What Is The Military Mind?

The reader may counter the title question by replying, “Is there a Military Mind?” There is a military mind if there is a judicial mind, an ecclesiastical mind, a legal mind, a medical mind, and so forth. In short, a military mind exists if we admit a professional training on subjects peculiar to the military field as a basis for service to society. For, in every society, the activities necessary to the survival of the whole are divided and apportioned to the various members. This formal division of activities serves to give society structure, organization, and cohesion.

Society perpetuates itself, as a distinct entity by training individuals to occupy places within the society’s structure. In order to survive, society must contain specialists as well as mere members. These specialists must be able to do certain things superlatively well, while leaving other things to other people. Thus, there is a military specialist, concerned with professional military duties. It is reasonable to assume that such a specialist could become military minded. It is well to point out that national security demands a professional excellence.

The role of the military specialist in national life may be important, but it is not dominant. Except for civilian control, the role played by him in military affairs is dominant. It is a far cry, however, from the days of the mercenary soldier. It is now more reasonable to consider the military as experts in administration rather than “specialists in violence.”

It is a popular pastime to excoriate the military and to regard our armed forces as replete with parasites who are well fed and overpaid, and who work from the most selfish of motives in utter disregard of costs to the taxpayer. Worse yet, the armed services are characterized as considering themselves the peoples’ masters rather than servants. There is also a suspicion of hideous intrigue to capture the civilian economy.

The present emphasis given the subject of the military mind by the anti-militarist can probably be attributed to generals in politics and to what has been called a new role for the military in the drama of the political elite. The present criticism of the military man represents the kind of thinking characteristic of ad hominem arguments. Since there are positives and negatives in this subject, it is well to examine the attributes of the military mind from two points of view—as others see us; and as we see ourselves.

In these writings, I am not attempting to ripple the pond of American verities. Neither do I seek to make reply to the anti-militarist with a mixture of indignation and uncertainty, being a member of the group criticized; but rather to give “both sides of the coin.” The reader should know that the writer is an ex-Reserve; thus I do have some objectivity and background for seeing both sides of the discussion.

The reader should know, too, that this discussion is written from a background of a broad general and professional education. It is mentioned here, not to impress anyone, but to indicate that the reflections offered are based on a degree of training which the military critic seems to demand as a basis for understanding world events and the people responsible for making them. Living itself is a learning process, but there has been an emphasis in some minds on broad formal education as a prerequisite to understanding world and domestic affairs. The military profession is one that has been singled out in criticism as not having the essential background for such understanding.

The military mind is usually' condemned as too narrow. This is a result of the fact that the military technique is in itself considered too narrow—and, too narrow to deal with the problems of the age. This point of view discounts the fact that many non-military individuals with no better qualifications grapple with the problems of the times and present each its panacea. The result is not a harmonious chorus. The narrow military mind, it is said, is produced by the service academies which provide a good technical education but one which is a specialized training only in the arts of war.

The military in politics has reemphasized this criticism. The service academies do not train their students to be President is the claim. This must be admitted. No institution of learning does this as a deliberate educational aim. We do not ever want to lose the tender American dream that any eligible citizen can achieve the presidency. Must he be an intellectual aristocrat?

All professional education is necessarily limited to serve the purpose for which it is undertaken. Whether a professional education should be based on a broad and liberal preliminary education cannot be argued here, but it does appear that the critics lose sight of the fact that military education is not essentially preparation for killing but preparation for an intricate calling. It is a matter of integrating strategy, logistics, and procurement. The planning and logistics for all operations is so complex and technical that the entire preparation has had to be broadened to account for worldwide scope and influences.

The military concern for world affairs is supposed to be, and is characterized as, limited to preparation for war through acquisition and building up of bases; building up forces; stockpiling strategic and raw materials; and capturing the industrial production to feed the war machine. Directly related to this frame of mind is the concept military men are supposed to hold concerning domestic affairs. The domestic economy serves to produce the war material and pile it up until the military gives the necessary orders, stands back, and waits for obedience.

These unreasonable opinions arise probably from suspicion and not seasoned judgments. It is not too strange, however, that Americans distrust the military. It is part of our national heritage, augmented by European backgrounds and the examples from history—the “military caste” the “struggle for power,” and the “man on horseback.” The military occupies an unusual position of reverence in war, of neglect and suspicion in peace.

Closely related to American foreign policies throughout our history have been the nation’s continuous military and naval activities, passing through cycle after cycle, from preparedness to hostilities to desuetude to alarm to preparedness. It is the clear duty of the military to invite attention to deficiencies in our arms. Naval strategy and foreign affairs are closely related. We rent our liberties from Fate and occasionally the rent comes due. When it does, the nation looks to the military to pay the bill. This attitude leads to the doctrine of military expediency in national affairs, both foreign and domestic. In essence, this doctrine holds that winning a war takes precedence over everything else and that this urgency justifies any political or diplomatic decision, any policy that the military indicates can shorten the war. Most of this doctrine is sound and not necessarily inspired by the military.

The war and its aftermath found the military projected into policy making in foreign affairs. This was construed to mean the dispossessing or ending of civilian control or direction of such policy-making. Our entry into Korea, however, where the decision was made by the Chief Executive and Secretary of State, is one example of current history which disputes the dominant role of the military in making foreign policy decisions. It is true that the military (such as the JCS) contribute advice which influences policy in international affairs, but it is the civilian power which makes the decisions, and thus makes policy, and military men are merely assigned to carry out this policy.

One of the most frequent criticisms of the military mind is that it does not appreciate diversity of opinion. Public debate, it is said, is accorded no place in the determination of military problems. This is as far as the comment goes, but the reader should not interpret this statement to refer only to a full dress public discussion of military secrets. We have witnessed a public debate on military policy wherein certain highly articulate members of society have pictured brass and braid pleading for money to keep up a great military establishment resembling in detail the one with which they managed to win the last war. The contrary side is concerned (and advanced as more logical) with forging weapons in the latest mode and scrapping the past because it is tied to traditional concepts. We are urged to build the nation’s strategy around new weapons, without regard to strategy itself and the womb in which it is born—geography. Military thinking is considered doctrinaire. This criticism does not imply a lack of alertness to new weapons and modified strategy, but it fails to consider the great imponderable—the future of scientific and technological research. The military has forged a professional partnership with the scientist because the applications that will probably flow out of science (now and in the future) can be soundly estimated only by those who have spent a lifetime developing and using science, and by those who can adapt it to military use. This may be a matter for public debate, but it hardly seems so.

The military mind is characterized as impatient with dissent, inexpert in the art of persuasion, and ignorant of the importance of minorities in our land. The democratic give-and-take, it is said, is missing in military life, the frictions of debate are not tolerated. The military mind is therefore not pliant. It is given to regimentation of people and ideas, being intolerant of disagreement.

Military life is undoubtedly more ordered than civilian affairs. To me, it is a refreshing attribute of military men that they follow orders. The business of preparedness is so complex and costly that it had better be ordered. When there is a clearly defined chain of command and an individual who has the authority and responsibility for making a decision, military men will argue before him with vigor, in spite of what their critics say, but when the decision is made, they will loyally abide by it.

In the face of civilian control, it is still argued that policy is made at the staff level by the professional expert. Policies, in effect, it is stated, are developed pragmatically in the lower echelons. These individuals are supposed to project the policies they want, which civilian chiefs espouse and adopt as their own. Assuming even that it is the right policy, the critic demurs, protesting a military orthodoxy. Political management is evidently considered in default, and it may be interesting to discover why. The integrity and devotion of military leaders is not questioned, but there is a reference to some faceless and amorphous group—the “military clique”—which operates to dominate.

The Constitution vests in Congress the power to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a Navy. In a democratic nation such as ours, therefore, basic military or naval policy is made by civilian legislators. At least it should be, and it usually is. In practice, as in the late war, Congress turns over much of its war power to the President, in the form of blanket laws entitling him to direct great segments of the nation’s life according to his own discretion. The supreme authority was vested even then, as always, in a civilian executive. Congress, too, did so only on a temporary basis. The military, as a matter of national policy, is subordinate to civilian political authority.

The JCS provides over-all decisions on strategy, but we all know that the President participates in such decisions where the political aspects are important. The control rests with civilian executive and legislative agencies. Congress set forth its intent in the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, Section 2 “... to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under the civilian control of the Secretary of Defense. ...”

The many critical references to control are considered to add up to a planned effort or rivalry between civilians and the military for control, and most definitely to seize control in wartime. There is in these references the shadowy zone of secondary meanings. Sinister motives are assigned to the military for assertedly basing broadening control on the regimentation that is taking place in our society. This belief makes officer- ship something arch-conspiratorial. In its blackest form, the military are considered to have a depraved desire for control. This does not square with the facts or the history of our country. Devotion to duty, as I have observed it and read about it, may have been intense but could not be considered diabolical.

Differences of opinion between civilians and admirals in the Navy have undoubtedly been many in number. To my own knowledge, admirals, too, have disagreed sharply among themselves. To analyze these is a subject in itself. Robert H. Connery¹ has treated this subject as seen in World War II. This is recent history and is quite relevant because it appears that the experiences of World War II have been the basis for the contentions of military aspirations for control. Summarized, the real differences involved organizational principles. Contrary to critics’ complaints, the fundamental disagreement did not involve prejudices and personalities, but rather differences on control of administrative machinery, unity of command, functional assignments of personnel, and effective channels of communication.

In World War II, it may be said with safety and no disrespect, there was no doubt about the ultimate civilian power. President Roosevelt, historians indicate, never hesitated to intervene personally in the gamut of military affairs. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill took part in the Combined Chiefs of Staff deliberations which defined strategic objectives and the forces necessary to attain them. This may be considered a more restricted supremacy, i.e., in the Presidency, but it is none the less a civilian supremacy.

The debate over the dismissal of General MacArthur is still fresh in the memory of the reader. The actual dismissal indicates the supremacy of civilian power. The American military are distinguished from European models in one important respect. Power is always limited by the watchdog vigilance of our citizens and by the self-restraint of our military men. The possession of power is modified and influenced by a lifetime of discipline within civilian control.

A frequent characterization of military life is that it is “military monasticism.” Although current events would seem to challenge the belief, the military is supposed to be possessed of a passion for obscurity. Military life is considered a sheltered existence because of living in some isolation from the general public on army posts, naval stations, and ships at sea. What may come as a surprise to most of the military is that the supposed economic security of military service is credited with contributing to this condition. The absence of competition for jobs and income, it is alleged, tends to make for an easier and simple life. But the actual realization of such security is contradicted by the more prosaic but more usual description of military life as “genteel poverty.” Furthermore, there is in military service a large element of competition. Rigid physical standards and hurdling the obstacles for selection and promotion do not make for complete peace of mind.

Life on a military installation may give the appearance of being more ordered and calmer than the confusion and disorder of the civilian world. Lacking in the freedoms found in civilian life, this existence adds an innocence to the military milieu. This isolation, it is said, leads to loss of ability to compromise. This description of military life might be more accurate if it were measured or placed in proper time relation to events. Prior to World War I, and between wars, there is some substance in the contention that the military were isolated from their fellow men. But with the build-up of forces and with the utter impossibility of providing living quarters on Naval Stations or Army installations, the military, perforce, lived in adjacent communities. Society, although made up of individuals, works as a whole. The military man does not exist outside of society any longer. He is part of it. This is a wholesome thing. He lives among men both in and out of the service. He shares the common aspirations and the travail, and finds his life bound up with that of society. Military life may well be considered a subculture of society, but it is not one which exists in a vacuum.

Whatever else it is, democracy is a way men have of living together. The common man in the United States—and this is a generic term sufficiently broad to include the military—is motivated to do what he ought to do, here, without compulsion by any tyrannical, autocratic legalism. Military and civilian life in the United States may have dissimilarity in freedoms. Although diminished to a certain extent by the “leavening” influence of many “civilian” officers turned regular, military life does require adjustment to a pattern which is more or less inflexible, necessarily circumscribed, and unfortunately delimited as to self-expression. There is a very large influence working today. We may call this “a civilianizing process.” The military has been “corrupted” by the “madding throng,” and the military man’s remoteness from his fellowmen is vanishing. This can only be a good thing.

Human life is essentially obligation; obligation to God, Country, and self. Even the civilian cannot escape these basic responsibilities. Freedom and discipline are not antithetical. There is a large measure of discipline required to achieve freedom. Military discipline has certain overtones related to the general matter of obligation that cannot but influence military thinking. With its insistence upon blind obedience to commands, it has little in common with inner discipline, which obligation connotes. It can contribute to the difficulties which the military mind has with ultimates such as the economic system (e.g., impatience with civilian delays; labor-management frictions); morality in the human and national drama; and the workings of governmental policy.

The military mind is accustomed to hard work and low pay. It is a mind not afraid of decisions. The military mind that I have observed is capable of logical and objective reasoning; it has, and breeds, confidence and self-reliance. In its objectivity, it may oversimplify. The formula for action, simply stated, is to size up a situation (“estimate of the situation”—a well worn military term) and take action. This, of course, is far from objectionable, but there may be a great naivete in the military mind because the impression has been given to many critics that we consider every problem as one never met or solved before. Military logic can make for an overly clear approach, ignoring perhaps the complicated and complicating ramifications.

Contrary to some, I have found the military mind capable of great buoyancy, high spirit, and warm belief in human beings. There is a clear tendency to delegate responsibility and authority. There is a high degree of selflessness and tolerance. Courage, endurance, and submission to authority, with their cognate virtues, may be summed up as manliness. The spirit of cohesion and solidarity of purpose, even though in a more restricted province, is the same thing as patriotism.

True military leadership is one of the high forms of humanity. It is an awful responsibility to be responsible for a man’s living and his very life. The behavior of men in battle can be soundly estimated only by those who have spent a lifetime in military affairs. Our military men, I believe it can be said, are definitely military, but are today far from militaristic. The one criticism that is most unfair is the direct or implied allegation of intrigue to control civilian life. The selfless dedication that I have observed supports a denial of this accusation and is buttressed by the sworn duty (of all agents of government) to obey the limitations on their powers prescribed in legal doctrine and, above all, in the Constitution.

The military man may start in the solitariness of his own mind. He is tried on various problems and situations, learning from past experience as any man does—by trial and error; by concerted relations with others; by reasoning—to enable his mind to produce. At the same time, he is developing his character. By a simultaneous process he discovers himself, which is what he has to give, and learns how to display this to best advantage. Then, in full possession of his faculties, he produces the best of which he is capable. That he has been able to do so is evidenced by the fact that he has been accepted in civilian life after military service at some considerable level of success. Evidently he has been able to rise above the “limitations” of the military mind.