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THE NAVAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR. THE UNITED STATES IN THE WAR 1917
1918, VOL. III. Harvard University Press. $375-
By Thomas G. Frothingham, Captain, U.S.R.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral W. V.
Pratt, U. S. Navy In reviewing this excellent work of Captain Frothingham’s, the attempt has been made to handle the subject in such a way that the reader can, at a glance, get a brief but fairly comprehensive outline of the contents of the book, together with any lessons which might be gleaned, due to our participation in this war. Therefore, liberty is taken of dividing this review into four parts. The first deals with the character and the scope of the book; the second is a synopsis of the contents; the third contains a few comments by the reviewer pertaining to statements made in the body of the book; the fourth sets forth a few of the lessons to be learned from the book.
- Scope and character of the hook. As the title would indicate, the book deals with the part which we took in the war after our entry in 1917. In carrying on his work into the third volume, the author has adopted the same method of treatment which characterizes his work in the two previous volumes. In general this may be stated as follows. Out of the mass of detail presented to the author, he has endeavored to use only those pertinent facts which give the reader a picture of the war, as conducted by us, in its broadest phases. Consequently, a mass of conflicting and possibly somewhat irrelevant detail has not found a place in this work. Those readers who desire to inquire more intimately into particular phases of the war will have to go to other sources. But the result to the general reader has been this. By omitting the mass of detail, the author has been able to present a continuous picture of the war, so that the reader can get a very fundamental conception of original causes, the larger methods of operation and final results.
Unlike some other books, the author has indulged in no personalities, neither has he endeavored to bring the personal equation forward except as it might be necessary in the expounding of cause, effect and result. Further, through his method of treatment, the author has succeeded in marshaling his salient facts in such an orderly array, that the story, while simply told, carries with it a conviction of truth and of accuracy. It is an excellent book to read because it is so simple and clear. The reader can digest this work, feeling that when he has finished with it he will have a clearer idea of what it was all about than he would from reading other more voluminous works. The book is of great value. It is accurate. It is simple. If there be a fault, it is this—that the picture which he draws is too glowing.
- Contents. In order that the reader may get at a glance the high spots of which the book treats, a statement of the chapters in which the book is divided is now made:
- The Situation at the Beginning of 1917;
II. The Entrance of the United States;
III. The First Shock of the U-Boat Campaign;
IV. The Object of the United States in the World War;
V. The Adoption of the Convoy System;
VI. The Episode of the German Raiders;
VII. Control of Shipping;
VIII. The Blockade;
IX. The Convoys in Operation;
X. The Shifting Conditions of 1917;
XI. The Effort of the People of the United States in the World War;
XII. The Production of Armed Forces;
XIII. Naval Forces at the Entrance of the United States;
XIV. The New Call upon the United States Navy;
XV. The Development of American Strategy;
XVI. The First Transportation of American Troops Overseas;
XVII. American Preparations Overseas;
XVIII. The American Transports;
XIX. Operating the Transports;
XX. The Wane of 1917;
XXI. The Situation at the Beginning of 1918;
XXII. The Problem of Transportation;
XXIII. The First German Assault of 1918;
XXIV. Rushing American Troops to France;
XXV. The Opposing Naval Forces in 1918;
XXVI. The Zeebrugge and Ostend Operations;
XXVII. The German U-Boat Raids off the American Coast;
XXVIII. The Northern Barrage;
XXIX. The Turn of the Tide;
XXX. The Unchanged German Naval Strategy ;
XXXI. The Disintegration of the Central Pow- ers *
XXXII. The Impelling Force of Sea Power;
XXXIII. The Collapse of Germany.
It is only necessary for the reader to look over these chapters, note their arrangement, note the method of treatment of the subject to realize that immediately here is an orderly presentation of events. Further, a realization is had at once of the fact that the naval history of the World War can in no wise be separated from the military operations of the war. And, further, this fact is borne upon the reader, that neither naval nor military operations can be separated from that vast movement which was taking place in America in the effort to supply and sustain the operating forces at the front.
- A Few Comments. At the foot of page eighteen and on page nineteen there occurs this statement:
This prevailing error of the British, that the German High Seas Fleet was inactive, and the consequent failure to appreciate the change of mission of the German Battle Fleet, went so far that it amounted to an error in strategy on the part of the British. Aside from not perceiving that the invasion idea could be dismissed, the attitude of the British Navy, in continuing the same policy of watching an inactive enemy to guard against a resumption of activity, did not lead to the use of the British Grand Fleet in active anti-submarine efforts against an enemy Battle Fleet whose whole effort was being devoted to carrying out the new German naval strategy of the U-Boat offensive.
The reviewer is obliged to take some exception to this statement. In the first place, it is his opinion that the invasion idea had been practically discarded as a part of the strategy of the British Navy before we entered the war; in the second place, it is difficult for him to conceive of what other strategy the British Navy could adopt with their Battle Fleet, other than the policy which it did. In the opinion of the reviewer, the policy adopted by the British Fleet was perfectly sane and sound. Criticism has been made that at times they did not send sufficient destroyers to deal directly in an anti-submarine campaign. But it must be remembered that the Grand Fleet was all that stood between Germany and the open sea; that it was imperative it should remain superior in force, and that in order to preserve this superiority it had to have a sufficient number of smaller auxiliary craft with it at all times. This same idea of maintaining a sufficient number of destroyers to accompany the fleet never was dismissed entirely from the minds of those who were responsible for the operation of our own Battle Fleet. This apprehension we felt, perhaps needlessly, even though we were separated by several thousand miles of water. Therefore, it was not only natural but proper that a higher degree of concern should be evinced in the Grand Fleet.
On page 29 occurs the statement:
It should also be emphasized that, from the naval point of view, the great united operation of the United States should be measured as follows: The greatest result attained by the Central Powers was the elimination of Russia. The effort of the United States not only took the place of Russia, but went beyond that in assuring victory. This reversal of the greatest result obtained by the Central Powers could only have been accomplished by means of the component naval operation. Consequently, with this just measure from results, we must believe that the year 1917 saw the inception of the most important naval operation of the World War.
The reviewer is inclined to doubt this statement. It is an expression of opinion and as such may be quite as valuable as an expression of opinion of the reviewer himself. But, if he may be permitted to say so, he is of the opinion that the most important naval operation was that of putting the pressure of the sea power of England against that of Germany after much the same manner in which England placed her sea power against France in the period of the Napoleonic Wars. If there is any one particular naval phase during the time of the entire war which might or might not have very greatly changed the character of the war before the United States even went in, it was probably the Battle of Jutland. When the United States entered the war there was just one thing for us to do, and that was to carry on along the lines pretty generally marked out already. The methods used of course varied with the situations as they arose. The blockade was already in existence; supplies were already rushing across the water; resources had already been built up. It remained for America to carry on on a far more stupendous scale than had ever been dreamed of, but the effort had already been inaugurated, and our entry into the war did not materially change the character of the war.
On page 35 one rather gathers the idea that the convoy system was something which the British opposed and which we advocated from the beginning. This is not quite correct. It is true that Admiral Sims was one of the very first, if not almost the first, to recognize the value of the convoy system. He came to the war fresh and with no preconceived notions. The British on the other hand had been carrying on this war some time. They had proceeded very sanely and safely up to this time, and it took time to convince them of the value of the new system. However, it also took time to convince the authorities in Washington that this was a sane system. Nor is it to be expected in war that every suggestion will be met and acted upon until much careful thought is given to the matter. Undoubtedly the convoy system proved to be the best method and that together with the escort of destroyers finally won out over the submarine menace, but that it should take time to do this is most natural.
On page 37 the author brings out the point that:
Consequently, to send destroyers overseas was the most practical assistance that could be given.
This is quite true. For the time indicated, the point is well made. Later when the character of the assistance which we could give changed or was increased, other features entered into the picture, but at all times this was one of the most important contributions which the American Navy could make. There were always conflicting opinions on this side of the water as to how much of a destroyer effort we should make and not reduce our own defense, but as the war progressed opinion became more enlightened.
On page 52 and page 53 the author has made an excellent contribution in his comments on "Control of Shipping.” It was of the utmost importance to us that this “control” was inaugurated. In fact, it would have been better if it had originated before, for then it might have been working a little more smoothly when we first entered. As it was, it enabled us to do a great many things during the time when we were getting ready, that we would not have been able to do if British shipping had not been in such an efficient position to handle our needs.
On page 62 in the chapter “The Blockade,” the author makes an interesting point in the method of carrying on the blockade. The gist of it lies in these words:
These agreements even went to the extent of bringing ships into British ports for examination, in return for “special facilities.”
The reviewer is inclined to think that this statement, as made, possibly might be amplified by the further statement that this was an innovation in the method of conducting blockade and that this innovation was not always agreeable to American shippers. The real point to be stressed is this: the character of the war, for it was unlimited war, presupposed that for practical measures something of this sort had to be done. The neutral shipper complained bitterly, but he failed to realize that in a war of this character neutral rights in the war zone had to be subordinated to belligerent rights in the same area. This particular point will furnish a very fertile field for discussion in the realm of International Law of the future.
These are merely a few of the comments which the reviewer has chosen to make but they may indicate how much food for thought there is in the body of the book itself.
- Lessons. As has been said before, this is a most excellent work. Those men who took part in the war, when reading this book, will not fail to draw a correct lesson from the reading between the lines. But it is a question whether the young naval officer, who did not take part in the war, on reading the book, would get such a correct interpretation of the picture or that the citizen at large, who reads the book, would not be apt to draw some rather faulty conclusions, even though the facts as they are portrayed are correct and arranged in an orderly manner. In the first place, it would appear that the picture of our effort is somewhat too glowing. It does not appear to the reviewer that quite enough stress has been laid upon the fact that we were given ample time to analyze the causes and effects of the war, before we went in, and that therefore we should make fewer mistakes than the Allies, who were hurled into the war at a moment’s notice. Had we made any grave errors after we went into the war, it would have been more to our discredit to have made them, than to our credit for doing what we did. This seems a fairly sane and truthful statement to make. After we were in the war we were given the fullest opportunity to acquire all the information that there was to be had, and, in addition, we had at our disposal the experience gained from three years of hard fighting. In the second place, we were given ample time to prepare and the barrier was held for us while we did our preparation. The stupendous work which we did in the rear was a magnificent spectacle, but it did not have to be carried on at the front and we were protected while we did it. This fact must never be forgotten, for unless it is kept in mind constantly, the naval strategist and the civilian who helped build up our great resources might find that in another war, the situation was entirely reversed, when we might have to prepare at the same time we were fighting, and that to expect any such glowing results as we achieved during the last war, in the first stages of a future war, would be an exceedingly faulty conclusion to arrive at.
As to winning the war, America did not win the war. The Allies together with
America’s aid won the war. We prevented the Germans, at a most critical period, from achieving the victory, but the three hard years during which the Allies and the Central Powers fought each other had brought the war to such a phase that the American effort turned the tide conclusively. But had American effort bumped up against a vigorous and fresh German offensive in the first stages of the war, the story would have been written differently. Therefore, too much credit cannot be given to those who for three long years fought the war and through their efforts helped to pave the way for American successes.
These statements must in no way be taken as in disparagement of the efforts which we did make. They were stupendous; they were splendid; they were successful. But in all fairness it must be recognized that our effort was only a part of the joint effort and, spectacular and splendid as it was, we were singularly fortunate, in so far as we ourselves were concerned, in having the brunt of the action taken by other peoples. In another war it is doubtful if a similar state of affairs would ever arise. It is extremely improbable that America will ever be as fortunate as she was during this particular war.
It is therefore important that the future strategist should not draw from our late efforts too glowing a picture of what we might expect to do at a future time. The very best lesson which we can take to heart is to remember that it was determination that won the war, determination which for three long years stood the most gruelling test which can ever be placed upon the shoulders of man.
FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES: THEIR BASES AND DEVELOPMENT.
By James Quayle Dealey. Ginn and Company, Boston. $2.80.
Reviewed by Captain Walter S. Anderson, U.S.N.
It takes courage to write a book upon foreign policies in this fast changing world. Courage Professor Dealey has, and imagination, too, which does not always accompany courage.
This is the latest of several books by this author. He is professor of social and political science in Brown Uniersity. As he states in his preface, the book “is the result of deep interest in world politics extending over many years.”
Professor Dealey is also lecturer at the U. S. Naval War College upon the subject of national policies. He has dedicated this book “to the staff and graduates of the Naval War College, in appreciation of cordial relations during the last ten years.” The relations have not only been happy, but also profitable to those privileged to hear his lectures. And all such will recognize in this new book the same easy and lucid style that has characterized Professor Dealey’s lectures at the Naval War College.
That the author is a college professor has not prevented him from using racy terms from the vernacular when they were especially appropriate. What reader does not prefer an occasional taste of piquant flavor rather than a dull wholesomeness of strictly pedantic expression? Professor Dealey is never dull. At one point in his discussion of Far Eastern affairs, he speaks of the Chinese having become embittered “because of the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917, in which Baron Ishii sold to Secretary Lansing a ‘gold brick’ in return for admission of Japan’s special interests in its Caribbean Sea.”
The humorous touch is not lacking. Discussing the American constitutional and sometimes awkward way of treaty making, with its dual control by executive and senate, he says,
After all, the American system, being founded on democracy, has its own peculiar advantages, and the possibility of an occasional conflict between the two agencies in treaty making, each jealous of its prerogatives, adds a little to the zest of international politics.
Referring to the Anglo-Japanese alliance, stating that it was the most troublesome in the Far East in 1921, the author, in speaking of the results of the Washington Conference, says:
Great Britain, like the man clinging to the tail of an infuriated bull, secretly did not like the connection but did not dare to let go. For America’s sake, for China’s sake, and for England’s sake, the conference solved the puzzle by the four power treaty.
This book is a comprehensive survey of affairs, particularly since 1776, but going back of that when necessary, to give an understanding of the origins and the development of American policies. Naturally its crowded historical facts, crowded, yet vital with interest, must include those of the progress of the United States, and to a certain extent, those of other countries with which the United States has had contact. In no other way could the interactions of national interests that have integrated into national policies be so well understood. In reading the brief sketch of Canadian history, for example, one realizes that long ago one should have studied in some detail the history of America’s kinsmen across the border.
Included in this book are extracts from the principal classic sources of American policies. We find part of Washington’s farewell address, extracts from Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist papers, the significant part of President Monroe’s famous message to Congress in 1823, and Lincoln’s Gettysburg address.
The book pleases the eye both by its dark green buckram binding, and its clear type upon substantial, unglazed paper. It is evidently suitable not only for a college text book, but will assist the mature student, and interest the general reader who wishes to know something of the background and meaning of American foreign policies.
In Part I in eight chapters embracing about one third of the book, are set forth the basic conditions and agencies from which came the foreign policies of the United States. In Part II in the remaining fifteen chapters, is traced the development of these policies. Then nine pages are devoted to a bibliography, selected principally from recent works, classified under ten headings. An adequate index occupies the last twenty pages.
In appropriate places, for the reader’s convenience, are shown four maps. These are in black and white, and not befogged by unnecessary detail. They show the Caribbean region, the Pacific area, with national and mandated areas boldly outlined, the Far East, and the Manchurian railroads.
Throughout the book Professor Dealey shows that appreciation of the power of public opinion that such a student of affairs could not fail to have. He stresses the necessity for such an education of the public in the history, traditions, and policy of the country that the reactions of the average man to any given international situation would “become well-nigh automatic.” His book might well find a place among the “tools” of the professional writer on affairs of nations. It could nestle on the editorial desk alongside The Statesman Year Book, The World’s Almanac, Who’s Who, and other indispensables of that ilk with profit to its owner.
This book is packed full of facts. It is probably too much to expect that it will escape falling into an occasional error, for the best of books contain them. A naval reviewer naturally reads most searchingly those passages that touch on naval subjects. They have been well and generously treated, though a reader will not necessarily concur with every opinion expressed.
In discussing Article XIX of the Washington Armament Treaty, the book makes no mistake in saying that “this was yielded by the American delegation as a compromise, though naval officials presumably were solidly opposed to the agreement.” Later on, the statement is made “that in some respects the non-fortifications agreement hits Great Britain much harder than it does the United States.”
In support of that statement, the author says, among other things, that “all British possessions south of the equator would be exposed to raids by Japanese cruisers, to say nothing of poorly fortified Australasia.” From this the reader might infer that Australia and New Zealand were included in the non-fortifications agreement, whereas they were specifically exempted. Further on in the book, it is true, the author shows an appreciation of this exemption. In referring to Great Britain in the Far East, he says: “Its fortification area in that region now has iio° east longitude as its farthest east, except Hongkong and its Australasian and Canadian dominions.” The inclusion of Hongkong in the foregoing sentence was a slip, however, as Article XIX first and specifically mentions Hongkong in enumerating the British possessions restricted to the status quo of fortifications.
In Chapter VII under the subject “Sea Power and the Navy in Diplomacy” is set forth the very considerable contributions of American naval officers in a field that is not always associated with them. That Commodore M. C. Perry in 1854 opened Japan to the western world is pretty well known.
However the analogous later services of Commodore Shufelt in connection with Korea are not so universally known. Nor are the distinguished services in this field of Commodore Kearny and various others mentioned by the author so generally known as they deserve to be. Particularly does Commodore Kearny seem to deserve the credit given him.
The author states that in 1842, at the end of the Chinese-British Opium War, the Commodore promptly sent copies of the resulting treaty to Washington and urged the administration to obtain similar treaties opening Chinese ports to the United States. He adds that Kearny prepared the way so well that upon the arrival of Caleb Cushing in 1844, Cushing speedily obtained the “coveted treaty,” which contained the most-favored-nation clause. As to Kearny’s part in all this, Tyler Dennett says in Americans in Eastern Asia:
This promise of most-favored-nation treatment, the introduction of which into Chinese international affairs in the form of an iron bound treaty agreement, is due primarily to Commodore Kearny, became in practice something far more than a block by which the door to commercial privilege could be held open.
As more recent and even contemporary diplomatic services of naval officers are mentioned, one cannot but wonder at the omission of the name of Rear Admiral Bristol, American High Commissioner in Turkey.
Admiral Bristol has represented America in Turkey since 1918. During that time he also served as an American delegate to the conference which resulted in the Lausanne Treaty, now under consideration by the Senate.
In two places the book gives fitting recognition to the services of Rear Admiral Vogelgesang and the American Naval Mission to Brazil, of which he was the first head. The book errs in stating that the Mission has returned to the United States, although it is true that Admiral Vogelgesang at his own request for sea duty was relieved, and returned.
Perhaps a mention might have been made of the smaller naval mission which the United States is putting at the service of Peru at that country’s request.
Professor Dealey’s treatment of President Wilson will interest the reader. The author speaks of Wilson’s “blunders” in connection with the consortium for China, also in connection with the Shantung agreement made during the Versailles Treaty negotiations, and of his lack of tact in dealing with the Senate and a Congress of opposing policies.
But in writing of Wilson’s wartime addresses the author says:
Unquestionably his constant stress on idealistic principles had a powerful effect not only in stimulating the morale of the Allies and correspondingly depressing that of the Central Powers, but also in keeping the Peace Conference from degenerating into a mad scramble for the spoils of war.
Later on he says:
The bitterness and antagonism that centered about the policies and personality of President Wilson will die out with the passing of his generation, and a calmer view of American responsibilities in world politics will then come to the front. Before this century passes, the United States will take pride in the achievements of three great presidents, the Father of his Country, the Savior of the Nation, and the Founder of the League of Nations.
Prophecy is always interesting. It is also dangerous, and perhaps that is the reason for its zest. Professor Dealey has not hesitated to make prophecies. No reviewer of a play should disclose its secret, and perhaps no reviewer of a book should elaborate too much upon those passages that probably will most interest the reader. But no brief review can “give away” this book. It must be read from cover to cover to get what it has, and it will well repay that reading. Also it will inevitably suggest further reading upon the manifold subjects it touches. And it offers a guide to carry out that desire, not only in its comprehensive bibliography in the back of the book, but also by frequent footnotes.
Professor Dealey sees a western hemisphere which in the not distant future will be all American in the larger sense. That is, from the Americas of that future all European political sovereignty will have been withdrawn. Not that the United States will have absorbed the continent. The countries to the north and south of the United States will have developed greatly. There will be a great forward movement in Latin America. It will feel more and more its affinity with European cultural influences, and its common economic interests. This will behoove the United States to proceed with a circumspect regard to the natural sensibilities and aspirations of its Latin American neighbors.
Nor will Canada ever be a part of the United States. Canada will develop its nationality, and a closer connection economically with the British West Indian possessions, and perhaps will absorb them into her administrative organization.
Professor Dealey sees another American canal near the isthmus, and possibly two more, employing both the Nicaraguan and the Colombian routes.
The author quotes with approval Seward’s statement: “The Pacific Ocean with its coasts and islands is destined in the future to become the great theater of the world’s affairs.”
He states that when the inhabitants of southeastern Asia “catch the significance of science and education, as they surely will during this century, there will come a world adjustment that will once again make the lands of southern and eastern Asia the center of a vigorous activity.”
He can see no independence for the Philippines, but he does see a large measure of autonomy for them under the protection of the United States.
Even by 1936 he sees “Russia restored as a member of the family of nations,” and China “well on the way toward complete sovereignty.”
He speaks of the steady determination of Great Britain, since 1895, to maintain friendly relations with the United States, and quotes Mr. Balfour’s statement that henceforth “between English-speaking peoples war is impossible.”
Professor Dealey has more than one good word for the League of Nations. He sees great possibilities for usefulness in the mandate system. He sees a greater degree of cooperation with the other countries of the world imposed upon the United States by world conditions and its own spirit of service. He expects, nay, advocates, greater participation in the activities of the League of Nations. To quote him:
.... Since the League has become a permanent institution, now well-nigh indispensable to the working of international administration, it has become clear that the United States must participate openly, not by back door methods, in the work of the League, if not to the full extent, at least in all but purely political issues. The movement in this direction is indicated by its decision to become a member of the Court of International Justice under reservations and to participate in the proposed Disarmament Conference. The admission of Germany into the League (September, 1926) would seem to make it even more imperative that the United States should sit in the Council of Nations so as to share in the discussion of world politics. Isolation from the Council may result in gradual ostracism from participation in affairs of the Eastern Hemisphere. Yet in this vigorous twentieth century the United States can hardly afford to “live in a house by the side of the road” and watch “the race of men go by”. Only petty or decrepit states can hold aloof from a world at work.
The chapter titles for the three chapters next to the last are significant of Professor Dealey’s viewpoint. Each one commences with the words “Changing Policies.”
They treat of relations to Europe, Latin America, and the Far East respectively. Excepting the final chapter, they put the cap stone upon the previous consideration of relations with all those parts of the world that have formed the body of the book preceding.
He deprecates the existing form of Japanese exclusion by the United States, and believes that the essence of exclusion might have been achieved with much better regard to the natural sensitiveness of that proud race upon this delicate subject. In one part of the book he states: “As for Japan, it no longer has any intention of warring against the United States,—if it ever did cherish any such design. The outcome of the World War showed the immense potential and actual strength of the United States ”
However, on an earlier page, in addition to many good words for the accomplishments of the Washington Conference, the author states:
The results of this conference eased the friction between the two countries and relieved in part the competition in armaments going on among naval powers, but the real causes of animosity still exist, and there is urgent need that the United States definitely decide on a permanent naval policy.
This book deals in realities, but has more than one touch of idealism. Actualities, of course, greatly predominate in its pages. But perhaps its ideals make the most abiding impression. Professor Dealey exhibits an optimism that is healthy and stimulating. Occasionally it seems to give a rose tint to conclusions that might be otherwise if based only upon a coldly judicial consideration of past and present events. Happy prophecies, it is true, are frequently tempered with conditions that are implied admonitions to powerful America to use well the gifts that have been given her. No reader will fail to hope that the book’s fair predictions may come to pass. None will deny that the writer has contributed a real share in pointing out roads that lead to happy consummations.
THE ROMANCE OF NAVIGATION.
By W. B. Whall, Master Mariner; edited by Francis E. McMurtrie, Joint Editor of Jane’s
“Fighting Ships.” Robert M. McBride & Co. New York. $5.00.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral (Retired) Albert Gleaves, U. S. Navy
This is a book which should be on the five-foot book shelf of every one who loves the sea. Although the title is restrictive and the volume comprises less than 300 pages, it nevertheless covers a wide field. It is a miscellany of facts about the sea, ships, and sailors, and might appropriately be sub-titled “An Introduction to Nautical Reading.”
I confess that until the book fell into my hands I had never heard of the Master Mariner who wrote it, but by reference we find that he was a Younger Brother of Trinity House, and according to a contemporary writer in the London Saturday Literary Review, “The co-editor, with Captain Todd, of a book on Seamanship” and “known all over the world.”
Captain E. R. G. R. Evans, who distinguished himself in the World War when commanding H.M.S. Broke, and who was with Scott and Shackleton in their Antarctic voyages, writes a foreword in which he says that when fitting out the auxiliary barque Morning, which found the Discovery, the skipper made a list of navigational and seamanship books which he considered essential for the voyage, and Whall’s Handy Seamanship headed the list. “I read and reread them, and learned a great deal I have never forgotten,” and of the book under review he says, “It is beautifully written and of absorbing interest from cover to cover.” This opinion by such competent authority stamps The Romance of Navigation with a cachet particidier which entitles it to attention in some detail.
Captain Whall has a thorough grasp of his subject and an easy pleasant style. He writes as only one can write who loves “Tall ships,” and “The grey sea with the grey dawn breaking.” In his preface he sounds the tone of the book “even to the tenth note”: “There were powerful incentives to exploration four hundred and fifty years ago, when the veil was being lifted year by year and new lands were ever coming into view; when the seaman from stormy Europe, with its coy seasons and its well- known peoples, could find fairylands where soft breezes blew the year round, and the harsh teeth of winter were never felt, where strange races were found, with gold, spices and pearls, where wondrous fruits grew to hand, where strange beasts roved, and birds of startlingly bright plumage filled the tree- tops with their cries.”
“Fall to then!”, he cries, “For indeed it is in truth, a Romance.”
What muniments of venerable archives must have contributed to its first chapters! We begin with Amraphel, King of Shinar, mentioned in Genesis XIV, and by some believed to be identical with Hamurazzi, who promulgated a code of sea laws 3,000 years before the Laws of Oleron, ascribed to Richard I. Sea laws connote ships and sailors, and from this we know that from the most remote antiquity men have followed the sea.
After the Chaldeans came the Phoenician navigators, essentially a race of seamen. They were familiar with the ports of the Mediterranean and cruised as far north as Britain and the Baltic, bringing back to Tyre and Sidon from those regions cargoes of tin and amber; from Spain and Africa they brought gold and silver, and according to the Bible, ivory, apes, and peacocks. They circumnavigated Africa from the Red Sea, founding many colonies on the West Coast; they explored the Canaries, they founded Carthage.
This was about 500 B.C., and then for fifteen hundred years the history of navigation halts. In the nth century men again ventured beyond the Mediterranean into the "Green Sea of Darkness.” During this long lapse, we are told that neither Greece nor Rome added anything to the romance of navigation, save the legendary voyages of Jason, Ulysses, and Afneas. Venice and Genoa became great sea powers, but they were too absorbed in their trade wars to send ships beyond the straits.
The new impulse toward navigation came from the Scandanavians. They visited Ireland, sacked Paris and discovered Greenland. Lief, son of Erik the Red, got as far down the American coast as Martha’s Vineyard. For many centuries it was thought that the old Stone Mill at Newport was built by the Vikings. Was it not John Fiske who spoiled the legend?
In the middle of the 14th Century Portugal began to loom large as a great maritime nation. This was due to Prince Henry, whose explorations showed the way for Columbus; it was he who conceived the idea of making the ocean, instead of the land, the great commercial highway. The author gives us a panoramic view of the adventures of the early Portuguese navigators of whom Diaz, Vasco da Gama, and Magellan are best remembered. “Doubly immortal and thrice happy,” writes Professor Draper of Magellan, “for he impressed his name indelibly on the earth and sky, on the strait that connects two great oceans, and on those clouds of starry worlds seen in the Southern heavens.” Although Columbus was born in Italy, he lived many years in Portugal and married the widow of the Governor of Porto Santo. While living in the Azores, Columbus prepared plans for his voyage to the westward in search of a short route to the Indies; these were rejected by the King of Portugal, acting under the advice of the churchmen. But in Spain, Columbus found a fairer field and more favor, and as a mark of gratitude adopted the Spanish form of his name, and henceforth called himself Christobal Colon.
During the next hundred years, more than half of the world was opened up by the Portuguese navigators. Portugal and Spain had the zenith of their glory, when England’s star appeared over the sea in the North. Then followed the golden age of the great Elizabethan sailors—Frobisher, Gilbert, Raleigh, Drake, and the last, perhaps the greatest of them all, whose marvelous career is set forth in Alfred Noyes’ epic.
These “merrie adventurers of Olde England” and hosts of others laid the foundations of British Empire overseas; they defeated Spain; they supplied men and ships to the new Royal Navy organized by Henry VIII. Over this most attractive period of maritime history, the author passes hastily, nor does he give more than a glance at the rise of the Netherlands as a formidable sea power. He is drawn to the romantic voyages of Dampier and Woodes-Rogers; Dampier accompanied Rogers as navigator and was with him at Juan Fernandez when Selkirk was taken off that island. It was Rogers’ A Cruising Voyage ’round the World that gave DeFoe the idea of Robinson Crusoe.
For representative navigators of the 18th century, Captain Whall selects Cook and Anson, both naval officers. Anson’s voyages equal in romance those of the earlier seamen. Besides his fame as an explorer he won distinction in a brilliant action off Cape Finistere. He became First Lord of the Admiralty, and died an Admiral of the Fleet.
James Cook was essentially a scientist as well as navigator. He was almost continually at sea for eleven years, and Captain Whall considers his greatest achievement the eradication of scurvy from his ships, which he accomplished by keeping the ’tween decks dry, generally supplying his crews with fresh vegetables, and maintaining strict discipline.
We can but wish that Captain Whall had found a place in his book for two very great French navigators of the same period, Bougainville and LaPeyrouse. These men also were in the Navy, and both had a peculiar interest for Americans, for they fought with DeGrasse off Martinique against Rodney and Hood. Bougainville, like Anson, attained the highest rank in the Navy, and was also made a Marshal of France by Napoleon I. He too wrote his name on the earth, for an island, a strait and a bay bear his name, as does also the most gorgeous flower of the tropics. LaPeyrouse like Cook met a tragic death in the South Seas, when his ships were wrecked on a reef in the New Hebrides. It was in 1785 his expedition sailed from Botany Bay, and for forty years was not heard from. Remains of his two frigates were found in 1828 and may be seen now in the Musee de Marine in the Louvre, with a model of the monument erected to him at Port Jackson. It was of LaPeyrouse that Carlyle wrote the haunting lines, “The bold Navigator goes and returns not, seekers search far seas for him in vain. He has vanished trackless into blue Immensity and only some mournful mysterious shadow of him hovers long in all heads and hearts.”
Long before the tropic seas were conquered, men began to look toward the “White North” for fresh adventures. Captain Whall gives a synopsis of Arctic and Antarctic search. Again the reader will probably wish that when he quotes from Captain Scott’s last records he had paralleled them with those of DeLong—the comparison is interesting. Scott’s last written words were “We shall stick it out to the end, but we are getting weaker of course, and the end cannot be far. It seems a pity, but I do not think I can write any more. For God’s sake look after our people.” De- Long’s last legible words were: “Sunday, October 30th, 140th day. Boyd and Gartz died during the night. Mr. Collins dying.” The diaries of both men were found under the snow close to their bodies.
And here we rest the case for The Romance of Navigation, and the navigators. In these pages there is no “sound of naval thunder,” to use Carlyle’s expression, save in a brief account of Anson’s capture of the Acapulco treasure ship off Manila, but there are stories of buccaneers, pirates, smugglers, and the like. The captain discusses the development of the ship under sail and steam, aids to navigation, and sailors themselves, and he has a chapter on sea flags from Prince Henry’s time, including an account of the Jolly Roger, what it was and who wore it.
When Captain Joshua Slocum’s Voyaging Alone Around the World appeared, his English publisher wrote to him from a sick bed, that he only wished he might make another 40,000 mile voyage with him. It is with some such feeling we close Captain Whall’s volume. It will appeal to all who love the sea, and go a roving whether for business, or pastime, on the long trail—the trail that is always new.
GREAT CIRCLE SAILING.
(See page 2645, December, 1926, Proceedings) By Captain Benjamin Dutton, U. S. Navy.
The review of Berkeley’s book, Great Circle Sailing, which appears in the December number of the Proceedings inadvertently creates a wrong impression regarding a book which was not the subject of the review, namely, Navigation and Nautical Astronomy. The following is quoted from the review :
The latest Naval Academy navigation textbook, Navigation and Nautical Astronomy, avoids this difficulty by the selection of the Haversine formula in deducing the course and distance for the great circle track. By the use of the azimuth tables for the derivation of these values still another method is available which is far more valuable than the one given in the book.
The inference of the above statement is that Navigation and Nautical Astronomy contains only a single method, and that it does not contain the use of the azimuth tables for finding the great circle course. On the contrary Navigation and Nautical Astronomy presents the following methods:
- The use of the great circle sailing charts
- Computation by the haversine formula without ambiguity as to quadrants
- Computation by the sine formula, with a rule for determining the quadrant
- The use of the azimuth tables for finding the course.
I am not aware that the azimuth tables can be used in the determining of the great circle distances between two places, as inferred in the quoted paragraph above. Later in the review the following statement appears: “I cannot agree with Commander Dutton that the tangent method of sailing the great circle is the best, but consider the chord method far superior.”
Navigation and Nautical Astronomy does not claim that the tangent method is the best, but states as follows: “Theoretically it is better to steam tangents to the great circle rather than chords. In practice, however, there is little difference between the methods.” The article then continues: “Theoretically the tangent touches the great circle at only one point so that the minute the initial tangent course is started the ship begins to get off the track.”
As contrasted with this, the course never does agree with the great circle when the chord method is used. Anyone can convince himself that as between a series of chords and a series of tangents of equal length, the tangents are more nearly in coincidence with the great circle.
The chord method is easier to lay down on the Mercator Chart than the tangent, simply because it does not require the drawing of a fair curve to represent the great circle.
The review states that there is an advantage to the chord method when a current sets toward the great circle (presumably from the equator toward the elevated pole). The reverse current would be equally favorable to the tangent method. It seems a 50-50 proposition.
When the azimuth tables, great circle charts or computation are used for the determination of the great circle course, the direction of the tangent is determined, not of the chord. In practice a navigator who finds himself set off his original great circle track, will find it better to determine a new course on a new track near the old track, rather than to regain the old track. Thus proceeding from one fix to another he will proceed by the tangent method.
GUIDEBOOK TO THE PORTS OF ASIA with Notes on Shopping.
By James A. Randall, Captain, Medical Corps, U. S. Navy. Philippine Education Co., Inc., Manila, P. I. $1.50, plus 24 cents postage.
This handy little volume is just what it purports to be, namely, a navy handbook for the Asiatic Station; and, while written especially for the information of naval officers and their families, who contemplate a residence in the Far East, it is equally valuable for army officers and their families, as well as tourists.
The book is complete, with general information as to the whole Far East, and treats of all the China coast ports, as well as the chief river ports; all the Japanese ports; the ports of Java and Celebes, Singapore and Saigon, and the Philippine Islands. It tells the kind of clothing and household goods to take along, as well as information in regard to one’s automobile. The book also deals with the health conditions in the Far East, as they may affect one’s family. Such subjects as passports, different kinds of money, traveling expenses, servants, the trip out, hotel prices, etc., are fully covered.
Further details of what the book contains may be seen from the following Preface by the author:
This book has been written primarily for naval officers on duty on the Asiatic Station, but will be found of value to all travelers in the East. It contains much information which cannot be found in the ordinary guide book.
The writer has visited all of these places, most of them a great many times, and he has tried to give the information which he has found useful. The notes on Yokohama and Tokyo are not very complete, for while the writer was in these places for some weeks immediately after the earthquake of 1923, none of these places had been rebuilt.
The shopping notes have been made as complete as possible. Very few prices are given, as these are constantly changing, and they also depend largely on the bargaining ability of the purchaser. A few of what are considered fairly permanent addresses are given. What is the best shop this year may not be the next, and they often go out of business or move to other locations.
H.A.B.
NICKEL STEEL BULLETIN.
The Institute has received the following notice:
Nickel Steel Bulletin #9—“Physical Properties of Nickel and Nickel Chromium Steels.” Compiled by Development and Research Department, the International Nickel Co., 67 Wall Street, New York, N. Y.—A 16-page 8 1/2" x 11" bulletin, perforated for binding, in which curves showing the average values of tensile strength, elastic limit, reduction of area, elongation and Brinell hardness at various drawing temperatures are given for the S. A. E. Standard Nickel and Nickel Chromium Steels. Tables of the maximum and minimum values of these same properties reported by various authorities are also given, together with causes of variations and notes on the use of the data in design.
JANE’S FIGHTING SHIPS, 1926.
Edited by Oscar Parkes, O.B.E., M.B., Ch.B., and Francis E. McMurtrie, A.I.- N.A. Sampson Low, Marston and Company, Ltd., London. $12.60.
This thirtieth annual edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships contains a brief but interesting history of the inception and development of this monumental work. With steadfast adherence to the original purpose of presenting in convenient form all available data on the navies of the world, its progress from 1897 to 1926 is marked by many changes. The size of the book has grown to keep pace with the increased number of naval ships and to give more complete and accurate particulars, with photographs and sketches. In the early issues the text was printed in English, French, German, and Italian, and to some extent names and descriptive matter were given in the language of the country to which they pertained. That this multi-lingual complexity has been given up is a satisfaction, at least to English speaking readers. For some years Jane included articles on naval subjects, but this custom has also been discontinued.
The project started some years ago of including airplane views of capital ships has apparently been abandoned, but an improved type of silhouette sketch, started in the 1925 edition, is being extended with the idea eventually of having it replace all the old style blocks.
In the 448 text pages of the 1926 edition, 430 pages are occupied with the descriptive matter which is the publication’s raison d’etre. The remaining eighteen pages are devoted to a foreword by the editors, the brief historical sketch already mentioned, a table of contents, general index of ships, and a list of Diesel engine builders.
To the uninitiated, the many pages of ship data may appear to be somewhat in the nature of a cross between a small boy’s picture book and a statistical abstract, offering occasional interesting facts, but with as little plot as Mr. Webster’s well-known dictionary.
To the serious student of naval affairs they not only present the tools for naval war studies, but also reflect most interestingly the results of world politics, systems of government, and racial characteristics. They are of practical use to the quartermaster on the bridge, as well as to the naval strategist or tactician, and equally they give food for quiet hours of thought upon the relative merits of different types of ships and the significance of warship construction, alteration, and scrapping.
As most Naval Institute readers are familiar with the general facts of existing naval strengths and building programs, these notes will not attempt any comprehensive review of them, but will be limited to comment on the new material found in the 1926 Jane.
In searching this latest Jane for what is new in naval architecture, one is first struck by the variety of novel effects in the 1926 styles of top-hamper. The designers of the new French and Italian cruisers and torpedo craft have suppressed their occasional individualistic tendencies and adhered to fairly conventional lines. The British and Japanese, however, who have usually been quite orthodox in their arrangements of masts and stacks, are now departing from tradition, and in various other navies the familiar aspect of older ships is being changed by alterations to meet the demands of better fire-control and of oil burning.
Modernization of the Moreno and Riva- davia has given them new tripod mainmasts, with two-story tops on both masts, while in the six older U.S. battleships it has left only a stump mainmast in place of the after cage mast, has erected an after fire-control tower on legs close abaft the single funnel, where it looks very much like a wayside water tank, and in the Texas class has introduced a new tripod foremast to support a three-story top like that of the California and Colorado classes. Alterations to the older Japanese capital ships have added platforms to their foremasts until these now approximate in appearance the remarkable pagoda-like heptapods of the Mutsu and Nagato. The later U.S. battleships have been noted for their massive superstructure, supporting the bridge and foremast, but this effect is dwarfed by the great edifices rising from the hulls of the new British ships Nelson and Rodney to such a height that the foremast mounted on it appears to be only about thirty feet high. The foremast of the new German Emden is unusual, being a cylinder about five feet in diameter, belled out at the top. But it is left for the new cruisers of the Kent, Aoba, and Kako classes definitely to take the step toward which other designs are tending, that of supporting the upper fire-control station by a structure that is frankly not a mast at all. In the British design this structure is a plain box-like building with the gunnery station sticking out of the top, while the Japanese have a conical tower which looks rather like a lighthouse.
The idea of a multiple stack which died unborn in our own Massachusetts class has been revived in the British Warspite class, which now has one stack instead of two, and in the new Japanese cruisers. Presumably to reduce smoke interference with gunnery personnel in the foremast, the forward stack of the Mutsu class is now bent aft to resemble an angry cobra, and high clinker screens are fitted on the forward stack of the Kongo and of the Fuso class. Elsewhere we see that conversion to oil burning has reduced the number of stacks in the Florida, Arkansas and Texas classes from two to one, while in the Brazilian Bahais the number has been increased from two to three.
This matter of top-hamper in battleships and cruisers is of only passing interest, but in aircraft carriers it assumes greater importance. We find that of the carriers whose plans are so far revealed to us the Hermes, Eagle, Lexington and Hosho classes have superstructures of the “island” type, arranged in one narrow slice down one side of the flying deck. In the Lexington this island reaches its maximum development, including a bridge, conning-tower and mast structure, an enormous stack, and four turrets, while in the Hosho it appears to include only a pole mast and three stacks which are hinged so they can be bent outboard to clear the deck. The French Bearn has moved the “island” outboard onto an over-hang, thus leaving the whole deck unencumbered. The Argus, Furious, and Langley have attained about the same result by discharging their smoke through the stern or the side, and reducing to a minimum the remaining upper works.
In addition to the vessels mentioned, we find that there are seven others being built or converted as aircraft carriers. The British cruisers Glorious and Courageous, sisters of the Furious, will presumably resemble the Furious when completed. A new carrier of 6,000 tons has been laid down for the Australian navy. The Japanese are converting the Kaga and Tosa, ex-capital ships, and the Naruto, ex-oiler. No new data is given on any of these. The French are building the 8,000-ton Commandant Teste, which will be a tender rather than a carrier, having plane stowage and catapults, but no flying deck.
The story of present capital ship construction is briefly told by the two pages which give all available details regarding the two new British ships of novel design which have been christened Nelson and Rodney. All other navies which might be building capital ships are prevented either by treaty or by poverty.
The data given on the cruiser programs now engaging the public interest offers too large a subject for this brief review, but a few points are worthy of special note. While the general result of the Washington conference has been to fix the size of new cruisers at 10,000 standard tons, this is not the invariable rule.
In addition to the Spanish Cervantes, and the French Duguay-Trouin class, whose size may have been previously determined, four Japanese cruisers of 7,100 tons have been built since that time, and the British navy is about to lay down one cruiser of 8,000 tons. Of the 10,000-ton “treaty” cruisers on which data is given, the British, French, and Italian vessels all carry a battery of eight eight-inch guns in a conventional centerline arrangement of four twin turrets. The Japanese Naclii class will have nine eight-inch, and the two U.S. Pensacolas will have ten. New particulars of the armament of the four late 7,100-ton Japanese cruisers come as a surprise. It appears that their guns are not eight-inch, as previously supposed, but are 7.5-inch, a new caliber in that navy; and that the battery arrangement divides these four ships into two classes, one with three twin turrets, the other with six single turrets. All the later cruisers in these principal navies carry two planes and a catapult, and are credited with speeds varying from thirty-two to a possible thirty-six knots. Little data is given on their armor plans, but it appears that the British Kents will have a four-inch deck, with armored ammunition hoists, but no side armor; that the French Tourvilles will have practically no hull armor; and that the Japanese Nachis will have triple hulls, with both vertical and horizontal armor over the boiler and engine spaces.
Neglecting paper programs, a total of fifty-nine vessels of destroyer type are reported to be building or on order: France thirteen, Italy fourteen, Japan nineteen, Netherlands six, Spain five, and Sweden two. Omitting the new Japanese boats, of which little is known, we find that they range in size from the Swedish 974-tonners to the French leaders which will displace at full load over 2,900 tons, and in designed speeds from thirty-three to thirty-six knots. It is interesting to note that every one carries six torpedo tubes on center-line mountings, and a center-line main battery of three to five guns either 4.7-inch or 5.5-inch in caliber, with one or more anti-aircraft guns. The Dutch design is remarkable in that it includes not only twenty-four mines but also a seaplane.
Submarine construction is also going on apace. Making due allowance for the secrecy surrounding the Japanese program, it appears that no less than sixty-five new submarines are building or ordered, and fifty- five more are projected. The major portion of these 120 boats is accounted for in the programs of four navies: Britain twenty- three, France fifteen, Italy twenty, and Japan twenty-two. The remainder are found in the sections devoted to Brazil, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. An addendum on page 448 notes the addition of two new submarines to the Peruvian navy.
No data is obtained on the six boats of the Swedish and Finnish programs, and very little on the Japanese. The new submarines which are described fall into three size classes, with submerged displacements respectively around 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 tons. The largest size is exemplified in the completed British X-i, of which some new details are offered, and in four vessels now building, one French and three United States. The last nineteen boats of the Japanese program may be of this class. So far as information is given, the 2,000-ton class includes, in boats building or authorized, twenty-three British, one Brazilian, fourteen French, four Italian, and three Japanese (though these last named may be even larger); all of them having surface speeds around eighteen knots, with six torpedo tubes and one gun of about four-inch caliber. The French boats will have ten tubes, and the Italians will carry sixteen mines in addition to their torpedo armament.
The current construction in auxiliaries and small craft shows little of interest, the only considerable increments being six small minelayers building for Italy and six China river gunboats for the United States.
Deletions from the various navy lists point out Great Britain as being the only country that has carried out any extensive scrapping during the year, though a few obsolete vessels in other fleets have been disposed of. There have been no losses due to hostile action, but the British sloop Valerian and three Cuban men-or-war were lost in a West Indian hurricane, the British submarine M-i, the Italian Ventero, and the U.S. submarine S-51 were sunk by collisions, the latter being subsequently salved.
Marine engineering does not appear to have taken any great strides in the new designs described. Steam-driven geared turbines are the general rule in surface ships, and submarines continue to rely upon Diesel engines for surface work and battery-driven motors when submerged. While most new ships will burn only oil and a number of older vessels are being converted to oil- burning, the new French cruiser Suffren will be fitted for both coal and oil, to simplify the problem of obtaining fuel in distant operations. In the U.S. section we find that the Lexington class still holds the distinction of having the most powerful engineering plants afloat; that the Pensacola class will have high-pressure steam; and that the V-class submarines have electric drive, which is otherwise used in warships only in the United States aircraft carriers and later battleships and in the Japanese fuel ship Kamoi. The most interesting innovation is found in the new British minelayer Adventure of 7,260 tons, 27.75 knots, which will have Diesel engines for cruising, with turbines for high speed.
Those interested in ordnance will note that the main batteries of all new designs are given center-line mounting, although in some ships recently commissioned, such as the Emerald, Omaha, and Java cruisers, this advantageous arrangement was not followed. The novel arrangement of the Nelson and Rodney main battery is particularly interesting, as is also the phenomenal power accredited to these guns by the ordnance table on page seventeen. The six-inch battery of this class is emplaced in twin turrets of a type first installed in the cruiser Enterprise. The four-inch anti-aircraft battery of the Italian Trento cruisers is also installed in twin turrets.
The editors of Jane have maintained in this latest edition their previous high standard of thoroughness and accuracy. Without detracting in the slightest from the credit due them for a masterly and monumental work, the casual reader should be warned that not all their data is to be accepted without question. Navy departments the world over are secretive about new developments, and their wishes as to what should be published must naturally be respected by the editors who are dependent to some extent upon their good will.
From the viewpoint of the United States Navy, we might, in conclusion, venture a hope that some able patriot may furnish to the editors of Jane a correct sketch of our national flag and naval insignia.
—H. M. L. RANGE and BALLISTIC TABLES—
1926.
By Lieut. E. E. Herrmann, U.S.N., U. S.
Naval Institute, $4.70.
This is a companion volume to Exterior Ballistics—1926, by the same author, and is similar to the edition of 1914, but contains additional material relating to the new methods.
Fifteen range tables are given, in whole or in part, for different guns from 1 pounder to 16 inch. For the 14" and 16" guns, both service and target practice velocities are included.
There are nine ballistic tables. Tables I and II give the Siacci-Ingalls primary and secondary functions. Tables III and IV relate to the atmospheric density, and Table V gives the altitude factor. Table VI contains the natural and logarithmic constants of the guns represented in the range tables.
Tables VII, VIII, and IX pertain to the new methods. The first contains the G-func- tion as defined by Eggert and is in English units. The values given are natural, which are not so convenient for computation as logarithmic values. The second table gives the logarithms of the H-function, argument feet. Both tables are conversions of those in common use, the last consists of excerpts from the translated A.L.V.F. Tables.
It was noted that the velocities given in the headings of tables K and L were interchanged, but the typography seems to be generally excellent. The volume measures 11" x 16", a rather unwieldy size.
Each page contains the matter from two pages of a range table. Artillery Circular “M,” of the A.L.V.F. tables. It would have been better, perhaps, to have used twice as many pages of half the size. The question of price may have governed in this respect.
L.W.