Its Origin
Our first essays in sea power met with many changes of fortune. National interests during the pioneering days of the Republic forced attention largely upon the vast areas of our domain that remained unexplored and uncultivated. There were periods during the taming of the Barbary Corsairs and the war with England in 1812 when our men-of-war were ranked with the finest of any nation of the Old World and Americans were proud of their Navy. There were the banner years of clipper ships when our Merchant Marine boasted of the swiftest and best-found vessels of any service. There were also periods of doldrums and neglect with attending lack of interest in all phases of sea power.
The modern Navy dates from 1880 when there were ordered our first all-steel ships. Simultaneously circumstances were forcing America to become a great sea power. The years of continental exploitation had ended and the wilderness that had been the United States was transformed into a modern state. Trouble in Cuba at the end of the century and the demands of the Hawaiian Island people for incorporation into our political situation forced the American people to look beyond their shores for the first time in that generation.
Trade competition among the industrial powers ushered in the twentieth century. The completion of the Panama Canal and the threat of war already hanging over Europe compelled the formulation of a new Caribbean policy. Earlier the Venezuelan incident had necessitated a restatement and clarification of the Monroe Doctrine. As a result of the war with, Spain we had accepted the guardianship of 13 millions of backward peoples in a heterogeneous archipelago 7,000 miles across the Pacific and athwart the trade lines from the United States to the great undeveloped markets of the East.
The area of industrial expansion culminating in the World War had caught the American people in its currents. The accepted standard of living of our citizens was now dependent to a large extent upon the uninterrupted flow of American surpluses from farm and factory to the markets of the world. An adequate merchant marine, a strong navy, and bases of supply and repair for that navy—in short sea power—became an imperative factor in American destiny. National policy required a navy adequate to implement the Monroe Doctrine when necessary, sufficient to protect our sea-borne trade, strong enough to defend our dependencies and protectorates, and commanding the respect that would make our voice effective in the council chambers of the world.
Thus American sea power was born of national necessity. But the formulation of a concrete naval policy derived from national exigencies lagged behind the recognition of America's naval needs.
Formulation of Present Naval Policy
It was in 1915 that the General Board of the Navy enunciated as a fundamental naval policy that the United States possess a navy equal to that of any other power. This policy met with the approval of the administration and in order to carry it out a program of naval expansion was inaugurated which was known as the 1916 Naval Building Program. At the time of our entry into the World War very few of these vessels had passed beyond the blueprint stage. Responsible statesmen of the World War period believed that had such an American Navy been in existence at the time the General Board's policy was formulated not only would this country have escaped becoming involved but our influence might well have brought the conflict to a speedier end and a more enduring peace.
Since that time international agreements among the principal naval powers have accorded world recognition of this country's right to primacy in naval strength. It is significant to note also that through various changes in political administration our government has adhered steadfastly to the dogma of naval parity with the strongest. This is a right recognized at home and abroad, and a principle that has consistently transcended the debates and issues of partisan politics, though funds to carry out that principle were not provided. Few persons today will question the wisdom of this policy of a navy second to none; nor will they question the two principal reasons for maintaining such a navy: "To support the national policies and commerce"; and, "To guard the continental and over-seas possessions of the United States."
The overwhelming endorsement by Congress in 1933 of the Vinson-Trammell Bill, which authorized the upbuilding of our Navy to the limitations of international treaties, was in response to the clear mandate of the American people. But our representatives in Congress were not content to stop at mere authorization. Generous appropriations by the Congress and additional funds from public works were earmarked for naval construction by the administration. As a result we have today in various stages of completion 79 ships.
Had the existing treaties remained in effect, by 1942 we would have had our Navy up to full treaty strength. Because the powers failed to reach an agreement in London as to quantitative limitations, the navies are no longer stabilized on what many had grown to consider an equitable basis. Now that the rigidity of quantitative restrictions will no longer be observed after this year, it is difficult to forecast what the future holds for naval building. We of the Navy do not expect and would deplore any navy building race. The policy of the Navy Department is not to build an excessive number of warships over a short period of time. Our industrial plants are capable of carrying only so much building load efficiently and economically. The requirements of research and experimentation also dictate a slow, progressive building program over a number of years. Such a program is far superior to the spasmodic policy that has characterized so much of our building in the past. Periodical replacements of obsolescent vessels and modest additions to our fleet need give rise to no concern by others; whereas alternate periods of neglect succeeded by feverish expansion may result in misunderstanding and misinterpretation by other nations.
The present naval building program for combatant vessels is considered by the Navy Department as satisfactory under existing conditions. It should result in giving to us a combatant fleet adequate in numbers and efficient as individual units.
Authorizations beyond those contemplated in the Vinson-Trammell Bill will be sought only upon the conviction that expansion of naval building by other powers compromises our relative naval strength and hence our security.
Need for Auxiliaries
Sea power comprehends more than a navy of combatant ships and planes. Naval bases and a merchant marine are the two other elements that together with the fighting navy constitute sea power in its broadest term. The number of naval bases are more or less fixed. They are dependent upon geographic considerations and new bases are difficult to acquire. A merchant marine is essential to the prosperity of any modern industrial state at all times and is a potential source of auxiliary vessels and personnel in war time. This last consideration is of great importance. The larger the merchant marine in peace, the more auxiliaries it can provide for the navy in war time.
The combatant fleet, however, requires naval auxiliaries that must operate and train with the fleet during peace time as well as in war. The Vinson-Trammell Bill authorizes the construction and replacement within treaty limitations of all combatant types. A bill now before Congress would provide a greater number of suitable auxiliaries to support this combat craft. The mission of these auxiliaries will be to make effective, through the function of service and supply, the fighting vessels of our fleet. That fleet in fulfilling its mission of naval protection to the homeland in time of war must take up its station far from normal bases of supply and repair. This fact is often lost sight of by earnest advocates of national defense. To be effective the combatant vessels of our Navy must be so mobile and self-sufficient that they can be projected a thousand miles or more from our coast and be maintained on their far distant stations. This, in effect, will create a new elastic frontier of steel. Behind this frontier will lie an oceanic hinterland of millions of square miles. Over this buffer state an enemy must launch an air attack before it reaches the valuable and vulnerable cities of our coast line. The dimensions of this neutral region are contingent not alone upon the number of our fighting ships. To maintain our combatant vessels upon this far-flung frontier, to preserve its elasticity by insuring the mobility of the individual ships and units, these vessels must be sustained from the homeland by a constantly cruising fleet of auxiliaries.
It is true that in war time many of these auxiliaries can be improvised from our Merchant Marine, provided we keep intact that great adjunct of national prosperity. It would be not only impracticable but a needless waste to provide our Navy in peace time with all of the auxiliaries it would need in any major war operation that sought to destroy or defeat any enemy fleet before it came within striking distance of our shores. The Merchant Marine will continue to be the main reservoir of our auxiliaries. But there are a certain number of highly specialized types of auxiliaries that cannot be improvised from the merchant craft overnight, that are needed with the fleet in its normal peace-time cruising and that, above all else, must be trained with the fleet.
No discussion of our Navy, however brief, should omit reference to the officers and men who man and fight our ships. In the final analysis the material itself is subordinate to the personnel. Proud as I am of the achievements that have been made in naval building in the past few years I feel greater pride in the character and the splendid attainments and qualifications of the Navy's officers and men. As more and more ships are completed and pass into service, more officers and men are required to man them and additional personnel must be provided and trained.
We are not now, nor ever have been, a predatory people. Our few ventures into imperialism have been predicated upon the loftiest motives, and once we have been given concrete evidence of a dependency's ability to assume and discharge the obligations of sovereignty we are only too eager to set a new ship of state on its course and bid her Godspeed. In a world where the traditional price of liberty is that of sacrifice in blood and treasure, the United States may well take pride in such an unprecedented attitude of generosity and self-abnegation. Thus territorial expansion and the coveting of our neighbor's lands mean little to the heirs of Washington and the founding fathers. We seek only to keep aloof from the strife that besets so many of our contemporaries. This is not to imply a national smugness or a lack of sympathy with those peoples less fortunately circumstanced by considerations beyond their control. Our efforts and aspirations should continue to be those of a "friendly neighbor," but the world is too large and too large a portion of it is in irreconcilable conflict with our own ideology and institutions for us to assume the role of our brother's keeper. Our excursions into altruistic diplomacy too often have been misunderstood by those antipathetic to our views and all too frequently have been awarded the charge of presumption and insolence.
To the furtherance of our national policy, the Navy stands committed. To the defense, preservation, and perpetuation of our national institutions and America's great heritage, our Navy is consecrated. National policy may change. That is the responsibility and prerogative of our statesmen. But when once formulated, our national policy is buttressed and supported by the Navy. For the Navy is but the instrument of national policy—an instrument we of the Navy hope may remain so manifestly capable as to perform its functions by mere potentiality but ready, always, for active service.