Events of the past week have indicated that the conference must either adjourn or seek some new plan, possibly such as budget limitation. The present political situation makes it probable that little , can be accomplished within the next few months, whatever the plan proposed. On the other hand, many European leaders, particularly Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, have staked much on the chances of success and are loath to let the conference adjourn without some specific result to show for its labors.
The conference itself might be compared to a man trying to work his way out of a maze. The first steps were along the path laid out by the draft treaty, but this proved to be a blind alley when the great difference of opinion became apparent between the French and the German points of view. It will be remembered that this question was taken up immediately after the preliminary plans were presented. The French were not very enthusiastic about the draft treaty because it did not provide the degree of security considered necessary, and because they placed security before any question of disarmament. They did approve of the draft as far as it reiterated the restrictions placed on German armament by the Versailles Treaty. Optimists were aware of the fact that there was a steady drift of French public opinion toward the left and they hoped that the elections would unseat M. Tardieu and thereby dispose of his nationalistic policy. They felt that time was on their side and were content to wait until after the French elections, trusting that the effects of the depression, which was just beginning to be felt, would drive France far toward the left.
The Germans objected to the adoption of the draft treaty because, by reaffirming the Versailles restrictions, it denied Germany her wish for equality. Although the Nazis and nationalist elements were gaining, observers felt that von Hindenburg would be re-elected and would continue to keep Chancellor Bruening in office. It was well known that the latter was very anxious to make any reasonable concession to insure peace.
In connection with this was the fact that the Lausanne conference was due to meet in June to consider the whole question of reparations. It was well known that the public in the United States was very much interested in the question of disarmament and was anxious to see some settlement made at Geneva. It was hoped by many Europeans that the United States would make some well-timed concessions on the debt which would have the effect of removing one barrier to agreement at Geneva and would remove from Germany the fear that France would reoccupy the Rhine country.
When the first crisis was reached between France and Germany, a great deal of care was taken to adopt a formula that was, in effect, a postponement of any decision. This was referred to in the press as a great “triumph.” In fact it was simply an effort to delay decision until political skies should become clearer. Although criticized by certain persons for lack of ability on the part of the conference to face the issues clearly, the leaders felt that time was on their side.
In an effort to bridge the gap between Germany and France, Mr. Gibson laid his proposals before the conference just after the Easter recess. These were to abolish tanks, large-caliber mobile artillery, submarines, and some other weapons suitable only for “offensive” warfare and to reduce armies to something like the proportion imposed on Germany at Versailles. He argued that the abolition of offensive weapons would so greatly strengthen the tactical defensive in war that no nation would find it worth its while to attack another, so that security could be assured without the international force proposed by France to maintain the status quo. He did not make any reference to the German position, but it was apparent that he was offering much to her by recommending abolition of the very weapons she was forbidden to have and by his manner of proposing quantitative reduction.
The proposal to abolish certain weapons was immediately called “qualitative” disarmament and was strongly supported by England. The leaders who had elected to wait when the path along the line of the draft treaty proved to be a blind alley were glad to follow up this new one. France objected, but finally assented to a proposal that the technical committees be instructed to inquire into the matter and report to the conference all weapons found to be suitable for offensive warfare with a view toward their abolition or internationalization. The latter phrase was the amendment made to get France’s consent.
There were many protests that the conference was shirking its work, but the leaders were glad to drop political matters for the present and let the technical committees talk the question of offensive weapons over in private. Von Hindenburg had been re-elected and the position of Chancellor Bruening seemed secure in spite of the ominous gains of the Nazis (Hitlerites). The drift to the left in French public opinion became more marked, and all seemed to be working well. The French elections held on the first and eighth of May made M. Tardieu’s defeat certain and it was hoped that his successor, M. Herriot, would have to go for part of his support to the socialist party headed by M. Blum, who was strongly opposed to military forces. It was also hoped that the technical committees might be able to produce a fairly large list of “offensive” weapons which could be abolished, if nothing else were done by the conference.
It was during the latter part of May and early June that matters took a turn for the worse. M. Herriot refused to forgive M. Blum for his former desertion and formed his cabinet bloc from the center and left center which included many of the parties which had supported the foreign policies of M. Tardieu. There was a marked swing to the right in Germany. The Bruening cabinet fell and the von Papen government was formed from Nazi and various nationalist elements. The United States reiterated its position that it would not take part in any discussion of war debts or tariffs, which ended the hope that it might “buy” disarmament. Finally the technical committees, as foreseen by most informed observers, reported that they were unable to reach an agreement on any weapons but poison gas and germs. As if to atone for their failure in other matters they condemned these two in the strongest terms possible. It was reported that they nearly reached agreement over guns of eight inches or larger and on tanks of more than seventy tons.
This left the conference up another blind alley. They were faced by the dilemma of talking themselves into ridicule or attempting to bring about an agreement in a less favorable atmosphere. On June 12, Mr. MacDonald arranged to meet M. Herriot and other leaders in the near future to try to arrange some plan of action. The Lausanne conference is to meet on June 16, with all countries drifting toward the right. The prospects there are rather dim but irrepressible optimists are present to remind the world that “it is always darkest before dawn.”