Many false conclusions have been drawn from the results of the use of aircraft in the World War. Some striking incidents of success are given exaggerated importance; some failures are considered conclusive proof of the limitations °f the use of aircraft.
Corbett writes: “Officers no longer look upon history as a kind of dust heap.... They go to it as a mine of experience where alone the gold is to be found from which right doctrine—the soul of war—can be built up.” The errors in our conclusions have been made because we were unable to study the problem of aviation in war time with the right doctrine in mind.
Prior to 1914, war between nations was waged only on land and sea. The World War added another theater of operation— the air. Where once only two dominions were considered in the strategical and tactical estimates of the situation there is now a third one to be considered. Should it be studied separately or in conjunction with the others? Will aircraft in future wars be so decisive that our armies and navies will merely become the protectors and the aids of the air service? These questions may best be answered by a careful study of the possible use of aircraft in naval warfare, together with their limitations and capabilities. Let us inquire first into the strategic characteristics, or the limitations governing their employment.
I he first limitation is a physical one, and it is the greatest one affecting the employment of heavier-than-air machines—the law of nature which requires that they must remain in motion in order to float or fly. Upon loss of motion they must land; then they lose all the characteristics which warrant their employment. Their usefulness depends upon flight and that can never become completely reliable.
The next limitation is that of weather. Meteorological conditions which render aircraft operations impossible vary with the locality and time of the year. A nation whose principal arm is aircraft, can only fight in favorable regions and at opportune times. At inopportune times and in unfavorable localities it would be at the mercy of any enemy with a stronger fleet or army.
The inability of a plane to maintain a continuous bombardment or fire on its objective is an equally unfortunate limitation. It must return to the carrier or airdrome for a new supply of bombs or ammunition. The allowance within its physical ability to carry is small. Hence continuous bombardment of an objective will require an enormous number of planes.
The fourth limitation is that of radius of operation. True, flights have been made of thousands of miles. The progress of aviation with respect to radius of action has been tremendous, but the results must not be confused with the capabilities of aircraft, suitable for war purposes, carrying bombs and guns. The maximum radius of action for bombers has been developed from five hours flight (the figure at the close of the World War) to about ten hours at the present day. To reach an enemy beyond this range, it is necessary to transport planes on carriers. These carriers will require battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, for their protection at night, and in the day time, when the weather conditions are unfavorable for their protection by aircraft.
Other equally important limitations are: (a) the inability to alone maintain an effective scouting line against surface craft, unless planes are kept constantly on the scouting line; and (b) the lack, to date, of a scouting plane that combines speed, long radius, and a strong enough armament to enable it to gain information in the face of opposition. The problem of speed, radius, and armament in aircraft is the same as for cruisers; and the answer will always be the same—one of the desired characteristics must be sacrificed to gain the other two in the desired degree.
Concerning the possible employment of aircraft, General Bird writes:
The end of war is usually attained when one nation has been able to bring such pressure to bear on another that public opinion obliges the government to sue for peace. The fact that an air force can carry war into the enemy’s country must necessarily give rise to the speculations as to whether pressure sufficient to end a war can be brought to bear on the spirit of a population by means of raids which would be directed against such objectives as railroads, factories, power stations, water works, mines, docks, harbors, etc., with the object of dislocating the life of the community. So long as the power of effective retaliation is possessed by a belligerent, it is, however, doubtful whether sufficient pressure will be exerted even by devastating incursions, unless means of destruction far more efficient than those now in existence are employed; since experience so far has shown that apart from provoking the desire of defensive measures, a raid is, in general, likely to arouse the longing for retaliation rather than for submission. Retaliation will, in turn, produce measures of defense on the part of the enemy, so that even were mutual raiding to be at first adopted to the exclusion of other methods, the old principles of war would in all probability soon reassert themselves, and it would be found that the natural step toward winning the war was to establish superiority over the enemy’s armed force…It seems, then, the principle that war is best ended through the defeat of the enemy’s armed forces will still be observed and that the primary objective of aerial strategy will be to obtain supremacy, if possible, but superiority, at any rate, over the enemy’s armed air forces; and that raiding with the objective of spreading terror will be secondary in importance until military objectives of victory in air, and on sea and land have been achieved…
War is a combination of movement and hitting—the movement being necessary to reach the objective; the hitting, to gain it or to prevent the enemy from doing so. Airmen can strike and keep on doing this, but their striking is somewhat in the nature of raid and scuttle, and it is therefore doubtful whether they will be able to acquire control over hostile areas, which must often be effected before decisive successes can be attained. It is also more than doubtful whether airmen alone could stop a well armed fleet and army which were supported by aircraft, and in the end the army would seize the bases, airdromes, and work shops on which aircraft, like all machines, depend for maintenance of their motive power. Airmen may oblige troops on land to fight behind armor as seamen do, but for many years to come nations will, it seems, as at present, rely on navies and armies as well as on air forces to effect their security and that of their interests.
How must this reliance on aircraft be fulfilled? What is their mission? We have seen that alone they cannot overcome the will of a first-class power; that they are unable to turn an advantage once gained into permanent benefit. Their physical characteristics limit the scope of their operations. They must be transported by carriers to reach an enemy beyond a distance of several hundred miles. They must have the same carriers or depot ships for their upkeep, their fuel, and ammunition supply. They are not able to protect their carriers at all times, and hence must depend upon . battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines for their security. Therefore they must have the assistance of the navy in their operations.
Let us consider them as a unit in such a combined naval force. The potential strength of this force will be increased by added capabilities in the employment of aircraft. The range of its guns will be hundreds of miles instead of a few. Its security will not depend upon the seaman’s horizon; instead its eyes may be hundreds of miles ahead. The aircraft will be secure in all conditions of weather and in any region. They may strike an enemy at a distance far beyond their radius of flight. The carriers or depot ships upon which they depend will always be secure. Their capabilities are increased by the strength of the navy with them.
As a part of such a force their mission must be the mission of the combined force.
Having derived this mission let us study some possible courses of action in its execution. Their value, chance of success, and importance will show whether or not this mission is a sound one. How may they best be used with the navy, and vice versa.
The study of war seems to give us certain basic principles for its conduct. These are the background upon which a picture of the plan may be tested for possible weakness, and the subconscious guide for its execution. They may be called Objective, Offensive, Security, Concentration, Economy of Force, Movement, Surprise, and Cooperation. Whether the force considered is land, naval, or air, these principles are applicable, for the combined military forces of a nation in war aim at a common goal, the defeat of the enemy’s resistance, with the consequent maintenance of policy of the victor. Let us take these principles separately and apply them to the use of our aircraft both as a guide and a measure of profitable employment, for the art of war has demonstrated no better principles.
The Principle of Objective
This is the first and most important principle, for it is inseparable from the mission or the task at hand. As shown in the previous discussion, the primary objective should not be the vital centers behind the enemy’s lines or frontiers. Such a campaign will leave our own land open to similar raids and reprisals with equal or greater damage, depending upon the geographical location of the vital areas. The enemy’s air forces would be free to assist the operations of their army and navy, while our military and naval forces would be without the assistance of aircraft. Such a campaign would result in the development of strong defensive measures by the enemy, in the face of which it is doubtful that an air force could accomplish decisive results.
Accomplishment of such a mission promises some successes, but not the decisive results which should be our aim. Let us look further. Aircraft are the new eyes of the army and navy. Positions of enemy troops, batteries, supply depots, ships, fleets, and bases may be by means of air scouts revealed to both belligerents. Such information will enable a fleet to avoid engagement under unfavorable conditions, will enable an army commander to attack the weak points in an enemy defense or strengthen his own weaknesses when superior enemy concentrations before them are apparent. The spotting by aircraft increases the range of both naval and land guns by increasing the distance at which their fire may be controlled.
If the air forces of one belligerent can destroy the air force of its enemy, then the military and naval forces of the unfortunate belligerent will be without the assistance outlined above. The vital areas at home of the victorious nation will be safe from raids. The enemy’s vital areas will be without the defense of aircraft, therefore more decisive results may be obtained from bombing operations undertaken after the enemy has been defeated in the air.
Some of the principal functions of naval aircraft are listed below in the order of their importance:
- Offensive action against enemy aircraft.
- The resulting protection of own fleet from enemy aircraft.
- Scouting.
- Spotting.
- Bombing and torpedo attacks on enemy war and merchant vessels at sea.
- Bombing and torpedo attacks on enemy ships in port.
- Bombing attacks on enemy naval bases and yards and ports.
- Operations to support military landings.
- Enemy merchant vessels at sea and in port and important enemy seaports would be an important objective in case a power had sufficient naval strength to enforce an economic blockade upon another; and enough planes to carry out the bombardments without sacrificing control of the air in other vital areas.
The operations of the naval air force must support the mission of the naval unit with which it operates. The importance of the agreement of the plan for air operations with the mission of the naval force with which it operates cannot be emphasized too strongly.
Too many objectives or too strong a one for the force available are equally great mistakes. Lord Grey of Falloden said: “The errors of strategy in past wars may be expressed in two words—‘Side Shows.’” They must be avoided in the choice of the objective.
Principle of the Offensive
Decisive victory comes only through the spirit of the offensive which must permeate a fleet and inspire its leaders, through whom the resulting power must be intelligently and efficiently applied. (Principles of War Applied to Naval Warfare, Naval War College pamphlet.)
Air superiority or control must be had in any area where extensive air, land, or naval operations are planned. It is a vital initial step to secure their success.
There is only one way in which this can be attained: the offensive-—in which the enemy’s aircraft in an area are destroyed faster than he can rush in replacements or beyond his ability to replace the destroyed planes. Intensive patrols by pursuit ships, in a number superior to the enemy’s, will soon drive the enemy out of the air. Intensive bombing raids on his carriers, airdromes, and important military centers in the vicinity will force his planes back in the air where they can be fought and destroyed. When the strategic plan undertaken requires general and lasting control of the air the enemy’s sources and means of production should be bombed and destroyed as well.
A force on the offensive possesses the great advantage of requiring the enemy to displace his own forces intended for offensive operations, by requiring them to assume a defensive role. The sporadic air raids by the Zeppelins and bombing planes at opportune times resulted in the maintenance in the British Isles of several thousand troops, and many aircraft sorely needed on the front. Though the physical damage inflicted by the German offensive tactics was small, their effort was also small, but the resulting employment of valuable forces for home defense was a vast benefit. It was not until 1917 that the British air ministry and general staff reached the conclusion that the proper defense for London was a strong offensive bombing campaign against German airdromes. For three years the Germans, in spite of all defensive measures, had reached their goal, but after the British offensive operations the attacks weakened and became fewer in number.
Adherence to the Principle of Offensive has another strong advantage in its favor. It raises the morale of the forces adopting it. It imbues them with the spirit that they are bound to win and brings confidence in their ability.
Even when the action is a defensive one the spirit of the offensive may still be profitably obeyed. If the enemy’s planes are attacked before they reach the near vicinity of their objective, they may be made to conform to the defender’s plans, causing a change in the operation, with resulting confusion. A change of plans in an air operation while it is in progress will find many of the units ignorant of the new plan. The leader cannot make his new decision known to his forces with the clarity that may be done with naval vessels.
The advantages of the offensive course of action were not realized by the British in their air defenses of London until late in the war. Then the German bombing formations were attacked in the air, long before they reached their objectives. The records of these later flights show that where from twenty-five to forty planes started only a few ever reached London; the others either turned back, or chose less important objectives for their bombs.
The Principle of Superiority
In the execution of a plan the Principle of Superiority must be observed. It means the concentration of a force tactically superior to the enemy’s in the same area. It does not require superior forces in all areas, but only the vital ones, and where contact is to be expected, and a decisive result desired.
As previously stated, air strength of two naval forces in contact may not usually be increased. Tactical air superiority must be acquired by the sound disposition of forces in the vital areas—and the avoidance of “side shows”—using planes for only necessary and important purposes, and planning their operations so that the units may exert a combined offensive effort.
This tactical superiority does not necessarily mean one of numbers. Superior skill of the pilots and performance of the planes and equipment will offset the advantage of numbers. This was clearly demonstrated on the Western Front in April, 1918, when the Germans brought out the Fokker type triplane for pursuit purposes. Its superior performance enabled them to deny the Allies any information of the enormous troop concentrations which took place immediately behind the front lines prior to these offensives. Yet, the Allies had a two to one superiority in number of aircraft, along the front.
Some further results of the World War illustrate the advantageous results of superiority.
General Ludendorf states in his work, The General Staff, that during the Battle of the Somme in 1917, the Allied air superiority increased the difficulty of the German defense. The German planes were unable to observe the movements of the Allies, and the Allied planes attacked their front line troops, reserves, and supply depots.
During the period of Allied air superiority towards the end of the war the German air losses were enormous in comparison with those of the Allies. In August and September of 1918 the Allies lost 489 planes while the Germans lost 1,962.
The Principle of Cooperation
The next important principle of war which should be applied in the use of aircraft is that of cooperation.
Unity of action towards the accomplishment of the mission of the entire force is necessary in order to obtain maximum effort. A naval force is made of many component parts, one of which is the air. The mission of the air force must coincide and its plan must cooperate with that of the surface ships. This is obtained through loyalty to the leader’s plan, and a thorough understanding of the undertaking and the part each unit of the force is to play. When the plan is changed, when situations arise which demand unexpected actions, if possible such information should be given to the air forces. It will not be easy to do this with forces already in the air. Maneuver rules allow a degree of communication between ships and planes that is idealistic. Too much confidence should not be placed in this form of communication. In actual practice it will be found that such action must depend primarily upon the initiative and judgment of the air force unit commanders in the air, which should be based upon the principle of cooperation.
The Principle of Simplicity
The Principle of Simplicity demands as strict obedience in aircraft operations as m those of surface vessels. It applies to organization, orders, instructions, technique of maneuvers, and especially communication systems, and the strategical and tactical plans of operation.
Simplicity in organization will serve to create a higher degree of efficiency, in both material and personnel, and make the units more quickly available for action, as well as giving better coordination of effort. The organization of tactical units should not be carried beyond the size that can actually be controlled efficiently in the air by the squadron leader. Flight groups should not be composed of units or types that cannot operate together efficiently.
The reasons requiring simplicity and clearness of orders and instructions are the same regardless of whether the forces concerned be army, naval, or air. An order should be clear, its meaning capable of only one construction, and the initiative of the subordinate should be respected.
The degree of latitude allowed to his discretion depends upon the subordinate’s training and indoctrination. War instructions have been prepared and battle formations developed from practical experience that will best fit tactical situations which are most likely to arise. If subordinates have been trained in the use of these instructions, they may be omitted, not forgetting that operations which would be simple for highly trained personnel should not be attempted with green pilots. An example of this is found in the training of German bombing squadrons before any night bombing raids were undertaken. The first raids were simple in plan, while successive ones that were equally as successful were more complicated.
Communications are just as necessary for the success of a naval operation as good gunnery and sound tactics. The Battle of Jutland showed many instances where the fruits of opportunity never ripened because important messages failed to get through. The seaplane sent up by the Engadine was not able to get its reports through. Engine trouble prevented thorough reconnaissance, and the information it gained was not delivered.
Communication between ship and planes and vice versa is difficult under the most favorable conditions. It depends upon a simple plan, efficient operating personnel and material, and careful calibration of ships and planes’ radio sets. The value of calibration cannot be overstressed, to one who has tried to communicate between ship and plane when many others are operating at the same time. No radio plan should make it necessary for a plane to communicate on more than one wave length, otherwise one of the messages will be off in frequency, causing interference and confusion. Communication between pursuit planes of different units must be by visual method. Anything but Very pistol stars is beyond consideration. Visual communication between planes and ships may be by some such method as smoke bombs, or dropping of messages on deck.
Due to the difficulty of communication between planes, the operating plan should be as simple as possible, and meet the greatest number of possible courses of action without requiring a change of plan. A complicated plan is likely to cause confusion and failure.
The Principle of Economy of Force
Guidance by this principle is one of the most difficult problems facing a force commander. It is so closely related to the principles of Objective, Superiority, Movement, Surprise, and Security that it must be considered with them in order that they may be followed as well.
The Principle of Economy of Force does not mean the use of as little force as possible for an undertaking. When defined in other words, as the principle of distribution of forces, the meaning is clearer, and more definite. Enlarging upon the definition, we see that it means the employment of as great a force as possible for an undertaking without weakening the forces at other vital points to the extent that reverses there would outweigh the resulting success of the project. Forces at unimportant points or used in objectives which contribute nothing to the winning of the action are forces wasted. So far forces drawn into a concentration to give superiority beyond that necessary at the sacrifice of forces needed at other vital points.
The ease and rapidity with which air craft may be moved, assist in conforming with the Principle of Economy. The most economical use of forces is gained by concentration. It took the Germans three years to learn this lesson over again. The Battle of the Somme found the German air service under the command of the individual army commanders. As a result when the British drive opened against the German first army, its air forces were not sufficient to deny the British air superiority. Much- needed forces were rendering no assistance in the quiet sectors. The hymn of the German infantryman was, “God punish England, our air forces, and our artillery.” The German High Command saw the necessity of reorganization. Only such air forces were assigned to an army as necessary for normal services; the remainder were organized into mobile squadrons and shifted from point to point where need of air superiority was imperative. The British air superiority was soon overcome.
Such an organization and concentration is more necessary for naval air forces prior to beginning a naval operation than for an army’s operations. The success or failure of the naval operation will be decided in a few hours of battle while the land struggle may last days and months. Once the two naval forces have joined action, only the forces in contact will be engaged, while on land, reserves may counterattack and regain the advantage lost to the enemy. In naval warfare there are not many instances where more than one operation of major size and great importance was underway at one time. Therefore the air units of forces not employed in the project should be used where they will contribute to the success of the venture.
Concentration of air forces results in economy of force through reduction of losses. In the first great air battle in the World War, Baron von Richthofen’s squadron, organized for concerted attack and trained to attack as a unit, intercepted a British daylight bombing raid guarded by several pursuit squadrons, on February 21, 1918. In the air melee following, between seventy and eighty planes were engaged. The British lost thirteen planes, the Germans one. The German attack was a united one, the British defense was not, and a loss of thirteen to one was the result.
The Principle of Surprise
In Principles of War Applied to Naval Warfare (Naval War College pamphlet), we find the following: “He who would employ surprise successfully must:
“1. Have much knowledge.
“2. Know his adversary.
“3. Deny his adversary knowledge of himself
“In tactics information of the enemy and secrecy as to our own situations are prerequisite to surprise…
“Secrecy is essential to most complete surprise…”
Secrecy of movements and intentions are absolutely essential in the employment of the Principle of Surprise in warfare. The value of this principle need not be discussed—only one point will be emphasized. The force using surprise will never be surprised by the enemy, for surprise operations depend fundamentally upon the denial of information to the enemy.
In naval warfare aviation may be used in three ways in the execution of a plan embodying the Principle of Surprise: to gain information of the enemy; to deny him information of own movements; and as the striking weapon.
As a general rule a plane may see a ship ten miles before the plane may be seen. Unless the enemy is guarded by an efficient aerial patrol beyond the range of a plane’s visibility it may easily obtain the desired information of enemy’s strength, position, and disposition. If the enemy is guarded by a strong air patrol, low visibility, with the usual low hanging clouds, will afford the desired protection for aerial scouts. If circumstances make the need of information an urgent one then a force strong enough to break through the enemy’s air patrol and obtain the desired knowledge must be employed. Such a movement destroys the element of surprise. This will rarely be necessary—a plane arriving in the vicinity pf the enemy just at dusk may easily escape in the coming darkness.
Only one other class of war vessel affords the opportunity to obtain easily unobserved information of the enemy, and that is the submarine. The slow speed and defenselessness of the submarine handicap it. Aircraft may obtain more information, more easily, and more quickly than may be obtained by any other means.
Before a surprise operation may be successful, the enemy must be denied all information of it.
Planes scouting beyond the radius of surface visibility from warships may see more, and cover more area than surface scouts. Enemy vessels in a vital area may be quickly detected, and the surprising force may then either maneuver to avoid contact, or drive off the enemy ships. Here again aircraft offer a profitable arm. One surface scout would have slight chance against an attack from a torpedo or bombing squadron.
The intentions and presence of the surprising force must be concealed from the enemy in the air as well as on the water.
The safest measure to insure this, though not always possible of employment, is to shape a course that will lie outside the radius of operation of shore or tender-based aircraft; to enter this danger zone only at night. Other measures must be used at the same time. Scouting vessels use planes to increase their radius of visibility, and to cover the area more effectively. To deny information to these scouts an air patrol both above and below the cloud ceiling must be maintained from shortly before dawn to shortly after dark, at a distance from the screened force greater than the radius of visibility from a plane. The stronger this screening air patrol the less opportunity the enemy will have to obtain information. Aircraft are a double-edged weapon; they offer the same opportunities to both sides. The one employing them most advantageously will benefit the most.
Let us next investigate the opportunities offered by aircraft as a weapon of surprise.
High-speed carriers afford a means of plane transportation in short time, and will allow sudden concentration of air superiority at distant points beyond radius of action of the planes.
The ability of planes to make bombing and torpedo attacks against both naval and military armaments may not be contested any longer. Through them a force secure from attack by surface ships behind protecting mine fields and land fortifications may be successfully attacked, even if their air defense be strong, for the speed with which a surprise air attack may be delivered will allow its execution before defensive measures strong enough to defeat it can be brought into play. An especially inviting objective for such tactics will be an advance force or fleet which has seized, and is operating from, a naval base in the vicinity of the enemy’s home land in an overseas campaign. Equally valuable are home naval yards and naval bases.
Such attacks must be delivered in force, and with a force strong enough to insure command of the air during the time of the attack. They should arrive at either dawn, dusk, or dark in order to render enemy defense more difficult. During the day the effectiveness of an antiaircraft fire is immeasurably increased, and defense aircraft may render strong resistance. Night, even with the attendant difficulties of night flying, offers the most favorable opportunities for success. Planes may bomb accurately during the dark if parachute flares are dropped from above the bombing altitudes by other planes. Naval antiaircraft defense cannot be as thoroughly organized and developed as that on shore. Night will increase its ineffectiveness. Another point in possible defenses to be considered when the time of a surprise air attack is chosen is the slight opposition other aircraft may offer at night. Visibility between planes drops to about 500 yards under the most favorable conditions. Contacts are only chance, and then easily lost. Coordinated tactics for pursuit attack cannot be carried out. Planes must fight singly. Individual successes are only lucky encounters. Summing the insurmountable difficulties attendant upon night combat between aircraft, we find that our own casualties on landing may be expected to exceed the damages we may inflict on an enemy in the air. Besides this, our own aircraft engaged in a general melee with enemy bombers will prevent the best use of antiaircraft guns or subject our own planes to the same possible damage as the enemy’s. The personal accounts of aviators on both sides in the World War who attempted to fight bombers in the air in the vicinity of their targets all strongly stress the point that their own antiaircraft fire prevented their reaching the enemy’s formations. Either one form of defense or the other may be expected and neither will be effective. Protection lies only in the obscurance of the target with smoke, and if the attack is enough of a surprise it may be completed before enough smoke may be laid to be of any value.
The above example and discussion are given to illustrate the capabilities in the use of aircraft as a weapon of surprise. The best strategy in war employs all weapons in every possible manner and at every possible time. This valuable capability should not be forgotten.
Principle of Movement
“The Principle of Movement applies to the attainment of a favorable position with reference to the enemy.” (Principles of War Applied to Naval Warfare) To attain this goal, a fleet may find it necessary to pass through a phase of the engagement when the advantage lies on the opponent’s side. In such a situation, a commander must weigh the results to be attained with the losses expected, and use every means within his power to lessen the damage the enemy may inflict while his force is in a disadvantageous position. Let us study the opportunities offered by aircraft for this purpose.
The initial phases of a fleet action begin with the approach before deployment. At this time, the enemy’s submarines may be expected to be on the surface, cruising to take up favorable positions for submerged attack on the battle line. Patrol planes carrying bombs can drive these vessels under the water and keep them there, hence limiting their radius of operation. After the submarines are forced under, an air patrol dropping depth and smoke bombs may assist the fleet in passing through this dangerous area.
During the approach and deployment, the rapidity and distance at which torpedo planes can operate offer an opportunity for an early attack with a possibility of damage to the enemy battle line before the engagement opens.
Let us study the next phase of the engagement, deployment. Low visibility may force this suddenly upon a fleet, with the attendant disadvantages of ineffective fire and confusion as was the case of Admiral Beatty’s battle cruisers at Jutland. Smoke screens laid by aircraft are ideal for protection during this disadvantageous moment; their uses and advantages will be separately discussed later.
When the officer in tactical command decides to use his surface torpedo craft for attack, they should be assisted by the coordinated attack of his torpedo planes. These craft, due to their speed, may reach a position on the disengaged side of the enemy that the surface craft could not possibly obtain. Smoke-screen planes can be used to cover the approach of both the destroyers and torpedo planes. This method of protection should always be used in an aerial torpedo attack unless low visibility, mist, rain, or already existent smoke will afford the same relief.
After fire has been opened by the enemy, his battle line evolutions must be restricted in order to maintain its maximum effectiveness. This is the most opportune time for a bombing attack on his capital ships. The bomber’s target must be on a constant course and at a constant speed during the time the plane is making the last part of its approach, otherwise the results will depend upon luck. A fleet observing the approach of a bombing attack, in absence of other protection, must zigzag in order to defeat it. This will decrease the effectiveness of its fire.
At this point, it is well to discuss briefly some possible defensive measures against both torpedo and bombing attacks during an action.
The torpedo planes are least vulnerable from pursuit aircraft when near the water. Surface screens at proper distances from the main body may keep the torpedo planes in the air at an altitude where they may be attacked during their approach. The range of torpedoes that aircraft now carry is comparatively short. The plane must be within twenty-five feet of the water when launching the torpedo. A destroyer screen on the disengaged bow and side at a distance of 2,000 yards from the battle line can with machine-gun fire completely defeat a torpedo-plane attack, for such a screen can keep the planes at an altitude above twenty-five feet and beyond the range of their torpedoes.
A continuous patrol of fighting planes strong enough to either destroy or defeat a bombing attempt must be kept aloft during daylight hours when attacks are possible, as a primary measure of defense. The strength of this protective force must be calculated on the basis that two fighters can destroy one bomber, and one fighter can keep one bomber from making its approach. The bomber cannot defend itself and make a successful approach at the same time. It must maneuver to keep the fighter from obtaining a position in its blind arc.
Should air defense fail or be lacking, zigzagging at high speed and smoke cover are the two most effective ways, in the present stages of development of antiaircraft fire, to defeat a bombing attack.
Smoke screens are a valuable aid in the execution of movement of surface craft as well as aircraft. Heretofore they have been laid only by surface vessels but now planes have many advantages for this purpose. They are briefly stated as follows: they cling better to the water; may be laid in about one-third the time of screens from .surface craft; more chance of success in the operation, due to high speed of plane, making it more difficult to hit than a ship; may be laid with ease to windward of enemy, even though own force is to the leeward; may be laid with greater exactness with relation to surface ships.
The following are a few of the most important uses that are suggested for air-laid smoke screens:
- To protect the battle line while advancing through unfavorable ranges.
- To cover retirement or break off engagement.
- To cover a disabled ship from further punishment.
- During turning movement of battle line.
- To cover a portion of the enemy battle line in order to allow heavy concentration.
- To afford protection against light force and submarine torpedo attack.
- To cover the enemy and confuse his movement.
- To aid light forces and planes in torpedo attack, and cover bombing attacks and withdrawal of same.
- To protect surface craft from torpedo and bombing attacks.
- To cover mine-laying operations.
- To protect surface ships from shore fire during the debarkation of troops.
- To cover a landing force until it arrives on the beach.
A study of these possible uses for aircraft clearly shows that the major role of aviation in war is one of assistance, and that surface ships must have the assistance of aircraft in order to render their maximum effort.
The Principle of Security
This principle applies to operations undertaken to deny the enemy information from observation, to protect against surprise attacks, and have freedom of action without annoyance.
The part aircraft may play in such operations is limited to tactical scouting and screening due to their limited radius of operation, but they move more rapidly, cover long distances more quickly and can observe without detection more easily than any other type of craft. Besides these advantages they offer another equally strong argument for employment. Tactical scouting is usually undertaken in an area in which the balance of control is in favor of the enemy. The difference in the hazard in the employment of a few planes and an equal number of surface vessels is the difference between a few lives and several hundred lives on the surface scout, between $100,000 and $20,000,000, the cost of the cruiser; between a fighting unit of negligible nature easily replaced and a valuable unit that cannot be replaced during the period of the war.
Operations in areas several hundred miles from the fleet or bases will require types of planes large enough to carry a complete navigational equipment, and enough men to obviate the fatigue factor. While it may never be practical to carry this type of plane on shipboard, the possibilities of future development must not be overlooked. With the present capabilities of planes the long-range scouts must operate from shore bases, and they must be augmented by surface scouts that can cover the vital area left unobserved by the planes after they have searched and returned to their bases. Such surface vessels in addition to performing this valuable service will also be able to render assistance to planes in case of emergency and forced landings, which will always be a part of flying as long as motors are used for aircraft propulsion.
When shore bases are not available for aerial tactical scouting operations or the area to be covered is beyond the effective range of operation of planes available, such operations must be undertaken by aircraft carriers, and the resulting loss of planes will be high if the operations require employment of planes near the limit of their ability.
Enough carriers should be assigned so that no planes will be employed beyond seventy-five per cent of their flight endurance except in cases of extreme emergency. In flight between the ranges of seventy-five per cent and one hundred per cent of endurance, the chance of breakdown rises from zero to practically one hundred per cent.
The advent of the airplane has introduced a new factor in screening. Control or command of the air will never be to such an absolute degree that it will be impossible for planes to enter an area, secure information, and depart safely. The more absolute the command the greater risk will be entailed in such an operation and the less chance of its success, but it will always be possible. The speed with which planes move and the relatively short distance they may be seen, make it so.
To deny the enemy such information then becomes the problem of making it impossible for him to launch aircraft. Cruisers and aircraft carriers capable of launching them must be kept at a distance beyond their aircraft’s radius of operation by cruisers and aircraft. Such defensive measures are the only ones that will absolutely deny the enemy information from the air. An air patrol in vicinity of the fleet or convoy will further increase their safety.
This closes an outline of the use of aircraft in naval warfare. The application of the principles of war to aircraft was chosen to illustrate some of the ways in which they may be employed to assist the navy and the manner of employment which will promise the greatest chances of success.
All possible and profitable avenues have not been discussed. Those would fill never ending volumes, for invention and development will enlarge the field of future capabilities. But whatever these uses may be, they must be directed along a line of common action with the navy, in order to derive the greatest results and make use of all the possibilities aircraft offer as weapons.