Why have we been able to fight successfully in Korea? Why have we been able to maintain our positions five thousand miles across the sea, despite the most strenuous efforts on the part of the communists to push us out?
Today we may be inclined to take this unique capability for granted—it has been so long since we were forced to fight on our own soil. Unless we in the United States understand clearly, however, why we are able to fight our wars across the seas at the doorstep of the enemy, rather than on our own shores, there is danger that this unusual advantage may one day slip, or be wrested, from our grasp. Other great peoples before us in history have, by a similar lack of understanding, unwittingly contributed to the decline of their civilizations.
Our operations in Korea have sometimes been characterized as “fighting out on the end of a limb.” The fact that we have been fighting in Korea, a considerable distance overseas, has sometimes been referred to as a situation of weakness, rather than of strength. Thus it becomes apparent that the strength of our own position is not generally appreciated. If this is the case, how can we be certain that we are employing our strength factors to the best advantage in our continuing search for security?
If we are inclined to become too engrossed in our own difficulties, let us look at the world through the eyes of the communists. The communist of the Asiatic hinterland need not travel far in any direction until he encounters some manifestation of the power and influence of the United States. As a matter of fact, in almost every area of the globe not actually dominated by the Red army, the influence of the United States is a paramount factor. This influence is exerted in the political and economic fields, as well as in the military field. The interchange of commodities, of literature, and of customs is an important aspect of it. This influence flows in two directions—from the United States to the rest of the world, and from the rest of the world to the United States. Such interchange has formed, over the years, a common bond of mutual sympathy among the nations of the maritime worlds—those nations which, by virtue of their easy access to the sea, are more accessible to one another. Thus, the communist, looking out from his position in the Asiatic hinterland, finds most of the world oriented away from him. He finds little sympathy for his political or economic ideas beyond the border areas which he is able to dominate with his Red Army.
Our access to the seas of the world and our ability to command them give us significant advantages over the communists. It is our command of the seas that enables us to exercise our moral, political, economic, and military influence—for better or for worse— over the greater portion of the world. It is command of the seas that enabled us to concentrate the military power of the United Nations in Korea in time to thwart a well- planned communist military grab. It is that same command of the seas that enables us to support our friends in Western Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean, and in every other area where blue water touches the shore. Our command of the seas also enables our friends to support us.
The advantageous position in which we find ourselves is not without precedent. History records that the most successful nations of all time have been those which have succeeded in gaining control of the seas for themselves and in denying their use to their enemies. The achievements of the more prominent land powers are, by comparison, but brief flashes across the pages of history.
What Is Seapower?
Since the day when man first learned to build a ship and move it across the surface of the water, the seas have been important to civilization as a convenient, economical medium of transportation. The cost of land transportation is usually many times greater than the cost of water transportation. The cost of air transportation is many times greater than the cost of land transportation. Cost, of course, is measured in terms of human and material resources—in terms of national effort.
Thus it can be seen that a nation which is in a position to conduct the bulk of its transportation—in peace or in war—by sea, would enjoy a tremendous advantage over any other nation. That advantage would be magnified even more by the nation which, while using the seas for its own purposes, is also in a position to deny their use to others. To put it another way, a manufacturer would enjoy an immense advantage over his business competitors if he could arrange to transport his materials and finished products at a fraction of the cost which his competitors were required to pay. That is just about the situation in which we find ourselves today in respect to the communist bloc. We are in control of sea communications and are therefore in a position to move men, equipment, and commodities—- war or no war—at an expenditure of a fraction of the effort which the communists must expend to move by land.
What does this comparison of transportation costs mean to the art of warfare? It is simply this. War itself is a transportation problem. It is a problem of transporting weapons—whether they be troops, guns, explosive shells, or atom bombs—to the point where they will have the greatest influence upon the enemy. For example, a fighter plane transports machine guns to the point where they can be brought to bear on an enemy bomber. A cruiser does much the same thing; it transports guns by water to where they can be used against the enemy. The infantryman transports a gun or a hand grenade to where it can be used to best advantage against the enemy. The aircraft carrier is a combination of two kinds of transportation. The air base and its complement of airplanes can be moved by sea to the point where they can be used to best advantage. The airplanes, in turn, leave the deck of the carrier to transport their guns, bombs, or rockets to targets which cannot be reached by ship.
Cost is as vital a factor in military operations as it is in commercial enterprises. There is a limit to the resources of any nation. The cost of a campaign must be balanced against the results to be achieved. To do otherwise is to invite defeat. Therefore, transportation costs are a major consideration in any strategic plan; and a strategic plan which makes maximum use of the easy, economical road of the sea offers by far the greatest dividends in return for the effort expended. This is as true today as it has been in the past. It goes a long way toward explaining why nations which have had the wisdom to turn to the sea for security have been able to outlive the nations which have not. Security measures based on the maritime concept of strategy have historically required a smaller percentage of the national substance than have measures based on land strategy. From a military point of view, it is usually more profitable to move a given effort forward by water, transferring the main effort to land or air, or a combination of the two, when the forward movement by water is no longer feasible. Coordinated ground and land-based air operations are usually necessary to facilitate movement by water and to secure narrow bottlenecks— such as the Straits of Gibraltar, the Straits of Sicily, or the Dardanelles—which may be located along the direct water route to any objective.
The British and the French employed such a strategy in the Crimean War. Early in that war the Russians marched their armies westward into Europe. However, the British and French, instead of engaging the Russians on the ground which they had chosen, transported their armies by ship through the Mediterranean and the Dardanelles and made a landing in the rear of the Russian main armies.
About a hundred years later, in September, 1950, our own forces in the Western Pacific employed a similar strategy by effecting a landing at Inchon in the rear of the communist main armies in Korea. In a very few days following this landing, the communist armies to the south abandoned their weapons and fled to the hills. This victory was attained by the intelligent exploitation of the sea communications which we controlled. Like the British and French in the Crimean War a hundred years earlier, we exploited our superior sea communications to defeat the enemy without having to engage him in a series of frontal engagements. The devastation of civilian populations and installations, as well as the great cost in manpower and material, which would have accompanied a land advance, was in large measure avoided by this seaborne landing.
In both the Crimean War and the Korean war the land power struck with his fist, in the form of a land offensive. But in each case the sea power, rather than counter with a blow against the land power’s fist, had the mobility and freedom of action to select a weak spot against which to strike. The effect of the amphibious assault against the land power’s weak spot was the same in both cases —the power and momentum of his land offensive melted away.
Now that some appreciation of the advantages of sea communications has been gained, what is required to maintain control of them and to deny them to others? In other words, what are the elements of sea power?
The Elements of Seapower
The changes which have occurred as a result of our rapid scientific and technical developments have had, and will continue to have, a profound effect upon seapower. The airplane and atomic energy have created problems which require continuous study and application. Moreover, since change is a continuing factor in our daily lives, it is only safe to assume that the airplane and atomic energy, as well as many other new discoveries, are still in their earliest stages of development.
While changes in weapons and techniques will continue, there are two important factors which will remain unchanged. The first factor is geography. The relationship between the land areas and the water areas of the globe remains about the same. It is safe to assume that the seas of the world will continue to cover approximately seven-tenths of the surface of the earth; and that the nation which is in a position to control them and use them will have a tremendous advantage over every other nation.
The second factor which remains unchanged is human nature. Human nature and human sagacity have improved little, if any, over the years. Those who are shaping our destinies today, as well as those who will operate and direct the powerful machines and weapons of the future, are the same type of human being, whose brilliance in some fields and foolhardiness in others has shaped our destinies in the past. The human being of the future can be expected to be vulnerable to the same error, the same pitfalls, as were his forefathers. Therefore, if history is any criterion, he will profit only reluctantly by the mistakes of his ancestors.
The unchanging characteristics of the geography of the globe and of human nature have an important bearing on the sea power of tomorrow. They form a strong link between the history and the future of sea power.
Seapower can be defined as the total capacity of a people to control and exploit the seas. It might be conveniently broken down into three major elements. These elements are, first, a favorable geographical position; second, the means and the resources to control and use the seas; and third, a population with the understanding and the will to control and exploit the seas. These elements will be taken up in that order.
The most important element of seapower is a good geographical location on the face of the earth. To be a seapower a nation must have easy and unrestricted access to the seas of the world. We in the United States have just that. Our position on the globe is such that we find ourselves athwart the major communication routes of the world.
Geographically speaking, the United States is to the modern world what Rome was to the ancient world of the Mediterranean Basin—what England was to the European world of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Indeed, from a geographical point of view, the United States may very well be the greatest seapower of them all. The weakness of Rome’s position was her land frontier to the north, over which the land-locked tribes of the European hinterland finally poured to bring about her collapse. England’s proximity to the European continent presented her with a security problem which has succeeded over the years in bleeding her of her wealth and manpower in pursuit of an acceptable degree of security.
We in the United States are blessed with friendly neighbors to the north and south of us and with broad expanses of ocean on either side. We are not plagued, as were the Romans, with a land bridge over which our enemies may one day launch an invasion. Nor are we plagued, as is England, with a position uncomfortably close to the Eurasian land mass. Our position is one of great strength; and although technical advances have diminished to some extent the security of our position, the security of other nations has suffered even more.
Let us compare our geographical position with that of Russia, for example. Almost without exception, around her entire perimeter, Russia is hemmed in by land belonging to someone else—or by mountains, deserts or arctic wastelands. Her accesses to the open sea are severely restricted and widely dispersed. From the Murmansk area her ships must pass close by Scandinavia, the British Isles, and the coasts of Europe and North America to reach the open sea. From the Baltic, Russian ships must pass through the Skaggerak, the English Channel, and the North Sea to reach open water. From the Black Sea her seaborne traffic must traverse the Dardanelles and the Mediterranean. In the Western Pacific the Japanese Islands and the Aleutians flank the Kuriles barrier, through which Russia has her only unrestricted access to the open sea. Thus Russia is under a significant handicap in respect to developing her own sea power. This same handicap will have a profound effect upon any attempt which Russia might make to deny the seas to others.
Russia, in an apparent attempt to compensate for her lack of more secure sea frontiers, has continued her historic practice of attempting to build up a chain of satellite, or buffer, states around her borders. While she may appear to have had some success in this undertaking, the territory which she has thus gained is not large when compared to the great expanses of the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, which serve as our buffer areas. Moreover, along with her territorial gains, Russia' has inherited discontented, restless populations, which may one day, as they have in the past, prove to be her undoing.
Geographic position can be a staunch ally or an implacable enemy. The United States has at her threshold the most convenient, economical transportation system known to man—the seas. The most important element of seapower—geographic position—has been placed in her hands by nature. To Russia, on the other hand, geographic position has always been an overwhelming handicap in her centuries-old quest for world power and security.
The second major element of seapower is the means and the resources to control and use the seas. This includes a secure homeland generously endowed with natural resources. It includes industrial capacity and a skilled population. It includes close political, economic, and military ties with other nations on the seashores of the world, particularly in such vital sea areas as the North Sea, the Mediterranean, the South China Sea, and other marginal seas of the European-Asiatic continent. It includes a strong merchant marine and an efficient air transportation system. A strong navy equipped with the latest weapons, including naval aircraft and atomic weapons, is essential. Highly mobile ground forces and land-based air forces, organized and equipped as expeditionary forces to spearhead and support overseas campaigns, are essential elements of maritime power.
The United States, in many respects, has led the world in the development of the means to control and use the seas in warfare. However, while good progress has been made, the possibilities for further development are immense. Before taking up the third element of seapower some of these possibilities will be examined.
The aircraft carrier is an excellent example of a new technique to facilitate control and use of the seas. The development of the aircraft carrier ushered in a new era of naval warfare. With its maintenance crews, its shops, and its living accommodations, it could be moved economically across the seas to wherever it might be needed. This idea was further developed and used to great advantage during World War II. The Japanese employed aircraft carriers to destroy our land-based air forces and units of our fleet at Pearl Harbor in December, 1941. We, in turn, employed our carriers to destroy Japanese land-based air forces and their naval forces in the Central and Western Pacific.
Twenty-four of the Essex class carriers alone were built and employed to good advantage in World War II. When the war was over, these carriers were returned to the United States. Some went into reserve status; a few remained in commission. Some were used for training, while others took station across the seas—in the Mediterranean and in the Western Pacific. When the Korean War broke these same carriers went into action again. They spearheaded the successful sea-borne landing at Inchon in September, 1950. Four of them were present off the port of Hungnam when United Nations forces were withdrawn from that area in December, 1950. As the enemy closed in, United Nations airfields in the vicinity ashore had to be abandoned. Carrier based aircraft played a major part in the successful withdrawal of our ground forces from Hungnam, not as refugees, but as organized fighting units.
As the danger of another war continues to threaten, these original twenty-four Essex class aircraft carriers are still available for employment wherever they may be needed. They are ready to operate overseas against an enemy for extended periods, and, like other naval forces, require only a minimum of installations on foreign soil for their support.
Meanwhile, innumerable land air-bases lie scattered around the globe in the after- math of World War II. Some have been left behind to sink once again back into the jungle, as the tide of war moved on to other areas. Others now lie within territory controlled by the communist bloc. Others have been rolled up, moved, and reestablished many times. Others lie behind communist lines in Korea. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the mobile shipborne airfield is proving to be an extremely useful and economical instrument of warfare. It is still in its earliest stage of development.
The mobility of the sea offers possibilities for further progress in other fields. The development of seaborne command facilities, for example, could be pressed further to keep pace with the increase in the scope of naval warfare brought about by World War II. While some naval operational command functions can be performed satisfactorily from shore bases, the mobile command ship has many advantages over the fixed type of command headquarters. There are, of course, technical limitations characteristic of command ships to be overcome; limitations on communication facilities and space limitations are examples. However, the advantages to be gained through increased mobility would appear to make further research and development in the field of mobile command facilities a profitable undertaking. An enemy will usually know the location of fixed bases and fixed command facilities. A command ship operating at sea would be difficult to locate, and once located, would be difficult to hit or to track. Meanwhile, the command ship, like the aircraft carrier, is capable of moving to any part of the world where the presence of the command is required. While so moving, as well as at all other times, the command ship is fully manned and operating on a 24-hour basis.
A possibility for increasing our mobility is presented in the employment of the Marine Corps as part of the operating fleet. Since its expansion during World War II, the Marine Corps has found it necessary in the interests of greater combat effectiveness to base much of its combat strength ashore. However, some authorities on naval warfare have regarded marines as a navy’s most effective offensive weapon. The problem, accordingly, is one of deploying combat elements of the Marines in the forward area with the fleet, under conditions which will not militate against their combat effectiveness ashore. Thus, it would appear logical to exert appropriate effort toward the development of a combat transport type, of sufficient size, speed, and damage-resisting qualities to permit it to operate at sea under actual battle conditions. A battalion landing team or a regimental combat team maintained afloat in the forward area can serve as a stabilizing element without, at the same time, giving cause for provocation. Such a force, when landed on the day trouble breaks out, and supported by a navy prepared to use atomic and other modern weapons, may under certain circumstances prove to be more effective than a number of divisions brought in several weeks later.
A third possibility for making better use of the sea might be found in increasing the mobility of ground forces and land-based air forces which are deployed overseas as expeditionary forces. It is possible for expeditionary forces to assume the characteristics of a permanent shore-based organization, with all the accompanying impedimenta. It is also possible for expeditionary forces to retain a high degree of mobility with a capability to shift troops, planes and supporting facilities by sea and air to any area where an opportunity to capitalize on enemy weaknesses might develop. If they assume permanent shore-based characteristics, they also develop the usual weaknesses of fixed installations. The enemy knows exactly where they are and can cope with them in his own time and in his own way, as he did with our installations in the Hawaiian and Manila areas at the beginning of the last war—or as he did with the Maginot line in Europe. On the other hand, if our land-based forces, together with their base and supporting facilities, retain the mobility to move quickly by sea and air from one area to another, the enemy’s problem is multiplied many times, While he may know where they are located at the moment, he cannot be certain where they will be when he decides to strike. They will be capable of appearing on his flank or in his rear on short notice.
There are innumerable possibilities for the development of methods and techniques for exploiting the mobility offered by the sea. The development of such methods and techniques for military purposes represents but one segment of all the possibilities.
Let us now examine the third major element of sea power—The understanding and the will of the people. Without this element there can be no control or intelligent exploitation of the seas. Indeed, peoples and governments may have the will to exercise control of the seas, but without a proper understanding of the nature of seapower, their efforts may be misdirected, as they have been so many times in history. The downfall of Carthage in the Second Century B.c. is an example of misdirected effort.
At the beginning of the Third Century B.C., Carthage, from her favorable position in the vicinity of what is now known as Tunis, held undisputed control of the Western Mediterranean Sea. The people prospered from the lucrative trade which her merchant ships monopolized in the Western Mediterranean Basin. No navy loomed on the horizon to challenge her control of the seas. Indeed, conditions were such that there were perhaps some among the Carthaginians who wondered why they needed a navy when there was no other navy to fight. The truth of the matter was that there was no other navy to fight. The Carthaginians had reason to be complacent about their preeminence at sea.
But across the sea in what is now Italy there lived a people who were not content to remain within their own borders. These Romans, as they were called, knew nothing about the sea, but they were seized by the urge to expand their territory and their influence. Thus in 264 B.C. a Roman army crossed the Straits of Messina into Sicily, which was then a Carthaginian stronghold. They had no ships, so they gathered together such small craft as happened to be in the vicinity—possibly the ancient counterparts of the junk-type of craft so familiar in the Western Pacific today—and ferried across into Sicily as best they could. What might have been the course of history had a few Carthaginian ships been alert in the Straits of Messina to sink those small craft loaded with Roman troops is an interesting matter for speculation.
Thus began the First Punic War, which saw a vigorous and enterprising Roman people take to the sea and, in a series of land and sea battles, force the Carthaginians to withdraw from a number of island positions in the Western Mediterranean. However, the Carthaginians had given a good account of themselves and soon set about to plan their revenge. Apparently, however, they failed to understand the implications of their loss of sea control to the Romans. Consequently, rather than devoting their primary effort to regaining control of the sea, they chose what appeared at the time to be the easier course. They attempted to avoid the necessity of regaining control of the sea; and instead, undertook a land campaign around the shores of the Western Mediterranean and across the Alps into Italy.
The subsequent campaigns are a story of the gradual bleeding of the wealth and manpower of Carthage as she sought to gain victory in a costly land campaign without facing the issue of control of the sea. Rome, meanwhile, continued to gain strength at sea, and in 146 B.C. a little over a hundred years after the beginning of the Punic Wars, she succeeded in carrying the fight overseas to the enemy shores. The Punic Wars were brought to an end by the complete destruction of .Carthage, which, little more than a hundred years before, had seen nothing to challenge her control of the sea.
Spain of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is another example of failure to understand the full meaning of seapower. From her favorable geographic position on the westernmost tip of the European Peninsula, Spain succeeded in projecting her power across the seas to the American Continent. Her ships were employed in transporting and supporting her overseas armies and in bringing back to Spain the wealth of the New World. Spain was admirably successful for a time in exploiting the seas, but she lagged in the development of a navy which could guarantee for her the continued use of the seas. Her concept of naval warfare was largely limited to the transport and support of land forces overseas. As a result Spain soon found herself unable to cope with the raids which the English made against the treasure-laden Spanish galleons. Thus it was that in 1588, the Spanish sent their troop-laden armada against England to punish the English for their raids against Spanish shipping. The Duke of Medina- Sidonia, who was in command of the Spanish Armada, was totally unfamiliar with naval warfare and seamanship. The results of this expedition are well known. The Spanish were soundly defeated by an inferior and hastily-assembled group of English ships, which were manned and commanded by sailors who knew how to fight and win at sea. Spain had neglected to secure control of the sea before sending her land forces overseas.
History contains other examples of misdirected effort at sea. Contenders for world power have at times sought to avoid fighting for control of the sea. At other times they have sought to avoid using it. But in most instances where an attempt was made to shrink from the problem of control and exploitation of the sea, failure has been the result. Human nature has changed very little over the centuries; and we can therefore anticipate a strong temptation to shrink from water-borne campaigns in the future. Men will be tempted to avoid the sea by skirting its shores; or they will be tempted to engage in extensive land campaigns in preference to naval campaigns. With the development of the airplane there will be additional temptation to avoid the issue by attempting to fly over the sea before exerting the effort required to control it. All these expedients are pitfalls, which lie across our path as we chart our future course.
The seas will be with us tomorrow in much the same form as they have existed for many centuries. Great will be the reward to the nation which is able to control them, and which knows how to exploit them. The methods by which the seas are controlled and the manner in which that control is exploited is undergoing continuous change. We in the United States must be the first to recognize these changes and to apply them intelligently to the fundamental problem of exercising control of the seas. The understanding and the will of the people—the determination of the people of the United States—to continue and strengthen their supremacy at sea is an essential factor in the continued existence of the United States as a great power.
Seapower and Airpower
No examination of seapower can proceed very far without considering the growing influence of the airplane on the control and the exploitation of world-wide sea communications. An objective approach to this problem is essential.
The development of the airplane has done more than anything else to overlap the areas of influence of land-based power and sea- based power. The airplane flying from land bases exerts an ever-increasing influence over the sea areas of the globe; so also, the airplane flying from sea bases exerts an ever- increasing influence over the land areas of the globe. Moreover, the influence of sea- based air power can be exercised from many directions; for, the seas of the world surround all the land masses of the world.
Air power and sea power have this in common: Both are instruments for exploiting media of transportation. Sea power has been defined as the total capacity of a people to control and exploit the seas. Air power might be defined as the total capacity of a people to control and exploit the air. From these definitions it can be seen that, just as the Navy represents but one segment of the total sea power of the United States, the Navy and the Air Force each represent but a segment of the total air power of the United States.
Man is a creature of the land. The great majority of his activities are centered on the land. The aspirations of peoples, their problems, and their conflicts are oriented toward the land. Sea power and air power are additional means available to man for use in the pursuit of his activities and in the solution of his problems on land. Neither sea nor air power are separate entities, powers sufficient unto themselves. They represent merely an extension of man’s ability to influence his activities on land. This does not in any way diminish the importance of either sea power or air power. Favorable decisions at sea and in the air in time of war will very likely be prerequisite to a favorable decision on land; but in pursuit of these decisions at sea or in the air, the ultimate condition which we seek to bring about on land must always be kept in mind. The methods and tactics used in warfare—on land, at sea, or in the air—must be consistent with the conditions which we wish to create.
Sea power and air power are neither competitive nor inharmonious. It is not a case of developing one in preference to the other. Sea power cannot be exercised effectively on a global basis without the concurrent and closely integrated exercise of air power. Air power cannot be employed effectively on a global basis without the concurrent and closely integrated exercise of sea power. This does not mean to imply that airplanes cannot fly over the seas without complete control of the seas, or that ships cannot move across the seas without complete control of the air. It does imply, however, that continuous, effective, and profitable overseas operations of aircraft must be accompanied by parallel control of the seas; and that continuous, effective, and profitable overseas operations of ships must be accompanied by parallel control of the air. The seas offer a means of transportation on a global basis at a rate considerably more economical than land or air transportation. The airplane, on the other hand, offers a means of transportation with advantages other than those offered by water transportation. It offers high-speed transportation. The airplane, within its technical limitations, is not so completely tied to the contours of geography as is the ship, although it is more completely dependent upon its land or sea base than is the ship.
Sea power and air power are most effective when used in combination. For example, airplanes can fly over deserts, over mountains, and, in war, over enemy ground defenses or enemy mine fields. On the other hand, aircraft, gasoline, bombs, weapons, and other types of cargo can be carried overseas at considerably less expense by ship than by air. Long range airplanes are limited in performance by the necessity of devoting a large percentage of their weight, size, and power to carrying fuel for their own consumption. This limitation is less applicable to ships, although ships designed with extremely large cruising radii have generally been found to be too large and too slow for practical military or commercial use. In the case of ships, it has usually been found more practical to sacrifice some cruising radius in the interest of greater speed and greater useful load-carrying capacity.
Does this imply that the development of long range aircraft should be either discouraged or eliminated? Certainly not. No avenue of development should be neglected or restricted; for, who has the clairvoyance to tell where such development will lead? But a concept which visualizes the eventual replacement of sea transportation by air transportation, or vice versa, appears to be somewhat limited. By the same token, neither air transportation nor water transportation can be expected to diminish the usefulness of land transportation, so long as man remains dependent on the land areas of the earth for his existence.
The power to control and use sea communications stems from the land and the people living on it. The power to control and use air communications stems from the same source; but in addition, it also stems from the seas which the nation concerned is able to control. Air power, so long as the basic instruments for its exploitation remain earth- based, is either land-based or sea-based. The extent to which it can be sea-based depends upon the ability of the nation to control the seas. The self-propelled air conveyance, whether manned by a pilot or not, is very much dependent upon the land or sea bases from which it is launched, and to which it must return, if the cost of such transportation is to be kept within reasonable limits. It follows, therefore, that the power to control and use the seas and the power to control and use the land are very much a part of air power. The airplane and the guided missile, so long as they continue to be earth-based, are dependent upon, and must be closely integrated with, the land or sea installations which sustain them. The airplane, or the guided missile, as a separate entity, independent of its land or sea installations, is of little value. The ship as a separate entity, independent of its bases, is also of little value.
Ships are most effective in warfare when they are used in coordination with airplanes (both land-based and sea-based) and mobile ground forces. Airplanes reach their greatest effectiveness in warfare when they are coordinated with land forces or ships, or both, in the pursuit of objectives common to all.
Sea-based air power has certain advantages peculiarly all its own. The sea offers almost unlimited expanses of water as readymade landing areas. A natural harbor with a supporting ship as a base is all that is required. There are no real estate or terrain problems. The base can be moved whenever it is desirable. The water landing area can support an airplane of unlimited size and weight. There is, in addition, another feature of sea-based air power which offers great additional possibilities for the future. A landing field can be built on a ship—the aircraft carrier, which can be moved across the water to wherever it is needed. Thus we have a unique combination which makes the future of sea-based air power appear very bright. That combination is the unlimited water landing field and the seaborne air base of great mobility. The intelligent and integrated development of sea power and sea-based air power offers immense possibilities.
Conclusion
It appears safe to conclude that the seas of the world, which have so vitally affected civilization in the past, will be with us tomorrow and the tomorrow beyond that. There can be little doubt that they will continue to exert a major influence on civilization. The nation able to control them and exploit them will be the dominant world power of the time. Change in the methods by which control of the seas is maintained and change in the manner in which that control is exploited will be the rule, rather than the exception.
The histories of Carthage, Rome, Spain, and England, four of the better known sea powers of history, are worthy of careful analysis. All four had the positions, the means, and the resources to be great sea powers. The reasons Rome and England were successful should be carefully noted. The reasons for the decline of Spain and the destruction of Carthage are also worthy of careful analysis. The circumstances surrounding the downfall of Carthage are particularly worthy of our attention.
Today we, like Carthage, enjoy undisputed control of the seas; and perhaps there are some among us who are inclined to be complacent about our ability to maintain that control indefinitely. And today also, there exists across the sea a nation which is predominantly a land power, a nation which has had some success in expanding her control over adjacent territory. The story of Carthage is, indeed, pertinent to our time.
The United States possesses the favorable geographical position, the resources, and the industrial capacity to be one of the great sea powers of history. By comparison, Soviet Russia is in a most unfavorable position in respect to the development of her own capacity to control and exploit the seas.
The same pitfalls which lay in the paths of great peoples of history also confront the people of the United States. The most hazardous of these pitfalls appears to be a feeling in some quarters that our current preeminence in the fields of science and technical development also endows us with a degree of wisdom in the application of such developments with which our forefathers were not blessed. This is typified by the present-day tendency to disregard or discredit the principles which have been formulated and tested over so many centuries of history. This tendency to forget, or to disregard, what has been learned before, however, is not peculiar to our time, for over 150 years ago the German philosopher, Hegel wrote:
“Peoples and governments never have learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it.”
Theories which herald the development of the airplane, or of atomic energy, or of any other weapon as marking the end of the dominant influence of the sea upon civilization should be subjected to careful scrutiny. All history, including that which has so recently been written in Korea, challenges the validity of such theories.
Control of the seas and the exploitation of that control in the best possible manner are matters of the utmost importance to the future of the United States. Control of world-wide sea communications, including certain seaway bottlenecks and land areas essential to such control, provides the freedom of action so essential to the successful conduct of war on a global basis. To secure that control should therefore he the primary initial objective, that is, the first essential step toward the attainment of any over-all objective, in the event of a general war. To attain this initial objective promptly will require the intelligent application of all weapons, of all branches of the Armed Forces, and of all resources which are reasonably available to the United States and her allies at the outbreak of war. The pursuit of other possible objectives should not be permitted to jeopardize the prompt attainment of this primary initial objective, short of which the successful prosecution of a war cannot be contemplated. The power to gain and maintain control of world-wide sea communications is also the power to deny to others any hope of military victory over the United States. The denial of such hope is the only type of deterrent which will withstand the calm, careful scrutiny of the strategists of a potential enemy.
The sea power of the United States is too vital a segment of our national power to be made a subject of controversy among our people—either in or out of the military services. The development of our sea power, of which the military aspects are only a part, should be of primary concern to all citizens of the United States, including those in the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.
The people of the United States have the position, the resources, and the capacity to attain an acceptable degree of security well within their means. Our capacity to recognize and make the most of our good fortune may well determine whether the life of our country will be measured in centuries—or in decades; for history presents strong evidence that our continued existence will depend in large measure upon how successful we are in developing the sea power of the United States and how wisely we use it.