We have been attempting to negotiate an armistice with the Communists in Korea for twenty months. Sometimes it seems as though our negotiators are getting nowhere. At other times they appear to be making slow—painfully slow— progress. The progress of these negotiations is being watched with intense interest by all our people. When things seem to be going badly, we have a tendency to lose patience. Why don’t we get the war settled? If they won’t agree with us, let’s send enough force over there to deliver a knockout blow.
After a little reflection, however, this question arises: Whom shall we knock out? Shall it be the North Koreans? But, now we recall that we did defeat the North Koreans once before—in September, 1950, when their army disintegrated after our amphibious landing at Inchon. After our advance toward the Manchurian border, however, the Chinese Communists entered the War.
So, we then ask ourselves: Shall we make war on China? Shall we bomb Chinese targets, and perhaps kill many Chinese people whom we know are not in sympathy with their Communist masters? Will that solve our problems; or is there still something else to consider?
After further reflection we remind ourselves that the Korean aggression would never have started in the first place if Moscow had not given the signal. We also have evidence that the Communist negotiators in Korea are taking many of their orders from Moscow. So, that brings us to the big question: Are we willing to risk expanding the war, even to the point of a worldwide conflict in order to deliver our “knockout blow”? Is an expanded war with its increased casualties, its huge cost, and its attendant uncertainty a satisfactory sop to our impatience?
Perhaps we should examine this national characteristic of ours—impatience—a little more closely. It is obvious that we in the United States are an impatient people. When we get into a war we want to win it. We want to return home from the war as we do from a football game—on the long end of the score. Then we can forget about it and take up where we left off in the civilian world. We could do that in bygone days, when others bore the burden of world problems. But today it is we who must do most of the worrying about these problems; and it is apparent that even if we do reach an armistice in Korea, the same major world problems will continue to be with us. Most of these problems are not susceptible to easy solution.
Impatience is an expensive luxury. It is possible that the Communists recognize impatience as one of our weaknesses. It is also possible that many of their tactics in the various situations around the world are designed to capitalize on that weakness. Perhaps it is their hope that through the use of stalling and other irritating tactics it will be possible to wring a number of concessions from us. Perhaps they have entertained the hope that if they wait long enough, we shall become disgusted and return home, leaving them in possession of the various critical areas around the globe.
Thus it might be appropriate to ask ourselves this question: Why are we not willing to wait as long as, or longer than, the Communists to gain our ends? Suppose that we did demonstrate a willingness to take part in a stalled conference in Korea, or anywhere else for that matter, for generations if necessary, without showing any signs of impatience. If this were possible, it would perhaps have a very beneficial effect on Communist negotiators everywhere in the world.
There is evidence of a general reluctance among our people to become involved in conferences with Communists. It is impossible to deal with them, we are told. But how do we know? We have been trying for only a few years. Perhaps after we have been at it for several decades, we shall be in a better position to judge.
Conferences may be beneficial in ways which are not always immediately apparent. In the first place, talk does not kill or cause physical harm. So long as negotiators continue to discuss their differences, casualties on any active fighting front are likely to be held to a minimum. Talking serves to boil the fundamental differences to the surface; it enables one to better understand his own case, as well as that of his opponent. In order to cope successfully with any opponent it is necessary to know him and to understand his motives and his techniques. Negotiations are the key to such knowledge and understanding. Moreover, in the course of discussions there is always the possibility that some areas of agreement will be found. These small areas may one day expand into areas of general agreement, since time often has a tendency to smooth the sharp differences which exist among nations.
Perhaps our impatience in the present situation stems from an impression that time is on the side of the Communists, that our position is the weaker one—growing weaker as time passes. But is this actually the case? Let us pursue this question a little further.
On the Communist side there are about eight hundred million people controlled by the iron grip of less than ten million Communists. The majority of these people have been tricked into a state of virtual slavery. Now, no man willingly turns over his life to the service of another man. Every man instinctively resents control by force and terror, and, given any chance at all, he will one day wreak vengeance upon his masters. There are few people behind the iron curtain today who are satisfied with their lot in life, few who would not fight for their liberty if given a reasonable chance of success.
Tyrants have come and gone in the interior of Asia over countless centuries of history. Occasionally they have succeeded in exerting their influence over some segment of the maritime community for a limited period of time, but never for very long. Eventually the internal pressure of the impoverished and discontented peoples which they control becomes strong enough to break the shackles of slavery and destroy the oppressors. Such internal pressure is a fundamental weakness of all dictatorships, which bare statistics do not reveal.
On our own side, the United States does not stand alone. We are able to count among our friends and assets the peoples and the resources of the entire world outside the iron curtain. The best evidence of this is found in the voting record of members of the United Nations Organization. In almost every instance where a fundamental issue is at stake, the nations which are free to vote according to the dictates of their own best interests find themselves voting together in opposition to the Communist bloc. Nations find it to their advantage in the majority of cases to follow the lead of the United States. Whatever our shortcomings may be, people everywhere have found that they can look to us for assistance, without any danger of their being maneuvered into a state of servitude.
The human and material resources of the maritime world are far superior to those of the Communist bloc. Control of the sea gives the free world a communication system superior to that of the Communists. Members of the maritime community, even the most remote, are more accessible to one another than is Vladivostok to Moscow. Communications are an important factor in the measurement of the power potential of state or groups of states.
The idea of human liberty, while it may suffer temporary reverses from time to time, is in the long run irresistible. When in history, for example, has a regime which has held its peoples in subjugation by executions, terror, and unkept promises ever been able to prevail against the coordinated, willing efforts of a strong coalition of free men?
With the vast majority of the world’s resources available to us and with the idea of human liberty at work in the world, forever undermining the forces of tyranny, time is clearly running in our favor. We can well afford to exercise patience in our dealings with those whom we know to be less favorably situated than we. Indeed, not to do so would appear to react to our eventual disadvantage.
In addition to a power potential superior to that of the Communists, something more is required. There must be a willingness to fight when our liberty and security are in jeopardy. The Communists must be aware of our willingness and intention to fight, or to take such other action as the situation may require.
We in the United States are a peace-loving people. Actually, however, our traditional desire for peace may be misleading, both to ourselves and to others. For example, when World War I broke out neither the German government nor the American people foresaw that the United States would become involved in that war. While we proclaimed our national objective to be one of remaining at peace, it actually turned out that we were willing to go to war to remove a threat to human liberty and to our own security. An encroachment upon the liberties of others has long been recognized, and rightly so, as a threat to our own security.
At the beginning of World War II our pronouncements for peace may have misled both the Nazis and ourselves. Eventually we went to war to prevent another encroachment upon the liberties of men and to remove a threat to our own security.
Prior to the Korean aggression our pronouncements for peace appear to have misled both the Communists and ourselves. Again we went to war to prevent another encroachment upon the liberties of a small nation and to check a growing threat to our own security.
Thus, like most people, we do prefer peace, if it can be had on acceptable terms. But we are also a liberty-loving people. Today, as always, we stand ready to fight for the cause of liberty against those who would destroy it.
It is important that both we and the Communists understand our readiness to fight for liberty. Such understanding may do much to prevent blundering into another war in the future—a war which might otherwise have been avoided. The will of the people of the United States in this respect must be made known to our opponents. There should no longer be cause for misunderstanding on this point.
Perhaps, with the passage of time, the wisdom of President Woodrow Wilson’s objective,—“To make the world safe for democracy,”—will be reaffirmed. One wonders what the course of history might have been over the past thirty years had President Wilson’s objective been accepted and faithfully pursued by our country.
We have the power to maintain our position in the world and the power to safeguard our liberty. The necessity for removing doubt from the minds of others as to our readiness to take action in our own interests is recognized. We need not specify in precise terms under what circumstances we will act or exactly what action will be taken, so long as any would-be aggressor knows that he must reckon with the United States of America and her allies in any adventure which he might undertake.
We have done much in recent years to clarify our position in the world community and to make known our readiness to use force, if necessary, to maintain that position. In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization we have committed ourselves to take action in the event of aggression against any member of that organization. We have entered into similar agreements with Japan and other nations in the Pacific Ocean area. These are commitments which we have made in order to avoid any misunderstanding of our future intentions.
Such commitments, however, create a necessity for maintaining a posture of reasonable military strength over a period of many years; indeed, over a number of generations, if necessary. What kind of military strength will be required to meet our world-wide commitments over a long period of years? Certainly we must not exert ourselves as would a runner in a hundred-yard dash if the race we are in is more like a 26-mile marathon. A military establishment geared to fight a war within the next year or two will not be too effective in 1970. A potential aggressor, who is aware of any date toward which our military build-up is oriented, need only wait a few years longer before attacking, to insure that our costly stock-pile of weapons is obsolete. A military establishment geared to fight a certain kind of war at a certain time may very well be ill-prepared to fight a different kind of war—under circumstances that may not be foreseen.
The United States is in an excellent position to create a military establishment which will provide reasonable security over an indefinite length of time and which will be well within the ability of the American people to support. This is so because we have certain natural, geographic advantages which, if properly exploited, can be of immense strategic value to us. Because of our favorable geographic position, we have unrestricted access to the sea lanes of the world. The seas are at our threshold; they are there for us to use. Whether we do our utmost to exploit this unusual advantage, or whether we choose to deliberately ignore it, is entirely up to us.
History has demonstrated that any nation which has had the geographical position and the wisdom to turn to the sea for security has enjoyed unusual advantages over its rivals. These advantages are measurable— in terms of the length of time these nations have been able to survive. For example, maritime power permitted the Romans and the British to outlive their less fortunate land power rivals by many centuries. The evidence of history clearly demonstrates that nations which, through unfortunate geographical circumstances or through the shortsightedness of their leaders, have relied upon land power concepts for security, have not been able to survive for any significant length of time.
In order to get the most effective military power per dollar expended, a military force must be able to move by sea. All elements must be organized and equipped so that they can be transported quickly by sea in order to provide superior concentration of force in the decisive area at the decisive time.
For example, if we control the sea, and know how to exploit that control, we shall be in a position to concentrate our power— whether it be in the form of ships, airplanes, infantrymen, atomic weapons, or any other form—at points on the fringes of the European or Asiatic continents more quickly, more easily and more economically than can the Communists. Seaborne forces deployed in troubled waters can provide continuous, subtle pressure over an indefinite period of time without giving cause for provocation.
It would appear therefore, that a mobile, flexible type of military force, a force which is flexible both in its thinking and in its tactics, would best fill our needs. Flexibility and mobility, rather than mere size—or numbers of troops or ships or planes—should be the criterion of such a force. A force sufficiently mobile and flexible to be moved to any unforeseen trouble spot and there used to best advantage has many advantages over one which is stationed in any particular area, or which is designed to cope with a limited number of situations, which may never develop.
There are limits to the size of a force best suited to meet the security requirements of the United States. There is wide divergence of opinion among military men as to both the size and the character of the force which is required. No segment of military opinion has the complete solution to this problem. All solutions should be carefully scrutinized by the people of the United States, through their Congress; for, it is their security, their resources, and ultimately their lives, which are at stake.
It is not necessary to maintain during peacetime a military establishment strong enough to defeat any potential rival. For, instead of preventing war, such a force may actually frighten a potential rival into taking some form of preventive military action! Our peacetime military force need only be of such size and character as to make it obvious to any potential aggressor that he can never win, that he will eventually he defeated.
The people of the United States have made known in a number of different ways and on a number of occasions that they have no aggressive designs against anyone. The American people desire to defeat or destroy no one. Nor do they desire to conduct their affairs in such a manner as to provoke fear in others that we are planning to attack them. We do not desire to be a party to any policy or move that might provoke others to go to war. Therefore, we must carefully scrutinize our own conduct and our own policies to insure that they accurately reflect the will of the American people in this respect.
The character of our military force must be such that it will not provoke or increase the danger of war. A good way to estimate the effect of our own policies on others is to place ourselves in the position of a potential enemy and then take a good, long look at ourselves. Let us then ask ourselves these questions: If we were the opposition what effect would this or that American policy have on us? Would it serve to deter us or provoke us? Is it clear to us beyond all doubt that the United States is not planning to attack and destroy us? The founders of our country took pains to provide a system of checks and balances, which would limit the degree to which military thinking could influence national policy. They did this with a keen awareness of history. For many governments of the past, in which military influence predominated, were characterized by a degree of impatience, which caused a tendency to anticipate problems.
As a rule, military men, in the process of safeguarding their country, are required to think in terms of assumed military situations, situations which they visualize as being particularly dangerous to their country. To many, working in such an atmosphere day after day, the assumed situations become almost inevitabilities. It is therefore possible, in cases where military men exert strong influence in government, for the emphasis to be placed on military solutions, with the result that events are sometimes shaped in that direction. Take the case of Japan, for example. Long before Japan contemplated a military attack upon the United States as a possible solution to her political problem, the Japanese military establishment requested a free hand to plan operations against Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, the Dutch Indies, and Malaya. Permission to commence planning was granted by the Japanese Government. Once the feasibility of an attack upon Pearl Harbor had been determined, is it not possible that the logic and persuasiveness of the military presentation began to impinge upon the thinking of the statesmen, to the point where their attention was gradually focussed upon a military solution to their problems? The tactical military solution seemed so attractive at the moment that no one in authority took the pains to think the problem through on a sound strategic basis. There were some among the Japanese who had grave misgivings during those critical months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, but theirs was not the popular view.
There is no combination of powers in the interior of Asia strong enough to defeat he strong coalition of free men around the world. It is our task to make clear to any aggressor that he can never win, no matter how long it may take to bring him to account. The absence of any hope of final victory is the best deterrent that can be devised. On the other hand it must be clear to others that we have no intention of attacking them, and a rigid reexamination of our external policies must be continued toward that end.
If we conduct our affairs wisely, our relations with the Communists could very well reduce themselves to a long period of attrition on both the political and military fronts. If our readiness and willingness to use military strength in limited situations remains clear to them, a direct military clash between the United States and Russia may be avoided.
With a clear understanding of the, strength of our position, and with a firm belief in the principles for which we stand, we can well afford to exercise patience in our dealings with our less fortunate, though somewhat difficult, neighbors. Impatience and provocation are for the weak, not the strong.
No matter how much we may dislike or disagree with our neighbor, we cannot solve our problems by destroying him, his house, and his family. For when we do, other problems, some even more difficult than the original ones, will arise in their place. Destruction solves nothing in the struggle for human liberty. For, in the process of destroying others, we also destroy a part of ourselves.
To make the world safe for democracy is a continuing task, to which we must address ourselves every day of our lives. Persuasion, rather than coercion or terrorism, is the most effective weapon of free men.