New weapons do not change the rules of warfare but only their application.
Any discussion of the function of aircraft in the modern naval engagement must be prefaced by a consideration of the number and type of aircraft that will be available to each of the opposing fleets. The naval forces of nations upon which circumstances or considerations of policy force the offensive role in the naval campaign are necessarily dependent upon aircraft carried on shipboard. States which, by reason of their geographic position, national policy, or other factors, are apt to assume the naval offensive in the event of war are accordingly committed to a naval policy involving the carrying of the maximum possible number of aircraft by their fleets. To these nations the policy of absolute naval control of the fleet aircraft is mandatory.
On the other hand, a state which, in all probability, will be forced to accept the defensive role in the naval phases of the war may be considered as having a greater latitude in its choice of policy in this respect. The theater of operations being near its coasts, the issue of a major naval engagement undoubtedly could be avoided without great sacrifice until the commander of its fleet could depend with certainty upon the supplementing of his aerial forces by aircraft based on shore. To a nation so situated, particularly in view of existing limitations upon naval armaments and the absence of any such limitations on aircraft, considerations of national defense seem to require the maintenance of an adequate shore-based air force. The latitude in the choice of national policy previously mentioned is now apparent. If the aerial force in question may be required for complementing operations on either land or sea, a unified air force with a supplementary fleet air arm appears feasible. But if these shore-based aircraft exist primarily for naval defense, complete naval control is appropriate.
In either case, the fleet required to assume the offensive must be prepared to contend not only with the aircraft carried by the opposing fleet but with the large numbers of planes based ashore as well. For, to quote from a statement of the then president of the Naval War College, made, I believe, in 1927: "One of the outstanding lessons of the War College tactical maneuvers of the past two years has been that no fleet can enter a hostile zone unless it has, beyond a doubt, superiority in the air. This means superiority not only to the enemy fleet-based aircraft, but to his fleet- and shore-based aircraft combined." Under these restrictions, offensive naval warfare is faced with an almost prohibitive handicap in the absence of overwhelming surface strength. Even in the case where the contending nations are in sufficient geographic proximity to permit of the supplementing of the operations of the fleet assuming the strategical offensive by shore-based aircraft, an avoidance of a major engagement, until the fuel supplies of such aircraft are exhausted, is a course of action open to the fleet acting defensively.
Therefore, it may be conceded that a great superiority of surface strength is now necessary to the assumption of the offensive in a naval campaign. With the existing limitation on naval surface strength, sufficient ships are not available to any of the great powers for such purposes except in the event of war with one of the smaller nations, or of an alliance with another of the powers. In the absence of such an alliance, the additional ships necessary to the successful undertaking of the naval offensive against a nation of equal rank would have to be constructed subsequent to the declaration of hostilities and after notification of the other signatory nations to the Limitation of Naval Armaments Pact, as provided for in Article XXII of that treaty. Hence, in the unfortunate event of war between any two of the great powers, we may reasonably expect a period of comparative stagnation in the naval phases of the war until such time as the logistical resources of one nation enable it to outstrip the other in a naval construction race sufficiently to justify it in assuming the naval offensive.
Hence, it may be assumed that in the next naval campaign the fleet acting offensively will possess a preponderance in surface strength and a considerable inferiority in the total number of aircraft available. This numerical inferiority in aircraft would arise from the prohibitive cost of constructing a sufficient number of aircraft carriers to transport enough planes to match the maximum number of shore-based aircraft which the enemy could launch. A shore base capable of providing facilities for five hundred may be constructed for about the same cost that would be involved in the building of an aircraft carrier capable of basing only fifty planes. The cost, therefore, of providing a mobile base of operations for aircraft is roughly ten times as much as for a shore base of equal capacity. While such a disparity can be endured to a certain degree it does not extend to the maximum strain that can be placed upon the entire resources of a nation.
Therefore this numerical inferiority in aircraft must be accepted as concomitant to the assumption of the offensive in naval warfare. If this is conceded, the problem then becomes one of consideration of the means by which the fleet acting on the offensive can, by a judicious selection of types of aircraft, most nearly offset this disadvantage. The preponderance in surface strength of this fleet is assumed to be great. Hence the logical and most efficient means of destroying the hostile surface fleet is by gunfire. An aerial striking force, consisting of types of planes capable of destroying capital ships of the enemy, is not needed. The inferiority in surface strength of the defensive fleet is so marked that it, in itself, does not form a serious menace to the safety of the offensive fleet. It could form such a menace only if, by attrition, it is able to reduce greatly the offensive surface strength. Its only real means of menacing the offensive fleet is from the air. Therefore, an aerial striking force within this fleet to harass or aid in destroying defensive surface craft not only is not needed but its presence in the fleet would reduce the number of aircraft available that could be used as a means of defense against aerial attacks.
At present the classification of an aerial striking force covers types of planes capable of carrying heavy bombs and torpedoes. These types, and particularly the heavy bombers, must occupy, because of the aerodynamical requirements of their design, more space than an equal number of fighting or scouting planes. Therefore, the elimination of heavy bombers and torpedo planes would result in the ability of the fleet to base a greater number of aircraft on its carriers than would be possible otherwise. In addition, the number of planes capable of repelling aerial attacks would be greatly increased. Thus the proposed change of types would not only increase the number of aircraft within the offensive fleet but would also increase the percentage of the more essential types.
With the elimination of the torpedo and bombing planes from the offensive fleet, its aircraft would be based as follows: scouting planes on the cruisers; on the capital ships, planes for observing their gunfire; and on the carriers, fighting planes exclusively—with the exception of a small number of scouting planes.
In the fleet acting defensively different considerations obtain. The great inferiority in surface strength necessitates the employment of all possible means of attrition of the enemy ships. A favorable opportunity for attacking the aircraft carriers of the offensive fleet may be presented prior to the arrival of the shore-based planes, and, with the assurance of aerial reenforcements, it is not vital for the commander of the defensive fleet to conserve his aerial strength, if its expenditure results in a compensating reduction in the surface strength of the enemy. Therefore, in the fleet acting on the defensive, all types of aircraft, including an aerial striking force, are required.
It is true that the limitations of space, weight, and other considerations necessitate the modification of the design in. heavy bombers and torpedo planes for shipboard use so that they are not quite as efficient in the performance of these missions as similar types designed for operation from shore bases. Nevertheless the shipboard Planes of these types are capable, under favorable conditions, of destroying any ship afloat so that their inclusion in a fleet acting defensively is quite justifiable.
In this fleet, accordingly, are to be found all types of aircraft, flying boats excepted, distributed as follows: scouting planes on the cruisers; on the capital ships, planes for observing their gunfire; and scouts, bombers, fighters, and torpedo planes on the aircraft carriers. This force is supplemented by aircraft of all types arriving from the shore bases. One modification of this distribution may develop within the next few years. Efficiency of design in the heavy bombing plane, which must carry a considerable load to fairly high altitudes, necessitates a comparatively great wing span. This, even when the design permits of the folding of the wings, results in considerable difficulty in handling these planes on the deck of a carrier. In addition, they occupy a disproportionate amount of space. The immediate future may disclose, for these and for other reasons, that heavy bombers are de trop on shipboard and that greater over-all military efficiency and striking force may be obtained by substituting a slightly greater number of torpedo planes, as that type does not require quite as much space for each plane. Among the shore-based planes, where the great wing spans of these planes do not constitute such a great problem, seems the logical place for this type.
It must not be construed from any .of the foregoing arguments that a nation should, in time of peace, fail to include in the aircraft of its fleet all pertinent types of planes. For even a nation which might reasonably expect to assume the naval offensive against any single adversary could, if faced by a hostile alliance, be forced to accept the more passive role. Therefore, it seems incumbent upon every nation to develop during peace time all types of naval aircraft to be prepared for just such a contingency. The suggested distribution of types within a fleet acting on the offensive could be effected, in the event of war with a single enemy, almost immediately after the declaration of hostilities, there being no great difficulties logistically in substituting the required additional fighting planes in lieu of the bombing and torpedo planes on the carriers.
If the foregoing is accepted we may then assume that in the naval engagement of the immediate future the strategical offensive will have a numerical superiority of aircraft carried in the fleet but an inferiority in the total number of aircraft available. The other fleet, while numerically inferior in fleet aircraft, will possess an aerial striking force and an over-all numerical aerial superiority.
Tactically, the first fleet will be on the offensive at the surface and on the defensive in the air. Its commander will obviously endeavor to engage the enemy at a place or time when the planes based ashore would be unavailable, while his adversary will seek to avoid an engagement under such conditions.
The fleet on the strategical defensive, assuming that it is able to avoid an engagement until assured of the support of all of its aircraft, will also attempt to destroy the hostile aircraft carriers prior to a major engagement. The accomplishment of this objective would be well worth the expenditure of the whole of its fleet aircraft and a portion of its surface strength as well. If such a disaster should be suffered by a fleet on the offensive it would instantly become a fleet on the defensive. Immediate retirement from the hostile zone would be the only possible safe maneuver.
In the absence of fortuitous circumstance, it seems probable that neither commander could, against an able opponent, attain either of these early objectives and we may therefore picture the general engagement as taking place with comparatively unimpaired forces on both sides. For the purposes of this discussion there are three different types of engagements from the aerial standpoint, in each of which the potentialities of aircraft differ widely. These types are: the day engagement with average to maximum visibility; the day engagement under reduced visibility conditions; and the night action.
In the day engagement under good visibility conditions the primary contact with the enemy, made by the fleet acting on the strategical offensive, will probably come from one of the planes launched from a light cruiser—in other words, a plane engaged in strategical scouting. Primary contact for the other fleet may come from aircraft having analogous missions or possibly from a shore-based patrol plane or dirigible. Planes scouting strategically usually would be unsupported by fighting planes. These scouts would ordinarily first report contact with the enemy's outer screen. This being accomplished they should continue on and endeavor to obtain information regarding the inner screen and finally the enemy main body. Once this has been accomplished they are of little further value. Lacking support, they would fall an easy prey to hostile fighters or even if they could avoid hostile aircraft and antiaircraft fire, they can hardly be taken aboard their cruisers again. The carriers will be too distant for their return to these bases and even if they were near enough, the carrier planes would be massed on deck and thus preclude the possibility of their landing aboard. The fuel capacity of these scouting planes is comparatively limited and they cannot remain in the air indefinitely. Therefore, they may be considered as expended once they have reported contact with the enemy main body. Instead of waiting to be shot down ingloriously by hostile fighters while attempting to escape or being forced down by the exhaustion of their fuel supply, they should continue onward and endeavor to damage the flying-off decks of the enemy aircraft carriers by diving bombing attacks. While the weight of the bombs that they could carry would be insufficient to menace the safety of the carriers, still, the successful bombing of the carrier decks with the resultant damage to the massed aircraft awaiting the signal for take off and to the deck itself, might seriously impede the operations of these vessels.
Subsequent to the receipt of the first contact information, the carrier planes will be ordered to take off and, from the defensive fleet, the shore-based planes as well. The objective in the offensive fleet would be, first of all, the defense of its aircraft carriers and then the protection of any scouting group that might be dispatched from the carriers. For the aircraft of the defensive fleet there is, at this stage, but a single objective—the destruction of the hostile aircraft carriers.
The first aerial fighting will gravitate towards the aircraft carriers of the offensive fleet. These vessels probably will be placed well in rear of the fleet and will therefore be comparatively safe from surface attack. They can be seriously menaced only from the air or possibly from beneath the surface. If they are destroyed by hostile aircraft or other means, the remainder of the fleet must endeavor to break off the action unless it is certain that the enemy surface strength can be destroyed in short order. Otherwise the commander of the defensive fleet can delay matters by discontinuing the action, while maintaining contact, until all of the aircraft of the opposing fleet are either shot down or forced down due to the exhaustion of their supplies of fuel. The planes of the defensive fleet, in this case, can refuel from their carriers or shore bases and thus maintain control of the air. The capital ships of the offensive fleet would then be hampered in their gunfire by the lack of observing planes. Their situation would be like that of a blind heavyweight boxer attempting to crush a smaller opponent who retained command of all his faculties.
However, in view of the comparatively great number of fighting planes in the fleet air arm of the offensive fleet and the fact that after launching their planes these carriers would probably retire to a distance, the success of an aerial attack by the fleet air force of the defensive fleet on these vessels is problematical. But if they are close to the enemy when or before their planes are launched, or if the defensive fleet should be able to make a coordinated attack using both the fleet air arm and its shore-based Planes, these carriers would be in serious danger.
A detailed discussion of the proper disposition of the aircraft carriers in cruising and battle formations is beyond the scope of this paper, but the preservation of these vessels both prior to and after launching their planes is a matter of such vital importance to the offensive fleet that it would seem that their employment in the scouting line when contact with the enemy fleet might be reasonably expected, would be a mistake. Even one or two hits from major-caliber guns or heavy bombs could easily destroy the usefulness of these ships as bases for aircraft operations, even though their watertight-integrity should remain unimpaired and the ships, except for their flying decks, practically undamaged.
Conversely, the carriers of the defensive fleet, while of great importance, are not so vital, particularly if their planes are launched prior to their destruction. The aircraft of these vessels surviving the aerial fighting can easily use the shore bases for future operations—a course of action not open to the opposing aircraft. Thus, generally speaking, the vital spot—the solar plexus of the offensive fleet—is its aircraft carriers; while the greatest weakness of the defensive fleet is its inferiority in surface strength.
Assuming that the carriers of the offensive fleet are able to launch their aircraft and retire to a safe distance, a certain percentage of these planes can be held to assist in the protection of these vessels from aerial attack and the remainder released for the protection of the main body against aerial attack. The planes so released then have three missions: protection of the planes observing gunfire of their capital ships; protection of the capital ships themselves from aerial attack; and protection of the carrier scouting planes from hostile fighters. As the main weapon of the offensive fleet is gunfire from its heavy ships, the protection of the planes observing this gunfire is placed ahead of the protection of the capital ships themselves, particularly as by maneuvering and by antiaircraft gunfire, these vessels are, to a certain extent, capable of protecting themselves.
The second of these missions, that is, the protection of the capital ships themselves from aerial attacks, involves offensive action against the hostile aerial striking force and its escort of fighting planes. The third and last involves the protection of the tactical scouting planes from hostile fighters.
This scouting group undoubtedly will be the first group to take off from the carriers, perhaps immediately upon the receipt of contact with the enemy main body. Its duty is to make and maintain contact with the enemy main body as soon as practicable and to keep the commander of its fleet informed of tactical developments such as deployment, course and speed of the enemy, etc. While a portion of this information can be obtained from surface vessels of the screen and from the observation planes, yet earlier and more complete information than is available from these sources is essential, as witness the uncertainty of Admiral Jellicoe at the Battle of Jutland with regard to his deployment, until just before the ships under his immediate command made contact with the enemy. He himself stated that had he been in possession of more accurate information he could have deployed to better advantage. Had he been in possession of an aerial scouting force as suggested, this information would have been afforded him. As such information is more reliable when coming from an officer of considerable tactical experience, this scouting group should carry in an observing capacity at least one officer of sufficient experience to enable the commander in chief to have confidence in his advice on tactical dispositions—as, for example, the chief of staff of the commander of the aircraft squadrons or a flag officer particularly detailed for such duty.
The main aerial portion of the engagement, however, will be between the fighting planes of the offensive fleet and the aerial striking force of the defensive fleet plus its escort. Past experience in aerial maneuvers seems to indicate that the groups involved will maneuver as separate squadrons or formations, of from nine to eighteen planes, with the individual squadrons attempting to coordinate their efforts. Each squadron of heavy planes will probably have the protection of at least one squadron of fighting planes despite the fact that a formation of heavy planes has a certain inherent ability to defend itself against aerial attack, particularly so in the case of torpedo planes when close to the water. In this latter case hostile fighters are hindered in diving, their usual form of attack, as they must start recovering from such dives well before reaching the altitude of the low-flying torpedo planes in order to avoid "squashing" into the water. In addition, the proximity of the water insures the torpedo planes from attack from beneath, which covers their greatest point of vulnerability due to blind angles.
In any event, fighters intending to attack heavy planes must themselves be provided with protection from the escort of such planes. The general aerial battle will therefore resolve itself into a number of smaller conflicts with, generally speaking, a squadron of heavy planes plus a squadron of fighters opposed to two squadrons of fighting planes. Additional squadrons of any or all types may be added on either side but in no case would a single squadron of fighters be justified in attacking a formation of heavy planes, except in the absence of protective fighting planes or of any consideration requiring their continued existence.
A more detailed discussion of aerial tactics is beyond the scope of this paper but before dealing with the second type of naval engagement, the following general observations are in order. First of all, the commander of the offensive fleet will not be justified in continuing the action once the control of the air has been definitely obtained by the enemy, unless the hostile surface fleet is at the point of being annihilated. Second, it is incumbent upon him, except under similar circumstances, to break off the action in the case of the loss of all or a great majority of his aircraft carriers. Third and last of all, if the issue remains in doubt, he must discontinue the action before his aircraft have exhausted their fuel supplies—in the case of the existing types of fighting planes, a period of not much over two hours.
This last assertion merits detailed discussion particularly as it might be argued that the defensive fleet would be faced with a similar problem. Such is not the case, however, as the shore-based planes of the defensive force may be dispatched in waves, the surviving planes of which may withdraw from time to time for refueling and rearming. The aircraft of the offensive fleet, being inferior in numbers, must be maintained at full strength at the theater of operations in order that the command of the air may not be lost definitely. While it is possible for fighting planes to carry fuel for as long as five hours or even longer, such additional fuel capacity can be gained only at the expense of performance which, in this type, would be fatal to their efficiency. Consequently the commander of the offensive fleet must discontinue action, if the issue is still in doubt, not much later than two hours subsequent to the launching of his fighting planes from their carriers, unless he is willing to concede the control of the air to his opponent.
From the standpoint of the defensive fleet, aerial tactics are in general similar to those for the opposing force but with certain additions. As previously mentioned, its numerical superiority in aircraft permits it to launch an aerial attack in sufficient numbers to contend seriously for aerial mastery and still retain a reserve which, if launched at a later time, will enable it to continue the action for a longer period, with less risk of losing control of the air, than can the offensive fleet.
Certain types of aerial attack not previously mentioned are available. First of these is an aerially laid smoke screen as a preface and an aid to a torpedo attack, either by small surface craft or torpedo planes, or both in conjunction. If laid by fast planes, an excellent smoke screen can be placed in a very short space of time without the expenditure of any large amount of military strength. Under the cover of such a screen, a torpedo attack, particularly if made by aircraft, would constitute a serious menace.
Seldom discussed, but nevertheless worthy of consideration, is the possibility of a diving bombing attack on capital ships by fast planes armed with bombs filled with chemicals instead of explosives. While certain nations have mutually agreed to prohibit the "use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids. . ."1 not all of the nations have agreed to this prohibition. Judging from the past, it is within the realm of possibility that, in the extremity of desperation, some nation might disregard such an agreement or argue that this wording does not prevent the use of gases that are incapacitating rather than deadly in their effects. Even the use of chemicals that are lachrymatory or otherwise temporarily disabling rather than definitely toxic in effect, affords a means of attack that merits grave consideration. A single formation of planes armed with bombs of this nature might conceivably put a capital ship out of action by the disablement of its personnel, even though the ship itself remained undamaged materially.
A discussion of the day engagement under lowered visibility conditions is now in order. Such a discussion might be prefaced by one of the various kinds of such weather conditions. These may be classified in four general types. The first is reduced horizontal visibility at the surface accompanied by good visibility in both dimensions aloft; the second, reduced visibility both horizontally and vertically; the third, which is of rare occurrence, good horizontal visibility accompanied by reduced visibility vertically; and the last, generally poor visibility.
Under the first two types of reduced visibility conditions, planes can generally sight the surface vessels well before they themselves become visible. Hence, under such conditions, an aerial striking force is at its maximum efficiency due to the decreased ability of surface ships to defend themselves. Consequently, in such cases, the command of the air is of relatively greater importance. With reduced horizontal visibility at the surface accompanied by good visibility aloft, an aerial striking force is concealed from surface vessels until just prior to the delivery of its attack. Fairly often, under such conditions, the first indication of the presence of hostile aircraft in the vicinity is manifested to the surface craft by the results of the attack. Although the engines of the planes may be heard their locations remain undisclosed. Surface craft are frequently visible to the aircraft when the reverse is not true. On one occasion during maneuvers the horizontal visibility was about 3,000 yards at the surface. Overhead was a layer of clouds about 2,000 feet above the surface. This cloud bank was broken sufficiently so that no serious difficulty was experienced in making an approach on the surface vessels preparatory to a heavy bombing attack. As the planes flew comparatively close to the upper limit of the cloud layer they were disclosed to the surface vessels only momentarily. If observed at all, they were seen only for a few seconds and would then disappear. Certainly little could have been done from the surface to impede the attack.
Under these circumstances, a group of torpedo planes could have located their objectives and maneuvered to gain the position for launching their attack while remaining above the cloud layer, and then descended and delivered their thrust, almost before the surface vessels could have opened fire.
On another occasion only the tops of the battleships could be seen from the air—quite sufficient for the bombing planes but very unsatisfactory for the surface vessels. Other actual instances might be added but these suffice for illustrative purposes.
When the visibility is reduced both vertically and horizontally, the aerial striking force has its greatest chance of success, provided only that the visibility is not so low as to prevent or hinder it from locating its objective. The chance of evading hostile aircraft altogether is excellent and the inherent defensive ability of surface craft is impaired. While the attack itself may not be launched quite as efficiently as under better weather conditions, still it is quite probable that a larger percentage of the planes attempting the attack would survive to deliver their blow. Fighting planes, under such conditions, must remain in, or nearly in, sight of the surface vessels they are guarding and frequently will not be in a position to launch an attack upon hostile aircraft immediately upon sighting them. Under these conditions, heavy bombing attacks may be greatly impeded if not rendered altogether impossible. On the other hand, an attack by torpedo planes has a greater chance of success.
If the third type of visibility conditions is encountered, that is, good horizontal accompanied by poor vertical visibility, the heavy bombing attack (which must be delivered from an altitude) is impracticable. Torpedo plane attacks will be quite possible. Under these conditions, the planes probably will be flying very close to the water, in which position they are least vulnerable to attack from hostile fighters. If preceded by smoke-laying planes and accompanied by a fighting plane escort, they would have an excellent chance of pushing home their attack despite aerial and surface resistance, particularly if they should ascend into the clouds after locating their targets and then did not descend until just prior to delivering their attack on the disengaged bows of the ships they were attacking.
In the last type of conditions, that is, reduced visibility in all directions, the effectiveness of aircraft would be dependent almost solely upon their ability to locate their objectives before they came too close to deliver an efficient attack. With the modern planes flying at 200 feet per second (120 knots) and faster, a considerable distance is covered by the time the pilots are able to identify the surface craft sighted as belonging to the enemy forces and deciding to attack. Arbitrarily, we may consider that if the visibility is much below 1,000 yards a successful aerial attack on surface vessels is purely a matter of luck. While bombing under these conditions would be almost impossible, torpedo plane attacks might (the visibility being assumed to be 1,000 yards or greater) be delivered with little or no aerial opposition. The chance of evading protective fighting planes is excellent and gunfire can do little to impede such an attack. On the other hand, the attack probably would not be well coordinated.
Generally speaking, in a day engagement under reduced visibility conditions, aerial observations of gunfire and aerial tactical scouting would be of relatively lessened efficiency and consequently of lesser importance. In fact, except for the increased menace of an attack from bombing or torpedo planes, a naval engagement of this type would have the same general character as an engagement under similar circumstances prior to the introduction of aircraft within the fleet. Due to the increased potentialities of the aerial striking force, an engagement under these conditions would be avoided by the offensive fleet and sought for by the defensive fleet.
In the case of a night action, conditions are quite different. Here, speaking from an aerial standpoint, the offensive fleet is at a great disadvantage. First of all, the results of such an action can hardly be conclusive and consequently it is incumbent upon the commander of such a fleet to conserve his aerial strength. If he launches his planes a large percentage will probably fail to return due to their inability to relocate their carriers prior to the exhaustion of their fuel supplies. The carriers can do little or nothing to aid the planes in this respect without exposing themselves to hostile aerial attack. If they exhibit lights the enemy will be aided in locating them as well as their own planes. If radio is used for this purpose much the same risk is incurred.
If the carrier planes of the offensive fleet are not launched, an attack from the aerial striking force of the opposing fleet, particularly from the bombing planes, can be delivered at little cost in aerial strength. Even if defensive fighters are launched it is by no means certain they could divert or otherwise impede the attack. The best possible course of action for the offensive fleet under such circumstances would be to retire at high speed.
From the standpoint of the defensive fleet, whose main objective is the attrition of the enemy surface strength, the opportunities afforded by a night action are ideal. As previously stated, the shore-based planes could deliver an attack on the surface vessels of the offensive fleet with only a slight expenditure of aircraft from hostile efforts. The location of the shore bases being already definitely known with more or less exactitude to the enemy, no harm would be entailed by the use of radio in guiding these planes back. Being beyond the range of the enemy, lights could be used without risk for this purpose, and to assist planes in landing. Consequently, few, if any, of the aircraft dispatched from shore bases would fail to return due to inability to relocate their bases.
In summary, the following general conclusions may be drawn from the premises previously enunciated. The difficulties inherent in the assumption of the offensive in a naval campaign have been considerably increased by the introduction of aircraft as an integral part of naval warfare. This will necessitate a greater preponderance of surface strength for the successful completion of the offensive mission than has been requisite heretofore.
As the larger nations lack such a definite superiority at present, under the limitations imposed by treaty, the necessary additional ships must be obtained by alliances or by naval construction subsequent to the declaration of hostilities. In the absence of such alliances, a period of comparative stagnation in the naval phase of the war must be expected, until one of the warring nations has been able, by new construction, to gain the superiority in surface strength essential to the successful assumption of the offensive.
With this preponderance in surface strength, the logical and most efficient weapon for the fleet acting offensively is gunfire from surface craft, thus enabling it to dispense with an aerial striking force capable of reducing the enemy's surface strength. This elimination enables the fleet acting on the offensive to replace planes of these types with others capable of aiding in the defense of its surface craft from aerial attack. This will permit the offensive fleet to contend, with a better chance of success, for the command of the air with the necessarily numerically superior aerial forces of the enemy.
The fleet acting on the defensive, by virtue of its ability to supplement the planes carried within the fleet by planes based on shore, will have a superiority in total numbers of aircraft available. This superiority in aerial strength, coupled with the inferiority of such a fleet in surface vessels, makes aerial attacks on the surface strength of the offensive fleet its most logical weapon as an efficient means of attrition. For this purpose aircraft of types capable of menacing the safety of capital ships are required and it therefore follows that all types of aircraft capable of being carried on shipboard are essential within the fleet acting defensively.
Because of its numerical superiority in aircraft, the defensive fleet is enabled to maintain a sufficient force of planes in the air at the scene of a naval engagement to contend for the command of the air and at the same time have replacement planes replenishing their fuel and ammunition. This, unless the fortunes of the day have been definitely decided, would enable the defensive fleet to remain in action a longer period than the opposing fleet. The aircraft of the offensive fleet, being outnumbered, must rem. am in the air at the theater of operations in their total numbers. Hence, the time that such a fleet can remain in action, while still contending for aerial control, is limited to the time required for its aircraft to exhaust their supplies of fuel—a period which, at present, does not exceed two hours.
The bulk of the aerial strength of the offensive fleet being based upon aircraft carriers, the primary objective of the opposing aerial forces is the destruction of these vessels. If even a majority of these carriers are destroyed a further continuance of the offensive is unjustifiable. Therefore, these vessels must be protected at all costs from aerial attack, both by means of aircraft and by placing them well in the rear of the fleet.
In the event of failure to destroy the opposing carriers, the next objective of the defensive aerial forces is the reduction of the capital strength of the opposing fleet. If its carriers are safe, the mission of the aircraft of the offensive fleet is the protection of its capital ships from aerial attack.
In the day engagement under good visibility conditions, the difficulty of delivering a surprise aerial attack is at a maximum and gunfire is at its maximum efficiency; hence an action under these circumstances will be sought by the fleet acting offensively. Conversely, as the effectiveness of defense against aerial attack, whether by other aircraft or by antiaircraft gunfire, is decreased under lowered visibility and as the efficiency of surface gunfire is likewise reduced, an engagement under these conditions probably will be more advantageous to the defensive fleet.
The offensive fleet must avoid a night action, due to the necessity for conserving its aerial strength, because of the comparative inefficiency of surface gunfire under such conditions, and because of the dangers of a successful attack from the air.
Finally, no nation can be certain as to whether strategical or political considerations may require the assumption of the naval offensive or the acceptance of a defensive role. However, the application of these principles, due to the comparative ease with which carriers may be re-equipped with planes of other types, is in no wise inconsistent with a naval policy involving the development of all types of aircraft, provided that the training of the naval aviators involved is sufficiently diversified.
1. Section V of the Washington Limitation of Naval Armament Treaty.