The possibility of a landing in Southern France in support of the intended cross-channel invasion of Northern France (Operation Overlord), was discussed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill and the Combined U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff as early as the Quadrant conferences at Quebec in August, 1943, when the Sicilian Campaign was still in progress. It received further and more detailed consideration at Teheran on November 29, 1943, where the idea was supported by Stalin as well as by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff. Prime Minister Churchill, however, while at that time expressing no definite opposition to the Southern France operation, very evidently preferred an advance from the North of Italy, via the Istrian peninsula and the Ljubljana gap, toward Vienna. He also felt that it was important not to neglect the Eastern Mediterranean, and that it might be possible to employ there forces not otherwise applicable to the cross-channel operation.
The upshot of the various discussions on the policy making level, in late 1943 and early 1944, was a decision that Overlord should continue to have first priority, that the advance in Italy should be continued to and beyond Rome but not beyond a line Pisa-Rimini, and that a landing in at least two division assault strength (Operation Anvil) should be made in the South of France concurrently with Overlord.
The first directive for Anvil was issued in Algiers, the Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean, on December 28, 1943, by the Commander-in- Chief Mediterranean, the Allied Naval Commander. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham, who had been General Eisenhower’s Naval Commander from the initiation of the North African-Mediterranean Campaign had been called to London in October to succeed Sir Dudley Pound as First Sea Lord, and his place in the Mediterranean had been taken by Admiral Sir John D. H. Cunningham, another inspiring and capable naval leader. General Eisenhower himself, in order that he might assume command of preparations for Overlord in the United Kingdom, had been succeeded as Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean by the British General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.
This preliminary directive for Anvil appointed me as the naval commander of the operation with the title of Naval Commander Western Task Force (NCWTF). In order to support the invasion of Northern France, the mission assigned was to establish the army firmly ashore and to maintain and support it over the beaches until the need for beach maintenance had ceased. As a basis for planning, it was stated that the landing in Northern France was expected to take place during the first suitable day in May, 1944, that a beachhead was to be established on the south coast of France in conjunction with the northern invasion for the purpose of supporting it, and that the composition of the army forces for the southern invasion had not been decided but would probably consist of ten divisions, three or four United States divisions and the remainder, French.
Upon the receipt of this directive, the planning section of the Eighth Fleet Staff immediately set to work on preliminaries, using the experience they had gained at Casablanca, Sicily, and Salerno. At this time there was no definite information as to what army or air units would participate, nor as to the amount and identity of naval forces to be available. Planning sections of all three services, on the Supreme Commander’s level and on the task force level, were set up in close conjunction in Algiers, the necessity for intimate inter-service cooperation in such matters having by now, fortunately, been thoroughly learned.
In January, 1944, I was ordered to Washington to consult on matters in connection with Anvil. The assignment of the necessary landing craft, escort vessels, and support shipping was thoroughly discussed. Arrangements were also made for the supply of material for the construction of added fuelling facilities in Corsica, deemed essential for the servicing of the smaller landing craft which would have to be staged through that island.
The period after the completion of the Salerno operation was being used by the Eighth Fleet for the buildup of maintenance and training facilities for the support of its current and future operations. Oran was being developed as the principal fleet supply base, and a badly needed Quonset-hut Naval Hospital was built there by the Eighth Fleet Sea Bees. To the eastward of Oran, the Arzeu area, the beaches of which had been the scene of the original allied landing near Oran and of most of the amphibious training for the Sicily and Salerno operations, was still in use as an amphibious training base, for French as well as United States troops. Bizerta had become thoroughly established as the main base of the Eighth Amphibious Force. At Palermo, the dry docks and repair facilities of the Italian shipyard had been restored to the point where, with willing Sicilian labor, it was operating most effectively as a shipyard for the Eighth Fleet. One of the major jobs accomplished there was the rebuilding of the stem of an LST which had been hit in the propellers by an acoustic torpedo. A U. S. Naval Detachment had been established at Naples to serve Eighth Fleet activities in that area. An amphibious training base had been inaugurated at Salerno. There, on beaches over which they had previously landed in assault, the troops which were to take part in the Anzio operation and, months later, those which were to land in Southern France were trained. A base for the maintenance of Eighth Fleet Motor Torpedo Boats had been established at La Maddalena, an old Italian Naval Base. From an advanced base at Bastia, our PT boats and their British motor torpedo boat confreres were harassing the enemy coastal traffic from Genoa and La Spezia south.
The Anzio Operation of January, 1944, already described in the Proceedings* by its Naval Commander would, it was hoped, result in the early capture of Rome and, consequently, the timely release from the Fifth Army of the United States divisions to be assigned to Anvil. Unfortunately, this expectation was not realized. Not only that, but the continued support of the Anzio beachhead by sea, over an extended period, constituted a drain on the naval resources of the Mediterranean which had not been contemplated. It therefore soon became evident that troops could not be made available from the Italian Front in time for a Mediterranean operation concurrent with Overlord, even with a date postponed to June, and that, even if they were, the number of amphibious craft expected to be available would be insufficient. There was no other source from which troops and landing craft could be drawn. This situation developed at a time when demands were being made in the North for the expansion of the Normandy operation to a five division assault.
As a result, the decision was made at the top level that Anvil must be postponed. Once this was definite, the bottom of the naval barrel was scraped in the Mediterranean to reinforce Overlord. The consequent reduction in Eighth Fleet and British Mediterranean Forces made any sizeable amphibious operation in that area out of the question until the necessary ships and craft could be spared from the Normandy operation and sent south.
On the assumption that Anvil would be a three division assault, Rear Admirals Bertram J. Rodgers and Don P. Moon, both officers with splendid records, were ordered to report to the Eighth Fleet early in 1944. These two, with Rear Admiral Lowry, Commander of the Eighth Amphibious Force, the veteran of Anzio, would provide three flag officers as Amphibious Attack Force Commanders. Rear Admiral Lyal A. Davidson, the Eighth Fleet Cruiser Commander throughout the previous year, was still available to direct gunfire support operations. However, upon the postponement of Anvil, Rear Admiral Moon was transferred north to command one of Over- lord attack forces, which he subsequently did, with distinction. Rear Admiral Rodgers was assigned to take charge of Amphibious Training in the Eighth Fleet, under Rear Admiral Lowry.
The desirability of letting our new Allies of the French Provisional Government in Algiers into the secret of Anvil and of obtaining their assistance, early became evident. Their support, naturally, was enthusiastic. My good friend, Contre Amiral Andre Lemonnier, the Chief of Staff of the French Navy, appointed one of his most able English-speaking officers, Capitaine de Fregate Le Hagre, as liaison officer with the planning section of my staff. His assistance, plus that of our other French friends “in the know,” with their local knowledge of the country, the coast, and the defense installations, was of the greatest value.
The French were greatly disappointed that their own troops were not to be permitted to make the initial assault on their own coast. Several of their units were actually receiving amphibious training at Arzeu. But the trained landing craft crews to be available were all English-speaking. When our gallant allies finally were made to realize the difficulties of effecting full co-operation between soldiers and sailors speaking the same language and that to add another, a language barrier, would produce an almost impossible situation, they reluctantly agreed that the decision to employ American divisions only, in the assault, was sound.
French naval units, originally at Martinique or Dakar, were beginning to arrive in the Mediterranean, fresh from overhaul and modernization in the United States. These were augmented by a number of American built French-manned destroyer escorts. All showed good morale and an eagerness for active service. The destroyer escorts were promptly employed in convoy work, and one, the Senegalaise, played an important part, with an Anglo-American-French group under the command of Captain L. M. Markham, Jr., U. S. Navy, in the sinking of a U-boat off Bougie and the capture of its commander, one of the most skillful and ruthless of German submarine skippers. In this action Senegalaise received a disabling hit in the stern from an acoustic torpedo. The French cruisers, under Admiral Davidson’s supervision, were given training on our gunfire support range near Arzeu. After a week on board, in nominal command of a French cruiser division, Admiral Davidson was very graciously presented with a French rear admiral’s flag upon his departure.
One of the first problems to engage the attention of the Anvil joint planners was the selection of the area for the attack. To the westward, the area around Sete-Agde at first received consideration, since a landing in that locality would permit of a drive through the Carcassonne Gap and Toulouse toward Bordeaux. This course of action, however, was rejected because of the difficulties both during the attack and the subsequent maintenance, which would have been imposed by the poor beach gradients and the many lagoons, lakes, and canalized roads inland of the beaches. Moreover, this area was beyond the range of effective air cover from the nearest available allied air bases. Intelligence further indicated that here were to be found the most serious beach obstacles and other defenses. It was apparent that the enemy had picked this region as the most probable point of attack from the south and was guarding against it.
The Rhone Valley offered a most attractive line of advance for an army. It was a natural avenue of approach from the south to the heart of France, and it offered excellent railroad and highway communications. The support of an army advancing by this route would require possession of the port of Marseilles and, secondarily, of Toulon. The defenses of these ports precluded any direct attack on them from seaward.
To the eastward, a landing in the Cannes- Nice-Menton area offered no immediate promise of support to Allied operations in the north of France, since any advance from that theater would have had to be along the coast or through the Maritime Alps, and consequently slow and difficult.
For the capture of Marseille and Toulon, a landing to the eastward of the latter appeared to be the most promising. Army planners at one time proposed a landing at Hyères, between the Giens Peninsula and Cap Benat. The Rade D’Hyères, however, was shallow and mineable, and could not have been entered without prior reduction of the defenses on the outlying islands of Porquerolles, Port Cros, and Levant, which covered all avenues of approach. Preliminary operations against these islands would, of course, have given the enemy time to concentrate for the defense of Hyères.
Further careful study, by the army planners and naval planners jointly, led to the ultimate selection of the Cavalaire-St. Tropez-St. Raphael-Agay area as the most promising point of attack. There were adequate beaches with satisfactory gradients and a deep water approach; the beach defenses, while presenting a problem, had not progressed as much as those further west; and suitable advances inland and to the left flank were considered practicable. From the right flank, the Argens River valley offered the possibility of a rapid movement to the westward to get behind Toulon and Marseilles and cut off their defenders.
The decision as to the theater for the initial landing having been made, and approved by the Supreme Allied Commander, detailed planning on the Western Task Force level continued, at least as far as current uncertainties as to available forces would permit. In early May, Major General Alexander M. Patch, who had commanded the Army troops which first relieved the Marines at Guadalcanal, arrived in Algiers to command the Seventh Army and to be the Army Commander for the Anvil Operation. He was a splendid officer and a delightful gentleman, and his previous experience gave him a thorough understanding of the problems involved. Friendly and intimate co-operation were consequently immediately established on the Army-Navy task force level. Not only that, but the early appointment of Brigadier General Gordon P. Saville, USAAF, as Commander of the XIIth Tactical Air Force, which would furnish air support for the operation, and the establishment by him of his Headquarters in close proximity to those of the Eighth Fleet and Seventh Army, made for effective Air Force co-operation. This was a big step in the right direction, and a vast improvement over the situation which existed prior to the Sicilian and Salerno operations. General Saville, himself, was a most efficient, understanding, and co-operative officer. Under these happy conditions, planning for Anvil made constant progress, was unusually thorough, and was able to adapt itself promptly to changes in the situation and the availability of naval, military, and air units.
The arrival in March of the newly completed amphibious flagship, the U.S.S. Catoctin, as Eighth Fleet flagship, was of the greatest assistance in the preparation for Anvil. In addition to well-equipped working space for the staff, this vessel had the latest in communication facilities and equipment for printing photography, photographic interpretation, and reproduction of charts and maps—all of the utmost value for the task in hand.
The landing in Normandy and the fall of Rome were practically simultaneous, on June 6. At this time, the U. S. 91st Division was receiving training in the Oran-Arzeu area, preparatory to an early transfer to Italy. Oran, being near the Spanish Moroccan border, was known to be full of enemy agents with ready communication. In order to promote strategic deception by giving the impression that another landing was imminent in South France, the Catoctin was brought to Oran, and the 91st division was ostentatiously combat-loaded on assault transports and landing craft. On June 9th, General Patch and I flew independently to Oran, and proceeded separately through the city to the docks in official cars, each at high speed with motor-cycle escort and flags flying. At nightfall, the Catoctin, transports and escorts, a respectable force in spite of the scarcity of shipping in the Mediterranean at the time, cleared the harbor and proceeded to the eastward. But, instead of continuing to the coast of France, the convoy turned in toward Arzeu and, in the early morning hours, carried out a practice landing. I do not know just how effective this deception was, but from intelligence reports received at the time, we had reason to believe that the enemy did interpret this move as the start of a new operation, and reacted accordingly.
On June 17, the Island of Elba, between the northern peninsula and Corsica and the Italian coast, was captured, after some bitter fighting, by French forces which had been landed by a small allied amphibious force, principally British, under Rear Admiral Troubridge, R.N. Possession of this island was a highly desirable preliminary to a further northward advance in Italy.
Upon his return from a visit to the Normandy front and a Combined Chiefs of Staff conference in London, Admiral King on June 17 visited Casablanca for a conference with me relative to the plans for Anvil, our needs in the way of naval forces, and what we might expect to have available. Strong British opposition to the landing in Southern France, so thoroughly argued by Sir Winston Churchill in the sixth volume of his history of World War II, Triumph and Tragedy, was already developing. The Prime Minister, General Wilson, and General Alexander all wished to see the Italian Campaign pushed to the limit and were loathe to relinquish from the Italian front the U. S. and French divisions necessary to the prosecution of Anvil. President Roosevelt, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff, and General Eisenhower, on the other hand, were all determined that, in the interest of completing the defeat of the Nazi enemy at the earliest possible date, operation Anvil should be carried out as planned. I must confess that my personal convictions were, and still are, strongly aligned with those of my American seniors. In addition, I should have been bitterly disappointed to see all our efforts in planning and preparing for this great operation go for naught. In my opinion, it is most fortunate that American counsels prevailed.
The Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Command Mediterranean (SACMED) was moved from Algiers, as a result of the capture of Rome, to the palace of Caserta (fifteen or twenty miles inland from Naples) about July 1. The naval commands, British Mediterranean Fleet, and United States Eighth Fleet, followed, but rather than go inland, away from the units with which they must deal, set up their headquarters in adjacent buildings on the Naples waterfront. The Western Task Force Planners, of all services, were able to make the move on board the Catoctin, thereby continuing their work with little interruption and becoming familiar with the ship on which they would be embarked for the operation.
The arrival in the Naples area was coincident with the intensification of preparations for Anvil. We, in the Eighth Fleet, had estimated that we might have to count on maintaining the Seventh Army over beaches for a period of at least thirty days before supply through the ports of Toulon and Marseilles could be assured, and that beach maintenance could not be guaranteed after the advent of the mistrales, the sudden storms which occur frequently off the southern coast of France after about October 1. Consequently, we set September 1 as the latest safe date for Anvil. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force in the United Kingdom (General Eisenhower), as early as June 12, had indicated that, in order to render optimum assistance to the invasion of northern France, a landing in southern France not later than August 15 was desirable. On July 2, the Supreme Commander Allied Forces Mediterranean set August 15 as a target date and directed that every effort be made to meet it. Army planners had previously estimated that it would require 38 days to withdraw a division from the front, refit it, provide the necessary refresher amphibious training, and mount it in the Naples area. The slower landing craft would have to depart that area for the assault area by D-6. Consequently, the withdrawal of the U. S. divisions for the assault had to be initiated at least by July 2, This was done. Amphibious training facilities in the Salerno area, and embarkation facilities in the Naples-Nisida-Pozzuoli area, had all been improved and expanded by the Eighth Fleet to meet this contingency.
The U. S. Army Divisions finally selected for the Anvil assault were the Third (Major General J. W. O’Daniel, USA), the Forty- Fifth (Major General W. W. Eagles, USA) and the Thirty-Sixth (Major General J. E. Dahlquist, USA). The Third Division was a veteran of the landing in Morocco (Torch), of the Sicilian Campaign (Husky), and of Salerno (Avalanche) and the subsequent Italian Campaign. General O’Daniel, prior to relieving General Truscott in command of the Third, had had command of the Army Amphibious Training Command, working with the Eighth Amphibious Force at Arzeu. The Forty-Fifth Division was a veteran of Husky and Avalanche. The Thirty-Sixth had made the initial assault of the U. S. Vlth Corps at Salerno. These three divisions, with certain additional elements, were to be grouped together as the VIth Corps under Major General Lucian K. Truscott. General Truscott had been connected with British “Combined Operations” training under Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten in the United Kingdom in early 1942, had been Rear Admiral Davidson’s Army opposite number in the landing at Safi, Morocco, on November 8, 1942, and had commanded the Third Division in the Tunisian Campaign, in the Sicilian assault, at Salerno and during subsequent fighting in Italy. Thus the assault troops, with the exception of replacements, were all veterans, and they were to be under experienced commanders.
By the end of June agreement had been reached as to the principal details of the Anvil Assault. On the left, one division (the Third) was to land southwest of the Golfe de St. Tropez, on beaches in the Baie de Cavalaire and in the Baie de Pampelonne. The task of this division was to secure the left flank, to make a rapid advance inland to the northwest, to capture St. Tropez and to link up with the division on its right. While the beach slopes were believed to be satisfactory, in general, sand bars created shoal water at varying distances and depths off both beaches. Photographic reconnaissance indicated a row of concrete pyramids underwater off the Cavalaire Beach (Red), and a double row of wooden pilings off the Pampelonne Beach (Yellow). Judging from experience with similar obstacles at Normandy, our evaluators believed both pyramids and piles to be mined. Offshore waters were also reported to be mined. Intelligence indicated that the coast defense batteries and minor beach defenses in this area were formidable. In addition, the Cavalaire Area was apparently covered by what was believed to be a 164 mm. battery on the eastern end of the island of Levant. The task of landing and supporting this division was assigned to an Alpha Attack Force (TF84), under Rear Admiral Frank J. Lowry who, would fly his flag in the Duane, a sister ship and improved edition of the Biscayne, so satisfactorily used in previous Mediterranean operations.
In the center, the Forty-Fifth Division was to land on beaches in the Baie de Bougnon between Cape Sardineau and Pt. Alexandre, an area just north of the Golfe of St. Tropez. Here the beaches were backed by steep hills and had only a narrow coastal road as an exit. A landing in the Golfe of St. Tropez itself was considered out of the question. The gulf was shallow and probably mined, and mine-sweepers and assault boat waves could be covered at short range from both shores. Information deduced from photographic reconnaissance and the determination of off-shore depths by the “wave method” indicated that Red and Green beaches, those nearest to Cape Sardineau, would require pontoon causeways for the unloading of LSTs, but that further to the northeast, these might be beached dry at Yellow and Blue beaches, the approaches to which were clear except for some rocks off-Yellow. No artificial underwater obstacles had been noted. The task of the Forty-Fifth Division involved the early capture of the little port of St. Maxime, at the northern entrance to the Golfe of St. Tropez, and a rapid advance inland to the northwest, in co-ordination with the divisions on its flanks. Since the single coastal road exit might become a bottleneck, administrative arrangements were made for utilization of the northern part of Alpha Yellow beach for the support of this division, should it be required.
Red and Green beaches, in this area, were backed for their full length by an eight foot cement anti-tank wall, to which there was only one exit. Behind Yellow and Blue beaches was a steep embankment, through which there was only one exit, back of Yellow. The whole area was estimated to be heavily fortified with some five strong points covering the prospective transport areas, the approaches, and the beaches themselves. This section was studded with cement pillboxes and casemates, some back in the hills overlooking the beaches.
The task of landing and supporting the Forty-Fifth Division was assigned to a Delta Attack Force (TF 85), under Rear Admiral B. J. Rodgers, who would fly his flag in the well-tried Biscayne.
The right flank of the assault was assigned to the Thirty-Sixth Division, which was to land in the Golfe de Frejus Agay region with the task of capturing St. Raphael and Fréjus, seizing of Lemuy and airfields in the Argens River Valley, linking up with the 45th Division on its left, and securing the right flank. The task of landing and supporting this division was assigned to a Camel Attack Force (TF 87), under Rear Admiral Don P. Moon, who was to be returned from Normandy in time for this duty, and who would fly his flag in the amphibious flagship Bayfield.
The only suitable beaches in the Camel Area were Red Beach, at the head of the Golfe de Fréjus; Green Beach, a narrow beach just northwest of Cap Drammont, fringed by hills and having only a single winding road as an exit; Yellow Beach, at the head of the narrow Rade D’Agay; and Blue Beach, about three-quarters of a mile further east, also narrow, hill-fringed, and having a single winding road as the sole exit. Camel Red was the only one of the four with sufficient capacity fully to support the Division, and it was immediately adjacent to a large airfield. Its approaches, however, could be covered by flanking fire from the vicinity of St. Raphael. The Golfe de Frejus was known to be thoroughly mined, and the immediate approach to the beach was defended by the most complete set of underwater obstacles observed in the Anvil attack area. Camel Yellow would make a good site for a small boat landing, except that intelligence showed a beach defense of pill boxes, machine gun emplacements, and small guns, all out of scale to its importance. The other two beaches, while considered practicable, would not support a landing on a wide front. Green Beach was the only one of the two over which heavy vehicles could be promptly handled. It was decided to land one Regimental Combat Team of the Thirty-Sixth on Green Beach and one battalion on Blue Beach at “H” hour. The assault on Red Beach, to be made by another Regimental Combat Team, was to be deferred until about H plus 6, to allow time for the capture of the flanking shore defenses near St. Raphael, and for the removal of mines and beaching of underwater obstacles obstructing the Red Beach approaches.
To the Support Force, under Admiral Davidson, was given the important initial task of landing a Sitka Force for the capture of the islands of Levant and Port Cros, thus eliminating the threat to the Alpha area from that quarter, and opening an approach to the Rade d’Hyères, which would have to be entered by vessels supporting the subsequent westward advance toward Toulon. The troops assigned to this island attack were the First Special Service Force, a Ranger outfit. In addition, the French Groupe de Commandos (Romeo) was to be landed at Cap Negre for the purpose of seizing the high ground in the vicinity and of blocking the coastal road, thus covering the left flank of the Alpha Cavalaire attack.
In order to deceive the enemy as to the point of actual assault and to prevent undue concentration to meet that assault after it had been delivered, several diversionary operations were planned. These were to be carried out by a Special Operations Group under Captain Henry C. Johnson, U. S. Navy, consisting of one U. S. destroyer, the Endicott (F), two British gunboats, two British fighter director ships (FDS), some thirteen highspeed airplane rescue craft (ASRC), of which one was British, eight American motor torpedo boats, and a like number of British motor launches. For the “D” day operations of this force, it was to be divided into two units. The Eastern Unit, consisting of the two gunboats, one fighter director ship, and four ML, was to depart from Ajaccio on the morning of D-1 and take a northerly course, as if bound toward Genoa. It was to be provided with fighter cover to keep reconnaissance planes away and during the night, north of Corsica, was to be joined by 12 motor torpedo boats (PT) from Bastia. Upon making this rendezvous, three PT boats were to detach toward Nice to form protective screen against enemy E boats (high-speed, armed motorboats), and four PT boats were to proceed to the Golfe de la Napoule for the purpose of landing seventy French Naval Commandos at Theoule Sur Mer. These commandos were to cut the coastal road leading from Cannes toward the Camel area. The main group was to continue north, attempting, by use of reflector balloons and other artificial radar targets and by radar jamming, to create the illusion of a large force. At 2330, based on the assumption that the turn to the northwestward of the actual assault forces toward the real assault area would have become known to the enemy, this group was also to turn to the northwestward and carry out a demonstration off the Cannes-Nice area. MLs and PTs were to deploy off Antibes, employing radar counter measures and using sound devices to simulate a landing, the gun boats simultaneously bombarding shore defenses in the area. The Western Diversionary Unit was to be composed of the Endicott and four ML from Ajaècio, to be joined by eight PTs and twelve ASRCs from Calvi at a point about 25 miles south of the lies D’ Hyères, at 2100 of D —1. Here reflector balloons were to be streamed and a formation was to be taken to simulate a convoy twelve miles long and eight miles wide moving toward La Ciotat, between Toulon and Marseilles, and radar counter measures were to be initiated. The enemy radar station at Cap Side, near Toulon, was purposely to be left unmolested by pre-D Day bombing so that nothing would prevent its observation of this manifestation.
Each Assault Force Commander had allotted to him, in so far as they could be made available, the ships and craft necessary to the accomplishment of his task. These comprised assault transports and cargo ships, landing craft (LST, LCT, LCI), escort craft and mine-sweepers, dan buoy layers, salvage tugs and net vessels, and a gun-fire support group of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. These last were allotted in accordance with intelligence estimates of the coastal and beach defenses- which that particular assault force would have to overcome. General Truscott had requested, as a result of his previous experience, that the two regimental combat teams in each division which would make the initial assault be carried in landing craft and that the reserve regimental combat team be transported in the large transports. Amphibious craft were assigned to the three main assault forces on this basis. When gunfire support vessels had completed their missions with the assault forces, they were to be released to Admiral Davidson’s Support Force.
Destroyers, destroyer escorts, sloops, and corvettes were to be assigned to the various convoys as required. As they arrived in the assault area, they were to come under the control of Captain James P. Clay, U. S. Navy, as Commander of the Anti-Submarine and Convoy Control Group. His task was to establish and maintain an anti-submarine and anti-torpedo boat screen for the protection of shipping in the three main assault areas, these being sufficiently close together to permit their being covered by a single screen. It was believed that this arrangement would be much more flexible and less productive of confusion. The depths off-shore did not lend themselves to the use of an antisubmarine mine screen, like those employed for transport areas at Salerno, Sicily, and Casablanca. Since he controlled all the escort vessels, Captain Clay was to be given the further task of forming vessels ready to leave the area into convoys and despatching them with suitable escorts.
Fighter plane cover for vessels en route to the assault area was to be provided by the Mediterranean Coastal Air Force. For shipping within forty miles of the beaches, it was to be furnished by Xllth Tactical Air Force, operating initially from Corsican fields. This protection in the assault area was to be augmented by planes from the Aircraft Carrier Force (seven British and two U. S. escort carriers), under Rear Admiral Thomas Troubridge, RN, which would also have the task of furnishing spotting planes to observe support gunfire and of providing close support missions. The Carrier Force was subdivided by Admiral Troubridge into two units, one of five British carriers commanded by himself, and the other of two U.S. and two British carriers under Rear Admiral Calvin T. Durgin, U. S. Navy. These carriers were assigned an operating area south of the Iles d’Hyères. Approach and retirement lanes were carefully laid down for troop carrier and other aircraft in order to keep such planes clear of transport areas and to avoid some of the unfortunate incidents of previous operations.
The Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons of the Eighth Fleet, under Lieutenant Commander Stanley M. Barnes, U. S. Navy, in addition to furnishing units to the Special Operations Group, was to form a Screening Group to defend the attack forces against attacks by enemy motor boats based on ports to the northeastward. This unit was also to establish night navigation markers for aircraft, and, as a novel feature in these attack operations, to operate a blood bank shuttle between Calvi and the Delta attack area. Until the completion of the Sitka operation against the Iles d’Hyères, it was to furnish to Admiral Davidson enough boats to form a night screen for his force.
The selection of 0800 as the H hour for the attack was eminently satisfactory to the Western Naval Task Force. A daylight hour for the assault was an innovation in Mediterranean Amphibious Operations, where troop commanders had previously insisted on the cover of darkness for the initial landings, in spite of the naval difficulties involved. The repeatedly proven effectiveness of naval gunfire had much to do with this important change. The daylight landing not only greatly simplified the problem of getting the soldiers ashore at the right place at the right time, but gave the attack forces the advantage of having an entire night for a final approach under cover of darkness. Since first light would occur at about 0610, there was a period of about an hour and three quarters which could be devoted to the destruction or neutralization of the coastal and beach defenses by aircraft bombing and gun bombardment, for which a schedule was carefully worked out by air and naval planners working in close co-operation. Military planners estimated that there would still be adequate time for the consolidation of the beach head before nightfall.
The U. S. VIth Corps was to be assisted in its initial landing by a First Airborne Task Force, under Brigadier General R. T. Frederick, U. S. Army. This force, consisting of a British parachute brigade, and U. S. airborne units of about two regiment strength, was to land prior to first light in the Argens River Valley near Le Muy with the mission of blocking the movement of enemy reserves from the north and northwest toward the assault area. The Western Naval Task Force had nothing to do with this airborne force except to ensure the establishment of troop carrier aircraft lanes as far removed as practicable from principal naval operating areas, to station beacon vessels to aid pilots to keep within the proper lanes, and to publish this information to all the naval forces.
The Seventh Army, in addition to the initial attack forces already enumerated, was to include seven French divisions, four infantry, two armored, and one mountain, all under the command of General d’Armee de Lattre de Tassigny. Of these, the First Moroccan Infantry Division and the Third Algerian Infantry Division, both recently withdrawn from the Italian front, were to be embarked at Taranto and Brindisi; the Ninth Colonial Infantry Division, veterans of the Corsican fighting and the Elba operation, was to be ferried by landing craft from Ajaccio; and the First and Fifth Armored Divisions, the Second Moroccan Infantry Division and the Fourth Moroccan Mountain Division all were to be transported from Oran. One combat command of the First Armored Division (Armored Combat Command Sudre), temporarily assigned to the VIth Corps to support the drive up the Argens River valley, was to be landed as soon as practicable on D Day in the Camel Area. These French units, after being landed in the beachhead were, as French Armee “B,” to advance to the westward for the capture of Toulon and Marseilles.
Rear Admiral Moon, fresh from his Normandy ordeal, reported to the Eighth Fleet on June 28, thereby completing the trio of Alpha-Delta-Camel Assault Force commanders. The Eighth Amphibious Force was then formed into three groups under these commanders as nuclei of their prospective forces. As ships arrived from the north, they were assigned to these groups, but many did not become available until the very last minute.
With the establishment of headquarters in the Naples Area, the Assault Force Commanders and their opposite number Division Commanders, each with his operations and planning staffs, were set up in an old fort or citadel in the middle of Naples. The Admiral had only to walk out one door and in the next to be able to consult with the General, and vice versa. Eighth Fleet Headquarters, Seventh Army Headquarters, and VIth Corps H.Q. were all convenient to each other and to the H. Q.s of the principal subordinates. Admiral Davidson also established an office on shore nearby for the planning for the Sitka and support operations.
In preparing the Western Naval Task Force Plan, every effort was made to avoid the inclusion of any detailed instructions except those necessary to effect co-ordination between the subordinate task forces, such as the allotment of operating areas, etc. The attack forces were assigned their tasks and allotted the means for their accomplishment and then were expected to work out the details. Since there were uncertainties, until the last moment, as to the number and identity of many units to be available, and as it was desired to take advantage of last minute information, it was not practicable to issue the Western Task Force Plan very far in advance. It was, in fact, dated July 25. But decisions, as they were made, and information, as it became available, were passed on immediately to subordinate commanders and military and air force opposite numbers verbally and by means of planning memoranda. By this method it was possible to proceed with the planning of the top and of the subordinate commands concurrently. Since it seemed neither practicable nor desirable to interpose another naval command between that of the Western Naval Task Force and the Assault Forces, the Commander Western Naval Task Force dealt directly with General Patch on matters concerning the Seventh Army as a whole, and with General Truscott in connection with the assault, by his VIth Corps. This worked quite satisfactorily.
July was a month of great activity. By the 8th, all three of the assault divisions were carrying out general amphibious training, and specific training for the coming operation; the Forty-Fifth and Thirty-Sixth over the Salerno beaches; and the Third, from Pozzuoli just west of Naples, over beaches in the Gulf of Gaeta. This training except for the final rehearsals, had been completed by the 27th. Vessels of all types were gradually arriving and reporting for duty. Admiral Durgin and his two escort carriers arrived on the 12th and Admiral M. L. Deyo with the heavy cruisers Tuscaloosa and Quincy of Cruiser Division Seven a week later. Later in the month, Rear Admiral C. F. Bryant, with Battleship Division Five (Texas, Nevada, Arkansas), and Rear Admiral T. E. Chandler with the Omaha, Cincinnati, and Marblehead of Cruiser Division Four reported to the Eighth Fleet. These, together with the Eighth Fleet veterans Augusta, Philadelphia, and Brooklyn, were joined for gunfire support duty by seven British Light Cruisers of the 15th Cruiser Squadron (Rear Admiral Mansfield), six French cruisers of the 4th Light Cruiser Division (Contre Amiral Jaujard), and two battleships, the British Ramillies and the French Lorraine.
The above mentioned battleships and cruisers and the British, French, and U. S. destroyers assigned to gunfire support duty engaged in special shore bombardment exercises, in so far as the availability of ships and ammunition permitted. Special communication exercises were also carried out in order to insure reliability in this important element.
During all this period, the Eighth Fleet was making a careful study of the problem of breaching the underwater beach obstacles, mined concrete pyramids, wooden piling, etc., with which it was for the first time being faced. Unlike the English Channel and the North Sea, there was practically no tide in the Mediterranean, which meant that these obstacles were always under water and could not be attacked by bomb or shellfire. No solution appeared other than the use of radio-controlled drone boats carrying 8000 lbs. of high explosive which could be scuttled and detonated by radio control, and the development of the maximum number of underwater demolition teams (Naval Combat Demolition Units). During experiments carried out against all types of beach obstacles set up off the Salerno beaches, it was determined that a path could be cleared by an explosive boat properly placed and scuttled. But placing was difficult, and controls were found to be thoroughly unreliable. Fifty-four of these so-called “Apex” boats and 27 control boats were furnished for the operation. Final reliance, in case of need, would have to be placed on the Combat Demolition Units.
On the last day of July, the experienced Third Division and the Alpha Attack Group carried out a successful rehearsal of the Cavalaire landing, in the Gulf of Gaeta. This was witnessed by Generals Patch and Truscott and by me,, and also other interested officials. The rehearsals for the Delta and Camel attacks were scheduled for August 7, the former in the Gulf of Salerno and the latter in the Gulf of Gaeta. This was only two days prior to the date some of the slower craft would have to be on the move toward the assault area.
It was at this point that a tragedy occurred which saddened us all. Admiral Moon had been thoroughly worn out by his experiences at Normandy, but unfortunately none of us realized how fatigued he was, particularly mentally. Upon his return to the Mediterranean, without opportunity for rest, he was immediately faced with the heavy load of planning the details of the St. Raphael area landing and of training the Camel Attack Force, naval and army. From the beginning, he had expressed concern at the unreadiness of his force, many naval units of which were very late in arriving from the north and in addition had had practically no assault training, having participated only in the Normandy “follow-up.” He spent some hours with me on the afternoon of August 4, discussing this subject and begging me to have the “D” day postponed. I explained the urgency of meeting the date set by the higher command and gave it as my opinion that the state of readiness, while not as complete as we would like, was still not as bad as he seemed to think. Eventually, it was agreed that we would carry on through the rehearsal, which I would carefully observe personally, and that if that did not prove to be satisfactory, I would then take up with the Supreme Commander the question of postponement. Admiral Moon left my office, apparently satisfied and in good spirits. The next morning, after what was undoubtedly a sleepless night, he took his own life.
This event, unfortunate in every respect, left the Camel Attack Force, at the very last minute, without a commander. Even had there been time to obtain another flag officer for this duty from outside the Eighth Fleet command, such an officer would have been faced with the very difficult problem of suddenly taking over a complicated task with no prior opportunity to become acquainted with it. Of the flag officers available in the Eighth Fleet, each of whom had other important tasks connected with the operation, only my Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Spencer S. Lewis, was fairly cognizant of the Camel attack plan. I therefore assigned him to command the Camel attack. He took over Admiral Moon’s staff in the Bayfield, and my Operations Officer, Captain Francis P. Old, acted as Chief of Staff for the Western Naval Task Force.
Continuing his previous custom of visiting the armed forces prior to a major operation, His Majesty King George VI made a trip to the Italian theater during the latter part of July. Upon my invitation, he inspected several U. S. naval units, including my flagship, the Catoctin, in which he was particularly interested. He took advantage of the opportunity to confer British decorations on several American officers of whom the author was one honored recipient. The spirit of goodfellowship and comradeship with the British armed forces -was at that time very high. As an illustration—one evening at a dinner, after having drunk the usual toasts to “The King of England” and “The President of the United States,” Admiral Sir John Cunningham remarked to me that this formula was unnecessarily long, that to him there was only one President, and that he felt sure that to me there was only one King; I agreed. Thereafter, when we were the seniors present, the toasts were “The President” and “The King.”
Another visitor, in early August, was General Charles de Gaulle, then head of the French Provisional Government. He called on me, with General de Lattre de Tassigny and Admiral Lemonnier. I was able to assure General de Gaulle that the Western Naval Task Force would support General de Lattre’s operations against Toulon and Marseilles with our maximum strength and that we would employ French ships in support of the French army to the utmost. I had to caution both Generals, and in this I was supported by Admiral LeMonnier, that operations of gunfire support vessels along the coast to the westward of the initial assault area would have to be preceded by considerable minesweeping. Admiral Lemonnier, who had no official part in the operation, had pleaded with me to be taken along as a passenger. Although the Catoctin was going to be very crowded (as an amphibious flagship always is), I was glad to tell him that we had found a place for him.
On August 6, Secretary Forrestal arrived from the United States by air, and on the following day he, Admiral Cunningham, and General Patch accompanied me in a naval patrol plane to observe the Camel and Delta rehearsals, the former in the Gulf of Gaeta, and the latter on the Salerno beaches. Both appeared to be quite satisfactory. The Secretary then departed to inspect the Italian front, returning only in time to board the Catoctin with me immediately prior to its departure.
At this point, it may be appropriate to advert to the British opposition to Anvil, which, led by the Prime Minister, had been constantly growing. In substance, the Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff advocated abandoning Anvil in favor of concentrating on pushing the German forces facing the Italian front back into plains of North Italy, with possible auxiliary operations in the Adriatic and elsewhere in the Balkans, and an eventual drive into Austria. The American Chiefs of Staff, and General Eisenhower, on the other hand, insisted on concentrating on the campaign in Western Europe, as the best means of accomplishing the final defeat of Nazi Germany at the earliest date. Furthermore, General Eisenhower argued that the port of Marseilles was urgently required for the support of the Allied Forces in the north of France.
To me, who naturally had no part in the foregoing argument, it seemed, in addition, that Anvil would provide opportunity for the immediate employment of considerable French forces in an operation which would raise their morale to the highest pitch, the liberation of their own country. Furthermore, Allied occupation of the south coast of France would deny to the enemy the only remaining submarine bases and air fields from which he could direct attacks against shipping in the Western Mediterranean. And, of course, it would have been a bitter disappointment to all those who had worked so hard over such a long period in planning and preparing for Anvil to see the results of their efforts thrown overboard at the last moment.
It required a determined stand by President Roosevelt to carry the day. And even after the final “Go Ahead” had been given, a last moment desperate effort was made to have the troops assigned to Anvil carried around and landed in the Bay of Biscay instead. Sir Winston relates that, shortly before D day, the code name for the operation was changed because the enemy might have become cognizant of the significance of the old name. Unfortunately, he does not confirm the story, at that time prevalent at Allied Mediterranean Headquarters, that he himself renamed it Dragoon because he had been “dragooned into it.”
* See “The Naval Side of the Anzio Invasion” by Vice Admiral F. J. Lowry, U. S. Navy (Retired), in the January, 1954, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings.