The current revival of interest in naval history is a natural accompaniment of this greatest of all wars. Participants in the conflict instinctively compare it with similar epochs of the past, and they have every right to expect that events of the colorful present will be duly recorded, evaluated, and propounded. It, therefore, seems timely to set forth in outline what is being done and projected towards an adequate history of their notable deeds and the potent consequences thereof.
Present projects or proposals fall under three main categories. First, monographs on special phases, limited either as to time, place, or subject; second, the collection and archiving of complete operational records; and third, the ultimate production of a comprehensive history, on the order of a staff history, which will include technical analysis with a view to future indoctrination. This latter is so far merely a proposal.
Among the more intriguing of the monograph projects is that under Lieutenant Commander Samuel E. Morison, U. S. Naval Reserve, the eminent historian. He is attached directly to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, and this administrative independence is happily combined with outstanding abilities and energy. He accompanied the initial expedition to North Africa and within several months had completed a comprehensive draft of a preliminary narrative of that important naval operation based upon not only personal observation but also careful study of the official reports. Publication is delayed partly for reasons of security. This experiment in history “hot off the griddle” (as Commander Morison himself put it) appears highly successful and he plans similar treatment for other major operations.
Although altogether admirable in their early utility, such monographs, like those of Commander Morison, are necessarily tentative and subject to future revision as history. As yet records are too incomplete or too unavailable, and opportunity for sufficient study by professionals is lacking.
In addition the monograph field is being rather widely covered by various activities, including several bureaus of the Navy Department, sea frontiers, naval districts, navy yards, and other shore stations. Such work is being done upon the initiative of the activity concerned, with but little advice or assistance by the Office of Naval Records. Under the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Professor Robert G. Albion is engaged upon an administrative history of the Navy Department during the war period; in line with the general program of the Bureau of the Budget to encourage histories of the war-time administration of government agencies.
Monographs undoubtedly occupy an important place in history and well serve the demands of specialized interest, yet their necessary limitations as to time, place, or activity leave broader aspects rather blurred. Due clarifaction requires a general narrative to fit the jig-saw pieces into a composite whole. General narratives and monographs supplement each other. Indispensable to both, the very basis of both, are archives of original manuscript material, to which reference may be made not only for the initial composition but also for future verification, study, and revision.
The matter of archives is of outstanding importance in relation to history. They are indispensable not only to the doing of justice to individuals but also to satisfactory broader analysis of and deduction from experience. It is not enough that the individuals participating in an event shall themselves benefit from the experience. The lessons should be broadcast currently and made permanently available for general guidance. A written record made soon after events (perhaps supplemented by a sound record) is the only safeguard against tricky memory and misleading distortion, and the best permanent means of elucidation. Such records covering war experience are obviously of special importance. They serve as a necessary gauge for the accurate measurement of theory, a jig enabling us to “tool-up” for adequate preparedness, and a compass to guide our course.
The Office of Naval Records therefore takes its archival responsibilities very seriously. The mere collection of reasonably complete naval archives is rather Herculean. An immense number of documents from ships, aviation units, flag files including those from task forces, sea frontiers, naval districts, operating bases, etc., must be assembled. Not only is the number of units very great but they have been scattered in a world-wide way, ashore and afloat. Furthermore the dispersion of mobile forces has gone on in kaleidoscopic fashion.
It is far from enough to make a mass collection. Equally important and even more difficult and time consuming is the problem of arrangement. The great reservoir of information must be so organized and administered that almost any cross section of data, great or small, that may be called for in the future may be found readily within a reasonable time. Otherwise the information is virtually locked up, with the key lost so far as utility is concerned.
The sad experience connected with the Spanish-American War will illustrate this point. The old Bureau of Navigation then had the function corresponding to what is now "Naval Operations" in all its ramifications. In addition the Bureau directed all matters of personnel and supervised administration of the Hydrographic Office, the Naval Observatory, the Naval Academy, training stations, etc. Unfortunately the Bureau's filing system was atrocious—in fact no system at all. Papers were merely filed serially as handled, regardless of subject. Seaman John Jones's lapse of conduct at Rio might find a place beside the battle report from Dewey at Manila.
Until very recently no attempt was made transform this indigestible mass of old files into an orderly set of archives. Consequently historians attempting work in the Spanish War period have been baffled by the incredible maze of the old filing system. In effect the data were virtually nonexistent.
A better job was done in the case of the first World War. Historical Sections having the function of collecting and archiving records of the war were established in both Washington and London a few months before the 1918 Armistice. The similar work then being carried on in England under the direction of Sir Julian Corbett was carefully studied. An archive system based upon that of the British was worked out by Lieutenant Tracy B. Kittredge, U.S.N.R., and adopted in London. When the London collection was transferred to Washington a few years later it was merged with Washington papers into a single set of historical archives, systematized under uniform principles.
When this was completed in about 1925 it became apparent that the same archival principles could be advantageously applied to earlier records. The Office of Naval Records had in its custody nearly a million priceless old manuscripts, dating from the Revolution to about 1890, representing a fairly complete operational heritage of our naval history. The great variety of filing systems and the large number of documents filed almost without system vastly multiplied the burdens of research, for which there is never ending demand. At this time the “National Archives” was not in existence and the Office of Naval Records had to do the job itself if early records were to be dealt with at all.
The task of rearrangement of so many papers, while at the same time keeping up with current work, was rather appalling at first. But gradually order came into being and well paid for itself. Today the entire lot of several million documents dealing with naval operations from the Revolution up to about 1920 are archived under one uniform system. The gain in facility of research is immense.
Of course the foregoing applies only to documents that were actually in the possession of the Navy Department. In periods prior to the War of 1812 a large proportion of the total existing operational documents are unfortunately scattered among many places throughout the country. The emphasis which has been placed herein upon operational documents should also be noted. Logistic material has remained very largely in the old files of various bureaus which have been transferred to the National Archives. Quite recently the Navy Department’s operational archives prior to 1910 have also been transferred to the custody of the National Archives, but under an agreement that the “servicing” of them by personnel from the Office of Naval Records shall continue indefinitely. Such an administrative arrangement respecting personnel has been found highly desirable for the collections of other Executive Departments in the National Archives. The technical knowledge and familiarity with the papers that have been acquired by such personnel through many years make them indispensable. Moreover the manuscripts are better available for the administrative use of the department concerned.
There is too little general appreciation of the high value of musty old records for up-to-the-minute administrative utility. No one can say in advance when or how a certain group of old documents may become of burning current interest. For example, when the matter of lend-lease naval bases recently flared into the limelight there was an urgent demand from the White House for information of the conditions under which the Navy used Minorca, Syracuse, and other places about the world as naval bases in times more than a hundred years ago. The answer had a direct bearing on an immediate problem. Many similar instances of an imperative need for data from really old papers for current administrative purposes could be cited. The demand never ceases.
Many years after the present war becomes “old stuff” its records will continue to be of great value and utility, not merely for history but also for then current administration. Probably this will be true of World War II more than any previous war because of its immense scope, political import, and revolutionary technical elements—especially in the advent of air power. There are, therefore, many very cogent reasons for constructing a really fine set of archives covering this, so far, greatest of all wars.
To this end a small but highly competent staff has been gathered by the Office of Naval Records; reserve officers well versed in archival matters, who had in civil life specialized in naval and maritime history. These have been making an intensive study of the problem. This has included a survey of the situation in various offices in the Navy Department and in the field, taking great care to avoid “getting in the way” and hampering the administrative war effort and also having due regard for security restrictions.
Archive methods.—The problem of assembly involves systematic arrangement such as will facilitate ready use of the material for a multitude of greatly varied purposes, into the distant future. The intricacies of archival methods have no place herein and hold little interest to the layman. For him it is not the tree but the fruit thereof that counts. In barest outline decision must be made as between two general methods of assembly.
Under one method the files of each office, great and small, are merely taken over, leaving the original order undisturbed—except for the elimination of the useless material usually present in considerable bulk. The various groups of files received are arranged so that the organizational setup of offices as a whole is virtually duplicated. Thus the normal relationship between groups of files is preserved.
The application of this so-called principle of “provenance” to naval operational archives, however, is less satisfactory than to more nearly static organization. Especially in war time the composition of fleets, squadrons, and task forces undergoes frequent and rapid changes. So also with their world-wide locations and missions. This kaleidoscope afloat and in the air is largely reflected ashore also. Thus the general difficulty of preserving the original relationship between groups of files becomes very complicated indeed, and the complication tends strongly to defeat the cardinal purpose of facilitating research, which is the heart of the question. We archive not merely to preserve the great reservoir of information, but principally to render the reservoir useful as an administrative adjunct and as a fountain source of history for all future time.
The alternative system of “methodizing” is merely an arbitrary arrangement that is devised with a view to fitting the case. It is usually a combination of chronology, subject classification, geographical locations, etc. Inevitably much overlapping will result and the researcher must often hunt through many different places to find what he wants. He will also be hampered by the ordeal of having to familiarize himself with the “crazy” filing system. Each such system differs from all others. However, the existing Navy’s system, covering a great mass of documents from the Revolution through World War I, is reasonably simple. It has stood the test of much research. For naval archives it is believed to be the best system for facilitating research.
In any case, microfilming seems to be the answer to the dilemma over which of the two archive systems to choose for naval records of the current war. Microfilming will also solve any great difficulties over sufficient office space for the mountain of papers which otherwise must be cared for. Moreover, microfilming is cheap, and there is inconsiderable further expense involved in subsequently enlarging such groups of documents as may be needed for frequent reference.
It has therefore been tentatively decided to microfilm all important files as convenient opportunity offers. The microfilm copies, with some enlargements, may be arranged under the existing Navy's archive system and its special advantages for future research thus fully utilized. The original documents may then be transferred to the permanent custody of the National Archives, so soon as their administrative use ceases and the originating office desires to so liquidate them. This usually means a lag of several years. The superb National Archives has very superior facilities and a highly competent staff to care for the permanent preservation of the originals. No doubt they will arrange the material so received under their preferred principle of provenance, whereas the Navy Department's microfilm collection of duplicates may be otherwise arranged to better serve naval administrative and research needs.
The basic purpose of archives is to create a reservoir of information. By proper internal arrangement we make useful what is otherwise a vast indigestible mass. Comprehensive and well-arranged archives are of immense value in a great variety of ways, many of them impossible to foresee. The experience of the past is often an indispensable guide for the present and an infallible preview in part of the future.
Staff histories.—One among many important functions which a proper set of archives may serve is that of staff histories. Our Navy has never had the benefit of this great adjunct to naval education and training in peace time. The present war marks a rather radically new era in naval warfare, especially in the advent of full-fledge aviation, but also because of many other novel factors such as the development of radar. More than ever before the future will see a genuine need of staff histories as one element in naval preparedness.
The utility of history in peace training and future war operations can be made very high. Marshal Foch in his book The Principles of War says:
History must be the source of learning the art of war. The more an Army lacks war experience the more it needs to make use of the history of war for its instruction. Although the history of war is no substitute for actual experience it can be a foundation for such experience. In peace time it becomes the true method of learning war and of determining the invariable principles of the art of war.
A recognition of these facts was the origin of Napoleon’s efficiency. He prepared himself for exercising high command without previous experience, principally by studying history, and throughout his writings he advocates the same methods for others. The elder Von Moltke, and many of the other successful modern commanders, emphasize the value of history for the same purposes.
In the development of modern professional armies, it soon became evident that historical education was required not only of the higher commanders but also among the body of officers. Since different historians gave varying interpretations and came to conflicting conclusions respecting the same historical events it gradually grew to be the custom for General Staffs to make their own historical analyses and deductions. This promoted uniformity of indoctrination and hence co-operation and unity of action within an Army in spite of the difficulties attending hostile operations.
It was not long before the Historical Section of the General Staff became an exceedingly important part of the staff during both peace and war. To it was entrusted not only study and analysis of older wars but the actual preparation of histories of current or recent wars. Upon its conclusions depended the establishment and development of the doctrines which were to guide the armies in their peace training and future fighting. No part of the General Staff work was deemed of greater importance than this.
The doctrines of the Germans during the wars of 1886 and 1870 were based primarily upon analytical studies of Napoleon’s campaigns. Those for World War I embodied the experience gained during 1866 and 1870 as well as deductions made from the Russo-Japanese, Boer, and other recent wars. French doctrines had a similar basis yet their analyses had led to different conclusions. Therefore, in 1914 German doctrines and French doctrines were markedly different in many essential respects, which had a vital influence upon the course of the war. Hence the need was manifested for the best talent available being employed during peace upon such highly important work as historical writing and analyses.
The methods outlined above had been adopted by all modern armies in 1914. So far as the writer is aware no Navy, except the German and possibly the Japanese, had followed suit. I believe it can be demonstrated that the results at Jutland, Coronel, and the Dardanelles were due to this influence more than any other. The British had failed to indoctrinate their service with deductions from history, carefully and authoritatively made. The Germans were not guilty of the same neglect. Hence a series of naval failures occurred for the British in spite of their great naval preponderance.
In principle the method of development indicated above is familiar to our Navy. It was the way in which rapid and permanent strides were made in gunnery. Each year the fleet held target practice. Results were carefully recorded, then studied, criticized, and analyzed by the best minds in the service. The conclusions reached, were published to the service, thus indoctrinating it for future practices. Wars occur with such infrequency that the same regularity cannot be followed in tactical and strategic development. Yet in principle the best method of doing so is the same as that which we followed with gunnery. “The Navy is a business which is only occasionally actually engaged in the performance of its business, and its business is of such nature that the people doing it often do not know what they are doing in its relationship to the whole. This they can only learn from history.”
Up to the present time the function under discussion—development and indoctrination through authoritative historical studies, writings, and deductions—has been almost wholly lacking in the American Navy. No history—in the sense of a General Staff history—of American naval operations has ever been prepared. Admiral Mahan’s history of the War of 1812 is probably the nearest approach to one. But in a large sense the lessons of all our naval war experience from the birth of the Republic to the present time are inaccessible to the present and future officer. They are buried in a mass of documents that have never been properly digested and interpreted. Generally speaking our service lacks authoritative analysis and deductions from the war experience of other nations also.
The preparation of such a history would obviously require intensive work by a group of well-qualified officers. Actual experience afloat during combat operations seems to be one of the necessary qualifications. Professional historians should also be included in the group. This is the opinion of such authorities as Vice Admiral W. L. Rodgers of our Navy and of Sir Julian Corbett, the eminent British naval historian. History writing is a profession in itself, in which naval officers can but rarely be proficient. Both professions must collaborate if the product is to be of the first class.
However, the preparation of a staff history of the current war is not definitely among the present historical projects. It is more in the nature of a proposal and has been discussed herein mainly to illustrate the great importance of a comprehensive archive collection to serve all historical ends.
