The Vinson Bill has given the United States its first systematic policy for replacement of combatant naval vessels. For the first time in the history of the Navy there is legislation to permit the replacement of vessels as they become overage within the meaning of that term as contained in the Washington and London treaties. However, as the auxiliaries, and by this term we mean to convey all vessels not limited by the terms of the two treaties mentioned, were not limited by those treaties, except with regard to certain characteristics which would prevent their use as vessels of the classes for which limits were prescribed, they have been somewhat neglected in the effort to maintain the treaty strength in combatant vessels.
This paper was in the process of development when the Secretary of the Naval Institute, in the July, 1935, issue of the PROCEEDINGS, called attention to the glaring lack of sufficient fast auxiliaries which must have been observed during the recently completed Fleet Problem XVI. He used the well-known statement that "an army, like a serpent, travels on its belly." Food and drink are but a minor phase of logistics, in the larger sense, where the fleet is concerned. The Secretary, in the course of his discussion on the desirability of developing the Merchant Marine stated:
Now that a building and replacement program is under way for the strictly fighting ships, it is only reasonable that this program be made 100 per cent perfect and that proper and adequate oilers, storeships, repair ships, and tenders be provided.
It is with the desire to point out certain weaknesses in our existing auxiliary craft that this article has been undertaken.
Treaty limitations on auxiliaries.—Article VIII of the London treaty prescribes certain restrictions on vessels not limited in numbers by the provisions of the treaty. Surface combatant vessels of 600 tons and under are unlimited, while surface combatant vessels over 600 tons but not exceeding 2,000 tons are unlimited providing they do not mount a gun above 6.1 inches; or mount more than four guns above 3 inches; or are not designed or fitted to launch torpedoes; and are not designed for a speed greater than 20 knots. Surface vessels which are not specifically built as fighting ships are unlimited provided they have none of the following characteristics: (1) mount a gun above 6.1 inches; (2) mount more than four guns above 3 inches; (3) are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes; (4) are designed for a speed greater than 20 knots; (5) are protected by armor plate; (6) are designed or fitted to launch mines; (7) are fitted to receive airplanes on board from the air; (8) mount more than one airplane-launching apparatus on the center line; or two, one on each broadside; (9) if fitted with any means of launching airplanes into the air are designed or adapted to operate at sea more than three airplanes.
Annex 3 of the London treaty lists certain special vessels which the signatory nations may retain and their tonnage shall not be included in the tonnage subject to limitation. These vessels for the United States are as follows:
Aroostook*
Oglala*
Baltimore*
San Francisco (now the Yosemite)*
Cheyenne*
Helena*
Isabel
Niagara
Bridgeport*
Dobbin
Melville*
Whitney
Holland
Henderson
The vessels designated by an asterisk are more than 20 years old at this time while the Niagara has been stricken from the Navy List.
Existing auxiliaries.—The Navy now has in its possession approximately 192 seagoing vessels which are not classed as combatant vessels. This number does not include seagoing vessels for the use of the Naval Reserve or those unclassified ships now assigned as receiving ships and to similar duty. Table I shows the number of vessels, by classes, which are now (1935) overage and those which become overage during the years 1936-48.
Twenty years has been taken as the useful life of all auxiliaries with the exception of submarine chasers and eagle boats, the two latter classes being looked upon as surface vessels not exceeding 3,000 tons, laid down before January 1, 1921, which section I (b) (1) of Annex I of the London treaty permits being replaced after 12 years.
Table I.—Number of Auxiliaries which Become Overage Annually (Replacement age for eagles and subchasers 12 years; all others, 20 years.) |
||||||||||||||
Class |
New overage 1935 |
1936 |
1937 |
1938 |
1939 |
1940 |
1941 |
1943 |
1944 |
1946 |
1947 |
1948 |
Now in Comm. |
Total |
Mine layers |
4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
4 |
Gunboats and yachts |
2 |
|
1 |
|
|
1 |
|
1 |
|
|
|
|
4 |
5 |
River gunboats |
2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
5 |
8 |
8 |
Destroyer tenders |
3 |
|
|
1 |
2 |
|
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
6 |
8 |
Submarine tenders |
3 |
|
|
|
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
5 |
6 |
Repair ships |
2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
|
3 |
3 |
Store ships |
|
|
1 |
|
2 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2 |
4 |
Aircraft tenders |
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
2 |
Oilers |
1 |
1 |
2 |
|
5 |
8 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
8 |
18 |
Ammunition ships |
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
2 |
Cargo ships |
|
|
|
|
3 |
2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2 |
5 |
Transports |
|
|
1 |
|
|
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2 |
2 |
Hospital ships |
1 |
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
2 |
Ocean tugs |
8 |
|
4 |
2 |
10 |
7 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
20 |
32 |
Train flagship |
|
|
|
|
1 (1) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
1 |
Station ship |
|
|
|
|
|
1 (2) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
1 |
Survey ships |
1 (3) |
|
1 (4) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2 |
1 |
Submarine chasers |
21 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
14 |
2 |
Eagle boats |
23 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
10 |
21 |
Mine sweepers |
|
|
|
12 |
15 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
22 |
28 |
Mine sweepers for duty with aircraft |
|
|
|
5 |
4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
9 |
9 |
Submarine rescue crew vessels |
|
|
|
2 |
4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
5 |
6 |
Total |
72 |
1 |
10 |
22 |
47 |
25 |
5 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
128 |
192 |
(1) Antares |
(2) Gold Star |
(3) Hannibal |
(4) Nokomis |
From Table I it will be noted that there are at the present time 72 auxiliaries which are overage. Of these, 44 are war-built submarine chasers and eagle boats which need not be replaced in quantity. Consequently, we may consider that there are 28 auxiliaries now overage with 33 more to arrive at that stage within the next three years. Our only auxiliary construction at the present time consists of the Erie and Charleston which are badly needed for gunboat duties supplementing the vessels of that type already in commission.
Before discussing our suggested program of auxiliaries let us for a moment consider the uses and value to the nation of these somewhat prosaic craft. Within the term "auxiliary" we find not only vessels which transport supplies for both the combatant vessels of the fleet and the personnel who man them but, in addition, there are the ships which repair material and personnel, which supply replacements for aircraft which may be lost, which provide rescue facilities for disabled submarines and aircraft, which clear the way for the fleet through mine-strewn areas, and, conversely, obstruct the enemy's fleet. Besides all these we find net layers to protect our harbors; floating dry docks which may accompany the fleet; salvage vessels for the raising of stricken submarines and sunken surface vessels; ocean tugs for the towing of disabled ships and as a means of saving fuel during transit to the point of combat. Of equal value in peace and war are the gunboats, a type which treaty limitations have taken from the realm of the policeman and placed in a position where they may render valuable service as a definite adjunct of the wartime fleet organization. The specialized river gunboat type still remains restricted to its original purpose which, however, is vital to the safety of American lives and property in the area where these ships are stationed.
Class |
1936 |
1937 |
1938 |
1939 |
1940 |
1941 |
1942 |
1943 |
1944 |
1945 |
Total Built |
Total Under Age |
Mine layers |
2 |
|
|
|
2 |
|
|
|
|
|
4 |
4 |
Gunboats |
2 |
2 |
|
2 |
|
2 |
|
2 |
|
2 |
12 |
14 |
River gunboats |
2 |
2 |
|
2 |
|
2 |
|
2 |
|
2 |
4 |
10 |
Destroyer tenders |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
|
1 |
|
|
|
6 |
6 |
Submarine tenders |
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
4 |
4 (1) |
Repair ships |
1 |
|
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
3 |
3 |
Store ships |
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
1 |
4 |
4 |
Aircraft tenders |
1 |
|
1 |
|
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
3 |
3 |
Oilers |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
|
|
2 |
|
2 |
|
12 |
12 |
Ammunition ships |
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
2 |
2 |
Cargo ships |
1 |
|
2 |
|
1 |
|
1 |
|
|
|
5 |
5 |
Transports |
|
1 |
|
|
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
2 |
2 |
Hospital ships |
1 |
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
|
|
2 |
2 |
Ocean tugs |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
20 |
20 |
Misc. auxiliaries |
|
|
1 (2) |
1 (3) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2 |
2 |
Survey ships |
1 |
|
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2 |
2 |
Anti-submarine vessels |
2 |
|
2 |
4 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
20 |
20 |
Mine sweeper |
|
4 |
4 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
22 |
22 |
Aircraft rescue vessels |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
8 |
8 |
Submarine rescue vessels |
2 |
|
2 |
2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
6 |
6 |
Aircraft supply ships |
|
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
1 |
Net-laying ships |
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2 |
2 |
Aircraft transports |
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
1 |
Mine depot ships |
1 (4) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
1 |
Floating dry docks (self-propelled) |
|
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
|
|
2 |
3 |
Salvage vessel |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
1 |
Total |
26 |
18 |
22 |
23 |
13 |
10 |
10 |
11 |
8 |
10 |
151 |
160 |
|
It is common knowledge that the United States in recent years has been backward in its merchant ship construction. Some of the examples of passenger vessels rank with the finest, but cargo and certain specialized types cannot be looked upon as comparable to those constructed in other countries. Hull forms, methods of propulsion, loading appliances, auxiliary equipment, and other phases of ship design have altered considerably since the war. The inauguration of an auxiliary program by the Navy would provide an incomparable laboratory for our Merchant Marine as the vessels which would be constructed would embody those features which the merchant marines of other nations have found most desirable.
The proposed program.—Table II sets forth a proposed 10-year auxiliary building program totaling 151 ships. The cost of this program would be approximately $309,000,000, or an average annual expenditure of somewhat more than $30,000,- 000. This is the penalty we must pay for neglect in the past. That the Navy needs these vessels cannot be questioned, although a few of the individual types included might be the subject of controversy. At the end of the 10-year period the Navy would find itself with 161 under-age auxiliaries compared with the present 192 vessels of which 70 are now overage. It is believed that this reduction in numbers would be offset by the enhanced individual value of the modern vessels which would be available for operation with the fleet. There would be more than sufficient vessels to replace the 128 auxiliaries now in commission, but a reserve for war is a recognized necessity.
It would seem to be advisable to discuss concisely the purpose of including certain classes of vessels in the proposed program, and the following paragraphs contain brief notes of the characteristics and proposed uses of such vessels.
Mine layers.—The four existing mine layers available to the Navy are all overage. They are all 4,000-odd tons each, and none of them was designed for the specific duty of mine laying. Treaty restrictions prohibit the construction of mine layers of more than 2,000 tons unless such tonnage is charged to the allowances for combatant vessels. It is believed that a 2,000-ton vessel of a speed of 20 knots, and armed with 5-inch dual purpose guns and embodying light armor over the mine magazines, would fill a useful place in the fleet. These vessels would be sufficiently fast to keep up with the main body, and sufficiently well armed to resist destroyer, submarine, and airplane attack. When it is considered that the present light mine layers of the Navy are approximately half the size of the proposed ships and almost 50 per cent faster, the additional tonnage and saving in engine space as a result of the reduction in speed make it apparent that a 2,000-ton mine layer could be given sufficient radius and mine storage capacity to make it a worth-while vessel. To increase their radius of operation, these vessels should have Diesel propulsion.
The mine depot ship which is proposed as a replacement for the Yosemite and Baltimore would be classified under article VIII (c) of the London treaty as not being specifically built as a fighting ship. Its tonnage should approximate that of the existing auxiliaries of the Whitney type. It would be assigned as flagship of the mine craft, but should also be designed as tender to the mine layers described above and such light mine layers as may hereafter be built. It would not be fitted to launch mines but would carry replenishment stocks for the layers.
Vessels which could be constructed as suitable replacements for the existing light mine layers would necessarily embody such characteristics as would compel their being charged to the allowances for combatant ships. There are now fourteen light mine layers included in the Navy List and it is hoped that at least one 1,850-ton and three 1,500-ton destroyers now under construction or authorized will be completed as replacements for these vessels. The 1,850-ton vessel should serve as division leader and, in the absence of any larger vessel, as flagship of the mine craft.
Mr. Wayne Francis Palmer writing in the November,1934, issue of the PROCEEDINGS came to the conclusion that
Our entire mining policy should be overhauled and brought up to date because in the next war the demands made in this branch of the service will be as drastic as they were in the last.
Earlier in his article, Mr. Palmer advised that
Immediate demand should be made for funds for the construction of as many surface and submarine mine layers as possible. The surface craft should be as large as treaty limits permit and should be designed for no other function to limit their use in this all-important mission. They should, first of all, have speed—at least 10 knots faster than any enemy ship. Their defensive and offensive strength will be their speed. All guns and torpedoes should be eliminated with the exception of a generous anti-aircraft battery. All tops and masts should be omitted and their design should be as low and their hulls as shallow as good practice may permit. An armored deck should cover the entire mine storage area to prevent detonation from any exterior cause. . . .
The great speed of these new ships will make it possible for them to dart into enemy waters unescorted, but what is more important, they can cut across the head of the enemy formations in battle.
Mr. Palmer's fast mine layers have certainly a very definite place in the fleet's organization but the characteristics he gives as a requirement for them would be difficult of embodiment within treaty limits, unless combatant ship allowances are to be utilized and agreement to this would undoubtedly be difficult to achieve, for submarine mining has been, as Mr. Palmer so aptly entitles his article, "Orphan Child of the Service."
Gunboats.—In recent years the United States has neglected the smaller types in its effort to build up to treaty limits in combatant ships. The need for gunboats may not be as necessary today as it was before the war, but the fact that England finds it advisable to include a few sloops in every building program is indicative of the value of this useful class of vessel. At the present time Great Britain and the Dominions possess almost 50 sloops of varying sizes and for varied purposes. The United States has three gunboats in commission with two under construction. The Sacramento is now overage, and the Fulton unavailable, due to the damage it incurred when it burned in Chinese waters. The Erie and Charleston may be looked upon as replacements for the two vessels mentioned, leaving only the Asheville and Tulsa as the other representatives of this class. The Special Service Squadron which formerly included several gunboats is now dependent on destroyers for patrol work. It is believed that the number of gunboats provided for in the proposed program could be well utilized in the following capacities:
Special Service Squadron 2*
Asiatic fleet 4*
Submarine force flagship..1
Base force flagship. 1
Samoa (station ship) 1*
Washington Navy Yard (President's
yacht and Navy Department tender) 1
Second Special Service Squadron. 4*
The asterisks denote gunboats which would be fitted as mine layers similar to the British Grimsby type. These vessels, in war time, could, where possible, be combined with the mine craft of the fleet or, when this was impossible, be assigned on independent duty as commerce raiders, as station ships in outlying possessions, or as convoy vessels. The second Special Service Squadron would be utilized in peace time on the innumerable duties which now fall to vessels of the fleet and for special "flag showing" cruises. The station ship at Samoa would replace the Ontario which is not entirely suitable for this duty and is now overage. The Submarine and Base Force flagships would permit the commanders of those forces the use of an independent vessel and prevent detaching vessels such as the Bushnell and Argonne from their other duties. The gunboat attached to the Washington Navy Yard would be available for the use of the President and as Navy Department tender replacing the old Mayflower and Sylph, in much the same way that the new British Enchantress is used.
While the majority of the proposed gunboats should be as large and as heavily armed as permitted by the London treaty, some of them might be of smaller size as the mere presence of a vessel is, in many instances, as valuable as the size of such vessel.
Two additional river gunboats are provided for in addition to replacements for the Monocacy and Palos. The latter should, by all means, be Diesel driven for use on the upper reaches of the Yangtze. The British maintain eighteen river gunboats in China and an American force of ten would not be out of keeping with the extent of our interests in that country.
Gunboats when built should be Diesel driven for economy of operation, especially during long stays in port, and for the comfort of the crews. Being armed with dual-purpose guns, these vessels when with the fleet would be valuable adjuncts to the anti-aircraft defense. If we have special anti-submarine vessels the need for special anti-aircraft vessels seems just as apparent and the greater the number of available anti-aircraft guns the less possibility there is of enemy airplanes breaking through.
Repair facilities of the fleet.—In our designing of destroyer, submarine, and aircraft tenders, and repair ships we must bear in mind the necessity for making the fleet as independent as possible of bases. With the increase in size of destroyers and submarines and the attendant increase in radius of operation, "mother ships" may not be considered as indispensable as they were heretofore, but the enlarged prospective area of operation of the fleet more than counterbalances the enhanced independence of the individual ships.
Miscellaneous auxiliaries.—The proposed replacement for the Gold Star, now station ship at Guam, would be a vessel combining the characteristics of a gunboat, cargo vessel, and small transport. It would mount the maximum armament permitted by the treaty for vessels not specifically built as fighting ships, as well as the maximum number of planes allowed. It would carry a small detachment of marines and would be available for the miscellaneous duties expected of a vessel of this class.
The replacement for the Antares would be similar to the vessel mentioned in the preceding paragraph but would, in addition, be utilized as fleet photographic vessel and target repair ship. It might also be used as tender to the floating dry docks which accompany the fleet.
Survey ships.—The Hannibal and Nokomis were not designed for surveying duties and, consequently, are not as well fitted for this duty as would be a vessel built from the keel up for the specialized service required. The British Challenger of 1,400 tons appears to be a suitable vessel for this class of duty. Diesel propulsion might be advisable for the benefit of the crew when in tropical waters, although the added vibration might be detrimental to the instruments which are carried. Provision should be made for carrying at least two airplanes and size, therefore, will be somewhat dependent on this. Commander C. C. Slayton in the January, 1934, PROCEEDINGS discussed the value of a nonmagnetic vessel for oceanographic work. One of the two proposed survey ships should, it is believed, have the characteristics of the now destroyed Carnegie.
Anti-submarine vessels.—While American and other submarines have increased in offensive power since the war, the United States alone has neglected development of modern anti-submarine vessels. Our war-time chasers and eagle boats have gradually been reduced in numbers while their age impairs their efficiency. In the unhappy contingency of war we should find it necessary to have available some means of defense against the submarine forces of the enemy. Our destroyer strength is no longer sufficient to permit detachment of vessels from the fleet. Consequently, the possession of smaller but specially designed vessels for use against submarines is a definite need of our Navy. The British have developed the Kingfisher class of coastal sloop of 585 tons armed with one 4-inch gun, and relying principally upon depth charges as its main offensive equipment. A speed of 20 knots may be considered by some as too low for anti-submarine work, but the Kingfisher is certainly an improvement over our eagle-class. The Ponzone class of French escorteurs appears to be unnecessarily fast although if the characteristics which they embody could be included in a vessel of the seaworthiness required for American ships they should be exceptionally useful craft. Torpedo tubes on an anti-submarine vessel would, however, probably be utterly useless. Submarine chasers No. 1 and No. 2 of the Japanese Navy, with a displacement of 300 tons, would undoubtedly be useful vessels for inshore work and might fill a place between the 600-ton class permitted by the treaty and vessels of around 100 tons which would replace the war-built submarine chasers.
With a minimum of twenty anti-submarine vessels it would be possible to assign four to each of the following:
Experimental Division (should be known as "Anti-Submarine Division One")
Submarine Base, Coco Solo ("Anti-Submarine Division Two")
Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor. ("Anti-Submarine Division Three").
The remainder would replace Eagle 19 at Boston, three eagles at New York, Eagle 52 at Camden, Eagle 32 in the twelfth district, and Eagles 38 and 57 in the thirteenth district. The latter eight, while assigned to Naval Reserve training in peace time, would be available upon the outbreak of war as protection to ship traffic entering and leaving their ports of assignment. They would be manned by the reservists trained on them in peace time.
Mine sweepers.—A total of 22 mine sweepers is provided. These vessels should be slightly larger than those now in commission and should approximate the characteristics of the British Halcyon class, although they should be of somewhat more seaworthy appearance and preferably Diesel driven for 20 knots. One 5-inch dual purpose and several anti-aircraft machine guns would appear to be sufficient armament for vessels employed on mine-sweeping duties. When not engaged on these duties their armament would be a valuable addition to the anti-aircraft defense of the fleet.
Aircraft rescue vessels.—The need for suitable vessels to act as tenders to the patrol plane squadrons has become more apparent with each year of development of such aircraft. These vessels should have characteristics which the size of the present mine sweeper does not permit. They should be capable of carrying at least two modern patrol planes. Their anti-aircraft armament should be sufficient for reasonably adequate protection against attacking enemy planes which would probably concentrate on the disabled planes these vessels are intended to rescue. In order to eliminate all unnecessary obstructions on deck these vessels should be Diesel driven. Provision should be made for taking planes on board by means of Hein mats if this is possible within the limited size to which these vessels must necessarily be restricted.
Submarine rescue vessels.—These vessels would be merely replacements for the converted mine sweepers now in operation and embody the improvements which may always be included in a vessel constructed for the purpose for which it is intended.
Aircraft supply ships and transports.—The number of planes now operating with the fleet requires that specially designated ships be employed for the transport of supplies and replacement aircraft. The two classes mentioned would operate as replenishment vessels for the carriers and tenders. Their characteristics should be similar to the other large vessels of the train.
Net-laying ships.—The study which other navies are giving to the construction of net layers is indicative of the faith which they have in vessels of this type. It would appear advisable, therefore, that our own Navy take cognizance of this development. For the protection of advance bases, vessels of this nature appear to be absolutely necessary. Foreign practice ranges from the 450-ton Kamome and Tsubame of the Japanese Navy to the 3,050-ton Guardian of the British Navy. Such vessels, when not engaged on their regular duties, could be utilized for various other purposes in the fleet similar to the photographic work of the last mentioned vessel.
Floating dry docks.—ARD-1 is undoubtedly a most valuable adjunct of the fleet. Its lack of propulsive equipment, however, somewhat limits its usefulness and, consequently, self-propelled craft of the same capabilities would be even more valuable to the fleet. It is believed that such craft are practicable.
Salvage vessels.—The lack of adequate salvage ships in the Navy was instrumental in causing Congress to direct that designs of such a vessel be prepared. The plans were presumably presented but no further action has been taken. Suitable salvaging facilities should be available to the fleet and, consequently, the inclusion of at least one vessel for this purpose in the 10-year program appears to be reasonable.
The types of ships which have not been specifically mentioned are all equally necessary to a well-balanced fleet. They should be capable of taking their places in the fast train which the proposed program is intended to supply and be designed for the specific purposes they are expected to fulfill. The heterogeneous vessels which now comprise the fleet's train cannot be expected to be suitable. Many were designed for entirely different duties and even those which were especially constructed by the Navy were built to a standardized design under the pressure of war-time conditions and were never considered as ideal examples of their types. One of the principal intentions of the program proposed in this paper is that before the completion of the entire program sufficient experience could be had with the vessels constructed in the first years to enable the final vessels of each class to be considered the most efficient obtainable. Wherever possible, construction of each class has been spread over a number of years in order to take advantage of experiments which would be carried out as each vessel is completed. It is not intended, however, that every vessel in a class be of similar characteristics. The anti-submarine vessels, for instance, should be composed of probably three distinct types, while the mine sweepers might be designed as two separate classes, one for fleet work and the other for assignment to fleet bases. A program of replacements for our auxiliaries offers the opportunity for designing such replacements not only for the specific purpose of the class, but also for the particular service expected of the individual vessels within such classes, thus enhancing the efficiency of the entire fleet.