*This article was submitted in the Prize Essay Contest, 1938.
“Though all the world be at peace if the art of war be forgot there is peril.”—Ancient Chinese proverb.
The Navy’s concern in the critical situation arising from Japan’s recent invasion of China goes far beyond current minor incidents such as the shelling of the Augusta and the bombing of the Panay. Similar happenings are likely to recur as long as Sino-Japanese warfare continues, and will call for the best quarter-deck diplomacy—of which Admiral Yarnell has already given us an inspiring example.
But we need to do much more than care for troublesome events of the moment, difficult as they may be. It is not enough even to keep the Navy ready for action should a call come from higher authority. We are a part of that government which bears the heavy responsibility of deciding what to do, and which necessarily looks to us for counsel. If it comes to serious action, such as the employment of large forces in support of diplomacy, or the clash of arms, the Navy should have a thorough understanding of the basic elements of the situation. Otherwise it cannot meet the issues squarely in accord with sound national policy as viewed by higher civil officials and governed by general considerations. It is therefore advisable that we should inform ourselves at this time as to the broader phases of the impasse in Asia.
The basic aspect of Japan’s enterprise on the continent is undoubtedly economic. A crowded island, poor in natural resources and severely limited in arable lands, seeks expansion. Nearby new territories invite relief from the miseries of overpopulation in two ways. Of these emigration is of lesser importance. Industrialization coupled with overseas commerce offers vast potentialities for supporting a large surplus home population in comparative prosperity. This is the main impetus that carries Japan’s military and naval forces to the lands and waters of China, and the main cause of her rapidly growing impact on the Western world.
Looking beyond the bombing of Peiping and other cities, the rout of Chinese armies in north and south, the deep naval penetration of navigable waters, we can clearly foresee the establishment of order under Japanese control such as will greatly favor industry and commerce. China’s limitless resources in raw materials and labor will then be made easily available for Japan’s industrialization. Abundant minerals and agricultural products, at costs far below those prevailing elsewhere, will feed Japanese factories whether located in the home country or on the continent. Untold riches will flow into Japan from world trade in which she will be well able drastically to undersell all competitors.
In this very fact, however, lies grave economic jeopardy to the entire Occident. It is the cardinal danger to Western interests that is deep-rooted in Japan’s penetration of China. Already American counters are flooded with astonishingly cheap Japanese goods while millions of our unemployed vainly seek jobs in idle factories. Already Britain’s traditional free-trade policy has had to be altered to exclude Japanese goods from her markets at home and in Crown Colonies. Already the normal overseas commerce of America, Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, and Italy has suffered severely from Japanese competition in all free markets where preference cannot be obtained. Yet this is as nothing compared with the economic catastrophe to manufacturing Europe and America that is latent in the current Asiatic crisis. Their whole prosperity and standard of living are clearly being undermined, and under circumstances which inherently align the interests of occidental powers, considered as a group, against Japanese interests.
History shows that a rise to great wealth through industry and commerce is normally accompanied by expanding military, naval, merchant marine, and political power, and particularly is this true in cases of nations animated by a high degree of racial unity, pride, and ambition. The Japanese believe it to be the intent of heaven that they shall dominate the rest of the world. Such a destiny would be a natural aim for them should they acquire the necessary means to support a preponderant navy together with a large army.
No doubt their ambitions would extend westward to Suez, southward to Australia, and eastward across the Pacific.
The Relation of Power to Japan's Actions
The foregoing vision of wider scope must be assumed to underlie Japan’s action respecting China in the present instance. All circumstances point to a permanence of her aims that is well borne out by the past. Steady encroachment has been going on during the last 40 years, taking full advantage of favorable opportunity. The progress would have been much more rapid but for the occasional intervention of strong European powers, to whom the Japanese have yielded only with great reluctance and resentment. Force has always been their governing factor in deciding whether to advance, stand fast, or retreat.
This is not said in criticism. We are here concerned only with facts and reasonable deductions from them, and not with moralities. If we estimate the situation from the ethical viewpoint of the Occident we only lead ourselves into erroneous conclusions respecting the Orient. And those who would condemn Japan on ethical grounds should remember the history of the “have nots” of our own race from time immemorial—yea even unto the present decade.
Having absorbed Korea at a time when there was no likelihood of interference from Europe, Japan broke the power of Russia in Manchuria early in the present century. The good offices of President Theodore Roosevelt in establishing peace were deeply resented by the Nipponese because the terms of settlement were less favorable than they had hoped for. There was even talk of making war on the United States and the delicate situation was handled in a way that is well worthy of special note at this time. The then relatively very powerful American fleet was sent on a friendly visit to Japan, and the mere sight of it by thousands of Japanese about Tokyo Bay was enough to turn growing hostility into staunch friendship. Such is normally the influence of superior power upon the oriental mind.
The conditions were again ripe for a further advance towards control of China when all Europe was aflame with the World War. Japan took full advantage of them. Secure from any possibility of Western intervention she occupied Shantung and dictated the famous 21 demands giving her virtual dominance over the Chinese government. This situation was a principal reason for the international Conference on Limitation of Naval Armaments that met at Washington in 1921. Although very reluctant to withdraw from China, Japan found the concerted pressure of strong and recently victorious powers together with the generous naval terms offered too great to be resisted. Force was again predominant in her outlook.
Japan’s withdrawal from Shantung and her participation in the Nine Power Treaty, virtually guaranteeing the future territorial integrity of China, were predicated upon the naval treaty negotiated at the same Conference. Under the latter Japan stood to gain much in relative naval strength especially through the feature which restricted British and American naval bases and thus severely limited the naval forces which they could bring to bear close to Nippon. In addition a holiday was established in the construction of capital ships, whereas no restrictions were placed on cruisers and other auxiliaries, in which categories Japan was relatively weak. The combination was especially welcome because of financial straits. Relieved of the burdensome cost of building new battleships, she could hold her comparatively advantageous position in this type and divert available money to auxiliary classes. This she proceeded to do with great activity while Britain’s similar construction was but moderate and America was content to set an example of severe restraint in the vain hope of promoting peace thereby.
Within a short decade Japan’s relative strength in total ship power had been greatly increased, while the ability of England and the United States to exert their strength in the Orient had been substantially reduced through the obsolescence of their naval bases. It was under these circumstances that in 1931 Japan launched and consolidated her enterprise in Manchukuo. Our vigorous protests were unavailing. Our claim that the operation was contrary to the Nine Power Treaty was met with the contention that Manchuria was not a part of China. Our bid for British action jointly with us proved abortive. Freedom from the possible interference of superior force appears to have been the decisive factor in the Japanese resolution to resume their encroachments on the continent in 1931.
The world setting for the great adventure of 1937 appears to be of special significance. Japan had freed herself from the restraints of naval treaties. Understandings with Italy and Germany assured her of at least the benefit of their sympathy. The readiness of Germany to attack Russia was an invaluable restraint against possible Russian intervention by land in the Orient. The great increase of Italy’s prestige and power in the Mediterranean and her strained relations with England and France, in consequence of the Abyssinian episode and the civil war in Spain, acted as a check against any large British or French naval forces being sent to China. The United States was engrossed with internal affairs, and public sentiment against any act that might possibly involve her in war was overwhelming. Although America’s naval construction had been revived on an extensive scale no substantial additions to her fleet would be ready for several years. The Fleet’s effectiveness for operations in the Orient was greatly lessened by a dearth of adequate naval bases in that region. In short, Japan was secure against interference by any large naval or land forces. The long-sought prize of China lay within easy grasp—and was seized on a scale to leave little doubt as to ultimate aims.
We are forced to conclude that Japan fully intends to gain control over most of China and to exploit that country for industrial no less than political purposes. It seems clear that freedom from outside restraint will serve only to hasten these ends; to make more certain the impoverishment of the Western world from oriental competition in world commerce; greatly to increase Japan’s military, naval, and merchant marine power; and widely to extend her political horizon. The only effective curb upon such unwelcome developments appears to be threat or use of superior force. Japan seems to heed that alone.
The Outlook of the Occident
At present no Western power has any desire to fight Japan, possibly excepting Russia, who is held in check by fear of German attack. Some nations seem even favorably disposed towards Japanese aggression in China because of its effects upon the European situation. Nevertheless the issues in China are so fundamental and far-reaching that few if any of the great occidental nations can ultimately escape the need of fighting Japan, for the sake of their bread and butter, unless Japanese control over China is prevented. This is the long-range outlook.
As for the immediate situation, the neutral country whose interests are placed in the greatest jeopardy by Japan’s actions is Great Britain. Her investments and general commercial “stake” in China are about twice those of France and nearly eight times greater than those of the United States. Moreover Britain stands to suffer by far the most from cut-throat competition in general world trade. As indicated, the interest of France in China is very substantial and so is that of Russia. The United States may be placed fourth, followed by a number of other countries having considerably less material interest.
Political tension in Europe precludes the possibility of England, France, or Russia embarking on any early enterprise against Japan. The situation in the Orient, however, is not likely to clear up soon and it is therefore pertinent to consider what should or may be done when European powers have greater freedom of action and might feel like seeking a permanent solution in eastern Asia.
With respect to the United States the hope has been freely voiced abroad that she would intercede against Japanese aggression. For more than three decades the contention has been held by many Europeans and Americans that war between America and Japan is inevitable because of clashing interests over the Open Door in China, immigration, the Philippine Islands, and the control of the Pacific. Despite these differences, however, the American people as a whole have normally maintained a friendly attitude towards Japan and have but rarely been stirred to the point where there was any danger of going to war. In the now current crisis they have frankly condemned the bombing inhumanities and other aggressions as reported in the press and have deeply resented the sinking of the Panay. Nevertheless, their general feeling seems to be clearly against playing a lone hand in order to rescue China or to preserve the general Western interests in China, of which their own interests form a comparatively small share. The likelihood of any substantial change in the American attitude does not seem great. On the other hand there is a growing feeling that America might participate jointly with European powers in some form of action that might offer a solution without war. Proposals of joint action have also received the favorable support of influential sections of the British press. Although Britain’s immense new air and naval program contemplates sufficient forces to take care of the situation in Europe while at the same time protecting her interests in the Far East, no doubt she would eagerly seek the co-operation of France, America, and any other power that would aid. So also would France and Russia. It is certainly true of most if not all European countries that they would prefer a pacific settlement of the alarming oriental situation rather than a resort to arms. Since the joint action of several strong powers undoubtedly offers a very probable solution short of war, it seems reasonable to believe that the attempt will be made.
The prospect of success in pacific joint action in this case is predicated upon several important factors. Despite the tradition of the samurai that is still strongly adhered to—to fight hard against any odds however heavy—for the past 40 years Japanese higher statesmen have consistently guided foreign policies with due regard to the strength of opponents. If we assume that navies aggregating about three times the power of the Japanese fleet are assembled in the Orient, it seems highly probable that cool heads in Tokyo would save their own fleet from certain destruction and accede to occidental demands.
Being insular, Japan can support her military effort on the continent only by means of sea communications. An overpowering Allied fleet would therefore threaten the destruction of not only Japan’s Navy but her Army as well, by cutting its communications completely and leaving it to the mercy of the Chinese, the latter would certainly win decisively in time if supplied by the Allies, even though Russia failed to send a large Army to the Far East.
Finally there is the near famine and economic catastrophe within Japan herself that would be bound to result from Allied blockade, and would be followed by social disorders of crushing magnitude. In the face of such a dismal prospect Japanese authorities could scarcely do less than come to Allied terms promptly. Obviously, however, the probability of success without fighting must depend upon the degree of naval superiority with which Japan is confronted. For severe terms, such as the complete evacuation of China that seems to be called for, the forces that England and France alone could mobilize so far from home might be insufficient. Should America join with them in such a demonstration and ultimatum?
The Position of the United States
Whether the United States should and will join with European powers in a naval demonstration to settle the oriental crisis are questions which can be answered only in the future and by the American people. Too much will depend upon particular circumstances at that time to be certain of an answer now. Nevertheless we can clearly foresee a need of some such action on our part in principle, if the probability of ultimate war is to be reduced while duly safeguarding our vital interests. There seems to be every reason in this case to use force as an instrument of diplomacy, as a means of avoiding combat if possible.
To accept the foregoing as sound is also to admit the need of strengthening our hand at this time. The mere fact of future strength may of itself be sufficient to gain our ends, even without threat or demonstration. But should it come to the latter pass, then the success of diplomatic demands backed by force will be measured directly by the degree of force at our command. Every reasonable argument, pacific or warlike, points to the existing need of making America capable of exerting great naval strength in the Orient and without delay. Otherwise the freedom of our future choice respecting both joint and independent action must be too severely restricted for our own good.
The two principal components of naval power in any given area are ships (including aircraft) and bases. The more distant the theater of operations from the home country the greater the importance of outlying bases when measuring total strength, since without adequate bases ships cannot even remain in the desired area for any considerable length of time. We should therefore now give particular attention to the matter of naval bases in the Orient, where the restrictions of the recently expired Washington naval treaty have left us with virtually no basing facilities.
Fifty per cent of the total strength of our Navy in ships is a conservative estimate of the naval power which we are capable of constantly exerting in the Orient today when we would be forced to operate from Oahu as a main outlying base. This follows from the great proportion of combat strength needed to guard burdensome trains on long and shifting communications, from time- and fuel-consuming passages to and from the base for docking, repairs, etc., and from numerous other well-known practical contingencies.
The quickest, cheapest, and most certain way of adding substantially to our potential strength in oriental waters is not to be found in the building of more ships —but in establishing naval bases in the Orient. The construction of ships would still leave our sea power in the Orient unbalanced and worse so than it is at present because the greater the number of ships that might be sent out there the greater would be the logistic difficulty in maintaining them. At the present time we can multiply our ship power in the Far East much more effectively through a new base than through new ships, however much the latter may be called for in general. The construction of adequate bases will make it possible to use advantageously any number of additional ships.
There is no need to confuse the question of an American naval base in the Far East with matters of Philippine protection or Philippine independence. Naturally if we had such a base it would serve as a means of defending the Philippines should occasion arise. But that is incidental. The principal virtue of the position would relate to the larger interests of the United States. Our normal commerce with the general region of the Orient amounts to $2,000,000,000 in annual value. For many future decades it will require protection in any war in which we might engage; without particular reference to Japan and quite irrespective of who our enemy may be. In regard to Japan it has to be assumed that her recent, vast commitment on the Asiatic mainland has completely supplanted any serious intention that she might have had to possess herself of the Philippines. An American base in those islands is called for now principally with reference to the situation in China—to enable us to back our diplomacy with the potent influence of clearly effective force, if and when we may desire to do so.
As for the independence of the Philippine Islands, that would be in no way compromised by our having a base among them. That fact was fully recognized in the negotiations resulting in the Act of Congress granting independence, and it was thoroughly understood on both sides that in perfect equity and propriety the United States should preserve its rights to the establishment of naval bases. Spain and Italy remain perfectly sovereign and independent notwithstanding British naval bases at Gibraltar and Malta. Bermuda and Jamaica do not infringe the independence of the United States. There are many positions in the. Philippines at which an American naval base would in no wise impair the independence of those islands. Quite the contrary, it would serve to make that independence more secure.
We urgently need a naval base in the Philippines to serve ships in the numbers that may be required for effective influence or action. And, obviously, we need the ships without which the base would be useless. Both of these principal components of naval power should be built up actively, in readiness for such single or joint action as future circumstances may dictate. The situation will not be improved, and seems certain of being made worse by apathy, weakness, or retreat. It can be duly cared for only by meeting the grave issues squarely and with adequate Power prepared in advance.
Conclusion
From whatever angle we may view the situation in the Orient, the issues seem grave and the solution difficult. Japan’s quest for power and wealth through winning control of other lands has many precedents, and it will also be a repetition of history that her success will adversely affect innocent neutrals. Especially in its economic effects are occidental countries deeply concerned in the current oriental contest.
A quarreling Western world is unable to Unite in defense of a common interest. The forces of even the strongest powers of Europe are tethered at home to watch each other. Sooner or later, however, an unchecked Japan is certain to erect such an economic structure in Asia as will make competition with her in world markets an impossibility. The industrialized Occident is thus threatened with economic ruin, and in time it must somehow act, for the sake of self-preservation.
America stands aloof from conflicts in East and West. She shares in the jeopardy to Western economics that is latent in Japan’s great enterprise on the Asiatic mainland. She is unwilling to be a lone champion of joint Western interests, is on guard against being drawn into war and hopes for a pacific settlement.
Political tension in Europe, now and for a long time to come, appears likely to prevent any single power from challenging the Japanese in the distant Far East. Japan’s past sensitiveness to the influence of superior force, however, suggests that a demonstration against her of overwhelming naval force by a concert of two or more strong powers may offer a means of settlement without war. The probability of success in this is much enhanced by the extreme vulnerability of Japan’s position in China to naval attack.
Future circumstances alone could decide the United States as to her participation in such a demonstration. In order that she may be able to do so effectively, in the event of wishing to do so, it is highly desirable that she should now build up her ability to exert naval strength in the Orient. This calls not only for adequate strength in ships but also for naval base facilities in or near the Philippine Islands.
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One of the chief psychological elements of success in warfare, whether military or industrial, is unity of action.—Le Bon, World in Revolt.