Among the many interesting but practically forgotten episodes of our early naval history is the spectacular destruction in 1816 of the so- called “Negro Fort,” located 25 miles up the Apalachicola River in the then Spanish colony of Florida, by a joint military-naval expedition under Lieutenant Colonel D. L. Clinch, 4th U. S. Infantry, and Sailing Master Jairus Loomis, U. S. Navy. As the United States and Spain were then at peace with one another the affair naturally attracted much attention in Washington and Madrid.
The peculiar circumstance of an American attack by regular forces projected into neutral territory originated in the Indian unrest and constant depredations along the Florida border. The Creek Indians resented the loss of a vast area of land, comprising what is now central and southern Alabama and southern Georgia, under the terms of the treaty which General Jackson had forced upon them after the campaign of 1813-14. Their desire for revenge had also been kept alive by the encouragement and support of a group of fugitive slaves living on the Apalachicola River with their central strong point at “Negro Fort.”
This fort and the general situation related to it were a legacy from the War of 1812. It will be recalled that preliminary to the memorable attack on New Orleans a small British squadron established itself in August, 1814, at Pensacola, then the Spanish capital of Florida. Not only did the squadron regularly use the port as a base, but British troops under Colonel Nicholls of the Royal Marines occupied Fort Barancas.
The bold and unexpected capture of Pensacola by General Andrew Jackson in 1814 caused Nicholls hastily to abandon Fort Barancas, before it was blown up by the Americans, and to retreat eastward by water. Re-establishing himself on the Apalachicola River, the Colonel built two forts; one an advance work near the Georgia frontier, and the other that which afterwards became known as Negro Fort, 25 miles from the Gulf.
While not large, Negro Fort was well designed and strongly constructed, with a parapet about 15 feet high and 18 feet thick. It was located on a “commanding bluff, with the river in front, a large creek just below, a swamp in the rear, and a small creek just above, which rendered it difficult to be approached by artillery” (Clinch). It was armed with cannon and well stocked with small arms and ammunition.
Upon finally evacuating the fort after the Treaty of Peace had been ratified, the Colonel left behind nine cannon, several thousand small arms, and a variety of military stores and ammunition which it was then inconvenient to take away with him. The fugitive slaves and their Indian allies who succeeded to the possession of the fort were thus well stocked with munitions of war which they subsequently used.
The result was that intolerable Indian depredations continued to be carried on against American territory and citizens from the vicinity of Negro Fort, after the British evacuation, and this finally brought forth a protest to the Spanish governor at Pensacola from General Jackson in April, 1816. The governor replied that the fort was no less obnoxious to his government than to the United States but that he had neither sufficient force nor authority, without orders from the governor general at Havana, to destroy it.
Such was the military, diplomatic, and political background which finally caused Major General Andrew Jackson, on April 8,1816, to authorize General E. P. Gaines to destroy Negro Fort “regardless of the ground it stands on.” The advanced operations were entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel D. L. Clinch, 4th U. S. Infantry, who was at Fort Gaines, situated 100 miles up the Chattahoochee River from its confluence at the Florida boundary with the Flint River. Below this junction the river takes the name of Apalachicola.
On May 9, Clinch submitted a plan for moving down the river with his command of about 150 men and establishing a fortified camp near the Florida boundary. Then after clearing up that vicinity his intentions were that “if my force will admit of it, I will pursue the enemy further, and strike a blow in another quarter.” By this he meant he would cross the border into Spanish territory and attack Negro Fort.
When these proposals reached General Gaines at Fort Montgomery, he made some substantial alterations in the plan. He was concerned for the security of the small force which was to operate in a hostile country so far from support. Fort Gaines, the starting point of the expedition, was itself an advanced post lying nearly 250 miles through virgin country southeast of the headquarters at Montgomery. Negro Fort lay about 200 miles beyond Fort Gaines. The General had to reckon upon the opposition of numerous Indians who were supposed to be abetted and aided by British agents and incited by the fugitive slaves. At Negro Fort, a well-armed fortification skillfully constructed by a professional soldier, strong resistance had to be counted on. Besides this the expedition involved the invasion of Spanish territory under occupation by regular forces which might be brought into action against the slender command of Clinch.
In the event of a reverse or any serious difficulty, Clinch would have to retreat and perhaps fight his way a long distance up stream, and a loss of supplies or ammunition might well cause disaster. Every consideration called for naval support from the lower Apalachicola River and this General Gaines very wisely decided to seek. Commodore Patterson at New Orleans was communicated with to this end, and Colonel Clinch was accordingly informed of the proposed new arrangement by which supplies would be sent under convoy of the Navy, which could also give military support to the operations at the critical point.
Clinch was instructed, to provide a boat and despatch it with an officer and fifty men, to meet the vessels from New Orleans, as soon as you are advised of their being on the river. Should the boat meet with opposition at what is called Negro Fort, arrangements will immediately be made for its destruction; and for that purpose you will be supplied with two 18-pounders and one howitzer, with fixed ammunition and implements complete to be sent in a vessel to accompany the provisions [from New Orleans).... Should you be compelled against the Negro Fort, you will land at a convenient point above it, and force a communication with the commanding officer of the vessels below, and arrange with him your plan of attack.
On the preceding day (May 22) General Gaines had dispatched a letter to Commodore Patterson requesting his co-operation and giving him the necessary information with which to concert the movement. The General pointed to the hazard to which Colonel Clinch would be exposed from his detached situation, “particularly in the event of war,” and because of the poor roads and the “distance from the settlement of Georgia near 150 miles.” Gaines had therefore “determined upon an experiment by water; and for this purpose” requested naval co-operation.
Should the Commodore “feel authorized to detach a small gun vessel or two as a convoy to the vessels charged with our supplies up the Apalachicola” the General was persuaded that he would “contribute much to the benefit of the service.” The Army transports were to be “under the direction of the officer of the gun vessels, and the whole should be provided against an attack by small arms from the shore.” It was further averred that,
should we meet with opposition from the fort, it shall be destroyed; and for this purpose the commanding officer above will be ordered to prepare all his disposable force to meet the boats at or just below the fort, and he will confer with the commanding officer of the gun vessels upon the plan of attack.
There was a quick and ready response from Patterson; one of the best of the old Commodores. Few naval officers have recognized as well as he the need of close co-operation with the Army, nor have given as conspicuous and effective an example of it. His wisdom had sought the co-operation of the Army in the defense of New Orleans; had outlined two months in advance the direction of the British attack upon that city; had foreseen the location of the battlefield and the great strength which naval support from the river would give to American arms ashore; and had prevailed upon General Jackson to move from Mobile in time to meet the British at New Orleans. Throughout that critical campaign Patterson’s ships gave the most effective, and at times decisive, support.
Upon the receipt of General Gaines’s plea for aid in the operations against Negro Fort, Patterson therefore turned eagerly from the very active warfare against pirates, in which his squadron was then engaged, to the project up the Apalachicola.
“From the very great importance, as detailed by General Gaines, that those stores and provisions should reach the Army in safety,” Commodore Patterson “felt it as a duty incumbent on me, when thus called on, to afford the requisite convoy for their protection.[1]
On June 19, shortly after receiving Gaines’s request, the Commodore issued instructions for the transports and convoy to assemble at Pass Christian. The naval commander was furnished with a copy of the letter from Gaines and ordered “with that letter for your guide, convoy the transports with Ordnance, Provisions, etc. up the River Apalachicola and Chattahoochee to such point or points as may be required if practicable.” He was further directed that should he “meet with opposition from the Negro Fort, . . . the Military Commanding Officer will have orders to destroy it, in which you will cooperate, the plan of attack to be concerted between yourself and him.” The transports were to be under naval “direction entirely.” In the event of hostilities between the Indians and the American forces, the naval commander would “if practicable afford any aid with your vessels in your power to the Army.” He was to “Remain in that River and co-operate with them until it shall be necessary to return here for provisions.” The Commodore directed that “should the Boat mentioned in Gen’l Gaines letter not meet you prior to your arrival at or near the Negro Fort and you have cause to expect opposition you will wait her arrival before you attempt to pass it.”
Sailing Master Jairus Loomis, who commanded this expedition, was further instructed to “act with vigor and judgement” and to “refrain from any act of hostility against a Spanish Force or violation of their rights and laws.” A final injunction was to “make no delay in your departure from the Pass Christian after the arrival there of [Gunboat] No. 154 & the Transports.”
Loomis proved himself fully equal to the many and varied difficulties of a naval, military, and diplomatic nature which confronted him in the succeeding operations. He had already proved his courage at the Battle of Lake Champlain and received a sword for his services there. The expedition which sailed from Pass Christian comprised the “U. S. Gun Vessel No. 149” as flagship under the immediate command of Loomis, the “U. S. Gun Vessel No. 154” (Sailing Master James Basset) and two schooners laden with provisions and military stores, the General Pike and the Semilanle.
It arrived off the mouth of the Apalachicola on July 10, and there dispatches borne by an Indian from Colonel Clinch requested that the ships remain at the river entrance until he could himself reach them with a party of men to assist in getting the transports up stream, and that all boats that might attempt to descend should be intercepted and detained.
Clinch had dispatched the Indian from his advanced position at Fort Crawford, about 120 miles above Negro Fort, and upon return of the courier on July 15 with information of the arrival of the naval forces at the mouth of the river, he made preparations for a further advance.
On this same date and while awaiting further word from the Army, Loomis observed a boat pulling out of the river and “being anxious to ascertain whether we should be permitted peaceably to pass the Fort above us”[2] he sent a boat with an officer. As the two boats approached each other the native craft opened fire with a volley and “immediately pulled up for the River.” The fire was returned from the flagship but with no effect.
Two days later Loomis “armed a boat with a swivel and musketry and four men, and gave her in charge of Midshipman Luffborough for the purpose of procuring fresh water, having run short of that article.” On entering the river, Luffborough saw a negro on the beach near a plantation and pulled in that direction. As the boat touched the shore he spoke to the negro “and directly received a volley of Musquetry from two divisions of Negroes and Indians who lay concealed in the bushes.” Luffborough and two men, Robert Maitland and John Burges, were killed on the spot. Edward Daniels was made prisoner and John Lopaz took to the water and escaped by swimming. He estimated that about 40 Negroes and Indians were concerned in the treacherous attack.[3]
None of this could be seen from the ships and the first intimation they had of it was the arrival of the body of Burgess which had been picked up from the water by a boat under Sailing Master Basset, who had also been sent in for fresh water a few hours after the first boat. Later on the swimmer Lopaz was discovered on a sand bar near the river entrance and rescued.
Meantime Colonel Clinch had completed his final military preparations and on July 17 commenced descending the river again with 116 picked men in boats. Major Mullenberg and Captain Taylor commanded the two companies into which the expedition was divided. That evening Major McIntosh joined up with 150 friendly Indians, and on the following day another large re-enforcement of Indians was received under an old chief called Captain Isaacs and the celebrated Chief Kotcha-Hajo, or Mad Tiger.
The junction with the latter force was accidental. Their expedition was declared as having long since been projected with a view to capturing the fort and returning the slaves to their proper owners. Since most of the band were without arms, it seems probable that the munitions in the fort were a main objective also. A council was held at which the late comers agreed to co-operate with Clinch in his attack on Negro Fort and the Colonel agreed to allow the Indians as much plunder in the way of arms as they could carry off after the fort had been taken. Meantime they were to keep parties in advance, to capture such negroes as they fell in with, and to join Clinch’s command near the fort.
On the 19th, the Indians brought in a prisoner with a fresh white man’s scalp in his possession, and from him was learned of the ambush of the boat under Midshipman Luffborough. The courier Lafarka returned from an unsuccessful attempt to deliver a letter to Loomis. At 2:00 a.m. of the 20th, Clinch landed his force “within cannon shot of the fort, but protected by a skirt of woods.”[4] Lafarka with four other Indians in a canoe was again dispatched down river and reached the gun vessels on the same day with a request that they ascend the river and join the Army detachment, then about one mile above the fort.
Loomis’ reaction to this, and to a similar request which reached him on the 23d was,
that by so doing in a narrow and crooked river from both sides of which my decks could be commanded and exposed to the fire of musketry without enabling me to act in my own defense, and also that something like treachery might be on foot from the nature of the message [verbal] I declined acting.[5]
Sailing Master Loomis returned a request that Colonel Clinch should send down a party of men to assist in getting up the vessels.
Meantime Clinch had been baffled in his efforts to take the fort. From the first it had been surrounded by the Indians under McIntosh who kept up an irregular musket fire, which had “the desired effect, as it induced the enemy to amuse us with an incessant roar of artillery, without any other effect than that of striking terror into the souls of most of our red friends.” This cannonading could be heard on board the gunboats. The American need of artillery was disclosed as indispensable by an early inspection of the strongly constructed works, and Clinch decided to await the arrival of the 18-pounders on board the transport Semilanle.
During the evening of the 23d, a deputation of chiefs was sent into the fort to demand its surrender,
but they were abused and treated with the utmost contempt. The black chief heaped much abuse on the Americans, and said he had been left in command by the British Government, and that he would sink any American vessel that should attempt to pass it.
On the fort had been hoisted a red flag with the English Jack over it.
In this situation on the 24th, the Colonel sent Lieutenant Wilson with a party of 13 men to assist in bringing up the gunboats. The squadron arrived at a point 4 miles below the fort on the 25th and Clinch came on board the flagship for a conference. With Loomis he reconnoitered the river below the fort and “determined on a site to erect a small battery of two 18- pounders, to assist the gun vessels to force the navigation of the river, as it was evident from their hostility, we should be obliged to do.”[6]
Clinch immediately commenced preparation of the position for the battery by disposing troops to protect it and on the following morning began clearing brushwood. He “ordered the gun vessels to move up, and directed the transport Similante to be in readiness to land the artillery, under cover of night.”
That evening the two commanders had conferred again. Loomis reports that Clinch
stated to me that he was not acquainted with artillery, but that he thought the distance was too great to do execution; on this subject we unfortunately differd totally in opinion, as we were within point blank range,[7] he however ordered his men to desist from further operations; I then told him that the gun vessels would attempt the passage of the fort in the morning without his aid.
Clinch makes no reference to a disagreement at the conference; merely stating that “after consulting with the commanding officer of the convoy I directed him to move up the two gun vessels at daylight the next morning.”
The Colonel had a splendid view of the spectacular naval events which followed early in the day of July 27, 1816. He thought that the ships came up the river “in handsome style,” while the fort flew the English Jack and the “red or bloody flag” and made preparation to receive them. After making fast alongside the position which had been chosen for the battery, across the river from the fort, the vessels “received a shot from a 32-pounder which was returned in a gallant manner.” Four shots were fired by the gunboats in a very brief interval. The fifth was a “hot shot from Gun Vessel 154” under the command of Sailing Master Basset. This, says Clinch, “entered the magazine and blew up the fort. The explosion was awful, and the scene terrible beyond description.”
The account of Loomis differs little from this. He got under way at 4:00 a.m. and began warping the ships up the 4 miles of river. At about five o’clock they reached a position within gun shot when “the fort opened upon us which we returned.” He reports that “after ascertaining our real distance with cold shot, we commenced with hot (having cleared away our coppers for that purpose), the first one of which entered their magazine, blew up, and completely destroyed the fort.”
Clinch says that the “war yells” of the Indians were added to the “cries and lamentations of the wounded.” The rescue and relief of the “unfortunate beings that survived the explosion” was the “first care on arriving at the scene of destruction.” The “soldier” was compelled
to pause in the midst of victory, and to drop a tear for the sufferings of his fellow beings, and to acknowledge that the great Ruler of the Universe must have used us as his instrument in chastising the blood-thirsty and murderous wretches that defended the fort.
The fort had contained about 100 effective men, including 25 Choctaws, and nearly 200 women and children, and of all these not more than 50 were saved, only 3 of whom were uninjured. There was not a single casualty among the American forces.
On investigation it was learned that Ordinary Seaman Edward Daniels, who had been taken prisoner after the ambush of Luffborough’s boat on the 17th, had subsequently been tarred and burnt alive. For this and for the killing of the other Americans at that time the outlawed Choctaw chief and the “Black Commandant, Garson” were immediately executed by the friendly Indian chiefs.
In accordance with the agreement which Clinch had made with the Indians, they took off most of the captured military property, including 162 barrels of powder which had escaped the explosion. Loomis took the cannon with 7 ship carriages and a considerable quantity of projectiles belonging to them, while Clinch had to be satisfied with a moderate amount of miscellaneous articles within the capacity of his water craft to transport back to Fort Crawford.
On August 1, the Colonel received information of a large body of Seminoles descending the river and hastened off to intercept them. Two days later Loomis set fire to the remaining parts of the fort and village and dropped down the river to the entrance where he found the schooner Maria of Pensacola under command of “an officer of His Catholic Majesty” named Calderon. The latter demanded all the artillery and ammunition which had been captured at the fort on Spanish soil. Loomis refused on the ground that the property belonged to runaway slaves from the United States and elsewhere, who had defended the fort “under the British flag accompanied with the bloody flag.” The Spanish officer expressed the “pleasure he felt at the destruction of the fort, and the gratification it would afford his government” and Loomis sailed for New Orleans.
Commodore Patterson was elated at the complete success of the expedition. He thought that “the very able manner and short time” in which victory had been gained “with a force so very inferior, reflects the greatest credit upon Mr. Loomis and the officers and men under his command.” In forwarding the reports to the Navy Department, he expressed “great satisfaction to recommend to the particular notice of the department” both Loomis and Basset “as highly meritorious officers.”
But Washington was shocked by the very audacity of the expedition and the international complications it might cause. High officials there had not yet lived through the astonishing invasion of neutral Florida on a large scale by Andrew Jackson in 1818, when Spanish forts and towns were taken and in the capital city of Pensacola the royal archives were seized, an American government set up, and even the revenue laws of the United States declared in force. In this invasion also the Navy was to play an important though long forgotten part.
In the Secretary of the Navy’s reply to Patterson’s enthusiastic report one seemingly detects frequent gasps between the lines. The Secretary could admit that “the conduct of the naval officers engaged in this expedition, appears to justify a belief of their having performed their duty with their usual spirit and gallantry.” But “in the present state of the case” he did not feel “authorized to express an opinon [or official sanction] of the proceedings, in anticipation of the course which Congress in its wisdom may deem proper to adopt.” With respect to prize money the case was “a new one, and the actual hostility on either part, cannot be considered as a lawful belligerent act.”
The Secretary preferred not to handle the matter himself. It involved “various and interesting points of national jurisdiction, jurisprudence, and national policy.” He was, therefore, induced “to transmit the papers entire to the President of the United States, as well for his information, as for the necessary instructions in reply . . . It is ever thus that naval officers must firmly act upon their own initiative and responsibility in distant places and hope for the best at Washington.
The struggle with Sir Richard Hughes, in which Nelson look the undesirable, and to a naval officer invidious, step of disobeying orders, showed clearly not only the loftiness of his motives, but the distinguishing features which constructed the strength of his character, both personal and military. There was an acute perception of the right thing to do, an entire readiness to assume all the responsibility of doing it, and above all an accurate judgment of the best way of doing it— to act with impunity to himself and with the most chances of success to his cause.—Mahan, Life of Nelson.
[1] Patterson to Navy Dept., August 15,1816.
[2] Loomis to Patterson, August 13.
[3] Commodore Patterson subsequently reported, “I regret exceedingly the loss of Mr. Luffborough, killed in this service; who though much indisposed, and having sent in his resignation to the Department, very handsomely volunteered his services, and accompanied the expedition. Mr. Loomis reports his conduct in the highest terms of approbation.”
[4] Clinch’s official report.
[5] Loomis’ official report.
[6] Loomis’ official report.
[7] To this statement Colonel Clinch subsequently took vigorous exception, and at his instance the distance from the fort to the point at which the gunboats lay at the time of its destruction was measured in 1819 by Major A. C. W. Fanning, an artillery officer. The latter reported this distance as 3,090 yards “subject to some correction since the instrument I used for taking the angle was very imperfect.’’