I
In 1911, in the March issue of these Proceedings, was published my paper on “Naval Strategy in a War between England and Germany,” in which I explained that this war was not likely to break out earlier than some time in 1914. It actually broke out at the beginning of August, 1914. That prediction, based on the knowledge that the opening of the Kaiser Wilhelm-Kanal was set for that year, has a peculiar significance today. The Canal enabled the German fleet to make front both in the Baltic and the North Sea, and thus virtually doubled its strength. It was responsible for the fact that no major operation in the Baltic was attempted by the Allies, although seriously considered by the British Admiralty. Admiral Jellicoe, who was entrusted with the defense of the British Isles, refused to divide his forces. Moreover, it was considered unwise to detach modern capital ships into those dangerous waters. The Belts and the Sound were mined, and the British fleet, when emerging into the Baltic from these difficult passages, would have to meet the German fleet in full force before it could deploy. The operation was carefully studied both before and after the campaign of the Dardanelles, but was found to be practically impossible.
So it came about that the Baltic remained a German lake throughout the war and Germany was protected against what was strategically the greatest possible danger, an attack on its extensive and vulnerable northern front.
If the British Navy had been in control of the Baltic, capable of landing large allied forces in the rear of the eastern front, threatening the lines of communication and even the capital, the long deadlock would hardly have occurred and the war might have terminated much earlier.
That the German General Staff realized the importance of maintaining control of the Baltic from the first can be seen from the fact that on August 5, 1914, in the early morning, when the first guns were being fired in the North Sea, the German minister to Denmark presented an ultimatum to the Danish government, demanding that it should close the Great Belt and the Sound by mines against all traffic, both of the German and the allied fleets. This Denmark did after a day’s anxious consultation with England. The Germans thus at one stroke obtained protection for their most vulnerable front. Denmark at the same time ensured her neutrality, which was maintained throughout the war.
Virtually it was the presence of the German Navy that protected Denmark from becoming another Belgium.
II
Consider now the situation as it is today, and note the differences from what it was in 1914.
(1) The German fleet is at present very weak as compared with the British fleet.
(2) The Danish Navy has been allowed to deteriorate until at present it has of modern vessels only a small number of torpedo boats and submarines. A few superannuated coast defense armor-clads are left over from the time of the World War. According to the Naval Bill of 1932, the Danish Navy is not to have any artillery ships. The personnel is entirely inadequate. Practically Denmark is defenseless at sea. The Army is in a much better condition, but is very small.
(3) The development of air forces has opened new and most potent possibilities for flank attacks against Germany if enemy air bases should be established on the Danish islands Zealand, Laaland, and Falster.
Let us consider the strategic situation under the assumption of a similar grouping of the powers as in the World War, without therewith implying that such a constellation is necessarily the most probable.
The British fleet can now, without any danger to the defense of the English coast, detach superior forces to the Baltic, but in order to secure and maintain safe passage through the Belt and the Sound, it is necessary to be in control of the Danish islands, in particular the Zealand group. On these islands, moreover, air bases can be established from which the northern part of Germany and therewith Berlin, Kiel, and Hamburg will be threatened with attack from the air. Once the British fleet has penetrated into the Baltic and the German fleet is locked up in Kielerhafen, no point of the German coast of the Baltic will be safe against attack. Landing operations on a large scale may be carried out, and an effective defense of this extensive coast line cannot be kept up without a serious weakening of the eastern and western fronts. The lines of communications to the left wing of the eastern front and even Berlin, the heart of the Reich, would be threatened.
It is clear that Germany will take all possible measures to frustrate such an attack, and that this can be done only by denying the British fleet passage through the Danish waters, but again, possession of the Danish islands is the first condition for ensuring this result.
In other words, the Danish islands form the key by which alone the door to the Baltic can be locked or unlocked. Now, since Denmark has allowed her defenses to deterioriate until her territory is strategically a no man’s land, she has no control of that door, and whether we look at the situation from the English offensive or the German defensive point of view, possession of those islands becomes a necessity in a Baltic campaign.
While Germany can always, if she so desires, invade Jutland and Fyen, the occupation of Zealand and Copenhagen becomes a question of who comes first.
We have often seen naval powers detach a fleet or squadron in critical times to points of strategic importance, and the perennial visits of British warships of recent years to the Danish waters may not be without significance in this connection. We have also seen cases where such points, especially if they have no defenses of their own, have been occupied before war has been declared.
Whoever comes first will demand permission to land troops on Zealand and will occupy Copenhagen, ostensibly in order to “protect” Denmark against attack from the other belligerent.
If the British occupy Zealand, it may be expected that German forces will invade Jutland and Fyen in order to “protect” these provinces.
If the Germans occupy Zealand before the English and at the same time Jutland and Fyen, it will probably be impossible for the English to penetrate into the Baltic without excessive sacrifices.
In either case, so long as Denmark is in her present defenseless state, she will be drawn helplessly into the conflict and forced willingly or unwillingly to co-operate with one of the belligerents or the other.
III
It is interesting to contemplate what the situation would be if Denmark had a relatively powerful defense both on land and at sea; that is, a defense which for a country of her size would be ordinarily regarded as of rather extraordinary strength, but such as now actually warranted by the existing political conditions in Europe. Let us assume further that it is the declared policy of Denmark that she will stand ready to use all the naval and military forces at her disposal to resist to the utmost any infringement of her neutrality, whoever may be the transgressor.
Under the conditions of such a positive and unequivocal neutrality on the part of Denmark, the belligerents on both sides know that they will meet with considerable resistance if they try to impose their will on the Danish government, and that presumably the enemy will come to the support of the Danes. It may well be doubted whether England under these circumstances would attempt a Baltic campaign, and Germany might find it inadvisable to take any other action than she did in 1914, with the result that Denmark would be allowed to remain neutral if she so desired.
IV
The position of Sweden has not been touched upon so far, but actually that country is also in danger of being drawn into the conflict. In the Sound is a channel called Flinterenden with about 25 feet of water, running close under the Swedish coast and being entirely Swedish territory. Although Flinterenden does not permit the passage of capital ships, it is of considerable strategic importance.
Air bases in the southern part of Sweden, if in the hands of an enemy of Germany, are equivalent to air bases on the Danish islands.
If the Danish islands are occupied by one of the belligerents, Sweden is entirely at her mercy, since her economic life depends largely on the traffic through the Danish waters.
Probably Sweden is not unmindful of this situation.
This is the duty of preparedness, which a neutral nation, desirous of peace, owes to belligerents, to the sisterhood of civilized states, and to its own people.
(1) To belligerents because they may be led by the objector’s apparent military weakness into disregarding rights that are being infringed.
(2) To the sisterhood of civilized states with whom in the matter of principles commonly recognized as sound each Power is sympathetically leagued for the preservation of right standards, whether or not such a compact follows lines suggested by the Cleveland Conference of May 12,1915.
(3) To its own people who may at any time insist upon ministerial action which is fraught with peril.—Brewer, Rights and Duties of Neutrals.