An immortal bard once musingly wrote, "Sweet are the uses of adversity," and gleaned therefrom a vast amount of philosophical comfort. We of the United States Naval Reserve of 1933 are evidently to have the opportunity of embracing and putting to the test that immortal philosophy.
The national income has fallen and the national deficit has risen. Prudently enough, the nation, rank and file, are crying loudly and persistently for a reduction in governmental expense. The administration have heeded this insistent demand and departmental budgets have been cut, fundamentally.
Whether or not the greatest wisdom was exercised in these capital operations is quite beside the point. That is a fait accompli. The budget of the Navy Department was among those involved. One of its prominent activities, the Naval Reserve, finds itself without adequate funds with which effectively to discharge its mission. That is, briefly, our present "adversity."
In 1931, the Naval Reserve had perhaps reached its highest efficiency as an organization. It had its sixty drills per year with retainer pay, its fifteen days of active duty, its reserve vessels and air bases under the command of competent inspector-instructors for year-round exercises, its modified S.R.B.P. competition, and its flight training.
One by one these activities have been discontinued until today we find the Naval Reserve, in all of its several classes, in various degrees of desuetude. The anomaly of a Naval Reserve without ships to navigate, without boilers to steam, and without guns to shoot or planes to fly, is almost as absurd as a battle force without allowances for tactical fleet maneuvers. But even an anomaly may be a fact and facts are made to be faced.
This is not the time to complain of the "adversity" which has closed in upon us. Neither should we pause too long in enjoying its "sweetness." It is rather the time to estimate the situation, to determine a course of action, and to move upon it with spirit and confidence. The problem is simple of statement but more complex of solution.
Given: A serious shortage of funds, a Naval Reserve understandingly shaken in morale, and a definite mission to be accomplished.
Required: The best means of operation for the reserve to preserve to it some semblance of its former self and to effect as close an approach upon its objective as is possible with the funds available.
To get right down to a Q.E.D. solution, therefore, let us rigorously appraise the essential "tools" which are left to the reserve for the performance of the task for which it exists, and speculate upon the most effective means of their employment.
Organization.—First of all, the Naval Reserve has its organization. It is still a "going concern." The Fleet and Aviation Divisions and the Communication Sections are intact and well shaken down. There is a trained man for every job, teamwork has been developed, and the turnover is relatively low. So long as the wheels continue to turn over, however slowly, this fact of organization has value.
In the "adversity" of 1921, the men of Class 2, U. S. N. Reserve Force, who wished to preserve their contact with the reserve were required to secure transfer to Class 6. When the clouds finally cleared, it was necessary for the department to build again these reserve units, largely from unorganized individuals. It is earnestly hoped that such will not be the policy in the present dilemma, but in its place that the existing units will be permitted to remain intact, ready to move ahead when the circumstances are again favorable. There would seem to be no valid reason, economic or otherwise, for not permitting the present well-knit organizations to continue as fleet units, albeit without compensation.
Moreover, the fleet units in the course of years have built up valuable civilian contacts in their home communities. Many of their "extra" activities have received public recognition. These are contacts which Navy public relations could ill afford to lose. To dissolve the fleet organizations into the V-3 or V-6 classes would be bootlessly to sacrifice these most effective bonds between a seagoing Navy and a land-living citizenry.
Armories and bases.—Apparently an effort is being made to retain armory and air-base facilities as rallying centers for Naval Reserve activities, in some measure to offset the loss of training vessels and summer cruising. Without these accustomed rendezvous, the disintegration of the reserve would be rapid and complete. With these, available as in the past, a natural tie is maintained between the reservist and the reserve, which will go far toward counteracting his reaction to the other dismembering elements in the situation.
During the 1921 curtailment the reserve unit of which the writer was the executive officer held its meetings in a police courtroom with the commanding officer sitting on the judge's bench, the officers in the jury box, and the enlisted men in the audience seats. When the speaker of the evening had been escorted to the witness' chair, the consistency of the proceedings was fully satisfied.
It is true that the dependable personnel of that division, at least, held together even in such inhospitable surroundings, but the experience was sufficient and conclusive. Only as a last resort should a unit be deprived of a suitable, and preferably an accustomed, meeting place. Habit has greater force than many executive orders.
Should it transpire that a unit is deprived of its armory or base facilities, recourse may be taken to rent-free public buildings. High schools with their assembly halls lend themselves to classroom instruction by the aid of blackboards, projectors, and small portable models. School gymnasiums can be adapted to a partial training program, although it is probable that infantry drill would have to be conducted without arms out of respect to the maple floors if not to the sentiments of the school authorities. And there are always the courtrooms.
Such an eventuality would not be unlike that of the early Christians meeting surreptitiously in the catacombs of Rome, except for the physical persecution. But Christianity survived the ordeal, and the reserve may hope to do the same.
Equipment.—Most reserve units by this time must have been equipped quite closely to their allowance lists. Small, therefore, should be the call for additions and replacements during the coming year. While many more items may well be desirable under ideal conditions, the equipment now on custody should be quite adequate to carry on effectively and comfortably through this emergency.
Uniforms will, of course, be required on the re-enlistment of the older service men whose clothing has passed its respectable life. Also, such recruits as are enlisted to fill vacancies will need the regulation out fits. If funds are not to be furnished for these, dependence will have to be placed in the division's "lucky bag," in which should be found all turned-in clothing from every source. This is an excellent excuse for requiring the return of clothing in the possession of V-1 and V-3 men no longer as active with their divisions as they should be. With the reduction in numbers, which must inevitably result from the general curtailment of reserve activities, the requirements for uniforms should be materially less than for the normal year in the past.
Volunteer service.—Turning again to the organization, we are confronted with uncertainty concerning the effects of the suspension of retainer pay and the success of the volunteer service which is to be fostered.
Service without compensation is in no way foreign to the reserve. Clustered about many of our fleet units is a group of capable, efficient, and enthusiastic volunteer officers who, year in and year out, have stood back of the fleet officers, giving them every assistance in training the unit. In many cases, the volunteer officer cannot be distinguished from the fleet officer in the value and the quality of his service. But few of these could have held any hope of a transfer to fleet status. Their service has been disinterested in the highest sense and may be counted upon, with assurance, for the future.
The enlisted men in volunteer status allowed each fleet division have likewise demonstrated the value and practicability of volunteer service. In the well-organized fleet unit, these volunteer men worked interchangeably with their fleet shipmates. It must be admitted nevertheless that there was more promise of fleet status for the encouragement of the volunteer enlisted man than for the volunteer officer. The service of all such volunteers should be viewed with greater appreciation than ever before, now that they have in effect been elevated to a pedestal for the emulation of their one-time fleet confreres.
The loss of the retainer pay to many enlisted men is a truly serious personal problem. Small though the amount of the quarterly check, it still was to some a sheet anchor to windward in these days of economic dislocation when the man was perhaps struggling against loss of income or unemployment in his civilian occupation.
There is another class of man in every unit, fortunately few in number, who have long been suspected of having signed-on in the reserve only for the retainer. Such a man will be resentful of the loss of the pay and will abandon interest in the reserve forthwith. Sweet, indeed, are the uses of adversity if they will serve to separate those few from the many who are in the reserve for the love of the game and the satisfaction of a duty well done.
There should be nothing in retainer pay suspension alone which would require or justify a man's not continuing actively in his fleet unit. Serious as this aspect is to the individual, it should be pointed out to him that he will not improve his economic situation by dropping the reserve, even as a protest against what he thinks is an unwise act. It is rare indeed that drill attendance interferes with a civilian job, if he is so fortunate as to have one.
On the contrary, it is the soundest of philosophy to hold fast what one has in time of adversity and to stand-by for an upward turn. To lie to is to gain when others are making sternway. The man who flouts the reserve in its time of adversity should have predetermined for himself his reception later when he condescends to return in "calm seas and topsail breezes."
The men's reaction to the situation will be largely a reflection of the attitude of the commanding officer and the officers of the unit coming down to the men through their petty officers. If the officer personnel continue with an enthusiastic and wholehearted participation, the petty officers will do likewise and the men will follow.
If officer leadership is disaffected, the disaffection will but be aggravated in the lower rates. Despite all the shifting values of these shifting days, the age-old principles of leadership—knowing more about the job and doing it better than those under your control—still hold. An officer who is irregular in his attendance and dilatory in his performance never can inspire regularity and punctiliousness in those who "volunteer" to serve under his direction. Every officer should feel that he has a contract to fulfill with his men, which he at least cannot afford to abrogate.
Might not the department take special cognizance of the present situation by giving specific recognition to those who show faithfulness in volunteer attendance and performance of duty at drills? Adapting the averment, "The United States then being in a state of war," from the military law, might not a notation be made in each fleet man's record to the effect that, "the Naval Reserve then serving without retainer pay, this man attended drills during the quarter ended—."
The earning of a good attendance record would then be a matter of pride to the man and well worth his while. It would serve as an indication that he was worthy of consideration for reinstatement under retainer pay or for advancement when circumstances favored. Even the most conscientious of officers would not be totally immune to such an incentive.
So much for volunteer participation in fleet units. I feel that it can be made to work, but it will demand the highest order of diligent application to bring it to pass.
Volunteer cruising.—Voluntary training duty for enlisted men without pay for periods of fifteen days or more will probably meet with but limited response next year, particularly if employment conditions improve and there is active competition for jobs ashore. Such an opportunity during the past year has been a boon, however, to many a single man out of employment, who was thus assured of wholesome living conditions and food, even without a cash wage.
Whether the officer personnel will be able to make such volunteer training cruises will depend entirely upon a number of personal factors which cannot be generalized into a prophecy. The reserve officer who occupies a position in civil life appropriate to his rank in the reserve probably finds that he must keep his nose closer to the civil grindstone these days than ever before. For such, voluntary cruising is proscribed by time rather than by wardroom expense.
Procurement.—The problem of procurement enters another uncertainty to complicate the ideal solution. The older men, particularly those who have gone through other periods of curtailment, will re-enlist as a matter of course if other conditions are at all right. Were this stringency too protracted, one may not say with assurance what its effects would be upon men who are completing their first hitch.
Without retainer pay as an incentive, the candidate who presents himself for first enlistment will be above any mercenary suspicion. He will undoubtedly be of as good, if not of better, material than in the past. There will be some competition for enlistments in areas where state funds are available for National Guard units but the seagoing urge will offset that dis advantage for the man who has the makings of a sailor in him. Under no circumstances should the standards for enlistment be reduced to ease the difficulties of procurement. To do so would cheapen the volunteer service of the higher-type man still faithful to the unit. Such men should be the measuring stick.
Drill schedules.—There must of necessity be a considerable revision of drill schedules for the division which is to meet their problem with success. In the past these have been built to considerable extent supplemental to the summer cruising. Last year, with the loss of the summer cruise, certain modifications were made. Now further adjustments will be in order. Programs will have to be so arranged as to sustain to the maximum degree the interest of the enlisted personnel. They will have to be made so interesting that a man will be loath to absent himself.
The new deal offers the possibility of augmenting educational work for both officers and men. To that end it is to be hoped that there may be no lack of printed courses and reference books for their use. In the past there has never been adequate time to cover the wealth of training-course material. To do so now is increasingly important under the newly inaugurated policy of quarterly written examinations for all rated men, with which inspector-instructors are just being charged.
The loss of the week-end training and the summer cruises can be but ineffectively compensated in shore-going drill schedules. Much seamanship can be learned in a 50-foot motor launch or a whaleboat with sailing gear where open water is conveniently at hand. A good small-boat man is generally a good sailor in any billet.
A landing force expedition, combined with an overnight beach camp, will supply experience in that much-neglected branch of naval training and will likewise prove a desirable morale builder with its recreational angle.
The disciplinary value of small-arms firing has long been recognized but never fully realized in crowded training schedules. Where there is a rifle range within reach, a profitable course with the rifle and the pistol can be conducted, preferably with competitive features within the division or between divisions. Considering the beneficial results to be gained, the expenditure of reasonable sums for small-arms ammunition would seem most desirable.
Drills aboard vessels of the regular service which chance to be in port have been found to furnish an interesting diversion from routine, even before the "adversity" descended. Some divisions have been fortunate in establishing working relations with officers of the fleet, which have resulted in arrangements of this character. Visits to navy yards under similar auspices would likewise possess educational and interest values.
Local circumstances and facilities will suggest other means of employment which the wide-awake division commander will seize upon to hold his men and to preserve and increase their attachment to the naval service.
Annual inspection.—Every schedule of employment, if it is to possess vitality, must have a goal toward which the activities of the period point. The annual summer cruise was such a goal and an excellent one. Second only to that as a driving motive came the annual overhaul by the Naval Reserve Inspection Board. Nothing in the present curtailed program will do more toward toning up effort and supporting interest than the assurance, threat, or promise that the unit must stand an inspection some time during the year, in competition with all of the units in the country. No portion of the limited reserve funds will be more productive of earnest endeavor, observance of duty, and efficiency of performance in general than that portion allocated to the Naval Reserve Inspection Board. Even though something else must be discarded, the annual inspection should by all means be retained.
The challenge.—Weighing all of these factors—organization, armories and bases, equipment, volunteer services and cruising, procurement, drill schedules, inspections, and the like—what of promise is there for the Naval Reserve as it stands poised on the brink of the new fiscal year? The answer, at best, is problematical.
If thought is given to the plans and action is given to their execution, the stronger fleet divisions will ride out this storm. They will roll considerably. They will lose some of their top hamper, and some men will be carried over the side, but they will forge ahead with their organizations sound and their morale unshaken. Many of the weaker divisions will develop surprising seaworthiness. A few will founder. This then is the sunniest side of the picture.
There is, however, nothing to be gained by being too Pollyanna about it. Facts must still be faced. The situation at best is critical. A cut of 80 per cent in Naval Reserve appropriations, from $3,000,000 to $600,000, cannot be smiled away except with a grim smile of determination.
The supreme importance of the national defense at sea is a constant quantity not subject to revision downward by legislation. It is to be satisfied only by the sum total of regular establishment plus reserve establishment. With the regular establishment greatly reduced in operating activity and somewhat reduced in numbers, the total of national defense can only be balanced with an augmented reserve. Funds may not be forthcoming for the reserve, as they are not now, but to precisely that extent the total requirement for the national defense will remain unsatisfied.
Coupled with this is the increased building activity, reaching up toward a treaty navy, proposed as a make-work measure for economic relief. This increased tonnage will require more trained men, not less. Yet, at this turn of events, the Naval Reserve finds itself aground and impotent. If ever there was a time for loyal volunteer service, it is now, the loyalty which speaks in deeds rather than in words.
This is a period of challenge to men and officers alike. For the man it is a challenge to his "saltiness." If he is a fair-weather sailor, he will shrug his shoulders and desert the ship. If he is of the type of most of the men whom I have encountered in the reserve, he will accept the challenge and prove that his grip is the firmer and his back the stronger when the strain on the line grows heavy.
For the officer it will be a test of his leadership. Can he call forth from his men the same cheerful response to his leader ship which was possible under the stimulus of retainer pay? Can he inspire in his men the same sense of responsibility for an effective reserve which they carried in the halcyon days of 1931? I think that he can.
No officer who thoughtfully reads his commission, ". . . reposing special Trust and Confidence in the Patriotism, Valor, Fidelity, and Abilities of—," can treat this situation lightly. It is incumbent upon those who bear that commission to see these adversities through to the bitter end with "Patriotism, Valor, Fidelity and," most important of all, "Ability."
Editor’s Note.—Lieutenant Commander Harris’ article was prepared before the cash withdrawals for the fiscal year 1934 were finally determined. The final amount allowed the reserves this year was $2,100,000, which provided annual cruises and twenty-four armory drills.