THROUGH purchase in England the Naval Historical Foundation has recently acquired a United States naval letter-book which is labeled as having been “Taken from the War Office at Washington, August 14, 1814.”
The book comprises “Orders on service, from Commanding Officers” received by Lieutenant John H. Dent between December 19, 1803, and December 29, 1810. Only a small proportion of the letters contained in the book are of record in the Navy Department archives.
The first entry is a copy of an order for Lieutenant Dent to “go on board the Enterprise, proceed to and land at Malta, wait on the Governor, acquaint him with my object in coming off the Island,” etc. These instructions were issued and signed by Commodore Preble on board the U.S.S. Constitution.
The next letter from the commodore includes an order to “keep a good lookout on the Tripoline prize and take care that the prisoners do not make their escape.” This “prize” was renamed the U.S.S. Intrepid, and subsequently used by Decatur in his spectacular burning of the Philadelphia, which had fallen into hostile possession through accidental grounding near the harbor of Tripoli.
In April, 1804, Lieutenant Dent received orders to take command of the United States brig Scourge and “join the squadron in the blockade of” Tripoli. He was instructed "to capture all vessels belonging to the Bashaw of Tripoli or his subjects, and to annoy and distress the enemy by every means in your power.” His blockading instructions were “you are not to suffer the vessels of any nation to enter, or to have commerce with Tripoli, and any vessels which may endeavor to enter that place, whilst blockaded by us, without permission from me for so doing, you are to detail and send into Malta for examination—you are to respect the rights of Neutral Nations and not capture vessels within the jurisdiction limits or under the protection of such nations.”
It was soon after this that Commodore Preble began a series of five attacks in force against Tripoli, with his squadron comprising the Constitution, the brigs Siren, Argus, and Scourge, the schooners Vixen, Nautilus, and Enterprise, and six small gunboats. These successful operations, lasting over a period of several months, involved much fighting at close quarters.
In the autumn of 1804 Commodore Barron succeeded to the command of the squadron which continued to operate against Tripoli and Tunis. In 1805 Lieutenant Dent, then in command of the schooner Nautilus, was directed “to proceed immediately for Derne and endeavor to ascertain whether the ex-Bashaw and his adherents have obtained possession of that place—if they have, you will, I conceive, find no difficulty in establishing an intercourse with them. In the contrary case you will shape your course for Bomba, where according to Mr. Eaton’s calculations I think it most probable that you will obtain information of him. As soon as you have established a safe and certain communication you will deliver to Mr. Eaton the two Field Pieces which you have on board, with the powder, ammunition, etc.”
In consequence of these instructions the Nautilus arrived just in time to participate conspicuously in the dashing capture of Derne by Mr. Eaton, an old time “Navy agent.” Mr. Eaton had been landed at Alexandria by the brig Argus, and from there had marched overland against Derne with a mixed naval and marine force, accompanied by friendly natives.
|
|
|
|
|
Through the illness of Commodore Barron the command of the squadron devolved upon Commodore John Rodgers, from whom Lieutenant Dent received a General Order, dated “U. S. Ship Constitution, Syracuse, 12th July 1805,” and reading in part as follows:
An insult offered to the flag of the United States of America on the 12th of June last, near Cadiz by a British Squadron under command of Admiral Collingwood, induces me as the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Naval Forces in this Sea to direct that you do not under any pretence whatever suffer your vessel to be detained or your men taken out of your vessel without you are compelled so to do by superior force; in which case after having resisted to the utmost of your power, you are directed to surrender your vessel as you would to any other common enemy.
We see here a prelude of the events which led to the War of 1812.
Our long and tedious wars with the Barbary powers are too little known and appreciated. They were undertaken at the instance of President Washington who said in his annual message of December, 1796:
To an active external commerce the protection of a naval force is indispensable…The most sincere neutrality is not a sufficient guard against the depredations of nations at war. To secure respect to a neutral flag requires a naval force, organized and ready to vindicate it from insult or aggression. This may even prevent the necessity of going to war, by discouraging belligerent powers from committing such violations of the rights of the neutral party, as may, first or last, leave no other option. From the best information I have been able to obtain, it would seem as if our trade to the Mediterranean without a protecting force will always be insecure, and our citizens exposed to the calamities from which numbers of them have but just been relieved. These considerations invite the United States to look to the means, and to set about the gradual creation of a Navy.
It is thus apparent that the Barbary depredations on our important Mediterranean commerce furnished the impulse behind the very creation of the Navy under the Constitution. The subsequent employment of relatively large numbers of personnel and ships in active hostile operations over a period of years served as a baptism of incalculable value for the creation and fixation of a high standard of efficiency in the United States Navy. It was wonderful training without which the Navy could not have so distinguished itself in the War of 1812.
In obtaining the valuable old document herein discussed, shedding new light on our old naval history and traditions, the Naval Historical Foundation feels that renewed recognition is in order to the Naval Institute for the generous financial assistance rendered in the creation of the Foundation. It will be recalled that the initial contribution to the Foundation’s trust fund was a sum of $1,000 donated in March, 1926, by the Naval Institute, whose board subsequently voted to give $500 additional yearly for five years. This liberality, together with donations from other sources, has made it possible for the Foundation to date to build up a trust fund of $3,000, in addition to a checking account of over $1,000.