The Soviet Union And Its Submarine Forces

A hundred years ago W. Bauer, the Bavarian engineer, was beginning his „ first diving trials at Kronstadt, and subsequently the Russian Imperial Navy became interested in this new venture, so that by 1914 they had 22 submarines in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Barents Sea, although they were scarcely fit for more than training. It was not until 1916 that the first operational submarines, from the 1912 program, were made available. Despite the large numbers of torpedoes fired, these vessels had only six sinkings to their credit, and those were all cargo vessels.

After the Revolution, the recovered Tsarist submarines were put back into service once more: eight of them in the Baltic and three in the Black Sea—all from the prewar program—but it was not until the first five-year plan that the U.S.S.R. seriously took up the matter of submarines. Hitler’s rise to power gave further impetus to the Soviet Union’s intention to develop a large and powerful submarine fleet. Ten years later, at the outbreak of the war, the Soviet Union had 95 submarines in the Baltic, 45 in the Black Sea, and 25 in the Barents Sea—a total of 165 in service—plus 37 on the ways in Leningrad. Besides being strong numerically, this fleet was composed almost entirely of recently constructed units (K, S, P, Shcha, and M classes).

The German offensive of June 22, 1941, caught the Soviets in the midst of their preparations, and the advance of German troops prevented Soviet submarines from carrying out operations in the southern Baltic.

In their retreat northward the Russians lost 24 submarines, chiefly through minefields laid by the Germans and Finns on the route leading into Kronstadt. A single German cargo vessel, the 3,700-ton Baltenland, was torpedoed on October 23, northwest of Oland. At the end of 1941 the Soviet fleet was blocked in Leningrad, and the year terminated in complete frustration for the Soviets.

Despite the aerial bombings of the winter, 35 submarines were made ready after the breakup of the ice, and the first offensive was launched in mid-June when the submarines crossed the German mine barriers. Several of these were lost, but eighteen units, mostly of the Shcha-class, reached the Baltic, where they operated until December. The Shcha- 320 made the first successful attack against the 2,513-ton Finnish cargo vessel Argo on June 16, near Bogskaer. The last attack of the campaign resulted in the torpedoing of the 952-ton Edith Bosselman off Danzig on December 9, 1942. Soviet submarines had destroyed a total of 25 freighters, amounting to 50,000 tons in all, and had damaged seven others, a very slim booty when we consider that the German traffic amounted to six million tons. Ten Soviet submarines were lost.

In the spring of 1943 the Germans anchored a double net at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, and despite all efforts no submarines succeeded in getting through to the Baltic. It was not until the Finnish armistice of September, 1944, that Soviet submarines reached the Baltic again. Twenty units then operated in the area until the end of hostilities. Although German traffic was stepped up considerably for the evacuation of the Baltic countries, a mere 21 vessels were sunk by the Soviets, amounting to 95,000 tons. Although opportunities had been very great and rich targets had traveled in slow convoys with scarcely any escort, it should be noted that not a single attempt was made to attack the important targets offered by German submarines on training cruises.

The initial situation in the Black Sea was more favorable than in the Baltic. There were no German naval forces in the area, and Rumanian forces were quite weak. The German advance soon obliged Soviet submarines to withdraw to Novorossisk, and later to Poti and Batum. The Germans, on the other hand, were able to acquire, partly through salvage, some 45 light anti-submarine units.

From 1941 to 1944 Soviet submarines preyed upon German-Rumanian traffic off the Bosporus, along the Bulgarian coast, and off Sevastopol. They sank 23 units (not including seven Turkish coastal traders) representing 59,500 tons, and damaged four others amounting to 16,500 tons. The Soviets lost seventeen submarines. Soviet achievements were quite modest even though there were frequent opportunities to attack convoys under light escort. No action was noted at the time of the German evacuation.

Soviet submarines in the Barents Sea operated against German convoys heading for Kirkenes and Petsamo. The submarines on this route were more skillful than those in the Baltic, but their success was rather limited. For example, in 1942 nearly six million tons of shipping were convoyed to Petsamo under very light escort, and only 29 cargo vessels, representing 45,000 tons, were lost during the entire period 1941 to 1945. Three vessels totalling 13,000 tons were damaged.

The total shipping sunk in the three seas by Soviet submarines amounted to 253,000 tons, a rather small figure when we consider the good hunting offered by many single travelers and convoys which were lightly escorted. Wherever the Soviets enjoyed an initial superiority, they failed to maintain it. Nevertheless, the submarines did take the lead in naval offensive, since all the large Russian naval units demonstrated a remarkable passivity.

Soviet materiel was not up to that of other navies since they had started practically from zero in 1929. It is true, German engineers had designed the Shcha’s, but qualitatively Soviet submarines were below standard. Inferior techniques could also be noted in production. Furthermore, although the submarine crews were highly selected and given substantial privileges, they had experienced little practical training.

At the beginning of World War II, Soviet submarines often operated in groups of two or three and attacked isolated vessels with gunfire. The use of deck guns had been found necessary in the shallow waters of zones traveled by coastal freighters.

A broad autonomy was enjoyed by the Higher Submarine Command. Soviet land stations were supposed to monitor radio traffic from cargo vessels in order to direct submarines to the attack. Radio communications aboard the Soviet submarines were rather heavy, but this did not seem to worry the Command, since operational zones were fairly narrow.

On departure, submarines received the following orders: “Attack vessels of commerce and warships. Do not enter neutral waters except to sink enemy shipping.” For the rest, the skipper had great liberty of action and was unhampered by any kind of navigational instructions. In case of an antisubmarine attack, submarine captains liked to lie on the bottom until the end of depth charging. In attacks on convoys or single ships, Soviet submarines usually attacked once and then withdrew. This behavior, which was very frequent, differed markedly from that of German submarines. On the other hand, a formal order was executed without counting the losses. Thus the behavior of Soviet submarines was unpredictable.

The various considerations mentioned up to now indicate that Soviet submariners possessed outmoded materiel with which they were able to survive only by dint of courage, but which was insufficient to the magnitude of their task. Tactically inept, they operated with a very limited aggressiveness. Their success was of scant strategic importance and of no help to the Allied navies. Actually their attacks had little more than a nuisance value. The Soviet concept of a navy as a complementary arm of the infantry was typically a product of the continental mind.

Starting World War II with out-dated submarines, the Soviets ended the conflict with the same kind of materiel. To be sure, Soviet submarines claimed to have sunk 3,600,000 tons, and nine skippers had been decorated with the Heroes of the Soviet Union medal after sinking three vessels apiece.

In order to bridge the gaps in their materiel and catch up with the world, the Soviets made certain at Potsdam that they would get as much German materiel as possible, even to the point of later buying up the crews to use them as instructors.

Since 1945 the Soviets have done their utmost to renovate the entire submarine fleet on the basis of wartime lessons. Their recent IF-type submarines continue to use conventional propulsion, since their construction presents no very new problems and they can be turned out more rapidly. No atomic propulsion for submarines has been announced, but Soviet progress in this field indicates that such types will be coming out in the near future. The principal characteristic of the modern submarine is its radius of action. In an ocean-going submarine this would indicate an offensive intention that is not altogether reassuring. Although the shipyards have all been rebuilt, construction programs are slow in getting under way. It is not easy to figure out the exact number of submarines built, since the capacity of the yards is not very well known. In comparison, the Germans had planned on 35 submarines per year, according to the Z-plan adopted by Admiral Raeder in 1938.

A study of the two German submarine wars of 1914-1918 and of 1939-1945 yields some excellent lessons. In the last two conflicts the German General Staff began operations with a very limited number of operational submarines (22 in 1914 and 27 in 1939), and the all-out war on Allied commerce did not hit its peak until two years later. In May, 1943, the Germans had 210 operational U-boats, of which 47 were in transit and 63 on patrols, figures which were never exceeded. One may easily imagine what a critical situation England would have been in, if instead of 27 operational submarines, Admiral Doenitz had had three times that number at his disposal in 1939.[1] In 1941 the decisive theater for the Soviets was continental, consequently the U.S.S.R. had no imperative need for mastery of the sea, but today this factor has become a prime one, and we can easily understand the Soviet interest in studying the German submarine war. In the event of a conflict with maritime powers trained in anti-submarine warfare and escorting convoys, the U.S.S.R. will need to have a submarine fleet much more highly developed than that of the Germans in 1939.

What is the Soviet Admiralty’s program? During World War II the maximum figure of German submarines oscillated between 400 and 450. The training and replacement of personnel always constitutes a long-term job. Moreover, the present more highly perfected submarine has a much more complicated technical setup than the older ones. These conditions lead one to believe that 250 is the maximum number of operational submarines maintained by the Soviet Union in time of peace. It is certain that older submarines will be kept for a time to permit training of personnel. During World War II, the Germans had fifty submarines permanently assigned for training duty. In 1939 the Russian 4th Brigade (School of Submarine Navigation) at Kronstadt was already using fifteen for the Baltic. These figures suggest that the total of Soviet submarines might even exceed the figure of 250.

In the twelfth year of the Atomic Era, it is already evident that the navies of the world will have to undergo a complete transformation. The use of nuclear energy will enable the submarine to use a single motor of great power, hence its performance will be much increased, and there will no longer be the need for regularly recharging batteries. At the same time, the modern escort will have detection apparatus quite superior to that used in 1945. Atomic cannon can be used with a pre-set fuse, enabling any vessel to destroy a submarine if the latter is detected at a sufficient distance to provide security for the surface vessel. Atomic depth charges dropped from a plane will not endanger the attacking plane, but in both cases, escort or plane, one must count on the proximity of friendly countries. With the appearance of atomic energy, the escort vessel and the submarine will have to make consequent changes of tactics.

For the moment, warships in service are nothing more than transitional units, and this means that the Soviet submarine fleet is due for another adaptation.

Since Peter the Great, rulers of Russia have tried to point out that a navy is indispensable to the nation. The U.S.S.R. has set up nautical clubs (Dosjlot) in all big cities. Lectures and nautical shows and literature are used in an attempt to give the peoples of the U.S.S.R. a feeling for the sea. Stalin and his disciples continually proclaimed the maritime and oceanic interests of the U.S.S.R.

World War II gave the U.S.S.R. what Peter the Great had promised his people. The Allies themselves sometimes supported these desires for expansion. Today three-fourths of the Soviet frontiers are maritime (40,000 kilometers, of which 24,000 are in the Arctic), but these frontiers increase the possibility of encirclement by an adversary, and that is why the U.S.S.R. is building a submarine fleet.

Since 1945 the U.S.S.R. has constantly asserted its ambitions, both maritime and oceanic, in all directions: by seeking revision of the Montreux Convention, by asking for common defense with Turkey of the Dardanelles, by demanding a share in the bases at Tripoli and in Erythrea (at the Potsdam Conference), by requesting international control of the Danish Belts and the Kiel Canal and revision of the Treaty of Sevres for the defense of Spitzbergen, by claiming territories discovered by Bellingshausen at the South Pole, and by setting limits of territorial waters at twelve nautical miles.

Despite substantial territorial improvements after the war, the Soviet fleet is largely locked in the Black Sea and the Baltic, hence the respective importance of the Bosporus Straits and the Belts. In practice, the Belts can be crossed only on the surface because of their average depth of only 12 meters. They cannot be traversed when defended and are easily watched. The bases in free waters of the Arctic and the Pacific are thus of great importance, as is also the Stalin Canal linking the Baltic with the Arctic.

Despite the distance separating its maritime theaters, the U.S.S.R. is trying to develop its means of transit from one theater to the other and to reduce the difficulties of concentrating its forces in them. The importance of the maritime route from the Arctic to the Pacific may readily be understood. After the example of Papanin, numerous detached expeditions on islands of ice are studying the hydrography, the glaciology, the wind movements which influence the drift of ice floes and concentrations of pack ice, salinity, temperature of water, etc. In this way they have learned that the temperature of the water rises regularly and the thickness of the ice diminishes. A special organization, the Glasevmorput (Chief Northern Sea Route Department) is charged with the organization and security of the route. The three sections of the route, Dikson, Tiksi, and Ambarchik, are equipped with a number of weather stations, ice-breakers, and a polar aviation unit. Each section plots the ice-free routes, wind, and fog charts.

On the 10,000 kilometer route from Murmansk to Vladivostok, navigation is possible three months of the year, beginning in mid- July. Vessels travel in convoy, following the coast where the presence of rivers warms the water. This route is usable by submarines, but supplying via the Northern Sea Route is quite risky; the ice forces shipping to concentrate in narrow zones, and in summer there is practically no night. Moreover, the Bering Strait is easy to mine, as are all the channels used by the Northern Route.

There is also the problem of moving submarines by river within the U.S.S.R. from one sea to another. This transit is limited by the size of locks, the depth of canals, and the eventual ice floes. According to information now at hand, all Soviet submarines can use these canals. The Stalin Canal, 277 kilometers long, is particularly important for transfer from the Baltic to the Arctic, but its nineteen locks are quite vulnerable to the A- bomb. Moreover, it can be used only five months of the year, since it is frozen from November to June.

As in other navies, performances of materiel are being improved. All operational submarines have some characteristics of the true submersible. Their submerged speed and the capacity of their batteries have been increased. They are likewise supplied with a schnorkel. Considerable improvement in torpedoes and detection are expected shortly. Cruising radius of their ocean-going submarines is considerable. Lasting qualities of both crews and materiel have been proved in action; they cruise from forty to ninety days. Research on special fuels is expected to bring some surprises in the realm of speed.

Although conditions of transit depend on detection equipment, assuming eight hours of night under schnorkel, and 125 nautical miles for 24 hours (very reasonable figures), we find that, departing from present bases for a period of ninety days, a submarine will be able to spend: 60 days on patrol at 2,000 sea miles from base; 45 days on patrol at 3,000 nautical miles from base; 30 days on patrol at 4,000 nautical miles from base; 15 days on patrol at 5,000 nautical miles from base.

The occupation of Narvik or the Danish Belts by the U.S.S.R. would reduce the Baltic-Arctic transit by 500 nautical miles. These conditions could vary with bad weather or seasons. In summer there is practically no night within the polar circle; in winter, conditions are reversed.

It is definitely known that the Soviets are studying the launching of teleguided missiles from submarines; however, it is believed that the necessary submarine missile carriers have not yet been produced. On the other hand, the use of torpedoes with atomic warheads is possible.

The Soviets have had a rather considerable first-hand experience in mines. They have proved their skill in defensive mine-laying. All Soviet submarines can lay mines, and although it pays off less than mine-laying by plane, submarine mine-laying is accurate and hard to detect. The U.S.S.R. also has a goodly number of small submarines; while they need bases close at hand, they are not easy to detect.

Finally, Soviet submariners have had great experience in two special aspects of navigation: navigation in shallow seas and in or under ice. Not only is the Gulf of Finland shallow, but so are all the coasts of the Arctic Ocean and in these areas they have been able to try out new and rugged equipment in the pack ice.

In a general way, Soviet submarine training is intensive and is built on an excellent basis, thanks to the length of service (five years) and the length of submarine courses (two years).

We have seen that the present construction and concept of the Soviet submarine are almost exclusively oriented toward the ocean. The principal mission of the Soviet submarine would apparently be against Allied lines of communication. All members of NATO effect their liaisons by sea. The indispensable supplies of petroleum, war materiel, and munitions, as well as food, are transported to them by sea, and Soviet submarine attacks in small groups or in larger packs could reasonably be expected against these supply lines, whose importance would necessitate the dispersion of NATO escort forces. In 1940, Churchill set the minimum subsistence tonnage for England at twenty ships a day arriving and the same number outgoing.

However, we know that in order to be effective, the submarine must be informed, and this applies especially to the submarine on extended patrol, navigating submerged under electric propulsion by day to reduce possibilities of discovery. This brings us to the problem of conducting a submarine war thousands of nautical miles from one’s base. Further, the radius of action of reconnaissance aviation must be sufficient to operate to the middle of the Atlantic or the Pacific. If the information obtained by the sea-patrol planes is to be used, they must have very exact navigation, and this means aids to navigation. Similarly, there must be highly perfected and powerful means of transmission, and this implies a communications and navigation control set-up which would be quite vulnerable to bombing.

Assuming that the U.S.S.R. will have 250 ocean-going submarines, it may be estimated that two-thirds will be based in the Arctic and the Baltic, a total of 166 submarines. If we admit that 30% will be in operation, this means 55 submarines on patrol and 55 others in transit. At the beginning of operations, the number of submarines on patrol could be greater.

Because of the great distance from their home bases to the patrol areas, it is thought that Soviet submarines would transit as much as possible under schnorkel. They would leave their bases submerged deep in order to avoid enemy submarines on the prowl; then they would schnorkel as often as possible, and perhaps surface along the ice-floes, where fog and bad weather are very common.

Supposing that the area north of England were mined as far as the Faroes, the Atlantic route would necessarily pass north or south of Iceland. These two straits would be closely patrolled by Allied anti-submarine aviation and hunter-killer groups. However, with the help of the very frequent bad weather, it is certain that Soviet submarines could effect a transit. Because of the great distances and the time needed in transit, the closest zones of operation would be chosen, i.e., the neighborhood of the British Isles and the approaches of Brest. These zones offer the double advantage of having shallow water with irregular ultra-sonar detection, while being focal zones of convoys not requiring aerial exploration as in the open sea. A few submarines could likewise be deployed off the U. S. coasts. Harrassed in these zones by Allied anti-submarine aviation and hunter-killer groups, Soviet submarines would be forced to deploy farther from the coasts, with a subsequent drop in effectiveness, since the problem of scouting by strategic aviation does not seem easy to solve under present conditions. The Tu-4 cannot go beyond a zone from the Canaries to Cape Farewell. The concentration of vessels in convoys would force the submarines to work in packs as the Germans did, forming a barrier on the probable traffic route. In general, it must be admitted that Soviet submarines are very much handicapped by the position of their present bases. With the occupation of French and Spanish coastal regions by the Soviets, this situation would be quite different.

In the Pacific, it is generally considered that the Soviet industrial and petroleum resources are inadequate for wartime naval operations. However, the effectiveness of the trans-Siberian railway is not well known, and it might be sufficient to provide logistic support for submarines alone.

Soviet training and adaptation to special conditions will enable their submarines to operate in the Arctic where they will be used as weather relay stations, supply and service stations, radio-guide or radar picket stations. These missions in support of strategic aviation are extremely important.

Eventually some submarines will be specialized in the launching of guided missiles against surface or land targets (Panama Canal, important ports beyond the range of strategic aviation). Of course, with atomic propulsion everything becomes possible, even navigation under the ice.

A certain number of submarines would be able to mine the entrance to ports, causing a traffic snarl that would expose cargo vessels to attack while waiting off these ports. We know that mines are detonated in many and combined ways. Sweeping them would be very difficult and would require a large number of minesweepers.

Will the Soviets succeed in deploying their submarine forces surreptitiously for D-Day? We hope not. The discovery by NATO forces of such a deployment would rob the Soviets of the benefit of surprise, but it must be admitted that the success of such an enterprise would give them a considerable advantage.

On the defensive side, Soviet submarines would be oriented on patrols in zones controlled by the Soviet naval air force, where they would endeavor to attack Allied raiding forces heading in their direction (Sea of Norway). In addition, they would have the mission of protecting the army’s flank, including the coast, against Allied landings and naval operations. This would be the most important task of the coastal submarines.

During World War II Soviet submarines manifested tenacity and courage despite their outmoded tactics and miscellaneous and out-dated equipment. If their activity was then defensive, the situation has since changed. The war enabled the U.S.S.R. to realize almost completely the old Tsarist ambition of obtaining free access to all the great maritime routes adjacent to their territories. In the process, they have made important advances. In 1914 and 1941 the Russians were allied to countries who were the masters of the sea. Today, the U.S.S.R. must become powerful on the sea in her own right. It is for this reason that the Soviet submarine fleet is being built up.

With the exception of the closed seas where the U.S.S.R. has a real superiority, the Atlantic and the Pacific offer theaters for the conduct of a war on commerce. Because of the distance from present bases to operating areas in the Atlantic, the U.S.S.R. will probably attempt to take over Norway and the Danish Belts at the outset of hostilities.

In contrast to the operations of the last two world conflicts, the Soviets can exploit a new tactic from the outset of hostilities, thanks to the use of the true and rapid submersible. In 1945 Soviet submariners were aware of their backwardness; today they have excellent bases, courageous crews trained in all kinds of weather, supported by a political and administrative organization out to give them the fullest aid. They are therefore at present a real force whose qualitative and quantitative value is constantly increasing.