Guam - Our Western Outpost

The island of Guam, until recently a remote dot in the western Pacific to most Americans, is now front page news. The 250 square miles of tropi­cal island with its 21,000 native Chamorro population had remained practically for­gotten by the country which seized this southernmost of the Marianas Group from Spain 41 years ago in the course of the Spanish-American War. Since 1899, the administration of the island by the United States Navy has effected what amounts to a modern sociological miracle which has passed unnoticed in this country. Not until the strategic possibilities of this tiny isolated parcel of national territory were envisioned anew by a naval board on fleet bases, was the problem of Guam brought to the attention of United States citizens. It may be well therefore to understand the threefold aspect of this problem: the status of Guam as our ward with her population a completely loyal and dependent native race; Guam’s position in a plan of national defense; and her position as a pawn in international relationships in the Pacific.

Our possession of this small island came as a result of an almost incidental capture when a United States cruiser en route to Manila with re-enforcements for Dewey stopped at Apra Harbor and took Guam without opposition. It is to be regretted that all the Marianas Islands, not simply Guam, were not taken. At that time they were unoccupied and their “capture” would have involved simply the changing of a few words when the American flag was raised in Agana, the capital of Guam and the island group. At the conclusion of the war Guam was formally ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris, while Spain promptly sold the other 16 Maria­nas Islands to Germany. The seat of the German government was established on Saipan, and in the ensuing 20 years a great deal was done to build up a strong German foothold in that section of the Pacific. After the World War, Japan acquired these islands together with the Pelews, Caroline, and Marshalls as man­dated territory, but now, since her with­drawal from the League of Nations, as actual possessions. These islands enabled that rising power to extend her line of national territory from her own archi­pelago southward, thus making a com­plete Japanese island barrier extending north and south across the western Pa­cific with Guam alone keeping open our door to trade with the Far East.

In the writings of the first American officers sent out to Guam there are found enthusiastic visions of the island fortified as a second Gibraltar—a U. S. stronghold in the mid-Pacific. The topography of Guam contributes to this viewpoint, for a low protecting coral reef surrounds al­most the entire island, leaving protected bays, lagoons, and beaches. One large deep harbor, called Apra, is several miles in diameter and is adequately protected by shore and reefs. Furthermore, if freed of navigational hazards it is well adapted to large mooring requirements. Sharp crags command all approaches from the sea and several of these the Spaniards had fortified, so that further development seemed reasonable to early American engi­neers. But the expense of the proposed improvements proved staggering to a country then unaccustomed to thinking in terms of billions of dollars, and one delay after another prevented them. The establishment in 1903 of a relay station for the transpacific cable at Sumay on the island reopened the question of further development only temporarily. Although Guam was thereafter able to communicate with all parts of the world by cable, and later by radio, no further improvement of her commercial or military facilities was made. Gradually, the development of Olongapo and Cavite in the Philippine Islands, and Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian area, both with repair and dry-dock facili­ties, together with oil replacing coal as fuel, resulted in Guam receiving less and less consideration as a Pacific base. Thus it remained a relatively insignificant naval station and port of call for government vessels only. A further blow to the im­provement of military facilities on the island was struck at the Washington Dis­armament Conference in 1922 when the United States, as well as Great Britain, agreed not to develop naval bases in the Far East. Guam, a potential air base only 1,300 miles from the island of Honshu with its highly inflammable city build­ings, was most directly affected and any tentative plans for the island’s material development were dropped. So effectively did Japan press this agreement that by 1932 all of the armament so laboriously mounted at strategic points over the island during 1917 and 1918, as well as a small aviation unit, had been removed. In con­sequence, our only steppingstone in that part of the Pacific large enough to be of strategic value, 1,500 miles from Manila and 3,300 miles from Pearl Harbor, at present lies defenseless, surrounded by alien territory.

As a result of this complete disarma­ment, the work of the naval government on Guam resolved itself largely into sal­vaging the remnant of the fine old Cha­morro race found on the island in 1899. During the 250 years the Spanish govern­ment administered the island, the native population decreased from an estimated 50,000 to less than 9,000, due largely to wars following political and religious changes and to diseases brought by the Spaniards. From physical, mental, and moral con­ditions too depressing to describe, Guam gradually emerged into one of the clean­est, most wholesome and prosperous spots in the tropics. Within 40 years the popula­tion has more than doubled to over 21,000, due to proper sanitation and medical care, modern water and sewage systems and a modem educational system. Extensive training in tropical agriculture under the direction of the federal Department of Agriculture has made possible a standard of living with comforts hitherto unknown in that part of the Pacific.

Following the observation of the first acting governor, Lieutenant William Saf- ford, U. S. Navy, that “nothing pays on this island so surely as coconuts,” each naval administration in its turn has urged, encouraged, even ordered the development of coconut plantations, so that since 1914 over 2,000 tons of copra have been ex­ported annually. With the recent de- •pressed market for coconut oil products, copra production has declined sharply. Nevertheless, the Chamorro people at least have the satisfaction of a product for which there is always some financial re­turn, and the comforting knowledge that actual need will not exist so long as typhoons do not destroy their coco­nut palms. Meanwhile they are learning rapidly to diversify the products of their fertile but shallow soil and to look to the sea, as of old, for plentiful fish rather than to all-too-attractive imported cans!

There have been other economic prob­lems to overcome in rearing the unsophis­ticated but intelligent Chamorros from a virtual state of peonage to self-reliant and independent Guam citizens. It took some time to establish a money economy on the island and to induce men to work regu­larly and dependably for wages—a system foreign to their native philosophy and customs. Wages have more than tripled since 1900, and although the Chamorros are essentially farmers and fishermen, ex­pert craftsmen trained in the naval shops are found in all villages as well as in Agana, the capital. Extensive roads built of locally mined casajo have made intercourse throughout the island possible and have facilitated transportation. Since the Navy has held Guam as a closed port for foreign shipping and immigration, the island has not offered attractive opportunities to capital for investment in its agricultural possibilities. Now, however, with Sumay used as a port of call by transpacific airliners and with the construction of a Guam Inn for clipper passengers, a po­tential tourist industry may be developing together with a new economic era in the history of the island.

Since the Spanish government had dis­couraged all forms of education among the Chamorros on the grounds that it would “render them unfit for future usefulness,” the great proportion of Chamorros were completely illiterate, their culture consist­ing chiefly of their distinctive language and songs and tales of early racial heroes. In 1898 there was reputedly but one grammar text (Spanish) on the island, and this precious book was passed from boy to boy until completely worn out. After the establishment of the Naval Government, English was adopted as the official language, and as fast as teachers and financial support could be found an extensive system of free public education was established. Selected U. S. Marines served in the early years as instructors of would-be Chamorro teachers. From a primitive beginning the school system has grown until over 4,000 pupils are now instructed. There are now high and normal schools as well as craft schools. Students are well instructed not only in the con­ventional three R’s but also in American standards and ideals, both political and social. The result is a hybrid Chamorro- American civilization with stress upon the latter.

With the establishment of present-day economic systems and methods, a new Chamorro standard of living has followed in the wake of increased knowledge, in­creased wants, increased activities, and increased incomes. One unsought result of this great sociological change has been a gratitude and loyalty to the United States which might well be an example to the citizens here. This intense admiration for all that is “states-side,” spiritual as well as material, has found expression in vari­ous petitions to be granted United States citizenship, not simply to derive increased benefits and protection, but to be an actual part of the democracy to which they give such wholehearted devotion. Thus far it has not been found expedient for Congress to grant the Chamorro’s re­quest, as again this matter is tied up with the ultimate disposition of the island.

When in 1936 the transpacific Pan­American Clipper planes made Apra Har­bor one of their bases, Guam regained some of her old prestige as a potentially valuable national possession. Without this conveniently placed island harbor, regular flights over the hazardous 3,000 miles from Wake Island to Manila would have meant maximum strain, if not serious difficulty. As clipper planes have increased in size and weight from 12- to 74-passenger 40- ton units, larger and better servicing fa­cilities on the island have become neces­sary. Apra Harbor has always remained a closed port to commercial shipping, but the naval station ships and the few Jap­anese schooners permitted to enter have learned to know the various safe channels and numerous navigational dangers. The new heavy planes, however, dependent upon winds and weather for safe landings and take-offs, need a larger cleared area for safe operations. If this country values her air connection with the Orient, the government and private enterprise must provide for its protection and further expansion. This means that dredging op­erations must be carried on extensively to clear the central harbor and the section near Sumay, the plane base. It will mean clearing out rock and coral formations— possibly raising the German cruiser Kormoran, which was scuttled by her officers and crew as she lay interned in the harbor when the United States entered the World War. It will mean also the construction of various breakwaters to insure protection from high seas during typhoons. In 1902, the U.S.S. Yosemite, then the station ship, was caught in the harbor by a sudden violent storm and tossed, first up on one reef, then back into the harbor and over another reef and finally out to sea where she was lost. As a result of that experience, it is the custom for all ships to ride out a typhoon at sea, but such procedure would not be necessary if adequate breakwater protection were provided. In addition to a breakwater, seaplane ramps and a har­bor pier have become increasingly desir­able. The port for Apra Harbor is Piti, a distance of 5 miles by a narrow dredged boat channel. This means the handling of all goods and shipments via lighters which is slow, expensive, and in heavy tropical rains, often disastrous. The chief export of the island is copra which must be kept dry.

These proposed improvements and de­velopments on Guam are no more than is customarily undertaken in the building up of any harbor or bay in the United States and by no stretch of the imagina­tion could such work be considered a move to fortify Guam. In fact, a precedent for such work has been set by the Japanese in their development of the neighboring island of Saipan only 120 miles from Apra Harbor. There, on the next largest of the Marianas, an adequate harbor has been dredged, piers and docks built at an ex­pense of more than 10,000,000 yen ($2,000,000), even a railroad has been constructed across the island. Since Saipan is kept a strictly closed port, as are the other Marianas Islands, it is probable that more extensive economic and potentially military undertakings have been accom­plished.

To be sure, dredgings and breakwaters might mean that the harbor would be safe not only for Pacific planes but also for large ships of commerce, or even sub­marines and other men of war, but that consideration is as old as our ownership of the island. Early recommendations originally outlined needs for artillery, am­munition, ships, a dry dock, and other features of an efficient naval base well protected from possible attack or capture. The significant point to critics of the recently proposed government project in Apra Harbor is that it may be the initial move in transforming Guam from a naval station of minor importance to a naval base of major significance. And this quite properly raises the question of Guam’s place in our scheme of national defense and international relations.

A special naval board headed by Rear Admiral A. J. Hepburn, former Command­er in Chief of the U. S. Fleet, has recently outlined a plan for increasing the number of United States naval bases in the inter­ests of more efficient national defense. Along with islands in the Caribbean in close proximity to holdings of European powers, Guam, in close proximity to Japanese holdings, was selected as a mid-­Pacific advance base for our naval forces in those waters. This is particularly sig­nificant in view of the fact that in 1946, the United States is scheduled to withdraw from the Philippine Islands. This includes the present base for our Asiatic Fleet at Cavite, thus leaving Pearl Harbor, 4,800 miles from Manila, as the nearest avail­able base for fleet units operating on the China Station, with, of course, the excep­tion of foreign dockyards to which gener­ally it would not be advisable to resort. In such a case, it is merely logical that the report of Admiral Hepburn’s board should recommend the gradual development of Apra Harbor as a small base with equip­ment, shops, materials, and fuel storage facilities which are essential functions of an advance base. The original proposal recommends only such harbor improve­ments as have been discussed in the fore­going paragraphs and which are essentially purely commercial. Moreover, the board stated that some Asiatic base is necessary and that a strong base in Guam might some day prove “indispensable to the success of United States defensive opera­tions” and that “the whole question of the United States’ position in the Far East would be considered stable and settled if Guam were made an advanced fleet base.” This question, however, involves eco­nomic, political, and international con­siderations which lie outside the strictly military field. These considerations re­volve chiefly about our trade in Asia, Malaya, and the Netherland’s Indies to­gether with our relations with our western neighbor, Japan, as well as our responsi­bilities toward the Chamorro people on Guam. And these considerations are of importance to all citizens of this country in that as they are decided by Congress, they will affect our prosperity, our prestige, and even our peace. Trade with China and the Far East, although a rela­tively small portion of our total foreign trade, is nevertheless an important part. It is important since it brings us products such as drugs, rubber, and tin which are essential to our national welfare, civiliza­tion, and defense. It is further important for it means the development of a trade which offers an outlet, and an increasingly large one, for our manufactured products in countries which have not yet become industrialized. This state of affairs is sought by all highly commercialized na­tions, and with our insistence upon the "open door” policy in Asia, this trade should permit American businessmen to benefit along with the businessmen of other nationalities competing there. If we withdraw from the Far East, we lose valuable imported products ancd a poten­tially large export business as well as our prestige, all of which are essential to us as a nation. If we do not withdraw from the Far East, our warships must follow our flag, and in so doing must have bases for upkeep and repairs. If we decide that the economic venture is worth undertak­ing, as a nation we must be prepared to’ pay the cost in terms of dollars for bases.

At the present time the political and international considerations have become of singular importance in the popular mind, and the very human problem of the population on Guam has been generally overlooked. The point has been raised repeatedly in Congressional hearings and elsewhere that even the harmless and constructive undertaking of improving Apra Harbor would be construed as an unfriendly act by Japan and this despite the fact that she herself has made similar improvements elsewhere in the Marianas as well as in the Pelew and Caroline Is­lands! We have not taken issue with Japan over her construction program which she has kept suspiciously secret, so there is no reason to believe she could logically object to similar moves on our part, especially when her small schooners were permitted, until recently, to go in and out of Apra Harbor for trading purposes. Her legal and ethical basis for objection to any de­velopment this country cares to make on Guam, military or otherwise, was removed when she abruptly walked out of the London Naval Conference of 1936. By that action, Japan acquired the right to build a navy of whatever size she chose, but she also released the United States and Great Britain from any restrictions upon developing naval bases in the western Pacific. Great Britain has already enlarged her defenses at Hongkong and opened her base at Singapore, so it is entirely proper that the United States proceed to develop Guam in whatever way she may see fit, especially if she persists in her intention to abandon the Philippines. Moreover, since Guam is our only break in the Jap­anese - Bonin- Marianas - Caroline Islands line across the western Pacific, it has be­come a door of first importance to us, and quite likely an agricultural as well as a military desirability to Japan. The tiny island of Rota, only 49 miles northeast of Guam and held by Japan, is visible in clear weather from Ritidian Point, the northern tip of Guam, bringing home the realization that without adequate “de­velopments” this defenseless door to the Far East could be closed easily by any power that holds the surrounding islands. Japan, like other oriental nations, easily can mistake lack of protection of the island for indifference or even abandon­ment of it in any scheme of national defense. Such an appearance of weakness had frequently been interpreted as an invitation to aggression. Such an inter­pretation can never be made if this country undertakes an extensive and com­prehensive program for development of Guam’s natural facilities.

The Chamorro people understand the situation in all its delicacy and their greatest fear is that they may come under the domination of Japan and receive no more consideration at her hands than have their relatives who fled with some Span­iards to Saipan at the time of the American capture of Guam. It is highly unlikely that this country would ever go to war in behalf of the Chamorros however great their devotion to the United States and its ideals. It is highly unlikely that Japan would go to war in order to take the island, and yet unless some steps are taken soon it is not at all impossible that a “tempo­rary occupation” of the island similar to that on French Hainan might occur! To grant Guam independence when the Chamorros lack experience and financial resources to continue their government without the support which comes to them directly and indirectly from federal ap­propriations and service personnel would be to court annexation of the island by envious powers. To sell the island would be a basic breach of faith with a group who have come to look upon this country as their savior and benefactor, and would also be poor strategy, relinquishing our key to the western Pacific and the Orient. Thus the ownership of Guam becomes for the United States a major problem in the Pacific.

Whether the United States comes to a decision on the development and disposi­tion of Guam this year or postpones the decision until 1946, the problem ultimately must be met. The proposed harbor improvements will be in no way “pushing our frontiers far out in the Pacific.” We have held the Island of Guam for over 40 years and until comparatively recently it was fortified. Force and threats of force have come into great prominence during the past year in the field of international relations. It is possible that a new policy of self-assertion on our part might not only yield us profitable economic returns, but also sound a distinct warning which, without doubt, would be heeded. More than ever it is true that as the United States decides upon its policy in regard to Guam it will also decide a more far- reaching question—our position in the Far East.