U. S. Naval Operations in the Northwestern African-Mediterranean Theater—March-August, 1943
After the successful completion of the Allied Landings in North Africa (Operation Torch), in November, 1942, the U. S. Navy was responsible for the Moroccan Sea Frontier, which included the Port of Casablanca and the air and seaplane base at Port Lyautey, and also for the Port of Oran with neighboring Mers El Kebir to the westward and Arzeu to the eastward. The Moroccan Sea Frontier was under the command of Rear Admiral J. L. Hall, who had accompanied me to Casablanca with the U- S. Naval Task Force, and had acted as my Chief of Staff for the operation. The Oran Area was originally under the command of Rear Admiral A. C. Bennett, U. S. Navy, who had gone in with the Torch landing. He, however, was soon succeeded by Captain Francis T. Spellman, U. S. Navy, who, m turn, was relieved by Commodore Charles M. Yates, U. S. Navy. Captain Jerauld Wright, U. S. Navy, who had participated in the pre-torch clandestine landing via submarine with General Clark in Algeria and in the secret flight of General Giraud from occupied France, was the sole U. S. naval representative on General Eisenhower’s staff.
At the Casablanca Conference, in January 1943, it was decided that, upon the completion of the Tunisian Campaign and the consequent destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa, the next objective for the Allied North African Forces would be the seizure and occupation of Sicily, to be designated Operation Husky. Capture of this strategic island would deny to the enemy air fields commanding the through-Mediterranean traffic lane, would advance Allied air forces toward the European mainland, and would provide a base for further operations aimed at the elimination of Italy.
Once this decision was made, the movement of the necessary U. S. shipping, personnel, and materiel to the North African Theater was promptly initiated. The new landing craft, LSTs, LCI(L)s, and LCTs, which had been under construction in the United States since the preceding summer, and the crews for which had been assembled and trained by the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet in the Chesapeake Bay Area, were despatched across the Atlantic in convoys as fast as they could be made ready. Rear Admiral R. L. Conolly, U. S. Navy, was designated as Commander Landing Craft and Bases, Northwest African Waters (ComLanCrabNAW), and, with an advance party, proceeded to French North Africa to prepare for their reception. Rear Admiral Hall was ordered as Commander Amphibious Forces, Northwest African Waters (Com-AmphibNAW) and established his headquarters at Oran. Rear Admiral Frank J. Lowry, U. S. Navy, relieved him as the Commander Moroccan Sea Frontier.
Upon the completion of my duties in command of Task Force 34, which had carried out the landings in Morocco, I had, in late November, 1942, returned from Casablanca and resumed my regular duty as the Commander Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet. In the following February, however, I was relieved as COMPHIBLANT by Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk, and was ordered to North Africa to assume command of all U. S. Naval forces and activities in that theater, with the title Commander U. S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters (COMNAVNAW). Somewhat later this command was designated as the U. S. Eighth Fleet. Operationally, it was to be under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, through his Allied Naval Commander, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham (now Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope). Administratively, it was. immediately subordinate to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
With a nucleus staff, I arrived by air in Algiers on March 16 and reported to the Supreme Allied Commander. The next day, I established my headquarters there, in order to be in close touch with my immediate superiors and their staffs. At that time, I found that planning for Husky was already well underway on the Supreme Commander’s level, in spite of the fact that the Tunisian Campaign was still in progress. A recent reverse in Tunisia had, in fact, threatened to delay somewhat the final elimination of the Axis Forces in North Africa. Planning had, however, progressed to the point of deciding that the Sicilian assault would be carried out by two major task forces. In the east, a British Naval Force under Vice Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey would land the British Eighth Army under General Montgomery on the east and southeast coast of the island. Further to the westward, a naval task force, predominantly American, under my command, would land a U. S. Seventh Army under Lieutenant General Patton. The Supreme Command, of course, was to be held by General Eisenhower, acting through his naval, ground force, and air commanders, Admiral Cunningham, General Sir Harold Alexander, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder.
The immediate problems with which I was faced were, first, the accommodation of the landing craft which were already arriving in quantities from the United States; second, the training of these craft and the amphibious training of the U. S. troops to be employed in Husky; third, the planning for the U. S. Naval participation in Husky; and, fourth, the establishment of the necessary supply and maintenance organization to support the Eighth Fleet. In addition, it was necessary to obtain quarters and working space in an already crowded Algiers, so that my staff and headquarters personnel could function smoothly and effectively. No vessel was available for use as a permanent flagship. My Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Spencer S. Lewis, and I, with my Flag Lieutenant, were given offices in the St. Georges Hotel (Allied Force Headquarters), adjacent to those of Admiral Cunningham and his Chief of Staff. The remainder of the staff and headquarters personnel were set up in what had been a girls’ school on the outskirts of Algiers. Quarters varied all the way from a fairly respectable villa, for about twelve senior members of my staff and me, to Quonset huts and some tents for other officers and enlisted men.
The port of Algiers and other Algerian ports to the eastward were under British control and were being fully employed for the prosecution of the Tunisian campaign. Consequently, it was necessary to make use of every suitable port to the westward, many of which were very small, for the U. S. Landing Craft. Oran and adjacent Mers El Rebir could not be utilized because they were fully employed in the handling of transports, supply shipping, and the larger combatant vessels. Landing Craft bases were therefore set up at Nemours, Beni Saf, Arzeu, Mostaganem, Tenez, and Cherchell, extending all the way from near the Spanish Moroccan border almost to Algiers, a distance of about 270 miles. The larger ports were used for the LSTs, and the smaller for LCI(L)s and LCTs. Initially, an overflow of LSTs had to be accommodated in the Sebou River, at Port Lyautey in Morocco.
Arzeu and its long adjacent beach, which was the site of the major landing near Oran in Operation Torch, was established as an Amphibious Training Base, and this area became the scene of most of the Joint Amphibious Training for U. S. Forces in North Africa. Admiral Conolly, as the Landing Craft Commander, set up his Headquarters at Demesme, an old winery, just back of the Arzeu beaches. The Army Amphibious Training Command occupied quarters at Port Aux Poules, at the lower end of the Arzeu beaches (which ran approximately south from Arzeu).
With respect to the planning for Husky, my planning officer, Commander (now Rear Admiral, Retired) R. A. J. English, and others were assigned as my representatives with the Supreme Commander’s planners. When the over-all plan had progressed to the point where a definite task could be assigned to the U. S. Naval Task Force, these officers were withdrawn to plan on that command level.
Oran was built up as rapidly as possible as a naval supply and operating base, supplemented by Arzeu for the Landing Craft. Casablanca also had to be utilized to some extent, but that port was primarily employed as a base and turn around point for trans-Atlantic convoy escorts. The far flung nature of the Eighth Fleet command necessitated air communication for transmission of urgent mail and adequate physical contact with the various commanders. Since Army air transport was rarely available when needed, the problem had to be solved finally by the establishment of a small naval aviation utility detachment, based on Port Lyautey.
The first U. S. Naval combatant unit to report to my command in Algiers was Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron Fifteen, commanded by the then Lieutenant Commander Stanley C. Barnes. Barnes, when asked his state of readiness, declared that his squadron was a well-trained unit and emulated Taussig in Queenstown in 1917 by requesting immediate active duty. Without loss of time, I walked into the next office and offered the squadron to Admiral Cunningham, who accepted it gladly as a reinforcement for the British Motor Boat force which, based on the Algerian port of Bone, was already operating against the Axis communications with Tunisia. M. T. B. Squadron Fifteen promptly became a highly effective member of the team which, nightly, played havoc with the Axis attempt to reinforce and supply and, later, to evacuate, its beleaguered African Forces. The young men of this squadron, by their initiative, efficiency, valor, and general co-operative attitude did much to further the Allied cause and to promote friendly British-American naval relations. M. T. B. 15 and the other squadrons which later came to join it were to distinguish themselves throughout the Mediterranean Campaign.
The initial Husky Outline Plan, produced by the Supreme Staff Planners in early April, when the Tunisian Campaign was still in full blast, contemplated the landing of five British divisions in the east and southeast with the object of capturing Syracuse and Augusta and securing the southeastern group of airfields. The American landing was to be in two phases. On D plus 2, one reinforced U. S. infantry division was to land in a western sector of the south coast, between Sciacca and Mazara del Vallo, to capture the Sciacca and Castelvetrano air fields. On D plus 5 two more reinforced U. S. Infantry divisions were to land on the north coast, west of Palermo, for the purpose of capturing that important port. In connection with the foregoing there were to be preliminary drops by air-borne troops, British and American, with the objective of neutralizing the beach defenses. On the assumption that the Tunisian Campaign would be completed by April 30, an early July “D” day was planned.
Initial planning on the U. S. Task Force Command level was complicated by the fact that General Patton’s planning staff, under his deputy, Major General Geoffrey Keyes, was in Rabat, 555 miles from Algiers, whereas General Patton himself was still actively engaged in the Tunisian Campaign. General Patton was relieved from this duty, after mid-April, and, in the latter part of May, he and his staff moved to Mostaganem, but this was still some 200 miles from Algiers. Previous experience had thoroughly demonstrated that daily personal contact between joint commanders and staffs was essential to the effective planning of a large and complicated amphibious operation, but in spite of repeated representations by the naval command, this ideal situation was not attained until a few days before sailing, when the Seventh Army staff embarked on my flagship at Algiers. This separation was responsible for some complications and delays which otherwise might have been avoided. I emphasize this point, in order that its importance may be realized by those who, in the future, may be faced with a similar problem. The relationship between General Patton and me, and our respective staffs, was always most cordial and harmonious.
The Tunisian Campaign came to an end on May 13 with the surrender of the remnants of Rommel’s once proud Desert Army. Not only did this clear the way for through Mediterranean traffic by permitting surface and air cover throughout the route, but the important base of Bizerta and other Tunisian ports became available for Allied use. By previous agreement, the French naval submarine and seaplane base at Bizerta itself, just inside the narrow entrance to the Lake of Bizerta, was made available to the U. S. Navy. This was ideal as a landing craft base and was immediately assigned to Admiral Conolly’s command. As soon as the narrow entrance, which the Germans had blocked by sinking a number of ships on top of each other, had been sufficiently cleared by the highly efficient work of the American-British naval salvage parties under Commodore William A. Sullivan, U. S. Naval Reserve, Admiral Conolly moved our landing craft rapidly forward from the Algerian bases and established his headquarters in Bizerta. The old landing craft bases, except the amphibious training and supply base at Arzeu, were rapidly closed out.
The original Husky plan was designed to secure Palermo at an early date as a supply port for the U. S. Seventh Army. However, since air cover could not initially be provided for the western end of the island, either from Malta or from Pantelleria (to be captured in a preliminary operation), staggered landings, as previously mentioned, were necessary. Air cover for the D plus two Sciacca-Mazara landing was to be provided from the previously captured southeastern fields, while the necessity for prior availability of the Castelvetrano air fields as a fighter cover base required postponing the landings in the Palermo area to D plus five. The principal disadvantage of this plan was that it involved a wide dispersion of effort, both geographically and chronologically. Furthermore, the Palermo attack force would be particularly vulnerable to air, surface, and underwater attack from the Sardinian- Corsican Area. This dispersion was a source of considerable concern to General Alexander, at whose instance the original outline plan was modified to cancel the proposed landings in the west and to substitute an attack on the south coast, further to the eastward.
The new outline plan, issued May 21, envisaged a landing by the British Eastern Task Force, as before, on the east coast and southeastern peninsula of Sicily, and a simultaneous landing by the U. S. Western Task Force in the adjacent Licata-Gela- Scoglitti area. This would increase the force of the blow, would insure the early capture of the main airfields, and would permit a prompt link up of the two forces. Air cover would be provided from Malta and Pantelleria. There was, however, the disadvantage that the major supply for the Seventh Army would have to be over exposed beaches, even if the port of Syracuse was eventually made available, as planned, as an American supply port after the British had cleared it. Another disadvantage was that the beaches in the Gela area appeared to be less favorable. The over-all advantages of the new plan, however, appeared to outweigh its disadvantages, and it was accepted. Unfortunately, its adoption forced the planners on the Western Task Force and Western Naval Task Force level to scrap all their previous work and begin all over again.
The Army Forces assigned to the Western Task Force were the First Infantry Division (Major General Terry Allen), the Third Infantry Division (Major General Lucian K. Truscott), the Forty-Fifth Infantry Division (Major General T. H. Middleton) and the Second Armored Division (Major General Gaffey). All these were already in North Africa, except the Forty-Fifth Division, which was to be transported from the United States, combat loaded, by Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk, who had relieved me as ComAmphibFor the previous February.
The Army plan called for the landing of the Forty-Fifth Infantry Division on the right flank, in the vicinity of Scoglitti, with the objective of capturing the airfields at Comiso and Biscari, extending the beachhead inland, and of linking up with the British forces on its right flank. The First Division was to be landed in the center near Gela, with the task of securing the important airfield at Ponte Olivo, of extending the beachhead inland, and of linking up with the forces on each of its flanks. The Third Division, on the left, was to land on either side of Licata, was to protect the left flank, and link up with the first division on its right. The First and Forty-Fifth Divisions were grouped as the II Corps under Major General Omar Bradley. The Second Armored Division, less one Combat Command assigned to the Third Division, plus one Regimental Combat Team of the First Division, was to form the Floating Reserve.
Minor features of this plan included the dropping of U. S. airborne troops (the 82nd Airborne Division) behind the enemy lines during moonlight of D-1, a few hours prior to the landing, in order to capture enemy air fields and to divert enemy forces from the beach defenses prior to the assault from seaward; and a diversionary operation on the western flank by a demonstration group of small craft equipped with deceptive devices to simulate an actual landing.
The operations of the Eastern and Western Naval Task Forces were to be protected against interference from Italian Naval Surface Forces by two strong British Forces composed of battleships and carriers, one operating in the Ionian Sea to cover the approaches from Taranto and eastern Italian ports, and the other south of Sardinia to guard against approach of hostile surface forces from the Tyrrhenian Sea.
The “H” hour and “D” day selected by the high command for the operation was 0245 of July 10. This was unsuitable from the naval view point because it involved an approach to the coast in bright moonlight. The last light on July 9 was at 2133 (Z-2); and the moon, which was in the second quarter, set at 0021 of the 10th, at which time the transports would have to be in their areas getting out their landing craft and disembarking their troops. In the outline plan considerable stress had been placed on the alleged necessity of utilizing paratroopers to neutralize the beach defenses prior to the main assault. The “H” hour and “D” day were therefore chosen so as to allow the airborne troops to be dropped during moonlight in sufficient time to permit the accomplishment of their mission prior to the beach assault which, itself, was to take place about two hours before first light. Naval gunfire, as a means of neutralizing the beach defenses, was discarded as ineffective and unsuitable since “naval gunfire is not designed for land bombardment.” (It required the experience, not only of Sicily, but of Salerno to teach some soldiers the falsity of this assumption.) In spite of the fact that, in the final plan, a task other than the neutralization of the beach defenses was set for the paratroopers, no change was made in the date and time of the landing, and the naval forces were still forced to accept the disadvantage of the moonlight approach.
Since the Forty-Fifth Division could not arrive in the theater until a short time before “D” day, it was essential that they be landed in the ships in which they would travel across the Atlantic, in what was then called a “ship to shore” operation. These ships, 18 APA-AKA, with the necessary escorts and supporting units, all under Rear Admiral Kirk, were to comprise the CENT Attack Force (T.F. 85). They sailed from Hampton Roads about June 6, before the final plans of the Western Task Force could be delivered to them. Consequently, the CENT transports had to be combat-loaded on the best prior assumption which could be made as to the prospective task of the division. General Middleton and some of his staff and Captain E. A. Mitchell, Admiral Kirk’s planning officer, flew over to Algiers in the latter part of April for preliminary consultations, but at that time no final decision had been made on even the over-all plan.
The Western Naval Task Force Plan, as finally developed, provided for the landing of the Third Division on the left flank by a JOSS Assault Force (T.F. 86), under Rear Admiral Conolly, composed of landing craft, LSTs, LCTs, and LCI(L)s, in what was termed a “shore to shore” landing. This was the very first major amphibious operation in which craft of these types were to be employed. The JOSS assault waves, however, strictly speaking were to be “ship to shore,” since they were to be carried in in small landing craft, LCVPs, for which additional davits had been fitted on the LSTs. The Third Division was moved into the Bizerta area well in advance of the operation, and General Truscott established his Headquarters with that of Admiral Conolly, in order that their respective plans might be worked out jointly. It was here also that many problems in connection with the employment of the new landing craft were satisfactorily solved. Among the important developments were the equipping of the LSTs with six davits for LCVPs for the prior landing of assault troops, the side-carrying of pontoon causeways by LSTs to form a bridge when unsatisfactory beach gradients made direct landing of tanks and vehicles over the ramp impracticable, and the fitting of flight decks on some LSTs for the launching of small (Piper Cub) observation planes.
It was planned to land the First Division, in the center, by a DIME Assault Force (T.F. 81) under Rear Admiral Hall. This force was to be composed of a combination of assault transports and supply ships and of landing craft (8 APA-AKAs, 16 LSTs, 19 LCI(L)s, plus 2 British LSIs, cross-channel passenger steamers). The First Division was established in the Mostaganem-Arzeu area, reasonably accessible to Admiral Hall’s headquarters at Oran. Later, June 13, before the arrival at Oran of Admiral Kirk’s force, the First Division moved to Algiers, from which it was to stage. Admiral Hall, in his flagship, the Samuel Chase, moved up with it. He, General Terry Allen, and their respective staffs were therefore in close contact during the final preparatory period.
A partial rehearsal for the CENT Assault Force landing was held in the Arzeu- Mostaganem Area, and one for the DIME Force was held on a beach west of Algiers, which had been one of those used for the original landing in Algeria. Both of these rehearsals were witnessed by General Patton and myself. The risk of submarine attack, incident to holding these exercises in the open Mediterranean, had to be accepted. A similar rehearsal for JOSS was held near Bizerta by General Truscott and Admiral Conolly.
The Monrovia, an APA hastily converted to serve as amphibious flagship (AGC), was assigned to the Commander, Western Naval Task Force, and was moved to Algiers sufficiently in advance to embark necessary staff details. It left much to be desired, since it was crowded and hot; the operations room was too small; and communications and other arrangements were sketchy. It was, however, the best ship available for the purpose, with the exception of Admiral Kirk’s flagship, the Ancon, which, when we saw it after his arrival, made those of us in Algiers somewhat green with envy. To have moved Admiral Kirk, General Middleton, and their staffs to another flagship in the short time available after their arrival in the theater would have caused entirely too much confusion, and so they were left in undisturbed possession of their prize. Admiral Conolly had for his flagship the Biscayne, originally a seaplane tender based at Port Lyautey which had been specially fitted by the Eighth Fleet repair forces as a flagship for the Landing Craft. It had a small operations room, a fair amount of quarters space, good communication facilities, enough speed to get around readily, and, due to its size, was inconspicuous. It was almost ideal for the purpose.
The Western Naval Task Force had assigned to it, in addition to destroyers for escort and gunfire support duties, five light cruisers, Crudiv Eight (Philadelphia, Savannah, Boise) under Rear Admiral Lyal A. Davidson, and Crudiv Thirteen (Birmingham and Brooklyn) under Rear Admiral Laurance T. DuBose, and, in addition, the British 15" gun monitor, Abercrombie. Rear Admiral Davidson, who, as it developed, was to remain with the Eighth Fleet throughout the Mediterranean Campaign and to become a leading expert in gunfire support operations and a “tower of strength” to his Fleet Commander, would be, by virtue of his seniority, the second in command of the Western Naval Task Force. During the advance of the major convoys along the African Coast, these cruisers, under Admiral Davidson, were to act as a covering force on the northern flank. Then they were to be split among the assault forces to furnish gunfire support, Philadelphia to CENT, Savannah and Boise to DIME, and Brooklyn and Birmingham to JOSS. Later, under Admiral Davidson, they were to form a Support Force to assist the Army as required in subsequent operations along the coast.
The different assault forces were also provided with minesweeping units and salvage craft, and small craft to act as control and guide vessels. The Western Task Force also included a minelaying group for the purpose of laying a protective mine field around the anchorage area ultimately to be established off Gela. British submarines were assigned as beacons and for reconnaissance duty.
An important event preliminary to Operation Husky was the capture of the Island of Pantellaria, which capitulated to a small British Assault Force on June 11 after several days of bombing. As previously noted, this island was of importance because of its small air field, which it was planned to use for the supply of fighter cover to part of the Western Task Force Landing.
On June 15, H. M. King George VI, as was his custom prior to a major operation, came to Algiers to visit the British and Empire armed forces. In addition to the Royal Naval units paraded in the dock area of Algiers, he reviewed a large U. S. naval contingent and did us the honor of inspecting the Savannah, which was moored in a near-by dock. The U. S. Flag Officers then in Algiers were presented to His Majesty prior to the inspection. All U. S. naval units made an appearance of which I, for one, was justly proud.
On July 1 there was an important meeting of senior officers in my villa, at which the final plans for Husky were thoroughly gone over and discussed.
A final preliminary event, which will always remain in my memory, particularly because of its significance as an evidence of Allied solidarity and British-American friendship, occurred a day or two prior to the departure of the assault forces for Sicily. This was the celebration of our Independence Day at Allied Force Headquarters, July 4. Drawn up in front of the St. Georges Hotel, at noon, were honor guards from each of the services of each of the three allies, the U. S., Britain, and the French Provisional Government. Facing these guards, to receive the salute, was General Eisenhower, flanked by his two naval commanders, British and American, and by General L. W. Rooks, U.S.A. (brother of Captain Albert Rooks, U.S.N., lost with the Houston in the Far East). After the playing of the “Star- Spangled Banner” by a French band, a salute was fired by Admiral Cunningham’s flagship in Algiers Harbor, a salute which had two unusual features. First, it was fired to seaward over the breakwater using live A.A. ammunition, and, second, in accordance with what I subsequently found to be U. S. Army custom, it was composed of forty- eight guns. Admiral Cunningham, when queried by me as to the reason for such a non-naval national salute, remarked that it was done at “Ike’s” request, and that as far as he (Cunningham) was concerned, “Ike” could have anything he wanted.
The necessity of bringing many ships and craft of different speeds and sea-keeping qualities, from different points of departure, together at their destinations at the appointed hour required very careful planning and convoy routing. The large transports und supply ships, composing convoy NCF #1, were to proceed in two sections, the second section, under Admiral Kirk, departing Oran-Mers El Kebir, on D-5 (July 5), and ]he first section under Admiral Hall, including the Monrovia (FF) departing Algiers D-4 (July 6), in time to take station just ahead of the second section. NCF #1 was to pass through the Tunisian War Channel immediately behind KMF # 18 which was bringing British assault troops from the United Kingdom for Operation Husky. Upon rounding Cape Bon, it was to follow a Prescribed route close along the African Coast until early morning of D-1, when it was to turn up to the northward. The landing craft were to be formed in convoys, TJF#1 for the higher speed LCI(L)s, TJM#1 for the slower LSTs, and TJS#1 for the still slower LCTs. The LCI(L)s were to depart Bizerta on D-4, land troops overnight at Sousse then re-embark and proceed on D-2. The others were to depart Bizerta immediately in the wake of NCF#1, pass through the War Channel, and thence via shorter routes in accordance with their speeds to their destination. All convoys were to make a landfall on Gozo Island, off the western end of Malta on the evening of D-l, the TJ convoys between 1600 and 1700, and NCF#1 at 1850. KMF#18 was also due off Gozo at 1615. After passing Gozo, ahead of the faster ships, the landing craft assigned to the CENT and DIME Forces were to break off from the main landing craft convoys, and head up for their assigned areas. Fighter cover for these convoys, until they reached the assault area, was to be provided by the Coastal Air Force.
The command organization for the Western Task Force was the same as that which had worked so well for Torch. That is, the Naval Commander was to have the command and the responsibility until the troops had been safely established on shore, whereupon the command was to pass to the Army Commander, and thereafter the Navy was to assume a supporting role. Unfortunately, this unity of command did not extend to the Air Force. While an Army Air Officer was assigned to the Flagship, he had no authority, except for the control of fighter aircraft actually in the area. All air support was to be under the command of the Air Commander in Chief with headquarters in Tunis. There were to be no air units, other than the cruiser observation planes, under the direct control of the tactical commander in the actual operating area, as had been the case with the naval air supporting the landings in Morocco. Requests for tactical support, or attacks on specific objectives, would have to be transmitted to Air Force Headquarters, with consequent delay, even if the Air Commander decided to comply with the request, which might not be the case. General Patton, mindful of our experience at Casablanca, repeatedly urged me to secure naval air support. While I realized as much as he the advantage of having tactical air under my immediate control, I did not feel justified in asking for carrier support, considering the proximity of land air fields and the urgent need for carriers at that time in the Pacific. The request, if made, naturally would have been refused.
It was unfortunate, also, that the air high command failed to realize, as did the naval and military, the vital importance of joint planning for an operation of this nature. In spite of many requests, there was no air cooperation whatever in the planning of the Western Task Force. Not only was this the case, but the air plans for tactical support of the Western Task Force, and for the landing of the paratroops behind the enemy lines in the Western Task Force Area, were not promulgated until after the Western Naval Task Force was at sea, under conditions of radio silence. Consequently, it was impracticable to complete adequate dissemination, or for the naval or army commander to comment on features of the plan which they considered objectionable. Never, for instance, would the Navy have agreed to the routing of troop transport planes over the convoys and the assault areas, as was the case. This was an error which was to contribute to most unfortunate results, as will be seen later.
Operation Husky, initially, proceeded smoothly as planned. There was an air attack on Bizerta on D-4, but fortunately the damage was slight, and there was little or no interference with the operations of the landing craft. By some slip up, copies of the Soldiers' Guide to Sicily, distributed prematurely to troops in transports alongside the dock in Algiers, were being widely read on deck in full view of all before getting under way. This was disturbing, in view of the many enemy agents known to be in Algiers. When the French harbor pilot, on leaving the Monrovia, wished the Captain a “Pleasant trip to Sicily,” arrangements were made for him to be taken into “protective custody” until “D” day.
So important was secrecy with respect to the organization of a U. S. Seventh Army, that it was considered undesirable to manufacture a Seventh Army Flag for General Patton on shore. Consequently one was made on the Monrovia, which I presented to him at sea in the presence of both our staffs. One of my valued possessions is a photograph of this event, subscribed “The Army and Navy Forever, G. S. Patton, Jr.”
After departure of the Flag, and of the first section of NCF-1 from Algiers, it was reassuring to see Admiral Kirk’s second section coming up from astern and the United Kingdom Convoy, KMF-18, drawing in ahead from the northward. Several yellow alerts were sounded, due to the barrage balloons on the second section being mistaken on the radar for hostile planes, but there were no actual attacks. On passing the entrance to Bizerta early in the morning of D-2, the LSTs and LCTs were observed to be on the move. The Monrovia rounded Cape Bon at 0940 that morning. The night of D-2 to D-l was uneventful except for several submarine contacts, which were promptly investigated by the destroyers of the screen.
On the afternoon of D-1, while the forces were headed to the northward toward Gozo, the weather began to make up. By 1630, when Gozo had been sighted from the Monrovia, the wind was blowing from the west with a force of about 6/7. This was somewhat disturbing, since it would make the coast on which we were to land, which had a NW-SE trend, a lee shore. We could not, of course, anticipate the sort of surf we might have encountered on the Moroccan coast in Torch, but the chop might cause considerable difficulty. Subsequently, it was learned that General Eisenhower and Admiral Cunningham, on Malta, were so concerned with the weather as to have been on the point of postponing the operation. Luckily, they held on. At the time, my principal worry was that the landing craft might be so slowed as to delay unduly their arrival at their destination. This was a contingency which was effectively taken care of by Admiral Conolly, who dashed about in the Biscayne, shepherding his convoys, and having them cut corners, with the result that they were exactly on time in spite of the adverse conditions. When I observed the rolling of some of the British LCI(L)s, as they rounded Gozo, I could not but wonder how effective some of the troops were at first going to be. But perhaps they were all the more willing to get ashore. The Eastern Task Force, fortunately, would have a lee for its landing.
My mind was greatly relieved by the prediction of my efficient aerographer, Lieut. Commander R. C. Steere (whose forecast of surf conditions off Morocco in Torch had been so accurate), that the wind would probably subside greatly by 2200. This prediction again proved to be correct. As darkness fell, the shipping around Gozo made quite an inspiring sight. Ahead were our landing craft, inshore of us was British KMF-18, slightly behind schedule, and numerous British landing craft. Astern was Admiral Kirk’s second section, which was then detached to proceed to the CENT assault area. Also coming in from the westward were the cruisers of the Covering Group, proceeding to take stations with their assigned assault groups.
At this time, it might not be inappropriate to observe that the Joint British-American assault about to be launched was of greater magnitude from the point of view of troops engaged than any prior or subsequent operation of the type, not even excepting Normandy. Eight reinforced infantry divisions were being landed simultaneously. The Eastern and Western Naval Task Forces combined numbered over 2500 ships and craft. For the first time, the new landing craft were being employed in a major amphibious operation. And for the first time the DUKWs, those clever amphibious trucks, were to be used to assist in disembarking personnel and supplies.
Much had already been accomplished by the strategic bombing command in attacking enemy air fields and in softening the beach defenses. To avoid premature disclosure of the point of attack, and consequent concentration of the defense, it had been necessary to follow initially a very general bombing program, with only casual attention to vital objectives, until the last day or so prior to the landing. This was a situation quite different from small island attacks in the Pacific where, with the enemy cut off by sea, the defenses could be bombed and shelled for days on end prior to an actual landing.
As we neared the coast, evidence of our air attacks was clearly visible in the A.A. fire, the flares, and the conflagrations noted at various points along the beach. The British beacon submarines were picked up on schedule, the transports arrived in their areas, and the work of getting out boats and disembarking the troops was commenced. Some of our own vessels were illuminated and silhouetted to us by searchlights played from the beach, but they do not seem to have been sighted by the enemy.
The landings in the JOSS and DIME areas (left and center) were made exactly on time, 0245. Owing to delays incident to the weather conditions, Admiral Kirk postponed the CENT landing until 0345, so that this landing was one hour late. All were successful and met with little initial resistance. The first naval casualties were the damaging of the JOSS gunfire support destroyers Swanson and Roe by collision at 0255, the damaging by dive bombers at 0450 and subsequent sinking of the minesweeper Sentinel, and the sinking of the destroyer Maddox by bomb in the DIME area at 0458, with great loss of life. At first light, about 0400, the gunfire support vessels opened fire on prearranged targets and on targets requested by the troops ashore. Enemy air attacks commenced at 0424 and were continued with intensity throughout the day. In addition to attacks on shipping, the beach areas were repeatedly strafed. Fighter bombers came in low over the hills to the northward, and their approach was difficult to detect on the radar. The first Spitfire fighter cover, according to my record, arrived at about 0515.
During the morning, our cruisers, which had been primarily occupied in silencing enemy artillery, became engaged with a large force of enemy tanks, which were threatening to drive through toward the beach at Gela. It was here that the Seventh Army began to appreciate the true effectiveness of naval gunfire. And so, might I add, 'd the enemy. In this, probably the first cruiser-tank battle, many tanks were destroyed by direct hits, and many others were put out of action by near misses. Dazed survivors, from the famed Herman Goering Division, taken prisoner, wondered what terrible new anti-tank weapon the Americans had. They had never experienced anything like the rapid fire of a 15-gun battery 6" cruiser, and they had no idea that what had hit them came from the sea. Naval support fire was most effectively controlled by cruiser observation planes and by shore fire control parties, landed with the troops, which had been previously trained for this role in the Amphibious Force schools. The cruiser planes, however, suffered heavy casualties. Due to their slowness and comparative lack of maneuverability, they were easy targets for enemy fighters, which soon proceeded to attack them and shoot all too many down. About their only defense was to dive for the water, and endeavor to escape by skimming along the surface. Time and again, I personally observed such a getaway, and then saw the gallant pilot gain altitude once more and resume his spotting duty. The need for better planes, and special protection for them, was clearly demonstrated.
In spite of the heavy enemy opposition, the military situation on shore continued to develop satisfactorily, except for heavy pressure on the First Division, due to the determined counter attack toward Gela by the Herman Goering Division. Here, the Army agreed, the cruisers really saved the day.
An incident which occurred in the afternoon illustrates how extremely important it is, in an operation of this sort, for army and naval commanders and their staffs to work in the closest co-operation, with a thorough understanding of each other’s functions and methods of doing business. I relate it merely to emphasize the obvious lesson, with the hope that in the future similar errors may be avoided. The floating reserve, Force KOOL, under Major General Gaffey, had been embarked in a Reserve Group held under my immediate command. This Group, composed of the transports Orizaba and Chateau Thierry, and sundry landing craft under Captain K. S. Reed, U.S.N., had been moved in close to the Monrovia, in a position of readiness to land as directed. We were awaiting word from General Patton. About 1530, I received a visual signal from Captain Reed to the effect that General Gaffey said he had orders to land, and that he, Reed, requested instructions. I immediately showed the signal to General Patton, alongside me on the bridge, and asked him what it meant. He said, “Oh! Yes! I gave orders an hour ago to land the reserve at Gela to support the First Division.” It developed that he had given the orders in usual Army fashion to his Chief of Staff, who had transmitted them via slow Army channels direct to General Gaffey, without informing anyone in the Navy, which, of course, had to do the landing. “Well,” said I, “General, it is too bad that neither I nor any member of my staff were informed of your wishes. If we had been, General Gaffey’s Force would have been on the way ashore long ago.” By fast work, these troops commenced landing on the beach at Gela by 1700, but there had been an unfortunate delay of about an hour, which might have been serious. General Patton, of course, realized the mistake.
In the course of one of the many air attacks, an LST beached in the DIME Area was hit about 1830 and set afire. Another badly damaged. The troops ashore requested more fighter cover, a request which had already been made by the Naval Commander. There were further air attacks after dark, particularly during the moonlight period. During one of these periods, when bombs were actually falling around the transports and enemy planes were under fire, a group of our own transport planes, carrying airborne reinforcements, blundered over the transport area. Many of them were shot down by naval anti-aircraft fire, and, others were shot down by our anti-aircraft on shore. This was a deplorable and much to be regretted episode, but the transport planes should have been routed well clear of the transport areas. I cannot but feel that the failure of the Air Force to engage in preliminary planning jointly with the other services contributed heavily to this most unfortunate occurrence.
On the 11th, D plus 1, the unloading continued, and the troops made further advances. Bombing attacks commenced again after daybreak. The Monrovia was near-missed, the APA Barnett and APA Orizaba were hit and damaged, a fire being started on the former, and the APA Dickman was slightly damaged by a near-miss. Many attacks, however, were broken up by the fighter cover. Gun fire supports continued to fire on tanks and other targets designated by
About 1100, I embarked on the minesweeper Steady to visit the other areas and to confer with the assault force commanders. Proceeding first to the JOSS Area, I visited Admiral Conolly on the Biscayne and found all going well. I was in time there to witness a “hit and run” air raid, with bombs on the Licata breakwater, and a strafing attack along the beaches. Turning east through the DIME Area toward CENT, we saw another similar attack on Gela. DIME transports were attacked again about the same time. Shortly before I reached Admiral Kirk, in the CENT area, the Robert Rowan, a Liberty ship in the DIME Area, carrying ammunition, was hit and set on fire. In spite of the efforts of the crew, and of the salvage group, the fire got out of control. Shortly after 1600, twenty minutes after she had been hit, firefighting parties had to be ordered off and adjacent vessels were ordered to stand clear. An hour later, just after I had returned to the near-by Monrovia, she blew up, with spectacular effects. Efforts to sink the hulk were unavailing, due to the shallow water, and the wreck continued to burn all the following night, making an all too perfect beacon and illumination for enemy bombers. No further damage, however, was done during the numerous evening attacks.
During this day, the protective mine field to seaward of the Gela anchorage was completed, and the Minelaying Group was given a deserved “Well done.”
On July 12 (D plus 2), General Eisenhower arrived on a British destroyer, visited the Monrovia, and had a look at the situation ashore. Later we had a visit from Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, who at that time was the British Chief of Combined Operations, which had to do with British Amphibious Training. Admiral Cunningham had passed through the Western Naval Task Force Area the previous day to gain a firsthand impression of the situation. Unloading continued throughout the 12th, and by nightfall the APAs and AKAs were ready to depart. Since General Patton had by then transferred his headquarters ashore and since the Monrovia, without the other transports, would be particularly conspicuous, I decided to send her along with the convoy, sailing after dark, under Admiral Hall’s command. Things being well underway in the JOSS area, Admiral Conolly in the Biscayne moved in off Gela, preparatory to taking over the duties of SOPA in the Western Naval Task Force Area. Accompanied by a few key members of my staff, I transferred my flag to a destroyer but actually boarded the Biscayne, with Admiral Conolly. Admiral Kirk also shifted from the Ancon to a destroyer. Nearly all the larger vessels were therefore cleared of the area during the night.
On the 13th (D plus 3), advances on shore were continued. Fighter cover was by now being provided from captured Sicilian fields, and there were no effective air attacks. Cruisers and destroyers under Admiral Davidson continued to furnish requested gunfire support, particularly along the coast as the troops advanced to the westward. The situation was well in hand, major units were returning to their bases, and an LST ferry service between Sicily and the African coast had been initiated. I therefore turned the remaining forces and unloading tasks over to Admiral Conolly, and Admiral Kirk and I departed, I, via Malta, for a conference with Admiral Cunningham.
Thus ended the initial assault phase of Operation Husky. Upon my departure from the active area, I sent the following message to my Task Force:
"Due to careful planning, excellent seamanship, gunnery and engineering, and a high standard of efficiency and devotion to duty by all hands, the most difficult task of landing our troops on hostile shores has been successfully accomplished. I am informed that reports of specially meritorious service and accomplishments have been many. I consider that all, from the Task Force commanders to the lowest ratings, have performed splendidly and are deserving of the highest praise. Well done. It is now our duty to support, maintain, and build up the forces which have been landed. Carry on."
Of the many messages of congratulation from higher sources which it was my pleasure to pass on to those who had so well earned them, the following was particularly gratifying to all concerned:
Excerpt from a message to General Eisenhower from Prime Minister Churchill—
"further congratulations on the unfolding success of the Sicilian Campaign. I should be grateful if you would give my compliments to Admiral Hewitt. The weather gave occasion, according to reports made by the Admiralty, for a magnificent display of American seamanship."
The Western Naval Task Force Staff, Upon its return to Algiers, promptly became occupied with the next operation, a landing on the mainland of Italy, intensive planning for which was immediately initiated. This operation was less than two months away.
In the meanwhile, operations, ashore and afloat, for the reduction of Sicily, continued. The naval story of this campaign would not be complete without an account of the support given by the forces afloat to the advance of the rapidly moving Seventh Army. The British Eighth Army, on the east coast, was held up by the difficult terrain and by the desperate resistance of the enemy, who was endeavoring to protect, at all costs, his line of retreat through Messina. The Seventh Army, however, advanced swiftly to the northward and northwestward, with its coastal flank supported throughout by the cruisers, destroyers, and minesweepers of Admiral Davidson's Support Force.
In the course of the movement toward Palermo, a number of bombardments were carried out, including one by the Philadelphia, Birmingham, and H.M.S. Abercrombie, July 15, on Port Empodecle and Agrigento. The Brooklyn, returning to the anchorage off Gela on July 14, unfortunately became involved in our own protective mine field and was slightly damaged. Various units had to be relieved from time to time for replenishment of ammunition, fuel, and provisions.
Palermo fell on July 22, just twelve days after the landing. This port, in addition to relieving the Army supply situation, was a great prize for the Navy, in spite of the damage done by our own bombing and by enemy sabotage. Not only did it offer a good little harbor with dock facilities, but it had a small shipyard with drydocks capable, after considerable reconstruction and repair, of accommodating our destroyers and landing craft. Commodore Sullivan and his highly efficient Salvage Group were soon at work. The ship yard was found to be a “treasure trove” of scarce ship repair materials, badly needed in the theater. By the time the Navy arrived on the ship yard scene, the Seventh Army Engineers were found to be making off with the dry dock spur shores for the purpose of bridge and highway repair, but fortunately this was corrected before the yard had been completely denuded.
The North Coast of Sicily is high and precipitous. The highway and the railway from Palermo to Messina follow this coast closely. They pass through frequent tunnels and over many bridges. The right of way is literally hewn out of the cliffs, reminiscent of the Corniche roads of the French Riviera, and the Amalfi drive on the Italian Sorrento Peninsula. In other words, it is a terrain highly advantageous to the defense, and a nightmare to the offense—that is, from a strictly ground point of view. But, it was flanked by the sea, and it was upon sea power that General Patton called for aid.
In response to General Patton’s request, Admiral Davidson’s Support Force, then designated as T. F. 88, was augmented by a detachment of landing craft, several LSTs, 10 LCI(L)s, and 7 LCTs, small escort craft of the PC, SC, and YMS types. Also included was the versatile Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 15, which had been continuing to distinguish itself throughout the campaign. Two cruisers were constantly available, the flagship Philadelphia throughout, the Savannah until August 9, and the Boise thereafter. The destroyer unit consisted of from four to seven destroyers plus such additional vessels as could be drawn from time to time from a squadron of seven engaged in convoy escort work. Task Force 88 was assigned the task of supporting “the eastward advance of the Seventh Army by gunfire support and by effecting advance landings of military units.”
Among the operations carried out by the combatant units of the Task Force were the bombardment of enemy positions in the immediate front of the Seventh Army, the bombardment of enemy rear positions and line of communications, and nightly patrols by destroyers and motor torpedo boats to prevent enemy reinforcement, supply, or evacuation by water. Landing craft, suitably escorted, were employed in ferrying troops, artillery, motor transport, and other heavy equipment around demolished tunnels and bridges. Landing craft were also extremely useful in augmenting the supply of ammunition, fuel, provisions, and other essentials to our front line troops, thus relieving overburdened land supply lines. But the most important use of the landing craft was in “leap frog” amphibious landings behind the enemy front lines. No sooner did the enemy establish a practically impregnable defense position, than he would find his front line cut off by a Seventh Army detachment landed in his rear. After two successful operations of this sort had been carried out (August 8th and 11), the enemy gave up. He then retired so rapidly that a third landing on August 16, intended to be made behind his line, was actually made behind ours. Messina was entered by our troops the next day, August 17.
These coastal operations were not carried out without enemy reaction, and some loss on our part, a loss that would have been greater had it not been for effective antiaircraft fire and highly skillful ship-handling. The enemy was by now fully aware of the danger, to him, of our naval gunfire, and he put forth his utmost efforts to eliminate it. He had 15 airfields within a radius of 200 miles of the operating theater, and, until the fall of Catania, on August 5, four within 60 miles. Our air cover, due to insufficiency of planes to meet all requirements, poor communications with the Air Support Command, and, in my opinion at least, lack of appreciation of the situation by that command, was entirely inadequate.
Palermo was repeatedly attacked by air and once by "E" boats. The latter attack was driven off by our surface patrols and was ineffective. The destroyer Mayrant was badly damaged by bombing on July 26 and was kept afloat only by the heroic efforts of its officers and crew. On August 4, while alongside the dock in Palermo, it was again damaged. In the same attack an LST was sunk and the destroyer Shubrick, damaged. Cruisers and destroyers operating along the coast were repeatedly near-missed but fortunately escaped serious damage. The Philadelphia was so often reported sunk by enemy radio that she acquired the sobriquet of "The Galloping Ghost of the Sicilian Coast."
On August 7-8, two Italian cruisers of the Garibaldi class made a sortie from the northward toward the Palermo area. When this information reached Admiral Davidson, Who was then covering the first "leapfrog" landing, he set out with the Philadelphia and Savannah and a number of destroyers to intercept. Unfortunately, the Italians made Prior night contact with some landing craft, en route to the island of Ustica with supplies for the population, and, probably mistaking them for something larger, turned for home at high speed. Thus Admiral Davidson was disappointed.
The mobile "floating artillery" of the cruisers and destroyers, by enfilade up the numerous coastal ravines or by attack from the rear, was often able to deliver an effective fire on enemy targets which could not be reached in any way by the artillery on shore. There was an amusing incident of a "cat and mouse" game played by the Boise and an enemy railroad gun. The gun would appear at one end of a tunnel to open fire, then withdraw to reappear and reopen fire at the other end. According to my recollection, the Boise finally won the game by knocking down a rock slide at each end of the tunnel, thus sealing the mouse in his hole.
Admiral Davidson's conduct of T. F. 88 was deserving of the highest credit. That his work, and that of his officers and men were fully appreciated, is shown by the following, which I am happy to quote:
7th Army Headquarters,
Palermo, Sicily
21 August, 1943
My dear Admiral Davidson:
Please accept for yourself and for the officers and men of your force the sincere and heartfelt appreciation and admiration the 7th Army feels for your constant, gallant, and generous assistance. Everything that we have asked from you, you have more than granted.
The gunfire support that you have provided has been of inestimable value, and it is my considered opinion that the three landing operations, carried on by you, were of critical importance in the rapid and successful advance on Messina.
It is our hope that in future operations we shall again have the pleasure of being associated with you and your men.
Most sincerely,
G. S. Patton, Jr.,
Lieut. General, U. S. Army, Commanding.
The following from Admiral Cunningham, in view of its praise and its comment on the use of sea power, is also well worth quoting. The italics are supplied by me.
181751B, August, 1943. From: CinC, Mediterranean To: Commander, 8th Fleet.
Information:
Comdg. Gen. 7th Army; C.T.F. 88; CinC, Allied Forces
We have watched with admiration the splendid and rapid advance of the 7th Army to Messina. I am fully aware of the great contribution of the U. S. Navy to the success of that advance and I request that you will express my satisfaction to all U. S. Naval Forces who have operated on the north coast of Sicily on what has been a model of the effective application of sea power in the support of land operations.
The fall of Messina marked the conclusion of the Sicilian Campaign. Husky resulted in the fall of Mussolini and was a notable operation from many points of view. It provided many valuable lessons for future operations, not only in amphibious and gunfire support techniques, but in the realm of effective inter-service co-operation.