A STUDY OF GERMAN NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS ON AUGUST 28, 1914
For some time after the outbreak of the World War great uncertainty prevailed in the German Navy Department in regard to the exact nature of the British naval strategy. A “close blockade” of the Heligoland Bight had been assumed in the German plans, but three weeks after the declaration of war saw no evidences of such blockading forces, nor had the German naval command been able to definitely locate the bases of the Grand Fleet. Political expediency dictated the policy which deprived the Commander-in-Chief of the High Seas Fleet of the authority to initiate any large scale offensive with the fleet and restricted the German Navy to a war of attrition until equalization of forces could be accomplished.
The High Seas Fleet being held in the harbors of the German Bight, the plans for the defense were drawn up primarily to prevent the penetration of British submarines into the inner harbors; the coast defenses of Heligoland Island being considered adequate defense against enemy surface craft. At this time, unfamiliarity with this new weapon, the submarine, caused both the British and German Commander to overestimate its possibilities. The technical difficulties of a submarine offensive were not fully appreciated particularly in view of the state of development of such boats at that time.
At the outbreak of the war the system of communications in the German Navy had been developed to a high state of efficiency considering the progress made in the art of radio signalling up to 1914. Judged by the standards of that time the material was excellent and the personnel well trained. One vessel was designated radio guard ship in order that messages might be relayed to the Commander Scouting Force, while the Commander-in-chief was in telephonic communication with the Heligoland fortifications while in port. (The coast defenses were under the command of the German Navy.) To facilitate reports of contact with enemy forces, the German Bight and vicinity was divided into numbered squares on the chart, letters being used to designate a particular section of the square. The code used required from ten to fifteen minutes to decipher according to the experience of the communication officers.
In spite of this excellent system of communications, the action of August 28, 1914, disclosed weaknesses which would only become apparent in the test of actual battle. Excessive air traffic on one wave length and interference caused delays in the transmission of the most important messages. Further, in their reports of contact with enemy forces the vessels of the patrol force failed to include information which was vital to the plans of the Commander-in- Chief. To these factors must be attributed the failure of the German counter-offensive on that date which resulted in the complete loss of three light cruisers.
That the British raid on the torpedo boats on the line of patrol was practically certain of success was due to the inherent weakness of the German plan of defense as will be shown; but the fact that the light cruisers were drawn into a carefully prepared trap must be charged to a failure of communications in a broad sense. It will be evident that had the Commander-in-Chief been informed of weather conditions prevailing at the place of contact with enemy forces, the counter offensive would not have been launched without the concentrated support of the first-line ships available. A study of the accounts of this action together with the summary of radio messages exchanged during the action reveals in a striking manner the difficulties confronting a force commander having to base his decision on the most meager information. Had these difficulties been more fully appreciated by the personnel of the vessels constituting the screen it is probable that their reports of contact would have contained more detailed information.
The British raiding forces consisted of thirty-one destroyers under the leadership of Commander Tyrwhitt on the Aretliusa accompanied by the Fearless. This force was supported by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron under Commodore Goodenough, later assisted by the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron under Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty on the Lion. The 8th Submarine Flotilla had previously entered the German Bight in order to attack the German surface craft as they left the harbors to support the screen, but in this they were not successful.
The raid was conducted in the early hours of August 28, 1914, and lasted until after noon when the British forces retired after having rolled up the German screen, sinking one torpedo boat, and later engaging and sinking three light cruisers and damaging three others.
In order to cover the action briefly short extracts will be quoted from authoritative British and German sources. The German accounts contain a wealth of interesting detail, much of which must be omitted on account of lack of space and in order not to confuse the main facts under consideration. In his account of the action Admiral Jellicoe gives a short summary as follows (The Grand Fleet 1914-16):
August 28—The weather was misty with a visibility of four to six miles until the evening, when it cleared slightly. The Battle Fleet during the day proceeded to the southward, the noon position being Lat. 58 19N, Long, o 21E. with cruisers in advance. The fleet was exercised during the day at battle tactics.
The sweep of the light forces into the Heligoland Bight which took place at dawn was successful in bringing enemy light forces to action. An official despatch published at the time dealt with the operation. At 6:35 a.m. Commodore Tyrwhitt, commanding the Harwich force, which had swept into the Heligoland Bight during the night to cut off enemy vessels, sighted a destroyer and chased her. From 7:20 to 8:00 a.m. the Aretliusa and the 3rd Flotilla were in action with destroyers and torpedo boats making for Heligoland, sinking one destroyer. At 7:57 the Arethusa, Commodore Tyrwhitt’s flagship, which had been in commission only two days, sighted two enemy light cruisers, and engaged them, assisted a little later by the light cruiser Fearless. At 8:25 a.m. a hit from the Arethusa wrecked the fore bridge of one of the enemy ships, and they both steamed at once for Heligoland, which was then sighted, and our ships turned to the westward. The Arethusa had been considerably damaged during the action and had suffered several casualties.
At 10:55 a.m. another German light cruiser was sighted by the Arethusa, and on being attacked by the Fearless and destroyers turned away; she reappeared at 11:05 and engaged the Arethusa and Fearless and was attacked by these ships and destroyers, and again turned away. Meanwhile, Commodore Tyrwhitt had informed Sir David Beatty of the position, and that officer proceeded at full speed to his support. The light cruiser Mains had been attacking the somewhat disabled Arethusa and the Fearless at about 11:30 a.m. and had suffered very severely in the action, being practically disabled. The arrival of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore Goodenough, on the scene about noon secured her destruction. Between 12:37 r.M. and 1:45 p.m. the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron engaged two other German light cruisers one of which was sunk; the second was last seen burning furiously and in a sinking condition.
The following German account of this action is extracted from the German official publication (Der Kreig znr See 1914-1918).
The entire German High Seas Fleet lay in the harbors of the German Bight and were disposed as follows:
The 2nd Battleship Division lay at Cux- haven with the light cruisers Danzig and Munchen.
The 1st Battle Division (two ships) and the 3rd Division (four ships) together with the battle cruisers Molkte and Von der Tann lay at Wilhelmshaven. The following light cruisers under the Commander Scouting Forces lay in Wilhelmshaven: viz, Strass- burg, Stralsund, Rostock, Hamburg (in dock) and the Coin (coaling) together with the old battle cruiser Bliicher. Patrol and scouting forces. The following disposition was made for the security of the German Bight:
Day patrol. (a) One torpedo-boat flotilla on scouting line, on arc of circle radius thirty-five miles with center of circle at Elbe lightship. In and out method of scouting covering zone between twenty-nine and thirty-five miles from Elbe lightship.
- Line of scouts—five boats on line Heligoland-Suder Haver, and another line of seven boats covering line Heligoland- Spiekeroog. In and out method of scouting covering five mile zone.
- Three small cruisers Nela, Stettin and Frauenlob with the Ariadne for transmission of radio messages to the scout commander.
- Reserve—one torpedo boat flotilla, one mine-sweeping division and the' submarines at Heligoland.
- Aircraft at Heligoland and Borkum.
- Airship L-g (later L-4).
Night patrol. By night the line (a) was withdrawn on arc on circle of radius twenty- five miles on center Elbe lightship. Other dispositions as for day patrol.
Mission of the patrol. Protection of the German Bight against enemy submarines and mine laying forces. Destroyers ordered not to attack enemy destroyers but to lead them toward the line of German submarines in retiring. Submarines to attack enemy destroyers whenever opportunity offered. Scouts to report the position of enemy forces. In addition to the above the minesweepers were to search the German Bight daily for enemy submarines working from Heligoland outwards. They were to force enemy submarines under water and by following them up using zigzag courses compel the latter to use up their battery current. No other offensive means were available against submarines at that time.
Supports. As support for the patrol forces the battleship Heligoland (later replaced by the Thuringen) was held inside the nets at the mouth of the Jade.
The battleships in the inner harbors could not proceed to sea except on four hours notice. In addition to this the depth of water over the bar was insufficient to permit these ships to gain the open sea except at high water which occurred at 1130 p.m. on August 28, 1914. The Second Battleship Division, consisting of the older battleships, was also under four hours sailing orders.
The fact that these supports were held inside the nets and were unavailable on instant notice was due to some extent to the presence of British submarines in the German Bight.
From the above it is evident how much reliance was placed on the light cruisers for the protection of the German Bight and the river mouths at this time. By day no less than four cruisers, two destroyer flotillas, and one mine-sweeping division; while at night no less then five cruisers and three destroyer flotillas were employed on this duty. Such disposition permitted only twelve days in the month for these vessels to overhaul boilers, etc., yet the patrols were further strengthened by a third line during daylight and a double line at night after a submarine attack on the G-m showed the presence of enemy submarines near Heligoland on August 25. The destroyer screen was extended to twenty-five miles from Heligoland and a mine-sweeping division formed the second line. Since a German submarine was unable to penetrate a triple screen near the Firth of Moray this protection against enemy submarines was considered adequate. On August 26, the off watch section of the patrol undertook the first efforts to close the Bight with nets. An aircraft report of enemy destroyer fifty miles west of Texel on August 27 resulted in a decision to further strengthen the patrol lines near the Ems and for this purpose a further destroyer flotilla took position on August 28.
Such was the disposition of forces in the German Bight as at 5:30 a.m. the 1st Torpedo boat Flotilla of nine boats proceeded to their daylight positions according to operations plan. The sea was smooth with light airs from the northwest; sky overcast and weather very misty. Suddenly at about six a.m. the commanding officer of the G-194 while sixteen miles from Heligoland sighted the two periscopes of a submarine close board; these disappeared suddenly and soon the bubbles of a torpedo were sighted. Two torpedo tracks were visible. The boat turned toward the submarine with full speed while the torpedoes passed under the vessel. The following radio was sent immediately to the Commander Destroyer Forces on the Goln:
Fired on by enemy submarine, two torpedoes, not hit. Am in middle of square 142c. Both periscopes seen at a distance of fifty yards. Mistake impossible. Enemy submarine on course NW.
Since the presence of enemy submarines in these waters was an every day occurrence, the G-194 proceeded to chase the submarine according to plan. Suddenly shots falling nearby indicated enemy surface craft which however were not at first visible, since the visibility varied considerably and was less than two miles in certain directions. (7:57 a.m.) A quarter of an hour later a force of nine enemy destroyers was made outwhereupon G-194 proceeded towards Heligoland at full speed. Efforts made to report the presence of enemy forces to Commander Destroyer Force were not successful until 8:25. Meanwhile, the next boat in line on patrol, G-196, having heard the firing, steamed to support; and after sighting enemy destroyers steamed towards Heligoland. Fire was opened by both forces but shots all fell short.
Meanwhile, the 5th Destroyer Flotilla, which had steamed out under orders to search for the enemy submarine, were surprised by the enemy destroyers, and finding themselves opposed by a superior force withdrew toward Heligoland. The resultant artillery duel was without effect on either side until the S-13 and V-i dropped out of formation being unable to maintain speed. At this time the enemy light cruiser Fearless was distinguished on the right wing of the attacking destroyers. Flotilla commander then signaled for support. V-i was now under concentrated fire and repeatedly straddled, suffering considerable damage. This vessel would certainly have been lost had not the light cruiser Stettin appeared at this time thus drawing off the fire of the attacking enemy destroyers.
The Stettin had proceeded to sea on the first report of enemy forces at 8:32 a.m. and opened fire at 8:58 on the enemy destroyers. At 9:05 a.m. a cruiser with four stacks was sighted near the enemy destroyers and the presence of same reported to the scout commander. Owing to lack of speed the range gradually increased and fire ceased at 9:10 when range had increased to 9,000 yards. Meanwhile the German destroyers had retired to Heligoland as they were outnumbered and outranged; and since their relatively low speed would give them no opportunity for torpedo attack. Enemy destroyers retired on southwesterly course and the Stettin returned to Sellebrunnen buoy to get up steam in all boilers and make preparations for full speed if needed for further engagements.
The Stettin had retired too soon however, as the British destroyers proceeding on their southwesterly course encountered the second line of patrols, consisting of the 111th minesweeping division, and rolled them up. The leader of this division, the D-8, had heard firing to the northward and mistaken it for target practice.* Thus this division was caught entirely unprepared and came under fire from the British cruiser at 8:40 a.m. Fire was returned as the D-8 retired toward Heligoland. The other older torpedo boats of this division also came under fire. Most of the boats suffered considerable damage with many killed and wounded on the D-8. At about 9:12 the German light cruiser Frauenlob joined the hard pressed minesweeping division and opened fire on the attacking cruiser. Most of the boats of this division were damaged in the retirement toward Heligoland, while two of these boats on the eastern wing of the force remained at their stations until recalled in the afternoon.
The light cruiser Frauenlob was first apprised of the presence of enemy forces by the sound of gunfire, and left her station to proceed to support at 8:58; passing shortly the retiring destroyers. Soon thereafter she sighted an enemy cruiser steaming at high speed accompanied by twelve destroyers, which were thereupon taken under fire. The British destroyers and the cruiser returned the fire but did not attempt any torpedo attacks against the Frauenlob although they were in a favorable position for attack. Several hits were observed on the enemy cruiser and the Frauenlob sustained some damage. The engagement was continued until the British forces were lost to view in the mists to the northwest. Shortly thereafter, the damaged mine-sweeping torpedo boat T-33 was sighted and in response to signal for help, was towed into Heligoland, with the assistance of the V-3, which had just come on the scene.
Meanwhile, the V-187 which was stationed next in line on the outer arc to the V-194, had received the report of enemy forces and turned to the northward to seek contact with the latter. Instead, two enemy surface craft were sighted which were reported at first as destroyers, but later recognized as enemy cruisers and the first report corrected. At 8:35 this contact was lost. At about 9:00 a.m. two other craft were sighted to the northward on southerly course steaming at high speed. These were avoided by turning away and the contact reported to Commander Destroyer Force. This signal
* N. B. The older torpedo boats of this division were not equipped with radio.
However did not get through to the Force Commander due to the enemy interference and the other heavy air traffic at that time. At the same time V-187 was unaware that the enemy was attacking in force and sought to maintain contact.
Shortly after 9125 four enemy destroyers were sighted to the eastward in a position to cut off V-187 from Heligoland; thus the latter was forced to steer to the southward in the hope of reaching the Ems. The enemy destroyers opened fire which was returned. The boat was steaming at full speed and leaving a considerable smoke screen with the idea of eluding the pursuing destroyers until she could reach the Ems. Suddenly, however, two light cruisers with accompanying destroyers were sighted to starboard at 9:45. V-187 now being cut off from her base, the Commanding Officer decided to try to break through the pursuing destroyers to regain Heligoland. Passing close aboard the enemy destroyers without receiving much damage, the destroyer was about to turn to the eastward when another enemy destroyer division was sighted to port, approaching at full speed. In the ensuing engagement, the Commanding Officer was severely wounded as well as a number of the crew. After all ammunition had been fired the flotilla commander, who was on board, ordered the ship blown up and all hands to abandon ship. By this time the after part of the vessel was burning and the steering gear disabled. The crew jumped overboard just before the ship sank and were picked up by boats from the enemy destroyers.
The other vessels of the 1st Destroyer Flotilla escaped to Heligoland, joining the retiring 5th flotilla. These boats had succeeded in effecting a concentration and were returning in formation when they sighted four enemy cruisers which opened fire when their recognition signal was unanswered. Later, two more cruisers joined this engagement. Visibility was poor and at times the cruisers could hardly be made out. Enemy cruisers were reported to Force Commander by radio, and the course changed to gain the Jade. At 9:20, the attacking cruisers broke off the engagement without apparent reason and turned to the west, while the German destroyers headed for Heligoland.
While the British destroyers were picking up survivors from the V-187 the Stettin came on them out of the mists, and not recognizing the purpose for which the British destroyers were stopped opened fire on them. The latter soon dispersed in different directions and were chased by the Stettin until contact was lost. Boats which had been put out by the destroyers were left behind and were found later in the afternoon.
Meanwhile the Hela, on radio information of the presence of enemy vessels, steamed to the westward to support the right wing of the scouting line. Later she turned to southward, on picking up signal from the Stettin that the enemy was withdrawing to the westward. The Commander 5th Destroyer Flotilla, on his return to Heligoland, instituted a searching force, assisted by the 10th Half Flotilla, to pick up damaged vessels and to support the 1st Torpedo Boat Flotilla. This force picked up the Frauen- lob with the damaged T-33 and the V-3. Later they picked up the British small boats containing the survivors of the V-187.
Up to this time the Commander-in-Chief and the Commander Scouting Force had received reports of enemy destroyers and a few light cruisers only. German torpedo boats on outpost duty were retiring according to plan. Thus the decision was taken to support the screen and undertake an energetic offensive against the enemy light forces. The fact that the light cruisers might encounter strong enemy supporting forces was not even suspected since no vessel had made any report of the misty weather prevailing in the German Bight, while in the harbors the visibility was very good. This is even more extraordinary since the coast defenses on the island of Heligoland could not open fire on account of the mists although the enemy forces were well within range at times.
An airship, the L-j, which had been ordered out at 9:20 a.m. to report on the strength and disposition of enemy forces, returned without accomplishing her mission owing to enemy gunfire and poor visibility. Unfortunately, the airship reported technical grounds as the reason for failure and made no mention of the weather conditions prevailing.
Under these circumstances the opportunity appeared favorable to the German command for attacking the enemy destroyers in the rear and for this reason the Mains was ordered to leave her station near the Ems and engage the supposedly retiring British destroyers near Heligoland thus cutting off their retreat. It was not until nearly noon when a telegram from the Heligoland defenses gave the Commander-in-Chief the first intimation of the poor visibility prevailing in the German Bight. At 2:35 p.m. a message from the Strassburg first revealed the true strength of the enemy forces. Thus the second phase of the action, the German counter offensive, was launched in ignorance of the true conditions.
The Coin and Strassburg had received orders to support the line of patrols at 8:55 a.m. The Mainz left the mouth of the Ems on a similar mission at 10:00 a.m. searching for the retiring enemy destroyers.- These vessels were aware of the fact that enemy surface craft had penetrated the German Bight and that the Frauenlob and Stettin had engaged the enemy, who was now on a northwesterly course. Under these conditions the supporting cruisers did not wait to effect a concentration, but, in order to save time, proceeded to the attack independently.
The Strassburg stood out at 10:35 avoiding the area where enemy submarines had been reported by the retiring destroyers. At 11:55 a.m. two cruisers appeared out of the mists accompanied by a division of ten to twelve destroyers. Immediately after sighting these the Strassburg had to turn out to port to avoid torpedo hits. Fire was opened by both sides. One cruiser of the enemy force soon broke off the engagement and retired behind the line of destroyers after having apparently received severe damage. For a while the enemy force was lost to view, then reappeared about ten minutes later at a distance of 8000 yards. Engagement was renewed against the destroyers, the latter firing a number of torpedoes at the Strassburg which were avoided by turning away. The Commanding Officer of the Strassburg thereupon decided to force the enemy to the southward toward the Mainz in the hope of concentrating with the latter for a combined action, but this decision had to be abandoned when additional enemy forces were sighted to starboard at 12:27 p.m. This new engagement drew the Strassburg further away to the northward. (At about this identical moment the Mainz made contact with the Arethusa which had just been previously engaged with the Strassburg.)
The Mainz had left the mouth of the Ems at 10:00 a.m., having been warned of the enemy forces by the radio messages from the patrolling destroyers. The destroyer flotilla which was at the Ems was ordered to remain at its post and not accompany the Mainz as its primary mission was to guard the Ems against enemy submarines. Intercepting a radio from the Strassburg reporting contact with enemy light cruisers, the Mainz steamed to the northward at full speed to support the former. At 12:30 the Arethusa and eight destroyers were sighted to the northeast at about 7000 yards steaming on westerly course. The weather was misty and visibility poor. Spotting was difficult but fire was opened and salvos apparently straddled. At 12:45 three further enemy cruisers (city class) were sighted to the northwest. Soon thereafter the newly arrived enemy forces opened fire on the Mainz and the latter received her first hit. In the meantime the Mainz turned to fire on the three cruisers while the Arethusa and destroyers were lost to view. At 12:55 the cruisers could no longer be distinguished and only the flashes of the guns could be seen. Shortly after, fire ceased and the Mainz proceeded twenty-five miles toward the Ems making smoke screen. In the meanwhile another cruiser and six destroyers were sighted athwart the course (this was the Fearless). In the ensuing engagement a number of torpedoes were fired by both sides one of which at 1:00 p.m. probably struck the stern of the Mainz and caused the the rudder to jam 10° to starboard. It was found impossible to clear the rudder and the Mainz turned slowly to starboard in spite of the port engine being stopped. In this condition the Mainz was then attacked by the Arethusa and the three cruisers of the city class as well as the destroyers which now numbered about twenty. Mainz directed fire entirely against the destroyers since against this type only was any marked result to be attained. Toward 1:20 p.m. the greater part of the battery was out of action. A torpedo then struck the ship amidships and exploded in the fourth fireroom. The Commanding Officer then gave the order to sink the ship and all hands to abandon ship, but the order was not transmitted throughout the vessel. Immediately on leaving the conning tower the Commanding Officer and the navigator were both killed. The executive officer then came on the bridge having no knowledge of the previous order and fire was renewed. The last torpedoes were fired but without effect. The ship then being entirely out of action the order was again given to abandon ship at 1:35 p.m. The crew came on deck within ten minutes, the port engine room being flooded. Enemy then ceased fire and sent boats to pick up survivors. The destroyer Lurcher came alongside and some of the wounded were transhipped to her. At 2:10 p.m. the Mainz sank.
The fate of the Mainz remained for some time unknown to the force commanders as well as the other German cruisers operating in the German Bight. The last message sent before the radio was disabled was at 1:03, reporting being chased by enemy armored cruisers. This was the first message received by the Force Commander reporting the presence of enemy forces superior to the light cruisers. Upon the receipt of this message the battle cruisers Von der Tann and Moltke received orders to proceed to support. At the same time the Seydlitz (Flagship of the Commander Scouting Force) and the Bliicher weighed anchor.
Upon receipt of this message and the departure of the battle cruisers the Commander Submarine Forces considered initiating a submarine offensive against the enemy armored cruisers, but since the submarines had been held too close to the inner barrier as protection for the fleet, it was too late for them to reach the scene of action with any prospect for success. (Of this disposition of submarines more later).
At 11:25 a.m. the Ariadne had received orders to leave station near the Jade and proceed to the support of the light cruisers outside.
Thus at 1130 p.m. the general situation was as follows, viz.: Furthest out (thirty miles west of Heligoland) the Strassburg reported a new engagement with cruisers and destroyers. To the southward the Coin was also engaged with cruisers and destroyers so that it was to be assumed that both were engaging the same enemy forces. Twenty miles further in was the Ariadne which reported to Coin that she was proceeding to assistance, while the Stralsund in the same vicinity was proceeding to the westward. Proceeding on westerly courses in different areas were also the Stettin, Kolberg and Danzig.
The Stralsund had left Wilhelmshaven at 11:00 a.m. and had received orders to support the Coin. In proceeding however, this cruiser lost time making a detour to avoid areas erroneously reported as suspected minefields. On the way efforts to get in touch with the Coin failed. The captain then decided to proceed to the vicinity of the Strassburg, which reported being engaged, with the idea of cutting off the attacking destroyers, but did not wait to effect concentration with the slower Stettin so that the Stralsund found herself opposed by a superior force. At first three cruisers (city flass) were recognized steaming in column and engaging some vessels which could not be distinguished in the mists. Stralsund then steamed ENE and engaged the leading enemy cruiser at 7200 yards fire being returned by the enemy. Visibility was very poor and splashes could hardly be made out. At this time the vessel which the enemy were engaging had seemingly disappeared and the entire enemy fire was concentrated on the Stralsund. The latter, to avoid this attack turned away without being pursued by the enemy cruisers. At about the same time and close by, the Coin and Ariadne were engaged with the enemy. The Ariadne had proceeded to sea upon radio request of the Stettin for assistance, but had returned to station near the Jade when the cessation of gunfire indicated the engagement at an end. This ship thereupon met the Coin proceeding to sea and received orders “Ariadne and Niobe proceed to support.” Since the Niobe was coaling, Ariadne alone followed the Coin to sea, which latter ship soon disappeared in the mists owing to her higher speed. Later, messages were received from the Mainz and the Strassburg that they were engaged. Shortly before 2:00 p.m. two ships were sighted in the mists one of which was recognized as an armored cruiser and did not answer the recognition signal; whereupon the Ariadne turned away. (The other ship was the Coin). The enemy thereupon switched his fire from the Coin to the
Ariadne. Soon the Ariadne was hit in a forward bunker which started a fire necessitating the abandonment of the forward fire- rooms; thus the speed fell to fifteen knots. The enemy was soon recognized as a vessel of the Lion class and was shortly joined by two other battle cruisers of this class. These vessels fired on the Ariadne for about one-half hour at ranges of from 5500 to 3000 yards. Ariadne was hit a great many times and the whole after part of the vessel was in flames. Very considerable damage was sustained principally by fire, which could not be extinguished as the fire extinguishing apparatus was wrecked. At 2:30 enemy fire ceased and the cruisers turned away, it being assumed that since the ship was completely enveloped in smoke it could hardly be seen. All attempts then made to extinguish the fire proved unavailing. The crew were then assembled aft and were picked up by the Danzig which arrived on the scene shortly before 3:00 p.m. Soon the Stralsund approached and the other survivors were taken off. As the vessel was about to be taken in tow several explosions occurred and she turned turtle at 4:25 P.M.
Stettin had been in the vicinity of Heligoland transmitting orders and repairing radio apparatus. When signals were received reporting engagement of the Mainz, Strassburg and Stralsund all in the same area, the Stettin had immediately proceeded to the scene of action. At 1140 p.m. the Ariadne had been sighted under fire from the battle cruisers and Stettin had barely time to turn away to avoid an attack from the former. The Ariadne was at first believed to be an English mine-layer, and her identity was not established until sometime later as the visibility was very poor. At 1158 the splashes of heavy caliber shells near the Ariadne were made out and soon thereafter the enemy was recognized as being composed of the latest type of battle cruisers. At 2:05 p.m. the leading enemy cruisers opened fire on the Stettin which was not returned, as the weather was very misty and Stettin did not wish to expose her position by the flashes of gunfire. After ten salvos the enemy ceased fire. At 2:20 the Danzig was recognized and turned away after signal from Stettin reported presence of enemy battle cruisers. Flames were then observed on the Ariadne and soon both vessels turned to render aid to the former, the enemy fire having ceased by that time.
The Coin had proceeded to sea following the course of the Strassburg, and approached the latter as she was engaged with the enemy destroyers. Coin had then received reports of the Mainz making contact and at 1:30 had changed course to reach the vicinity of the latter. On this course she sighted the Arethusa and the enemy destroyers. At this time the speed of the Arethusa was very much reduced and the Coin then decided to cut off the westerly retreat of the enemy, by altering course to carry out this plan. At 1130 the Coin reported being engaged with destroyers. This was the last report from the Coin. The fate of the Coin was only known from English sources as only one survivor was picked up.
In the meanwhile the Strassburg had been drawn further and further to the north and west in her engagement with enemy light forces; had later shaken these off and returned to the southward where gunfire was heard. Thus at the opening of the engagement of the Ariadne the Strassburg was only five miles to the westward. Strassburg had been repeatedly attacked by enemy destroyers but had avoided torpedo hits and had held the latter under gunfire. No damage was received in spite of the heavy fire. At 1104 p.m. the Strassburg was again attacked by destroyers assisted this time by two light cruisers. One of the attacking destroyers was apparently hit amidships. Strassburg then heard gunfire to the southward and shortly after received radio message from Coin stating that that vessel was engaging destroyers. At the same time another concentrated attack was made by both enemy destroyer divisions without result. Efforts to communicate with Coin and Mainz both remained fruitless and further the signal from Mainz reporting enemy armored cruisers was not intercepted by Strassburg. This vessel then attempted to effect concentration with the Coin, but at 2:00 p.m. suddenly sighted a battle cruiser. This danger was avoided by turning away on northerly course. However, on this course two further enemy vessels were sighted which proved to be armored cruisers of the city class. By turning away two points the Strassburg was able to escape these vessels after about fifteen minutes without being fired on. Junction with the Coin and Mainz could then only be effected by a long reach to the north and eastward to avoid strong enemy forces to the south. At 2130 p.M. however, four battle cruisers of the Lion class were sighted steaming on opposite course. The only chance for escape appeared to lie in deceiving the enemy in the misty weather. Therefore, the captain did not change course suddenly but altered course very slightly one point at a time to increase the range which was then about 8000 yards. The deception succeeded, because the enemy forces did not make a recognition signal until after they had passed by.
Although Maim and Stettin had both reported large enemy cruisers at 1:03 and 2:00 p.m. respectively, nothing definite in regard to the enemy strength had been signalled until at 2:35 p.m. the Strassburg reported “117e, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, course southwest.”
At 2:25 p.m. the Commander-in-Chief had ordered the 1st and 3rd Battleship Divisions to get up steam as quickly as possible. The decision was then taken to recall all light cruisers, and to hold the Destroyer Flotillas in readiness for night attacks. Upon the receipt of the message reporting the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, the Commander Scouting Force received orders not to attack enemy battle cruisers with the large cruisers since these also would have met a superior force before they could be supported by the Battle Fleet. Therefore the light cruisers were ordered to assemble on the Seydlitz. This order was given too late, however, as all the light cruisers had been surprised by superior enemy forces before they were aware of the true situation.
Upon receipt of this message Strassburg abandoned the idea of supporting the Coin and laid course for the Seydlitz (no communication could be established with either Mainz or Coin at this time).
In the meantime the Danzig as well as the Stralsund had arrived in the vicinity of the Ariadne which was then burning. On signal for assistance from the latter, the Danzig steamed as close aboard as possible and took off survivors in two of her boats.
On proceeding to sea the Kolb erg sought to support the Strassburg, but being warned of enemy armored cruisers to the eastward, changed course to the northward, later sighting the Ariadne. Since rescue work was already in progress this vessel then steered northwest to scout for enemy forces while the rescue was in progress. At 3 4.5 p.m. the Strassburg appeared in sight and reported that the enemy armored cruisers were last seen in area 117e, and shortly thereafter, the battle cruisers Moltke, Seydlitz and Von der Tann arrived in the vicinity.
At 3:00 p.m. the battle cruisers Von der Tann and Moltke had put to sea under command of Rear Admiral Tapken, with orders not to proceed further eastward than area 126 as the Seydlitz was held back owing to condenser repairs and the Commander Scouting Force wished to keep his forces concentrated. The first intention was to support the Strassburg, but later messages indicated that no support was necessary for this vessel, whereupon this force proceeded to the point where the Ariadne was reported severely damaged. No word had been received from either Mainz or Coin.
Accompanied by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla, the battle cruisers arrived at the scene of the destruction of the Ariadne at 3:25. The 16th destroyer half flotilla was sent to assist the Kolberg in scouting for enemy forces. At 4:10 p.m. the Seydlitz with the Commander Scouting Forces, Admiral Hipper, arrived on the scene, and started scouting with the entire force preceded by the light cruisers Kolberg, Strassburg and Stralsund. Since this force had orders not to attack the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, a short scouting operation to the northward was initiated for the purpose of picking up the Mainz or the Coin. These they failed to find as the nearest ship in this force passed four miles from the place where the Coin was lost. After the Bliicher had joined this force about 5:00 p.m. these operations were broken off in order to return to the Jade before nightfall.
The night patrol for the German Bight was reestablished, the 8th Destroyer Flotilla taking the outer stations on scouting line. The Munchen, Hela and Kolberg supported the line.
From English reports it was established that the Coin had engaged the Arethusa at long range, and that shortly thereafter, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron had appeared. Coin sought to escape to Heligoland but was cut off in this direction and changed course to the northward at 1:42 p.m. At this time the British forces sighted the Ariadne and fired on her until she appeared to be in a sinking condition. Thereupon the force turned away as they, suspected floating mines, which however, proved to be erroneous.* The Coin was again sighted on southeasterly course. This vessel was then taken under fire and sank at 2:35 p.m. At this time the Strassburg passed within four miles of the enemy battle cruisers and the fact that she escaped is attributed to the enemy’s attention being directed on the Coin at the time.
In this action the German losses were, one destroyer and three cruisers totally lost, three destroyers badly damaged and three other cruisers slightly damaged. Killed and drowned 712 and wounded 149, captured 381. English losses were, Arethusa severely damaged, nine killed and ninety-six wounded. Destroyer Laurel damaged with twenty-two killed and wounded, damage to the Fearless and two other destroyers, Liberty and Leartes.
The loss of these cruisers was a severe handicap to the German scouting force and could not be quickly replaced.
As a result of this action the Germans saw the necessity for the equipment of all light cruisers with electric target bearing indicators, as such devices were found to be indispensable in any action against destroyers, where the target changed frequently and divided fire was often necessary.
In his report on the action the Com- mander-in-Chief stated as follows: “The penetration of enemy forces into the German Bight on August 28, was the result of a well conceived plan and the operation carried out with strong forces. The raid was largely helped by the misty weather and poor visibility conditions. It is to be assumed that the disposition of German patrol forces had been carefully observed dnd reported on by the British submarines since August 21, and that poor visibility conditions such as existed on August 28 were awaited. Further they appear to have taken into account the well known spirit of the German fleet to attack. From this the lesson is to be drawn, in similar situations, for our own forces to retire, difficult as this may be, or else to attack with our whole force, disregarding
* N. B. These were empty cartridge cases which the Germans had thrown overboard in action.
probable danger from enemy submarines. The enemy if he comes, will attack only with the most modern craft and in such superior force that he will be insured against any serious reverse.
“Under similar weather and visibility conditions we must be prepared for a repetition of similar attacks; and our own measures must be so taken that none of our forces fall a victim to the enemy superiority before the decisive engagement, for example, erection of the Jade barrier, etc.’’
Admiral Mantey, the official historian, has the following critique on these operations in the German naval history of the war:
“With the order for the immediate withdrawal of forces on the scouting line in the event of attack the crux of the problem is left untouched, since the possibility of the enemy rolling up these patrol forces with a speedy and superior force still exists even in clear weather, if support of the battle fleet is lacking. The error of maintaining light forces in a line of scouts so far relatively from the nearest bases and at the same time withholding the fleet, was not even yet clearly recognized.
“One could even strengthen the line of patrols with more cruisers or even the battle cruisers, and still the enemy would be able by careful reconnaisance with submarines to arrange a preconcerted attack in a definite area, and surprise the patrols before that force could be supported. Thus the weakness, as clearly recognized by the enemy, lay in the system itself. The defense of the German Bight consisting as it did of three lines of patrols was insufficient to accomplish its primary mission of preventing enemy submarines from penetrating into the bight as was shown by the events of August 28. Thus the wide intervals between the individual destroyers offered no resistance to the penetration of even the weakest enemy craft. On the other hand the danger of the penetration of these craft in the river mouths was seen to be exaggerated.
“The lines of defense for the German Bight should not have been extended beyond the range of the guns at the base fortifications. Thus material and personnel could have been saved and the outer areas could have been protected by a mine barrage. The latter would certainly have led to losses for the enemy forces and would have made the penetration of the German Bight more difficult for enemy submarines.”
The plan of holding the German submarines in so close to the Heligoland defenses was criticised on the grounds that in this position they were of little value for the protection of the fleet against enemy submarines near the inner harbor, while on the other hand the distances were too great for them to attain position for attack in the event of enemy surface craft making an attack on the screen. Thus in the action recounted above the German submarines were useless as a defensive weapon owing to their slow speed and their distance from the scene of action.
The following summary of radio messages will enable the reader to appreciate the point of view of the Commander-in-Chief of the German fleet as the various phases of the action developed. The most important messages only are quoted herewith; however, these contain the only information available to the Commander-in-Chief and the Commander Scouting Forces in regard to the engagement which was taking place in the Heligoland Bight. On this meager information the force commanders had to base their estimate of the situation and reach their decisions. As the action progressed the situation as revealed to the force commanders was continually varying but it was not until 2:35 p.m. that the curtain was finally lifted and the true state of affairs disclosed. By this time the British forces had accomplished their mission and were retiring towards their bases while the scattered German forces were still in ignorance of the fate of their light cruisers.
The flagship of the Commander-in-Chief was the Friedrich der Grosse at anchor at Wilhelmshaven, while the Commander Scouting Forces was aboard the battle cruiser Seydlitz which vessel was undergoing repairs to main condensers. The Commander Destroyer Forces was aboard the Coin which was sunk with all hands by the British Battle Cruiser Squadron. In the list of messages which follows the question mark in the time column indicates either that the message was not received or that the time could not be established.
A study of the foregoing summary reveals an outline of the action quite at variance with the true state of affairs. The first message at 6:50 a.m. indicated the presence of enemy submarines near the German Bight. This being a not unusual occurrence no special action was called for since the anti-submarine defense measures would be conducted according to plan. Thus the 5th Torpedo-boat Flotilla was ordered out in pursuit.
At 8:06 (approx.) and 8:23 the presence of enemy destroyers and cruisers was first reported. In accordance with the German plan the torpedo boats on outpost duty should retire towards Heligoland, since these vessels did not mount sufficiently heavy armament to permit them to engage the British destroyers; everything being sacrificed to torpedo attack. The supporting cruisers in the screen had the mission of engaging enemy destroyers and cruisers while the torpedo boats led the enemy towards the line of submarines. Thus the first phase of the action was going on in accordance with the prearranged defense plan. Since the visibility at the flagship was good and no reports intimated misty weather outside, the force commanders made the natural assumption that no strong supporting forces were within twenty miles of the attacking enemy cruisers and destroyers.
The cruisers of the patrol force were then ordered to attack enemy destroyers since the opportunity appeared favorable for overwhelming the latter before they could escape from the German Bight. At 9:00 a.m. the Danzig and Munchen were ordered out as further supports, while at 9:22 the Mainz was ordered out for the purpose of attacking in the rear the enemy destroyers which had by this time neared Heligoland. To the German commanders the situation appeared highly favorable at this time. Effort was made to scout for enemy supports with aircraft but the attempt was doomed to failure owing to the misty weather and the upper strata of fog; a condition of which the force commanders remained in ignorance until 11:35 a.m.
The second phase of the action began with the German counter offensive launched with the light cruisers. Two battle cruisers were held as supports but since the reports had not revealed the true enemy strength they were held back. For some time the light
cruisers reported various engagements with enemy destroyers and light cruisers. Additional light cruiser support appeared to be ample.
At 11:35 a.m. a telegram from the Heligoland fortifications gave the first report of low visibility. Immediately thereafter the battle cruisers were ordered to hold themselves in readiness as it was now realized that stronger supporting forces might be needed. The fact that the light cruisers might fall into a carefully prepared trap does not appear to have been realized at this time.
The signal from the Mainz at 1:00 p.m. gave the first intimation of the possible failure of the counter offensive. This message was, however, not confirmed and no further word was received from that vessel. As is known now the Mainz shortly thereafter fell a victim to the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. The battle cruisers Moltke and Von der Tann were ordered out however, and the Seydlitz made preparations to follow. As accounts of the action show, even this force would have been insufficient as they would have been outnumbered by Beatty’s squadron.
By this time the German light cruisers Mainz, Coin and Ariadne had all fallen into the trap although their fate still remained unknown to the Commander-in-Chief. Messages from the Stralsund and Strassburg at 2:12 and 2:30 indicated the presence of strong enemy forces but not until 2:35 did the message from the Strassburg reveal for the first time the presence of the British battle cruisers. The full enemy strength was now known but the only effective measure which could now be taken, i.e., the recall of the light cruisers, came too late. That the other German light cruisers escaped destruction can only be attributed to luck. The message from the Strassburg was received just in time to prevent the German battle cruisers from proceeding to engage an unknown superior force.
After a battle when all the facts are known it is relatively easy to find the strategical faults and point out the errors made.
To prevent these mistakes is another matter. However, a study of the mistakes of others may frequently help to prevent them in the future, and a study of this action brings out several interesting factors.
It is reasonable to suppose that had any vessel of the screen reported the low visibility conditions existing the German command would certainly not have undertaken a counter offensive without the concentration of their full strength since it would have been apparent that strong supports might be in the immediate vicinity of the German Bight unseen by the patrol force. The fact that the aircraft also failed to report misty weather at a time when such information was vital to the plan of action leads one to believe that the importance of such factors was not appreciated by the commissioned personnel.
The above example shows clearly the necessity for the indoctrination of the commissioned personnel before the outbreak of war. In time of war destroyers and submarine chasers assigned to the screen and patrol duty will of necessity be largely commanded by officers who have not had the benefit of War College training, yet on the accuracy and clearness of their reports may depend the success of a plan of action.
The system of communications should be so organized that several vessels may communicate simultaneously with the force commander without undue delay and congestion of air traffic. Enemy interference must be overcome by technical improvements in the apparatus. It will be further noted that most of the German cruisers had their radio disabled in the first few minutes after the action began and for that reason the Coin and Mainz were unable to report the strength of the enemy forces with which they were engaged. This shows the necessity for auxiliary radio stations and additional aerials which may be quickly installed in battle.
Lacking these essentials communications may fail to fulfil their primary mission in the crucial test of battle and bring to nought the strategy of the force commander.