed. Naval history and traditions should be thoroughly learned, and firm discipline should start the first day a man calls himself a Midshipman or Officer Candidate. If the spirit of the Blue and the Gold is not injected prior to commissioning, there is little chance of doing it later.
The three-year career must be eliminated. Officers should enter training with the idea that they are embarking on a permanent career. We must realign the mental attitude of these officers so that the “Big” decision would be to decide to get out—not to decide to stay in the Navy.
Officers as a whole should be held to higher standards of performance and conduct so there can be no doubt in the mind of the young officer (or anyone else) as to the honor and dignity of the naval profession. Our promotion system should be revised to allow the rapid promotion of promising officers. Competition and opportunity for advancement should be made a part of the daily life of an officer. The trend toward the “leveling” of pay should be reversed, and the pay of senior officers should be increased to make the attainment of such rank more attractive. If the broad selection exercised by the last two Admiral’s section boards were generally applied to lower grades, it would tend to attract the more capable and ambitious young officers to compete for advancement within the Navy.
The line officer is the backbone of the fleet. His career must not be subordinated to that of the staff or specialist groups, no matter what their special problems. The Navy will lose its vitality and the fleet the keen edge of its fighting capability, if the professional line officer is not as highly regarded and rewarded as any other group. Hazardous duty pay where there exists a real extra hazard is generally regarded as just, but the implication of extra pay for specialist groups is detrimental to the over-all officer program.
The problem of dull duty and burdensome administrative detail should receive the attention of all echelons of command. Instructions and reports should be eliminated except where absolutely essential. Paperwork should be cut by command action, not just talked about. A command sponsoring an instruction should realize that the problem has probably been successfully handled without the instruction and can probably continue to be. If there is any question about the necessity of an instruction or report, it should be eliminated. The heavy load of instructions and reports indicates a lack of confidence “down.” One can easily understand the lack of interest by the junior officer at the end of the line when he comes to the realization that little confidence is placed in his judgment and ability.
Training must be tempered to the practical limits of the ship and men to receive benefits from it. It is worthless to the Navy and discouraging to the individual to heap training courses and requirements beyond the individual’s capacity to absorb. We gain no benefit from trying to “force feed” training beyond the point where the individual retains his interest. “On the job training” produces the most permanent results. An individual seldom forgets how to do something he has actually done, and the excellence of his knowledge and ability is not increased by any number of reports.
A key to much of the problem lies in the planning of fleet operations. Home port time, upkeep, maintenance, administrative load, shore-based training, and recreational opportunities should be carefully balanced in planning operations. A recreational break in the middle of a prolonged operation can make it a memorable cruise. Assembling the fleet for fleetwide sports competitions would add a lot to the spirit of the crews.
To meet our overseas commitments we should assign ships for extended tours or on a permanent basis. A home port should be assigned in the area of operations, and the ships should return to the home port as frequently as possible. Re-establishment of permanent foreign fleets or squadrons would eliminate many of the personnel problems inherent in our system of deployment today. A permanent European Fleet and Asiatic Fleet could probably be manned entirely from personnel requesting the duty, and ships based in the continental United States would be relieved from the extended overseas tours except in emergency.
As technological developments continue and our ships are refitted with new and ever more complex equipment, the need for capable and experienced officers increases apace. The rapidity with which war may be thrust upon us and the immediate catastrophic consequences of atomic bombardment may eliminate the opportunity to train officers after an emergency commences. The fleets of the nation must be ready when the first hostile move is made against us. An essential part of our readiness is the retention of the capable young officers who are facing the decision between the Navy and civilian life today.
1. See “Special Trust and Confidence,” by Lieutenant Colonel R. D. Heinl, Jr., USMC, in the May, 1956 Proceedings.