One hundred years ago this month, within the garrison limits of West Point, Alfred Thayer Mahan was born. Fifty years ago this spring his first book on the influence of sea power, which profoundly influenced the history of his own time, was published. Midsummer of 1940, Mahan’s centenary, as this is written, there is about to begin a life and death struggle between British sea power and German land and air power. Clearly the American Navy should not only celebrate the hundredth birthday of one of its most distinguished officers but should dispassionately re-examine his conception of sea power to ascertain if it needs modification on account of the rapid development of aviation.
The continued progress of aviation need not alarm Americans. By suitable preparation their continental territory, their interests and possessions abroad can still be secured if airships prove superior to surface ships and submarines. American youths take to the air as naturally as their forefathers did to the sea. American industry can produce aircraft equal to any and superior to most. Our Army and Navy, entirely convinced of the value of aviation, have carefully trained our Army and Navy fliers. Today American aviation is not merely an aggregation of fast and powerful planes; it is an integral part of our Fleet and Army.
Our naval aviators, most of whom are graduates of the Naval Academy, have the training, the traditions, and the spirit of the Navy. They are especially proficient in aviation tactics over the sea and can operate with or against a surface fleet. If ever the vast ocean reaches are continuously controlled from the air, it will be done by United States Naval Aviation. But before entrusting their future primarily or entirely to aviation, Americans should assure themselves that they no longer need their Army and Navy.
Should the continued progress of aviation modify Mahan’s thesis, it would not reflect adversely on his historical research or the soundness of his reasoning, for he based his conception of sea power on a study of history undertaken a quarter of a century before the Wrights flew at Kitty Hawk. If aircraft eventually prove the continuous master of surface and sub-surface ships, it would only mean that the primary instrument of obtaining and exercising sea power had been changed. The value of sea power to the United States would be as great as ever. So before assuming that aviation will cause the abandonment of Mahan’s thesis, we should be sure that we comprehend it entirely.
It was that naval paladin, Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, charter member of the Naval Institute and founder of the Naval War College, who selected Mahan as lecturer on naval history and naval tactics. Preparing for this duty, Mahan had his inspiration; there “came from within the suggestion that the control of the sea was an historic factor which had never been systematically appreciated and expounded.” He undertook to investigate this historical factor and after two years’ study expounded his ideas, first to brother officers in a series of lectures and then, in search of a larger audience, he published The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 in 1890, in which he gave the first closely reasoned estimate of “the effect of sea power upon the course of history and the prosperity of nations.”
After 1890 the thesis of sea power was no longer “vague and unsubstantial” but rested “upon a collection of special instances in which the precise effect [of sea power] has been made clear by analysis of the conditions at the given moment.” These “special instances” Mahan collected from seven great wars, beginning with the Second Anglo-Dutch war and ending with the naval war of 1778-83, in which we gained our independence. Before publishing his theory he tested it by the events of a century and a quarter of history packed with wars. In his second book he subjected it to the severer test of the Napoleonic wars; during these tremendous struggles land power was wielded by Napoleon, who controlled directly or by alliance the continent of Europe and personally exercised all the powers of the State, while sea power, based on the British Isles, was supported by a population approximately half that of France, and the British armed forces were directed by a distracted cabinet, tormented by the criticism of a partisan parliamentary opposition, that would not be permitted today. Under such adverse conditions, sea power triumphed over land power, but only after seven years’ struggle, and Mahan reminded his readers that this war “nearly ruined Great Britain but entirely ruined Napoleon.”
This last phrase should be emphasized, for sea power wins slowly and cannot be successfully exercised by a nation whose people lack the stamina to endure the burdens of a long war. Sea power has never won a war in six weeks nor yet in six months. It requires time for sea power to compel a powerful, courageous, continental nation to sue for peace. In compensation, sea power not only insures the destruction of enemy overseas trade, but it protects and often nourishes its own. London merchants boasted that during the Seven Years’ War, under Pitt, commerce was united with and made to flourish by war. Mahan did not assert “that war increases the prosperity of nations” but claimed that during the Napoleonic wars England found much economic recompense for the inevitable losses occasioned by war.
In the first chapter of his first book on sea power, Mahan gave a synopsis of his theory, supported by historical instances and explained by a running commentary. The basic elements essential to sea power were (a) Production, (b) Shipping, (c) Colonies and Markets.
Production included agriculture and mining, which increase the products of the earth; manufactures, which multiply the products of man’s industry; internal trade routes, by which exchange of products from the interior to the exterior is made easy. Shipping embraced not only ships and shipbuilding but the shipping and customs regulations which tended to keep the carrying trade in national hands, in order to encourage the building of ships, merchant as well as naval. Under Colonies and Markets Mahan discussed colonial administration and development, by which external markets could be monopolized for the home trade; treaties, which should protect a nation’s trade; and tariffs that encouraged the carriage of national goods in national ships.
The development of these three elements of sea power was primarily affected by the geographical position, physical conformation, and extent of territory; the number of population, the national character of people, and the character and policy of governments. Mahan’s studies led him to conclude that from 1650 to 1890 sea power developed naturally among the people of the British Isles, and encouraged and enabled them to expand the United Kingdom into the British Empire.
Nowhere in his discussions of sea power did Mahan limit it to naval power; something more than the most powerful fleet in the world was necessary to sea power. In his opinion, to gain and maintain sea power a nation (1) must have a favorable geographical position; (2) must have favorable physical conformation, particularly of its seaboard—numerous and deep arbors add a source of strength and wealth; (3) its territory must be sufficient to support the agriculture, mines, and manufactures, and must be sufficiently populated so that it can be readily deeded; (4) its population must have an aptitude for the sea. Sea power, Mahan believed, tended to develop naturally among trading nations; the tendency to trade accompanied by the ability to produce something to sell was the national characteristic most important to the development of sea power. The next important national characteristic was the capacity to plant healthy colonies.
If successive governments were in accord with the natural aptitude of the people for sea power, they would steadily and with conscious purpose extend the Nation’s sea dominion and foster the growth of the nation’s sea power. During the period when England rose from a kingdom to an empire, British governments in the main steadily kept in mind the maintenance of sea power. But as early as 1890 Mahan noted that the governments of England had become much more democratic than the governments which had created the empire, and he questioned “whether a democratic government will have the foresight . . . and the willingness to insure its prosperity by adequate” military preparations. He recorded even then that there were signs that as England became more democratic it tended to drop behind in its naval preparations.
The history of the British Empire was extensively used by Mahan to illustrate the influence of sea power, but his avowed purpose was “to draw from the lessons of history inferences applicable to one’s own country and service.” The similarities between the peoples and the position of the United Kingdom and the United States were obvious. The continental position of the United States, unvexed by powerful neighbors, fronting on the Atlantic and Pacific, made it essentially a huge island, whose constantly growing population in 1890 had already solved the problem of domestic production and who would be compelled by its successful attainment of the first element, production, to strive for the two other elements of sea power, shipping and overseas markets, in order to dispose of their products. Americans were naturally traders and seamen; they possessed the personal characteristics necessary for sea power, and could enter the struggle with every prospect of success.
His study and reflections convinced Mahan that the United States should follow the example of the United Kingdom. He knew the larger territory and population of the United States could be a substantial basis for an expansion greater even than that achieved by the United Kingdom; he felt that the altruism of Americans of the twentieth century would insure consideration for backward peoples who came under their tutelage and American expansion would have a beneficial effect upon them and the world generally. Accordingly, he became an ardent advocate of American expansion. Sea power was to be the means of this expansion, and from 1890 until his death in 1914 he urged Americans not to content themselves with being a continental people whose influence was bounded by their own coasts, but to develop their natural and greater heritage, sea power, and employ it to extend their trade, political influence, culture, civilization, and religion abroad. Only in this way could Americans take a proper share in the world’s life.
Mahan was convinced that no one nation could ever again exert the unlimited control over the seas that England had during most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but he did think that together the British and American nations could exercise such control. He thought they should co-operate because in general American and British external interests coincided, and in the few instances where their interests clashed he felt an adjustment could be effected. He opposed a formal alliance between the two countries but was convinced they could act in concert throughout the world under an easily cached general understanding, which would be mutually helpful and would tend to stabilize world conditions.
Mahan never claimed that the greatness of any state could be attributed to sea power alone, but he did prove by historical instances that it was the central link in a chain which lays under contribution other Nations, and reiterated that, “In England this control and use of the sea seems to arise naturally.”
It should be emphasized again that Mahan never asserted that sea power could be obtained and sustained by a superior fleet alone. He always insisted that armies and forts were required to support sea power. In his first book he stated that the protection of naval stations like Gibraltar and Malta must depend upon direct military (land) force. In his first essay directly addressed to the American Public, he called attention to the obsolete fortifications of our Atlantic seaports and recommended that they be protected by modern coast defenses from occupation or bombardments by enemy fleets. He knew these unprotected harbors invited invasion and wanted the United States Fleet, when constructed, to be free to act on the offensive. Later Mahan recommended that the defenses of Hawaii, Panama Canal, and other overseas bases he protected by the Army in order that the Fleet would always be free to seek out the enemy fleet; he realized that to exercise control of the sea a fleet needs overseas bases from which to operate, and he always denounced the employment of a navy as a “fortress fleet” to defend unprotected or partly protected harbors. Naval bases must be fortified so they can resist enemy attacks until the fleet can raise the siege; the fleet has the additional responsibility of maintaining the communications of the bases with the home country.
Mahan knew that in war on the sea it was impossible for any navy to be everywhere in overwhelming strength; under certain conditions it might be necessary to leave some distant dependency temporarily unprotected, in order to concentrate superior force in the vital area; he also knew that success in the vital area would eventually restore the situation in the minor theaters. The Caribbean Sea and the Panama Canal together formed our most important strategical position, for they held the key to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans; he wrote “the Canal should be so fortified as to be indifferent at a moment of attack whether the [United States] Fleet is at its ports or a thousand miles away.”
Mahan lived long enough to see surface sea power challenged by the German submarines. He predicted after the sinking of the Cressy, Hogue, and Aboukir, that the submarine threat could be met and overcome and that in spite of the German success (on land) in 1914 “the British Fleet holds the decision in its hands as in the days of Napoleon . . . provided the Allies persist to the end.” He did not see nor anticipate the rapid development of aviation but it is possible to apply some of his leading ideas to present-day aviation and make some reasonable conjectures about his reactions to the new and powerful weapon.
In the late 1880’s Mahan urged the modernization of our Navy, he insisted that automobiles, torpedoes, and lethal gas, then new weapons, be given an opportunity to prove their merit; it is a fair inference that he would have welcomed aviation into our Navy. His acute mind would have immediately appreciated the extreme mobility of aircraft which give them such far-flung potentialities on the offense and defense. He applied with certain modifications the principles of land warfare to naval tactics, he certainly would have sought to apply with suitable modifications the principles underlying naval tactics to air tactics. We can be sure that he would, wherever possible, have used naval aviation in conjunction with the fleet and against the enemy’s organized resistance. He realized how difficult it was to force an inferior fleet to leave a protected harbor; in command of a superior fleet, he probably would have employed his air bombers to force a reluctant enemy fleet to come out to fight.
We know how insistent he was that a defeated fleet be relentlessly pursued, he certainly would have employed bombing planes to cut a fleeing enemy fleet to pieces. Although advocating the offensive whenever possible, Mahan knew that some occasions forced a defensive attitude and under such conditions a fleet must be protected, we can be certain he would diligently have prepared to defend the fleet from the harassing attacks of aviation.
During the five years preceding 1914, Mahan continually warned his country and Great Britain against the increasing military and naval strength of Germany who was then demanding her place in the sun; it is a reasonable assumption that if Mahan, who always kept a keen eye on military and naval developments in Europe, had been alive from 1934 to 1939 he would have warned both Britain and America against the rise of German air and land power. In 1912-13 he urged Great Britain, although possessed of the largest fleet in the world, to adopt conscription; under the present conditions it is a certainty that in addition to the world’s greatest navy, he would have recommended a huge air force and universal military service to create a powerful army.
British and German capital ships have shown increasing ability to continue operations after being hit by air bombs and torpedoes; British and French light cruisers, destroyers, motor launches, and merchantmen proved at Dunkirk that when Provided with an “umbrella” of fighting Planes they could continue operations in spite of bombing planes; but it must be accepted that surface fleets cannot operate in narrow waters in proximity to land- based air bombers unless they are continuously protected by their own fighting planes. Such sea areas are definitely dangerous for surface fleets; they will tend to increase in extent with improvements in bombing planes, but it will probably be possible for a surface fleet adequately supplied with anti-aircraft guns and accompanied by its own fighters to make sudden sweeps into these narrow waters if the military situation justifies the risk. And it should not be forgotten that the efficiency of fighting planes and anti-aircraft guns is increasing. It will be natural for an inferior surface fleet to endeavor to restore the balance by maneuvering to bring on an engagement where its bombers can take part. Under such circumstances the relative numbers of planes and relative skill of aviation personnel will powerfully influence the result.
Various defense measures have reduced the effectiveness of submarine attacks on surface ships; in these aircraft have played a major part. Simultaneously, submarines have been able to maintain themselves in sea areas denied by airplanes to surface craft. Therefore, these two weapons can be employed against each other by the surface fleet, for to a certain degree each neutralizes the other. Both submarines and aircraft are too often only considered as natural enemies of a surface fleet and, therefore, the annihilators of sea power; actually, they attain their greatest efficiency when employed in support of a superior fleet to secure control of the sea.
The surface fleet can contribute directly to the protection of the continental United States from enemy bombing attacks by intercepting any aircraft carriers that attempt fly and run tactics. It indirectly contributes to their protection by maintaining the communication with our island outposts and Alaska, which denies possible enemies the use of these strategic positions as bases for an air attack. The Army, with its anti-aircraft batteries and aviation, plus any local naval aviation present, would provide direct protection to the vital areas in continental United States.
The United States have a continental position that today is not vulnerable to attack by potential enemy aircraft, our population cannot be starved by a blockade, we have enough overseas territory, including Alaska, to give us the necessary bases from which our naval and air forces, if sufficiently strong, can operate to keep enemy fleets and aviation at great distances from our vital continental areas, provided we equip these bases and fortify them.
Considering the events of the present war to date (August 15), despite submarines and aircraft, Mahan’s thesis of sea power still obtains as far as it applies to the United States. Actually, the development of these new weapons enhances our advantages over former competitors for sea power. Today the United States is the nation indicated by position, extent of territory, and population to be the preponderant sea power. It is the only state that can exercise sea power that is not itself vulnerable to land or air attack. It is endowed with the elements necessary to sea power as understood by Mahan. Today the United States can more easily develop, exercise, and protect sea power than any other nation. An increasingly greater proportion of naval aviation with the fleet will be necessary: bombing squadrons, whether Army or Navy, must be trained to operate in conjunction with the fleet; and army garrisons that defend our naval bases must be ready to defend the fleet or any part of it, when repairing or refitting, from air attacks. When this is done, the United States can trust her security for the foreseeable future to the navy supported by land and air forces. Sea power as understood by Mahan has always comprehended and required much more than a preponderant surface fleet.
With the increasing improvement of aviation it is not impossible that the relative positions of air and surface craft will be reversed; aviation may become our major weapon and the fleet only a sustaining member like the Army. But we should not lay the old weapon aside until the new is further tried. Sea power in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries required an army as well as a fleet. Today it requires aviation in addition. In the meanwhile the co-operation already existing between the three forces, land, sea, and air, should become closer and closer so that our national security may not be endangered during what may prove to be a period of transition. If the time ever comes when the United States must entrust the principal responsibility for its national security and right to its own way of life to aviation, the Army and Navy can turn over their major functions to the Air Force without regret, as parents pass down a heritage and responsibility to a son and heir.