*This article was submitted in the Prize-Essay Contest, 1934.
We may choose peace or war. The choice lies with us—with you and with the man in the street, who, it is probable, seldom consciously and of his own volition, desires war. The choice is in our power. It is a very simple choice.
War is not caused by individual acts of aggression or offense which a surprised and indignant nation must avenge, although which acts frequently form the torch which ignites the waiting fuel.
The tendency toward war develops by the accumulation of economic pressure between nations, which builds up and prepares the fuel in the hearts of the people. The rising economic pressure gains in intensity until the point is reached at which the spark flies from the electrode much as the lightning strikes the house top, and the fire follows.
It is quite possible for such a state of feeling to exist between two states that a very trifling Political motive for war may produce an effect quite disproportionate—in fact a perfect explosion. The passions which break forth in war must already have a latent existence in the peoples.1
Let us examine this phenomenon for a moment. It is an axiom of electrical designers that a spark will never pass between two bodies at the same potential. And as between two bodies, one under rising potential, the other at a low level, there comes the inevitable point of blinding flash followed by destruction. There may, however, be applied to the lower electrode a countercharge, which, when developed and kept at the proper level will always prevent the occurrence of any discharge between the two. But the discharge must take place if the potential continues to rise, and will then be directed to some third object. This is a basic point. If you read on, please bear it in mind.
The impelling or compelling motives of civilized men and nations—and we are not concerned with those not civilized—arise fundamentally from economic sources of pressure; from the need of men to supply themselves with the things which they require; from commerce and trade, with the infinitude of detail that they imply. This economic pressure, as we know, is ever with us in rising quantity, until the point of explosion is reached.
As against these impelling, or compelling motives, there is always a deterrent: what is to be gained by action? Everything? Something? Or nothing? Or will it surely result in punishment and be without advantage?
The most beneficial use of a naval force is not to wage war, however successfully, but to prevent war with all its suffering, expense, and complication of embarrassments. Of course, therefore, a navy for defense only, from which an enemy need fear no harm, is of small account in diplomatic relations, for it is nearly useless as a deterrent from war.2
There may be a balance between this rising pressure and the deterrent, to a greater extent than is readily apparent.
President Coolidge several years ago immortalized the old Puritan version of the verb, “to choose,” but he was by no means the first president to so use this word.
As a colony, we revolted against what we believed to be the unjust domination of our mother England, and there evolved from that bitter struggle one of the most courageous and farseeing minds this country has ever produced. In his intense and whole-hearted desire for the continued existence and welfare of our government, he has left for us a heritage of principles which we may well review; the occasional neglect of which has in the past plunged us into the major foreign wars in which we have engaged, and which will in the future plunge us into war again when our deterrent is again neglected.
In his “Farewell Address,” George Washington gave to us for our guidance forever the immortal words which head this essay, and also
It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances. . . . Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.
Our first president was too brilliant a mind to indicate that foreign commerce should be entirely avoided, or those necessary foreign relations that apply to it: he “safely trusts” to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies. He was one of the ablest minds of his time, and it is probable that no person ever so much desired our welfare. His counsels, therefore, bear weight, but why did he consider them so imperative?
He says, “Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course.” He very clearly considered the military isolation of the Americas to be the prime factor to be considered in our national defense and foreign affairs. And by what means did he plan for us to “choose peace or war”? The answer is clear and plain: “Taking care to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture.”
A broad and basic view of his experiences and final success answers the question as to what manner of suitable establishment was required to best utilize military isolation in national defense. We can, by reason of this oft-debated isolation, only be seriously attacked by water. By controlling the strength of our Navy, there is placed in our hands the tool by which we may choose for ourselves when and whether we shall enter war, and which renders us comparatively free from the necessity of endeavoring to keep peace and avoid war solely by foreign alliance.
The Navy evidently becomes our first and decisive line of defense. Can this be proved, or is it merely a hypothesis?
During the weary years that the Revolution dragged on; Washington won battles by courage, he won them by strategy, by superior force, with inferior force, by quickness, and by cunning; and he lost them for one major reason. He was compelled to watch helplessly the governing factor of the war; the continual landing of foreign soldiers on American soil, while his own troops dwindled through battle after battle until even Washington himself nearly despaired of success.
Relatively speaking, the Continental forces had no ships. Had they been able to prevent the continuous landing of foreign troops and supplies, the Revolution would probably have been successful in a shorter time. Conversely, had they not been finally able to prevent the landing of those troops and supplies, Cornwallis would have received aid and this country would not have become a Republic.
It was not until France recognized the colonies, quickly followed by war between France and England, and the dispatch of the French fleet (through the efforts of John Paul Jones in part) which prevented further landing of troops, that the Revolution was won.
It is generally accepted that the decisive factor of the Revolution was a blockade by the French Navy; that without it, all the courage and genius of Washington and his heroes would have been wasted, and that this decisive naval blockade directly made possible the existence of this government.
It is seen that Washington derived and had burned into his being, through the fire of many battles, the utter need of a Navy sufficiently powerful to prevent the landing of foreign troops on our soil. Let us examine the question as to how large and of what quality a Navy is required to prevent the landing of foreign troops in America.
Command of the sea means the control, absolute and unassailable, of the enemy's maritime communications, and it means nothing else. Meaning that, it means everything that naval warfare, as such, can attain. In the case of an island, it means that such an island cannot be invaded, starved out, or otherwise injured from the sea so long as its sea defense is unimpaired.3
Naval warfare has two purposes: to destroy the main fleets of the enemy, and to protect or assail maritime commerce. One is a necessary prerequisite to the other. Where the decision by arms is demanded by one nation, it cannot be refused by the other. The nation in the point of vantage is that nation so armed that the resort to arms will not be desired by others than themselves. It is by no means to be said that war will not again occur, for so it will, but it cannot be gainsaid that the choice between peace and war lies with him who has the means of aggression. For any object less paramount than national existence, no nation will go to war well knowing that it will be beaten. From the political point of view defense is the sole object of all warlike preparation; but even so, as soon as issue is joined, defense will always in the first instance take the form of attack.
Our ships therefore must be of types particularly well fitted for offensive action. Further, the history of naval wars shows that they are in large measure fought with the ships in hand at the beginning of the war.
The ultimate consequences of defeat no man can foretell. The only way to avert them is to ensure victory, and again following out the principles of Clausewitz, victory can only be ensured by the creation in peace of an organization which will bring every available ship and gun, if the war be on the sea, in the shortest possible time, and with the utmost possible momentum, upon the decisive field of action.4
If one of the belligerents has no naval force at all, the other will capture his commerce, invade his territory, and attack his forces on land. If one of two belligerents has the stronger naval force, the weaker can inflict comparatively little damage to him, either on land or at sea. With approximately equal strength and skill, history shows battles indecisive and wars long.
A modern example of a moderately inferior force is shown by the position of Germany in the World War. Ship for ship, the High Seas Fleet may have been more than a match for their opponents, yet their inferior numbers in capital ship types, and inferior numbers in other types having regard to the Navy as a whole, stand as a permanent lesson to those who advocate a Navy almost as good as that of a possible opponent. Every action of the war reflects this basic fact, which eventually resulted in the virtual sealing of the High Seas Fleet in their bases, from which they were only forced to emerge to their disadvantage by the growing discontent of the populace with the results of the war. Following this sortie, the inferior force at Jutland was considered by some to be fortunate to have again reached its base without complete destruction; and actual, as well as potential command of the sea passed permanently to Great Britain. Pursuing the usual history of wars in this respect, there followed the widespread blockade which was so decisive in winning the war.5
A second-best Navy, therefore, like a second-best hand in the ancient game with which many arc familiar, only prolongs the struggle until a decisive fleet action renders blockade and control of commerce possible. This prolongation of the struggle, the outcome of which must be fairly certain, barring accidents or poor judgment, results only in increased expense of the war in lives and money, with slight chance of success awaiting at the end. A strong Navy is far less expensive from every standpoint after the results are counted.
The types to which the ships of our Navy conform are developments of four typical variables: their
(1) Armament, by which is meant all offensive weapons, aircraft, guns, torpedoes, mines, and others.
(2) Armor, which includes side and deck armor, all defensive devices.
(3) Mobility, separate factors being
(а) speed, further distinguishing between
(aa) speed which the ship may sustain continuously,
(bb) speed which it may maintain for some definite time, or, as may be said, intermittently.
(b) radius of action, which has reference to fuel
(aa) without refueling, at high speed and at economical speed,
(bb) including refueling at sea or at base,
(c) and provisions and supplies.
(4) Co-ordination of the above factors in order that the fleet may constitute one whole, consisting of well-matched complementary types.
You cannot have everything. If you attempt it, you will lose everything; by which I mean that in no one quality will your vessel be as efficient as if you had concentrated purpose on that one. On a given tonnage, which in shipbuilding corresponds to a given size of army or fleet, there cannot be had the highest speed, and the heaviest battery, and the heaviest armor, and the longest coal endurance which the tonnage would allow to any one of these objects by itself. If you try, you will be repeating Richelieu’s mistake when he tried to carry on offensive war on four frontiers. He also wanted four things."
Every design of any ship, unit, or machine has its very definite limiting factors, which may be those of volume, weight, speed, pressure, or temperature. When the limiting factor is removed or raised by reason of development of better materials or methods, the relative design may be increased. For example, when metal is developed which will stand more than 1,100 degrees without excessive softening and creep, boilers can be made more powerful for the same volume.
The typical variables of our ships and of their number are fundamentally governed by four factors:
- The fundamental laws of naval strategy, as affected by the geography of our terrain, with
- Its comparative isolation by great distance from European and Pacific powers,
- Its great expanse of coast line on east, west, and south,
- The strategical location of the Panama Canal,
- The special strategical situation in the Pacific,
- The special strategical situation in the North Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the South Atlantic.
- The fundamental laws of naval tactics, which indicate certain types as accessory and complementary to others.
- The advance in science as reflected by the progress in engineering research, which necessitates the continual development of new weapons, if the arms of the nation arc to hold their relative international position.
- The foreign affairs and international relations of our country with world powers. This factor not only includes the normal diplomatic and treaty relations with other countries, but also is affected by a discernment oi their prospective actions as indicated by their present conduct, exclusive of agreements.
These factors, while in principle entirely distinct, are in considerable measure interrelated, so that, as a slight touch moves all parts of a spider's web, any change in one not only immediately indicates a needed change of ship type, but also disturbs the balance of one or all other factors, which further affects the type of ship most suitable for national defense at the time.
All four factors, it must be noted, are in a continual state of flux. It is not a state of change of the step-by-step type, but of the incremental or gradual type. During any one year, for example, the change in separate items may appear so gradual and minor as to seem of little consequence, but when considered as a whole over the year, certain definite action is seen to be required to maintain the fleet in its relative state of efficiency. Over longer periods, such as our long-term building programs, it has frequently been found that certain ships have become relatively useless for the purpose intended, and even the building program itself requires change.
Some writers have said that "splendid isolation is a thing of the past." We must here distinguish between political aloofness, on the one hand, and military separation from the geographic standpoint, on the other. These writers refer to diplomatic isolation, and our experiences prior to entry in the war, particularly the various difficulties met in maintaining our neutrality, bear them out.
With regard to that military separation which is of prime interest to the Navy, it must be said that fundamental facts do not change. Only methods change. The development of power-propelled ships, of faster ships, of larger guns, of heavier armor, of protective blisters, of control methods, of aircraft and dirigibles, does not alter the geographical position of this country. Faster and larger ships and the feasibility of aircraft bombardment can only change the types and methods we must counterpose in defense. It cannot alter the principles of the relative advantage nature has given us over foreign countries so far as defense is concerned.
By reason of our isolation we apparently feel a certain security which is entirely unwarranted. Nothing could be farther from the doctrines of Washington than to assume that protection is given to us by isolation. Considering again the case of Cornwallis at Yorktown, the decisive blockade by the French fleet under Admiral de Grasse was only possible after a moderate but sufficiently decisive defeat of the British off the Virginia capes.
. . . battles, like men, are important not for their dramatic splendor, but for their efficiency and consequences. The battle of! Cape Henry had ultimate effects infinitely more important than Waterloo7.
Certainly there never was a more striking example of the “influence of sea power” on a campaign. Just at the crisis of the American Revolution the French Navy, by denying to the British communications by sea, struck the decisive blow of the war8.
The principle in question here is important. The blockade won the war, but successful fleet action, as is always the case, was necessary before it could be established. The control of the sea reverts, then, to a major fleet, even for the purest ideal of defense.
“A navy for defense only” in a political sense is one that will be used only in case we are forced into war, but one that in war is strong enough to attack. “A navy for defense only” in a military sense means a navy that is so weak that the best it can do is to await attack and to defend its ports, leaving the enemy at ease as regards his own interests and at liberty to choose his own time and manner of fighting.
. . . Defense in a military sense is rarely effective toward concluding a war—never effective when it comes to national defense. , . . A navy for proper defense is one that all possible enemies have to respect in peace and fear in war. . . .
Every power that has based its naval program on a coast defense idea, a military defense instead of a political defense, has failed to achieve its object. To build and maintain a navy of that kind is poor naval strategy.9
Usually every result which may be investigated is found to have one overwhelming reason for its being. There is seldom an effect for which there is more than one governing reason, although frequently many reasons are offered by those advancing special interests.
The fact is that “splendid isolation” was never more nor less than it is at this time. The natural and inherent value of military isolation, as viewed by Washington, and as it still exists today, lies in the fact that we may never be seriously attacked by land, but that an invading enemy must of necessity come by water or by air. Isolation gives to us the priceless privilege, which nature has refused to most governments, of first defending ourselves upon the sea. Washington said: “Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation?” Why indeed?
The simple facts are often the most difficult to appreciate. Theoretically, if the Navy were strong enough, the Army would never be called for the purpose of defense. Of course, possible combinations of sea power by foreign nations render such a Navy impossible—yet the principle remains.
Isolation indicates to us one thing—and one thing only—a capable Navy. A strong Navy is to us a natural law specified by our geographic position.
Considered in conjunction with the Panama Canal, it actually forces upon us the military advantage of interior lines, from the strategic standpoint.
The expression “interior lines” conveys the meaning that from a central position one can assemble more rapidly on either of two opposite fronts than the enemy can, and therefore can utilize force more effectively.10
It gives us the power of quickly concentrating our entire force, or a majority of strength from a central position against an invader on either side, while yet refusing the opposite coast to his ally. A blockage of the canal would reverse that advantage. The liability of the canal to blockage by sudden raid, which most assuredly would be the first and most promising attempt by an enemy initiating war, is telling us forcibly to protect our position of interior lines by completing the Nicaraguan project without undue delay.
Defensive strategy implies that our bases will, on the whole, be best located for protection of the coast line of the Americas. It does not preclude raiding or controlling bases in outlying situations. As has been pointed out by Admiral Schofield, it must be understood that a “controlling base” or position docs not in itself control anything.
Positions do not control—they simply make control possible. The control is exercised by the forces that operate from these positions and bases.11
The policy of Washington with regard to isolation, from the national as distinguished from the military standpoint, resulted later in the Monroe Doctrine, which fundamentally formulated the principle of international defense of the Americas, with the tacit corollary of non-aggression abroad. The Monroe Doctrine effectually further extended an already long coast line which must be defended, thus accentuating this feature of our strategic problem- With the growing power of the South American countries, it also indicates as desirable a much closer military and naval treaty alliance as well as commercial friendship with our sister American republics than has been heretofore effected.
In this connection, the recent statement of the President extends a virtual invitation to the South American republics to participate in the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.
The definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention.
The maintenance of constitutional government in other nations is not a sacred obligation devolving upon the United States alone. The maintenance of law and the orderly processes of government in this hemisphere is the concern of each individual nation within its own borders first of all.
It is only if and when the failure of the orderly processes affects the other nations of the continent that it becomes their concern; and the point to stress is that in such an event it becomes the joint concern of a whole continent in which we are all neighbors.12
In the late summer of 1823, the Holy Alliance proposed a conference at Paris to consider means for combined action in the resubjugation of the erstwhile Spanish colonies and the permanent extension of monarchical rule to the Americas.
The basic plan of the principles which later led to the Monroe Doctrine, and which originally included a proposed alliance with Great Britain in the interests of preservation of the representative form of government, was first suggested by George Canning, British foreign secretary, to Richard Rush, the American minister, pursuant to that proposed conference.
While action by President Monroe and his cabinet was pending, Canning announced to the French ambassador on October 9, 1823, that Great Britain had no desire to hasten recognition of the Spanish colonies, but that any foreign interference, by force or by menace, would be a motive for immediate recognition; that England "could not go into a joint deliberation upon the subject of Spanish-America upon an equal footing with other powers, whose opinions were less formed on that question." This declaration was communicated to the chancelleries of Europe, and while the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine in our message of December 2, 1823, met a storm of criticism, the very effective support of England, with the British Navy at that time in supreme control of the sea, rendered the standing of the Monroe Doctrine unquestioned.
Thus it is seen that while the Monroe Doctrine has always been considered as essentially a fundamental ideal of American tradition, which indeed it is, yet its primary success rests in large measure solidly upon the support of the British Navy.
Since that time, the Monroe Doctrine together with the policy of isolation has existed for more than a hundred years without the necessity of our lighting in its defense. Is this because there have been no attacks against its principles, or because foreign powers did not desire to cross swords with our Navy, which is its chief defense? The action of Great Britain has shown consistent friendship to our principles when they have been in question.
On the occasions of the establishment of the Maximilian Empire in Mexico in 1861, the Venezuelan boundary dispute with British Guiana in 1895, and the pacific blockade of Venezuela in 1902, England has consistently and effectively supported the Monroe Doctrine and American principles of representative government.
This situation (the Monroe Doctrine) has been in full accord with British policy. Americans should not forget the fact, moreover, that at any time during the past twenty years Great Britain could have settled all her outstanding differences with Germany by agreeing to sacrifice the Monroe Doctrine and give her rival a free hand in South America. In the face of such a combination our Navy would have been of little avail.13
The friendship of Great Britain in its actual conduct since the War of 1812, which was largely an adjustment of differences existing in the international law of the period, combined with our natural affection for the British for obvious reasons, happily renders the possibility of war with Great Britain practically nil, in fact, mutual support would be a much more advantageous and logical course.
Admiral Schofield, it is believed, expressed a very conservative but representative opinion when he said: “I do not believe those fleets will ever face each other. . . .” It is probable that no greater catastrophe could possibly happen to the two nations, either at this time or later.
There seems, therefore, little cause for the criticism by the British press of our present construction program. The voluntary destruction of our battle cruisers in 1923 demonstrated beyond all possibility of misunderstanding that it is not, nor will it ever be, the desire of this country to engage in competitive naval building with Great Britain, or with other countries. Nor can building to treaty limits be so construed, as the types and tonnages specified represented those arrived at in conference by all concerned as being those most likely to keep the peace.
In fact, the most apparent way in which our country may contribute to the tendency toward peace is to maintain, not a big Navy, nor a small Navy, nor yet necessarily a Navy second to none, but a Navy controlled to that strength most conducive toward peace, which we have found by experience and have observed from history to be a strong Navy equal to the immediate and changing international situation in prospect. This strength of Navy, whatever that may from year to year prove to be, we should maintain as a principle.
What we desire in a Navy is a controlled power, always well balanced and never wanting in energy, which in the most critical moments rises to great heights, and the next moment reverts quietly again in subordination to the play of the most subtle political influences. We require a Navy sufficiently strong that our national diplomats may have at their support a more influential argument for peace than can be afforded by any international court or disarmament conference.
It is interesting to note how the gradual growth of factors cause changes in the compelling motives of nations which eventually result in changes of the international law.
Great Britain and her allies during the World War visited and searched for an ever increasing list of items of contraband, applied the doctrine of continuous voyage to both absolute and conditional contraband, and further placed the burden of proof as to destination upon the owners of the cargo.
This action caused Germany, citing as a precedent Great Britain’s establishment of a military area in the North Sea, to declare her now famous “strategic area” around Great Britain and to resort to unlimited submarine warfare.
The British Retaliatory Order in Council of March 11, 1915, with its concurrent and subsequent events, is indicated to have been a turning point of several phases of the international law of blockade, and represented a new point of departure in naval strategy. Further, it was a primary focal and turning point of the World War.
This order,14 and the decree by France of March 13, 191515 retaliated to the establishment by Germany of the submarine war zone by instructing their fleets to prevent all exports from, and imports to, Germany, and the order was later extended to all enemy countries. The British Prize Courts have recognized this order as being in accordance with international law.
The rule that belligerents must not interfere with the legitimate commerce of neutrals is based on a compromise—just as is the rule that belligerents must not invade neutral territory; and it presupposes that both belligerents will carry it out, and that neutrals will prevent both of them from violating it.16
Thus the international law pertaining to blockade, to military areas, and control of imports by neutrals was altered—in each case by absolute and pressing necessity for the action taken, and each case representing a logical advance over the previously existing international law on the subject.
These developments are mentioned here purely to illustrate that, in possible future wars, the military establishments may again find it imperative to operate under international law radically differing from that existing at the present time. The types of ships constructed and principles guiding military operations should not, then, be too closely based upon the present law, but may well take the factor into account and be based primarily upon military considerations.
President Wilson literally gave his life to the attempt to establish world control ever all wars. The means he endeavored to employ in this attempt were disarmament, agreements for disarmament, and arbitration. His principles were, it is almost needless to say, extremely admirable, and were those of an altruistic idealist.
The causes for war form an interesting study, and, it is believed, can be grouped in two general classes. In the first class may be listed most infractions of international law, international public and semipublic damage suits, international cases of tort, such as indignities suffered and injuries sustained whether public or private; all of which are primarily questions of adjustment of differences. The characteristic of this class is that the offense or difference is a fixed quantity; that is, it does not tend to gain or increase in intensity. Such differences of fixed intensity, while they have many times during history caused war, readily lend themselves to settlement by treaty, or in world arbitration or chancery courts.
The second class of causes for war is of entirely different origin. These causes arise mainly and fundamentally from economic and vital sources, such as, for example, a people of high birth rate hemmed in by natural or artificial boundaries. As the population grows, the need for more territory to support them increases from the desirable stage to the necessary, becomes impelling, compelling, and finally the dominant factor of their national life. A similar position, possibly of less acuteness, occurs when a country primarily of manufacturing propensities loses the market for its goods, either because of the natural changes in industrial geography, such as change in the sources of raw materials, or because of artificial changes, such as the erection of tariff walls by countries to which their goods have been supplied. The result is the same. The characteristic of this class of causes for war is that of constantly increasing intensity. Under the never ceasing increase in pressure, it is apparent that nothing but the direct relief of expansion, or war, which is destruction, will, or can, bring equilibrium. Under the rising intensity, treaties, arbitrations, court decrees, in the words of the German war-time premier may frequently be treated as “scraps of paper.” The discharge of this pressure must take place.
Causes for war arising from disputed differences may, and should be, settled by courts. Therefore, as in most debated principles, I resident Wilson was correct in part, and the establishment of arbitrational courts has without question been the greatest step ever taken toward permanent peace. However, in order that war arising from fundamental pressure of rising intensity may be diverted to other nations less discerning and less fortunate, it is essential that, in the words of George Washington, “a suitable establishment” to “take advantage of so peculiar a situation” be maintained, and that establishment inherently is the Navy.
The advocacy of a “big Navy” per se, is regarded as merely unwise. What is necessarily desired is not a “big Navy,” nor even the largest Navy; what is desired is a controlled Navy, by which we mean that the size and strength of our fleet and its accessories should be constantly controlled to be not necessarily of equal, but of sufficient size and strength, whatever that may be, whether large or small, compared to any other. The strength of our Navy should be governed by the actions of foreign countries in building and in their plans for aggression, and not entirely by their discussion in conference. This does not recommend that we indulge in “competitive building.” It does mean that we match fleet for fleet, when advisable to do so.
A phrase which is believed to have done more harm than good for the service is that misnomer: “Preparedness for war.” Its meaning is clear to those of military inclinations. To the pacifist element, the phrase implies that we are making definite preparations for a definite war, and that as soon as may be the preparations will be completed, whereupon the firebrands will at once set the torch and call the soldiers to the colors. It is an unfortunate phrase, badly applied.
What we endeavor to say is that we require a controlled Navy for the prevention of war; certainly not a “big Navy” in preparedness for war.
Granted that our Navy should have a strength which is controlled to be equal to coping with those of foreign countries when their probable plans render it advisable, it is evident that the control may logically be exercised by annually building, in addition or as replacements, the necessary number and types of ships to accomplish the purpose. It is essential and imperative, therefore, that regular, systematic, and annually recurrent as contrasted to periodic or spasmodic building programs be set up for this purpose.
Politics, diplomacy, and the probability of war are so closely related that one may be said to be the continuation, or constitute the genesis, of the other.
The major effect of our regulation of the price of gold, plus actual increases in many items of the tariff itself, is to raise the tariff wall, in many cases to a higher basis than ever before, and excluding foreign merchandise from our markets to a greater extent than ever before.17 This increase in the tariff has accordingly deprived those countries of one of their best markets for some goods, and may, perhaps, have thrown many of their people out of their customary employment and means of livelihood.
For example, witness the frank statement of the crowded condition, the need for expansion, the former manufacturing prosperity, and the loss of their market by the Japanese,18 which was the impelling motive for the assassination of the Japanese premier, and the subsequent invasion and conquest of Manchukuo by their military party, all of which gained in influence with the people as the economic pressure increased.
Here was a splendid example of a fruitful source of war. The simile of the two electrodes at high potential is once more useful, particularly with regard to the discharge of this potential to a third point at low potential, in this case the weak and inviting Manchukuo. Need the evident fact be emphasized that our fleet was sufficiently large at this time, and sufficiently efficient for this purpose, coupled with our advantage of isolation, to act as a very effective deterrent from a successful war? Repeating the question: What was to be gained by action? Everything? Something? Nothing? Or might it even result m possible disadvantage?
The answer is plain, and as we view the pictures of Manchurian battlefields strewn with the bodies of thousands of Chinese soldiers who were strong in courage but weak in weapons, it is hoped that we may long heed this practical lesson. Shall we always have this priceless choice? Shall we save our money and spend our lives, or spend our money and permit ourselves to be shocked by the flow of foreign blood?
Lest the gradual and insidious manner in which these situations arise be forgotten, will the reader recall his own surprise on first hearing of the Japanese attack at Shanghai? And the unreadiness of the French for the first German advance in 1870, and in 1914, even though in each case they had generally been preparing and vaguely been expecting such an eventuality for years?
Our program of building ships for the Navy has ever been a periodic development of the immediate political administration.
War is only a continuation of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself. Policy has declared the war; it is the intelligent faculty, war is only the instrument, not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible.19
This, of course, is as it should be. It is inherent in the Republican form of government that policies frequently change, or may reverse, with the change in administration.
Such changes of policy probably engender the welfare of the country over a long period, each administration continuing the better features and correcting the errors of its predecessors, and gravitating toward that even middle ground of pursuing the obvious course required by common sense, which is so simple in principle and so difficult to achieve.
Yet from the viewpoint of the welfare of the Navy and of the country from a national defense standpoint, it is urgently essential to note that our present method of authorization of and appropriation for construction of new ships, whether as additions or replacements, results in alternate periods of strength and stagnation. In our periods of strength, our Navy has never been “second to none.” In our periods of weakness, we have been vulnerable. The weakness of our Navy has directly led us into the two greatest foreign wars in which we have engaged.
The first was the War of 1812, when British ships boarded our men-of-war to search for deserters; the second with Germany in 1917, because of her failure to follow the general principles of visit and search before sinking ships.20 Had our Navy at those times merited such respect, to use again the words of Washington, “as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected,” it is most probable that it would not have been necessary for us to have taken part in those wars.
If we had maintained a strong naval force and could have presented a good fighting unit in 1914, I feel sure the United States would not have been drawn into the World War.21
We will not be attacked when we arc unquestionably strong. It is a truism that a nation will be drawn into war in its periods of weakness.
If the principle is followed of using the Navy as a deterrent from war and as an argument for peace by our diplomats, it is apparent that a consistent, consecutive, continuous, and permanent policy of building for the Navy be adopted, so formed as to carry through from administration to administration, and to be so strong, so well founded, so completely systematized, logically established, and gradually progressive that non-naval, non-military, non-technical, non-maritime, and even hostile members of law-making committees will facilitate through natural patriotism, rather than oppose, the necessary annual appropriation.
The advantages of an annual building program are well recognized. As has been said before, each fact or result has one, and only one, controlling reason for its being.
The prime need for an annual building program is that the strength of the Navy may be controlled at all times without lapse to that point most conducive to peace at the time. It offers the secondary and incidental advantage of providing better ships; for more consideration and care can be exercised in their design and construction than can be obtained in haste. The ships built during the war, many of which are out of commission, indicate this factor to an extreme degree. The ships can be built more economically, owing to the steady employment of men and building ways and shops which it provides. Further, the art of building sound and valuable ships would be greatly advanced by the permanency of personnel and records of progressive design. Also, if it is desired to further the merchant marine, steady employment for a nucleus of designers and shipbuilders is a most practicable way of rendering practical aid to the industry.
Policies which endure do not spring up overnight. The need for them must grow until action comes as a natural sequent. But in order that they may endure when initiated, they must be promulgated with such firmness and overpowering conclusiveness as to be unquestioned.
There is an ancient adage, “Two minds are better than one,” and if the idea is accentuated, three are better than two, and so on, until, say, a hundred are better than any lesser number. However, such a theory is immediately criticized by those who habitually serve on committees and courts, and know from experience that concentration of thought is the essence of successful conclusion, and that consequently one member of such a body frequently does most of the work, his fellow-members assisting by suggestion, comment, discussion, and criticism.
As in most diverse opinions, both views are probably partly right, and each has its advantage. A combination of the advantages of the two would naturally be ideal. Suggestions and comments as to the annual requirement of the Navy for construction submitted, say, semiannually from many sources, such as from each destroyer division and larger units, must, by their nature, furnish a completeness and a variety which would overlook few possibilities. If such comments are thoroughly and regularly combed over by educated technicists on the subject, such as the staff of the Naval War College, the probability of their annual recommendations to the General Board being of logical professional nature is excellent. Aside from the intrinsic value of these data, strengthened and supported by the composite opinions of the entire service, the General Board may with great confidence render its decision to enable the chief of Naval Operations to submit to the Secretary of the Navy, annually, a final recommendation with such an overwhelming weight of opinion supporting it, that it will come to be regarded as the Navy's annual requirement, to be granted without further ado.
To summarize, the following logic is advanced:
- The value of a Navy to George Washington brought to his mind our isolation and the possibility it affords to "choose peace or war."
- The choice between peace and war lies with him who has the means of aggression.
- The original creation of our government rests upon the victory of a major fleet engagement, and the following decisive naval blockade made possible by it.
- (a) The tendency toward war is caused by economic, combined with biologic, pressure.
(b) The causes of war are of
(aa) fixed intensity, such as cases of international damage suits,
(bb) increasing intensity, as growth of population.
- Causes for war arising from factors of
(aa) fixed intensity may and should be settled by arbitration,
(bb) Increasing intensity can only be settled by relief or destruction, either of which may only be accomplished by war.
- The discharge of this pressure will take place toward the point of least resistance, never toward a country better armed than that under pressure.
- The principle of maintaining a Navy as a deterrent from war does not require a "big Navy" in "preparedness for war." It indicates a Navy the strength of which is controlled for the prevention of war.
- A controlled Navy may not mean the smallest nor necessarily the largest Navy, but a Navy the strength of which is controlled to meet the changing conditions of the current international situation from year to year, and the replacements of the fleet.
- A controlled Navy requires an annual building policy, as distinguished from the long-term policy, as the change in international affairs and naval developments is too rapid to permit of long-term programs.
Finally, this article reflects a hope and plea of the service that a regularly progressive, annually recurrent policy of building be developed which will bring and maintain our first line of defense on a controlled level equal to any international situation, in order that it may continuously and without lapse be ready to efficiently obey and support the dictates of its overlords, our statesmen, and that they may always have the option of choosing between peace and war.
Peace is maintained by the equilibrium of forces, and will continue just as long as this equilibrium exists and no longer.22
1 Von Clausewitz, On War, VI, 26.
2 Malian, Naval Strategy.
3 Thursfield, Nelson and Other Naval Studies, 280.
4 Col. F. N. Maude, C.B., Introduction to Clausewitz.
5 Stevens and Westcott, History of Sea Power.
6 Mahan, Naval Strategy, 44.
7 Reich, Foundations of Modern Europe, 24.
8 Stevens and Westcott, History of Sea Power, 211.
9 Admiral Schofield, Naval Institute Proceedings, 50. 259.
10 Mahan, Naval Strategy.
11 Admiral Schofield, Naval Institute Proceedings, 50, 259.
12 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address to Woodrow Wilson Foundation, Dec. 28, 1933.
13 Latane, From Isolation to Leadership, 53.
14 London Gazette, March 15, 1915.
15 Dalloz, Jurisprudence Generate, 1915, 78.
16 Oppenheim's International Law, II, 502.
17 Samuel Crowther, America Self-Contained.
18 Kawagami, Manchukuo: Child of Conflict.
19 Von Clausewitz, On War, III, 128.
20 Soule and McCauley, International Law for Naval Officers, 91.
21 Geo. P. Harrow, House Naval Committee, Phila. Address, Dec. 14, 1933.
22 Col. F. N. Maude, C.B., Introduction to von Clausewitz, On War.