Historians agree that the Yorktown campaign decided the American War for Independence. The surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, Virginia, on October 19, 1781, marks the successful close of the Revolution. It is true that peace by treaty was yet to come, hut the decisive character of the event was at once recognized by Great Britain’s civil and military leaders, and the following spring, after the surrender, brought suspension of hostilities, as if by common consent. American Independence was an assured fact.
In our eagerness to immortalize the name of the incomparable Washington and to do honor to the genius of his youthful co-actor, Lafayette, we have all but forgotten the leading part played by sea power as embodied in the French Admiral Count de Grasse. The commander-in-chief on land, as every school child knows, played his part with consummate skill to win undying fame, but the story of the commander-in- chief at sea seems to have been relegated to the limbo of forgotten things—at least so far as school histories are concerned. Lafayette, a subordinate general, is in daily remembrance throughout the land hut the commander-in-chief, Admiral de Grasse, upon whose decisions Washington predicated his every move in the final campaign, has almost passed from memory. But for the control of the sea gained by dc Grasse the victory at Yorktown would have been impossible. Docs America recognize its debt to the profound influence of sea power?
The story of de Grasse’s sailing from Santo Domingo to succor the armies of the patriots in their darkest days, of his borrowing troops and money, of his ruse in deceiving the British West Indies Fleet, of his passage and arrival at the Chesapeake Capes, of his prompt landing of troops, of his protection and of his masterful tactics in defeating and out-maneuvering a large British fleet under trying circumstances, may have been told, but so long ago that the vast majority of Americans have either forgotten it or never heard of it. The purpose of this article is to revive this fascinating story and to bring into relief the determining influence of sea power on the outcome of the Yorktown campaign and the attainment of our separate national life.
There were many actors in this fateful drama—at widely dispersed points on land and sea—soon to take their roles in what is termed the Yorktown campaign.
The beginning of the year 1781 finds Great Britain at war with France, Spain, and Holland, and a revolution going into its sixth year in her American colonics. The fleets of England and France had fought no less than three times without attaining decisive advantage. The empire of the West Indian waters remained unsettled and French troops were fighting in America under Count de Rochambeau. In this situation King Louis XVI of France decided to render secure his possessions in the West Indies and, if practicable, extend aid to the allies on the American continent.
Accordingly, a fleet was fitted out at Brest under the command of Admiral Count de Grasse.1 It comprised twenty-one
1 Francis Joseph Paul dc Grasse-Rouville, Count dc Grasse, Marquis dc Tilley. Born in 1723, son of Captain Francis de Grasse-Rouville, of the French army. Captain of the Robuste (74) in 1775, in action off Ushant July, 1778. Chef-d’escadre (commodore) at Martinique in February, 1779, At the reduction of Granada, siege of Savannah, Georgia, and under Dc Guichen in 1780 rescuing the Sphynx and Artesirn from superior English force. Given command West Indian Fleet 1781. Assisted at the capture of Tobago and sailed immediately for the Chesapeake to second the operations of Washington. Returned to West Indies, defeated and taken prisoner by Rodney, April 12, 1782. Arriving in London he was made informal agent to carry peace overtures to the French government. On return to France conduct investigated and exonerated, retired, and died January 14, 1788. Married three times, French Revolution drove surviving children to U. S. Daughters married prominent New York merchants and have descendants in families of Fox, Livingston, Fowler and Coster.
69 ships of the line, three frigates, and thirteen sloops, with the Ville de Paris2 as flagship. On Thursday, March 22, 1781, the fleet, with a large convoy of 150 ships, set sail for Martinique in the Caribbean Sea. On March 29, when 450 miles off Lisbon, five sloops and forty merchantmen, under Badly de Suffern, were detached to the East Indian station. The Sagittaire (50 guns) left the fleet on April 5 with a convoy of thirty vessels bound for Boston. These vessels carried 660 recruits and supplies for Rochambeau’s army and arrived at their destination in June. The Sagittaire carried a letter from de Grasse to Rochambeau, dated at sea March 29, proposing joint action.
Thus begins the cooperation of de Grasse with the purposes of the revolution. In this he never faltered as future narration shows.
At daybreak, on April 28, after a voyage of thirty-six days (an unheard-of quick passage then for so many vessels), the fleet with convoy intact sighted land at Martinique.
Awaiting him in these waters was the English Admiral Rodney reinforced by the late arrival of Admiral Samuel Hood so that he now had some twenty-one ships of the line at his disposal. It is a long way from Martinique, St. Lucia and Tobago to Yorktown, yet the events which took place among those distant islands are closely related to the final scenes on the Chesapeake and must be examined preliminary to any account of the closing of the net around Lord Cornwallis. For, if Rodney and Hood had destroyed de Grasse at Fort Royal, or at Tobago, in the early summer of 1781, the French fleet would not have appeared off Yorktown, Cornwallis would have escaped, and the liberty bell would perhaps have rung in vain.
Upon the arrival of de Grasse off Martinique, he hove to on the windward (east) side of Martinique after having discovered the presence of Hood’s ships to leeward. Early the next morning, with favorable winds, de Grasse rounded the southern part of the island, keeping his convoy close inshore until it reached the port of Fort Royal on the west side of Martinique.
Here the French fleet was augmented by the junction of four ships of the line from Fort Royal which had been blockaded by the British under Hood with eighteen ships. A skirmish between the two fleets took place here. The British suffered badly and the consequences were equivalent to defeat. Had the British fleet been to windward of the island it would have been in a most favorable position for attacking de Grasse, encumbered as he was with a large convoy, but it had gotten so far to leeward that de Grasse was able to bring his convoy safely to port. For this false position Hood was severely blamed by Rodney but it may have been due to light winds and a lee current. At any rate, we know that Hood eagerly pressed the admiral to be allowed to cruise to windward.2
2 A magnificent three decker of no guns, unsurpassed in her time.
The English had now only eighteen ships to the French twenty-four and the latter were to windward. But de Grasse, for fear of exposing his convoy and of sustaining damages that might unfavorably affect the coming American venture, desisted from attack.
The islands of St. Vincent and Granada were revictualled; an armed expedition was sent against Gros Islet; St. Lucia and Tobago were captured. On June 5, the English fleet approached but later bore away. De Grasse laid in wood and water at Fort Royal and made some repairs, sailing for Cape Francois (now Cape Haytien) on July 5, and arriving on the sixteenth with a convoy of 150 merchantmen. Five more ships joined him here under Commodore Chevalier de Monteil, who had just returned from an expedition with the Spanish in the taking of Pensacola, Florida.
For the moment let us shift the scene from Santo Domingo to America and visualize the situation there. Count de Rochambeau with his army had formed junction with Washington and under his direction was before New York besieging Sir Henry Clinton, the British commander- in-chief. General Lafayette, with American troops, and General (Mad Anthony)
3 Hood to Rodney, “I do not find myself pleasant in being to leeward; for should an enemy’s fleet attempt to get into Martinique and the commander of it inclines to award battle, nothing but a skirmish will probably happen which in its consequences may operate as a defeat to the British squadron, though not a ship is lost and the enemy suffer most.” (Naval Records Society, "Letters of Sir Samuel Hood".)
Wayne on the Virginia peninsula above Yorktown, were dogging Lord Cornwallis’ footsteps in Virginia. French Admiral de Barras with a small fleet of eight ships and four frigates was at Newport ready to assist Washington in the projected attack on New York. Rear Admiral Graves, who was destined to play an unenviable role in the approaching catastrophe, covered New York with seven ships.
Clinton, concerned with the threatened attack on New York, ordered Cornwallis to transfer a portion of his army from Virginia, and Cornwallis had gone to Portsmouth to make preparations to transport the troops from that point. Clinton decided, however, in view of certain dissenting opinions expressed by Cornwallis respecting the situation in Virginia, not to withdraw the force that he had called for, and which was about to sail for New York, but permitted Cornwallis to retain the whole with which he had been pursuing Lafayette and in addition the large garrison at Portsmouth, totaling seven thousand men, rank and file. New instructions issued at the same time were to abandon Portsmouth, which was considered too unhealthy for troops, hard to defend, and gave no protection to ships of line, and to occupy and fortify Old Point Comfort as a protection for British shipping in the event of temporary naval superiority of the enemy, and to insure a defended anchorage for line of battleships of the covering fleet while engaged in operations in Virginia.
Cornwallis, pursuant to these instructions, ordered his engineer to examine and survey Old Point Comfort and the channels adjoining it; he also visited it with captains of the King’s ships lying at Hampton Roads.
Lieutenant Sutherland, engineer, writing on July 25, 1781, from the Billy, ordnance transport, reports to Cornwallis:
My Lord: Agreeable to your orders, I have examined the ground on Old Point Comfort with as much accuracy as I possibly could, and for your Lordship’s better information I have made a survey of the ground, upon which is laid down the width and soundings of the channel.
I beg leave to offer what appears to be respecting the situation of a work on that spot.
The ground where the ruins of Fort George lay is the fittest for a work, but at the same time must be attended with many inconveniences.
The level of the ground there is about two feet higher than the high water mark, which, from its very short distance to the deep water, must soon be destroyed by a naval attack.
The great width and depth of the channel give ships the advantage of passing the fort with very little risk. I apprehend fifteen hundred yards is too great a distance for batteries to stop ships, which is the distance here. Ships that wish to pass the fire of the fort have no occasion to approach nearer.
Nor do I imagine a fort built there could afford any great protection to an inferior and weak fleet, anchored near the fort, against a superior fleet of the enemy, which must have it in their power to make their own disposition, and place our fleet between them and the fort, the channel affording no bay for the security of ships under cover of a fort.
The time and expense to build a fort there, must be very considerable, from the low situation of the ground, which must necessarily cause the soil to be moved from a great distance, to form the ramparts and parapets; and every other material must be carried there, as the timber on the peninsula is unfit for any useful purpose.
These are the remarks which have occurred to me on examining the ground and situation of a work on Old Point Comfort, for the protection of the harbour and fleet, which I humbly submit to your Lordship. I have the honour to be, &c.
Alex. Sutherland, Lieutenant of Engineers.
Knowing Hampton Roads as we now do as an unexcelled protected anchorage for the largest vessels and the site of an important naval base, the report of ship captains is interesting:
My Lord, In consequence of a requisition that your Lordship received from the commanders in chief of his Majesty’s troops and ships, relative to a post being established at Old Point Comfort, for the protection and security of the King’s ships that may occasionally be sent to the Chesapeake: We, whose names are hereunto subscribed, have taken as accurate a survey of that place as possible, and are unanimously of opinion, from the width of the channel and depth of water close to it, that any superior enemy’s force coming in, may pass any work that can be established there, with little damage, or destroy it with the ships that may be there, under its protection.
We have the honour to be, & c.
Charles Hudson, Charles Everitt,
Thomas Symonds, RALPH Dundas.
Admiral Graves at New York wrote Cornwallis on the twelfth instant that:
There is no place for the great ships during the freezing months on this side of the Chesapeake where the great ships will be in security and at the same time capable of acting. Hampton Roads appears to be the place where they can be anchored with greatest security. Old Point seems necessary to be occupied by us as commanding the entrance to the road.
But notwithstanding Clinton’s orders and Graves’ advice, Cornwallis, on the strength of the opinions of his engineer and the small ship commanders (with which he entirely concurred) decided to abandon the Old Point project. In conformity with
what lie conceived to be the spirit of his orders, Cornwallis, before hearing from Clinton, immediately seized and fortified Yorktown, and Gloucester on the opposite shore, as the best available harbor which would give protection to line of battle ships. To this move Clinton made no subsequent objections and Cornwallis remained here until his surrender.
Clinton afterwards held that Cornwallis violated his orders and that, even though lie occupied Yorktown, he should have held Old Point until report of conditions should have been made and further orders received. It is probable that had Cornwallis taken Old Point instead of going to Yorktown, he could have made his escape to Norfolk and thence south as soon as the French fleet appeared off the Capes. In this light, Clinton’s charge of disobedience of orders appears to have more than ordinary weight.
It is not the writer’s desire to enter into the merits of the fruitless controversy that raged afterwards in England between Clinton and Cornwallis in their attempts to exculpate themselves for the Yorktown debacle. It is significant, however, that Old Point was soon afterwards fortified by Washington at the instance of Admiral de Grasse, who feared Cornwallis might be succored by a reinforced British fleet entering the James River. Knowing this to have been de Grasse’s opinion, it seems fair to assume that he would never have attempted to force the entrance, had it been fortified. Graves’ recommendations therefore appear well founded and here outcrops the oft told story of a difference in opinion between the Army and Navy in joint operations with its lesson for unified command.
Let us return again to Haiti, where we find that the frigate Concorde of Admiral de Barras’ squadron had arrived with dispatches from Rochambeau and Washington which clearly revealed the crisis existing in the colonies, “Come!” Rochambeau had written.
"America is in distress. Bring with you from Santo Domingo troops of Marquis de Saint Simon, obtain from the colonists 1,200,000 livres4 and bring them also.” And later, “I will not deceive you, sir, these people are at the ends of their resources”; and again, “General Washington has but a handful of men .... the army
4 French coin equivalent to about twenty cents, gold.
of Cornwallis is in the heart of Virginia .... you can well understand how urgent it is that you bring some troops with you; this country is at bay, all its resources are failing at the same time.”
Rochambeau suggested as his opinion the favorable opportunity for an expedition against Cornwallis on the Chesapeake, which he considered more practicable and less expected by the enemy.
He further entreated, “Send the Concorde back promptly that we might take the earliest opportunity to continue our march with that of General Washington so as to proceed by land as expeditiously as possible and join him in any stipulated part of the Chesapeake.”
De Grasse made up his energetic mind at once, discarded all ideas of detaching war vessels from his fleet for a convoy then about to return to France, and put himself to the task. He at once conferred with M. de Lillancourt, commandant of Haiti, and the Spanish Admiral Solano. The commandant arranged to furnish him with a detachment of 3,000 infantry, 100 artillerymen, 100 dragoons, 100 pieces of field ordnance and several of siege artillery and mortars from the regiments Gatinois, Agenoise, and Touraine. The regiments were furnished on condition that they would not remain in America after October 15, and that while away the Spanish Admiral would furnish protection to the commerce of the island.
The reasons given by Count de Grasse for his inability to leave troops beyond that period were presented in this letter to Rochambeau:
First, because part of them are under orders of the Spanish generals and have been obtained only on the promise that they shall be returned by the time they will be wanted; and, secondly, because the other part are destined to the garrison of Santo Domingo, and cannot be spared from that duty to M. de Lillancourt. The entire expedition, in regard to those troops, has been concerted only in consequence of your request, without even the previous knowledge of the ministers of France and Spain. I have thought myself authorized to assume this responsibility for the common cause, but I should not dare so far to change the plans they have adopted, as to remove so considerable a body of troops.
You clearly perceive the necessity of making the best use of the time that will remain for action. I hope the frigate which takes this letter will have such dispatch that everything may be got in readiness by the time of my arrival, and that we may proceed immediately to fulfill the designs in view, the success of which I ardently desire.
De Grasse despatched the Concorde, on July 28, to Newport with the intelligence that the whole force would be embarked in twenty-five to twenty-nine vessels of war to sail on August 13, proceeding directly to the Chesapeake. The money requested could not be obtained at Haiti but recourse was bad to the Spanish commissary Senor Salavadra who agreed to go to Havana with letters to the governor and to do his best to assist the public treasury by purses of individuals. It must be said in honor to the Spanish ally that all were eager to do so, ladies even offering their diamonds.
At this time a large convoy was ready to sail from Haiti for France and dc Grasse was expected to furnish several ships as an escort. He upset all tradition, however, by refusing to weaken his force for the benefit of the “trade" and deliberately postponed the sailing of the convoy—a most unusual thing to do—until he should have returned from North America. He further showed his good judgment by embarking the troops on his ships of war instead of on transports which would have tended to slow up the operation.
To reach America de Grasse took the route via the old Bahama channel in order to prevent the British from knowing of his intention to go to America and also to obtain the money from Havana.
The frigate Aigrette was detached from the fleet and touched in Havana for the money and rejoined. The fleet then shaped course through the Florida straits and, favored by the Gulf Stream, headed for the Chesapeake via Cape Hatteras.
In the meanwhile, what had Rodney been doing to permit de Grasse to sail in force for America without seeing the French fleet neutralized? With keen insight, as early as May 3, he had warned Admiral Arbuthnot at New York of its arrival in the Caribbean Sea: "that you may be on your guard," are his words, "should they visit the coasts of America, in which case I shall send every assistance in my power."
Admiral Graves had succeeded Arbuthnot as commander-in-chief but soon after getting this intelligence sailed off on a cruise to the eastward to intercept ships with money and supplies for the revolutionists bound for Boston. When Rodney heard that de Grasse was going to Cape Francois, he divined a movement north during the hurricane months, and promptly sent a second dispatch to Graves at New York by the sloop Swallow (sixteen guns) commanded by Captain Wells. He advised that in all probability de Grasse would proceed to the Chesapeake, therefore recommended to him to make junction with the squadron he should either bring or send5 to his assistance off the Capes of Virginia, and to station frigates to look out and to give his squadron necessary information relative to affairs in America.
Commodore Affleck, who then commanded the port of New York, sent the captain to sea within twenty-four hours in quest of Graves. Coming in sight of a privateer he gave chase and took her, but falling in afterwards with three privateers he was obliged to run the Swallow ashore on Long Island. The dispatches he sank unopened claiming not to have known their importance. Thus we have the example of a captain, either through over-zealousness or greed, who by giving chase while carrying dispatches, sacrificed vital information. Thus the unfortunate Graves remained in ignorance of de Grasse’s movements and of the coming of the British squadron.
As Rodney reluctantly left for home he detached Admiral Samuel Hood with fourteen ships of the line, six frigates and one fire ship to join Graves and head off de Grasse. Rodney, through misinformation, underestimated the number of vessels that de Grasse had taken north, and with four ships sailed for home escorting a convoy, and, in addition, weakened Hood by detaching two ships for convoy duty to Jamaica with orders for them to join Hood later. The absence of these six ships, which were sacrificed for the “trade,” thus hampered the purely military phase of the operations and was the immediate cause of British naval inferiority in the fleet action that followed.
Sailing up the coast Hood looked into the Chesapeake on August 25 (just five days before dc Grasse’s arrival), also the Delaware; he found no French, nor was there the expected frigate or any news of Graves. Continuing on to New York he reported the situation to Graves, who for
5 Rodney hoped until the last minute to go himself instead of sending Hood, but his health broke down and he had to return to England for an operation for hernia. He returned to the West Indies too late to take part in the Yorktown campaign.
the first time learned6 of de Grasse’s approach and the threatened danger in Virginia. On the evening of the same day, August 28, came advices that de Barras had left Newport on the twenty-fifth with his squadron, presumably for the Chesapeake.
Graves instantly joined his five ships7 of the line and one fifty-gun frigate with Hood, assumed command of the fleet of nineteen ships, and on August 31 sailed for the Capes hoping to cut off de Barras before he could effect a junction with de Grasse.
Let us now turn our attention for the moment to the situation on land. With the arrival of the Concorde at Newport, bringing intelligence that de Grasse had sailed for the Chesapeake, Washington ordered Lafayette to take a position that would best enable him to prevent a possible retreat of Cornwallis from Yorktown to the Carolinas. Under cover of a cleverly executed feint against Clinton at New York, Washington started for Virginia with the combined forces of himself and Rochambeau. All roads now led to Yorktown. The net was drawing closer.
At the close of August the picture is this: Cornwallis fortifying leisurely at Yorktown, Wayne on the James at Harrison Landing, Lafayette on the Pamunkey, Washington marching down through Trenton, de Barras on his way to the Chesapeake with troops and heavy siege artillery, Graves sailing from New York for the Capes, de Grasse entering Lynnhaven Roads. Cornwallis in serene bliss was still ignorant of Washington or de Grasse!
On August 30, de Grasse with twenty- eight ships of the line and five frigates, anchored nine miles south and east of Cape Henry,8 out of sight of land by advice of coast pilots, while the entrance of the bay was being reconnoitred. Next day, the thirty-first, the fleet anchored in Lynnhaven Bay in three columns.
The frigates Glorieux, Aigrette, and Diligente were scouting ahead upon entering the bay: they discovered the British frigate
6 In consideration of the general situation Graves has been criticized severely for not exerting himself to secure information. He had sufficient frigates for lookout and scouting purposes.
7 The Prudent and Robuste (two deckers) were being overhauled and were left behind, neither could be equipped within ten days.
8 Location familiarly known to present day naval officers as "The Southern Drill Ground.”
Guadeloupe and corvette9 Loyalist anchored at the entrance and pursued them to the mouth of the York River. The Guadeloupe escaped up the river, but the Loyalist was captured. Nowhere was it expected that the French would bring so large a force; Graves lost information as to their numbers by the carelessness of these ships which had been ordered to keep underway off the Capes, but both were surprised at anchor. The neglect of these subordinate captains cost Graves all important intelligence; he was totally ignorant of the grave danger at hand. It is logical to suppose that if Graves had known the strength of de Grasse before reaching the Capes, he would have aimed to waylay and capture de Barras, thus denying the besieging army troops and the heavy siege guns necessary to the reduction of the Yorktown defenses. This dereliction without doubt affected the general outcome of the campaign for:
Had Admiral Graves succeeded in capturing that squadron, it would have greatly paralyzed the efforts of the besieging army, if it would not have prevented its operations altogether; it would have put the two fleets nearly on an equality in point of numbers and would have arrested tbe progress of the French arms for the ensuing year in the West Indies; and might, possibly, have created such a spirit of discord between the French and Americans, as would have sunk the latter into the lowest depths of despair; from which they were only extricated by the arrival of the forces with de Grasse.10
The Ville de Paris was immediately boarded by Lieutenant Colonel Gimat, sent by Lafayette to concert with the admiral. De Grasse proved himself to be a man of action and at once (September 1) detached forty boats from the fleet to transport the 3,300 troops of Marquis de St. Simon to Jamestown Island in the James, where they made junction with Lafayette.
Taking part in this troop movement, and in position to prevent Cornwallis from escaping across the James River to the southward, was the Experiment (50 guns), and the sloop La Courageuse (50 guns), Aigrette (32 guns), Andromache (32 guns), La Diligente (26 guns), and La Guadaloupe (24 guns), while the York was blockaded by the Glorieux (74 guns), Triton (64 guns), and the Valient (64 guns). These detachments reduced the strength of the
9 Flush deck vessel having one tier of guns ranking next below a frigate.
10 Naval Researches, etc., Capt. Thomas White, R.N., published in 1830.
main fleet to twenty-four sail of the line and deprived de Grasse for the time being of much needed scouting vessels and signal repeating ships.
On the evening of September 2, General du Portail brought de Grasse dispatches from Washington announcing the departure of de Barras from Newport and asking for the assistance of light vessels to transport his troops from the head of the Chesapeake. All vessels under sixty-four guns were ordered prepared for this service.
The fleet was in Lynnhaven Bay waiting for further news from Washington and the return of its boats and boat crews, when on September 5 at 8:00 a.m., the lookout frigate off the Capes signaled the sighting of twenty or more sail to the eastward under foresails and topgallant sails steering for the entrance. It soon became evident from the numbers that it was the British and not Admiral de Barras who had been expected.
As soon as he had ascertained the number, strength, and disposition of the enemy, de Grasse made signal to prepare for battle, to recall boats from watering, and for the fleet to be ready to get under sail. At noon, the current favoring with the full run of the ebb tide, the signal was made to slip cables11 and form line promiscuously as the ships could get underweigh. The wind was northeast with fresh breezes. De Grasse’s decision to meet the enemy in the offing was due to his well known disinclination to engage without maneuvering room and to the realization of his own numerical superiority in ships of the line. The hope of making a junction with or favoring the expected de Barras was also an important reason for not remaining at anchor.
Notwithstanding the handicap of the absence of ninety officers and eighteen hundred of the best seamen, who were in the James assisting the debarkation of troops, the captains applied themselves so diligently that the fleet was under sail in less than three-quarters of an hour and the line formed. Commodore Bougainville in the Bourgogne commanded the van division. The Languedoc, commanded by M. de Monteil, Commodore of White and Blue
11 To get under weigh with despatch. Done by unsplicing the cable on deck, to the anchor end of which is affixed a buoy and buoy rope to be picked up later.
squadron, in getting underweigh happened to be the next ahead of the Ville de Paris, and de Grasse, observing that no general officer was in his rear, gave Monteil a verbal order to go take command there.
The relative strength of the fleets about to be engaged were: French, twenty-four sail of the line, and British, nineteen, constituted as follows: French, one 110 (3 decker), three 80’s, seventeen 74’s, three 64’s; British, two 98’s (3 deckers), twelve 74’s, one 70, four 64’s (besides seven frigates).
It was not until 9:30 a.m. that Graves’ frigate scout Solebay sighted the French fleet in the southwest and immediately made signal to this effect. At 10:00 a.m. Cape Henry bore southwest from the flagship London at a distance of eighteen miles. At 10:30 cruisers were called in and signal made to prepare for action. By 11:00 a.m. the British were sufficiently near to identify the French fleet as one composed of many large ships at anchor supposed to be the enemy, from which it was taken for granted that de Barras had joined de Grasse. Signal was then made for line of battle ahead two cables’ lengths between ships and at noon the ships were taking their stations. The fleet was in three divisions, Admiral Sir Samuel Hood in the van on the Bar-fleur, Rear Admiral Francis Drake had the rear on the Princessa, and the commander-in-chief was on the London, the middle ship of the center division where his signals could best be seen and control could be exercised. Frigates were stationed to windward of each division to repeat the signals of the flagship.
At the moment that the French fleet was getting underweigh, the British main body bore east one-half north from Cape Henry, distance fifteen miles. In approaching the Cape only three miles in as many hours, Graves was holding well off shore with wind on his port quarter. The weather was fair, sea moderate, wind fresh and inclined to be squally, so that the London and other ships furled topgallant sails and took a single reef in the topsails. The visibility was unusually high.
At 12:45 the signal was made to close to one cable’s length and at 1:00 to form on an east and west line at one cable’s length. At 1:08 the admiral desired the rear to close up and signaled for more sail to be made. The leading ship was then directed
to lead more to starboard heading up for the Middle Ground.12 At 1:25 the signal was again made for the rear to make more sail and several individual ships were directed to keep station. The admiral was very particular about the line and continually admonished his ships for being off station. At 2:00 o’clock the enemy was definitely made out to be twenty-four ships of the line and two frigates, van bearing south standing to the eastward with larboard tacks aboard (port tack).
At 2:04 Graves finding his van approaching too near the shoals of the Middle Ground, made preparatory signal to veer wear), and eleven minutes later wore the fleet together and formed the line upon the same tack as the French, bringing to— slowed to steerage way—in order to let the enemy van come abreast of his own. At this time the French van bore south from the London (distance three miles) and therefore was abreast the British center. After the execution of this maneuver, the old van became the rear and the British were on the port tack, heading to the eastward nearly parallel to the enemy.
It was clear that Graves intended to keep a formal and deliberate line of battle matching van for van and rear for rear. Although outnumbered by five line of battle ships, he had the advantage of the weather gage by which he retained the initiative of attack and choice of position. Likewise, he had the advantage of speed13 due to all of his ships having been coppered—the latest innovation of that day which had not been generally adopted by the French.
The maneuvers preliminary to the actual engagement should be carefully examined as the final outcome can be traced directly to their influence. The British, being five ships less, naturally did not extend so far as the French rear which in fact was in bad order, not yet being clear of Cape Henry.
At 2:30 Graves made the signal for the leading ship, Shrewsbury, to lead more to starboard in order to approach the enemy. Had all ships changed course simultaneously toward the enemy, the line of bear-
13Sandy shoals lying three miles to the north of Cape Henry. Between it and the Cape is the main ship channel.
14Battle speed ordinarily ranged between three and five knots, defending upon the direction and strength of the wind. Sail was mostly confined to topsails and foresail. In this case speed is estimated at about four knots.
ing parallel to them would have been preserved, but as all ships followed the leader the British column formed a slight angle with the enemy’s line. This angle was intensified, forty-seven minutes later, by the repetition of the signal for the van ships to lead in towards the enemy. At 3:34 the signal for the van to lead in was again made, increasing the angle between fleets still further. “This was the original and enduring cause of a lamentable failure by which seven of the rear ships, in an inferior force undertaking to attack, never came into battle at all.”
At 2:40 the Salamander (fire ship) had been given the order to prime, indicating that she might be needed.
The wind all the time was hauling to the eastward which made the ships of the French van find themselves too far to windward to preserve a well-formed line, and de Grasse made them alter course to starboard two points that all ships might have the advantage of engaging together, and they kept the wind when sufficiently in line to leeward. Graves followed with his van ships as before noted, but with the "line ahead” signal still effective. This brought the rear and some of the center ships still further from the enemy’s line which all the time was falling off to leeward. As the headmost ships approached, Graves made signal for all ships to close to one cable and bear down and engage— the signal for the line still flying.
The London, who had her main topsail to the mast,14 filled and bore down. According to the log of the London recorded by the Flag Secretary, at 4:11 the signal for the line ahead was hauled down that it might not interfere with the signal for close action. The headmost ships, when within musket shot, opened the engagement with a brisk fire which extended successively to the twelfth ship in line or two ships to the rear of the London.
The flagship, by leading, had advanced further towards the enemy than some other ships ahead, and, while luffing to bring her lee broadside batteries into action, blanketed the fire of the Royal Oak next ahead.15 Other ships toward the van were
14 Hove to with bare steerage way on.
15 Captain White, an eye-witness on one of the rear ships, in Naval Researches, etc., attributes this confusion to have been caused by ships ahead of the London underestimating the distance and hauling up too soon from the tasking (diagonal) course in order to engage. The results in either case, however, would be similar.
likewise crowded which caused Graves at 4:22 to hoist again the signal for the line ahead.
While the ships were being extended, the London hove to while firing. Five minutes later the signal for the line came down and the signal for close action was again made. At 5:20 signal for close action was repeated. The wind continued to haul ahead bringing it about east which placed the French van to windward of the center. De Grasse wishing to make the action general bore off his vanguard. The British rear division, under Admiral Hood, at 5:30 bore up16 but was unable to get within effective range. At 6:15 Graves sent the Solely to ships in the rear, and the Fortunee to those in the van with orders for his ships to keep in a parallel line with the enemy and well abreast of them during the night. At 6:23 he made signal for line ahead at one cable’s length and hauled down that for close action.
Darkness terminated the battle at 6:30. At 9:00 the Montague reported being so badly damaged she could not keep the line. The London had her fore and main masts dangerously wounded, standing and running rigging much cut, inner gammoning of bowsprit shot through, and sails torn. The Shrewsbury’s captain lost a leg, the first lieutenant (executive) was killed and both topsail yards were shot away. The Intrepid was badly cut up in every respect. The Princessa’s main top-gallant mast was hit and about to fall, and Admiral Drake shifted his flag to the Alcide. The Terrible had so many leaks that she was set fire to on the night of the ninth. The Ajax was hulled very severely, and leaky. This was no sham battle, the results were decisive enough.
The British casualties were ninety killed and 246 wounded, while the French gave their loss as 200 killed and wounded, including the captain of the Reflechi.
Before proceeding further, it is well to comment on certain phases of the action. It
16 "Bearing up” and “bearing down,” although seemingly opposite, frequently meant the same thing; for example, a fleet close hauled to windward of another and wishing to bring it to action, would first “bear up” (sail large or before the wind) and is then "bearing down” upon the fleet to leeward.
will be noted that at no time were the last seven ships of the British line near enough to take an effective part. Thus, we have the sad spectacle of an attacking inferior fleet reducing its effective strength from nineteen to twelve by failure of the rear vessels to get into action. This failure was due to the ancient fetish that an enemy fleet could only be approached in a regular line of battle equally extended with that of their opponent, and in consequence of the oblique angle which the British line made with the French, with the van nearer the enemy. Those British vessels which did engage approached nearly head-on, which is an inherent disadvantage of the weather gage, thus exposing themselves to a destructive diagonal or partly enfilading fire. Thus Graves almost exactly repeated the tactical blunder of Byng before Port Mahon, Minorca, in 1756, for which mistake he was court-martialed and shot.
Admiral Hood, a brilliant officer whose ability as a tactician is unquestioned, claimed that the enemy van and center should have been attacked before the rear had gotten clear of Cape Henry. The vessels in leaving Lynnhaven straggled badly because the lack of weatherly qualities of some made a tack to port necessary before they could clear the Capes. Hood estimated that a full hour and a half elapsed within which the enemy van and center could have been attacked unsupported.
He also avers that the commander-in-chief committed the further mistake of keeping the signal for the line of battle flying until nearly sunset. Hood took the view that, while that signal was flying, it was obligatory on him to maintain the position in column, each ship following his leader. It appears that he would have willingly taken a more active part were it not for the persistence of his superior in maintaining the line which kept the rear division where it could be of no service. This is one of the instances where a kind of sanctity appears to have been attached to “the line” in the estimation of so many admirals of that day. The British Fighting Instructions, Article XIX, reenforced by the sentence of Admiral Mathews,17 had apparently established the belief that to disorder the line for the purpose of beating the
17 Mathews was court-martialed and disgraced for breaking his line to attack in the action off Toulon in 1743.
enemy was conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. This idea had hung like a millstone around the neck of the British Navy for nearly a century until able and intelligent men, such as Hood and Rodney, sounded the tocsin of revolt which after this battle resulted in the abolition of copybook methods of fighting.
Hood’s criticism of Graves indicates no consciousness of wrong-doing for not bringing the rear into action. He stated:
Had the center gone to the support of the van, and the signal for the line been hauled down, or the commander-in-chief had set the example of close action, even with the signal for the line flying, the van of the enemy must have been cut to pieces, and the rear division of the British fleet would have been opposed to those ships the center division fired at, and at the proper distance for engaging, or the Rear Admiral who commanded it would have a great deal to answer for.
The log of the London refutes the statement that the signal for the line was kept continuously flying.
Captain White, then a young officer on one of the ships of Hood’s division, says on this point:
Will that log (London’s) or the log of any other individual ship in the fleet confirm the statement thus published to the world? (By friends of Graves). If they do, I shall be induced to fancy that what I that day saw and heard was a mere chimera of the brain, and, that what I believed to be the signal for the line, was not a union jack, but an ignis fatuus conjured up to mock me.
The trouble was caused entirely by a misunderstanding as to the proper course of action to take while the signals for the "line” and "close action” were displayed at the same time. Graves undoubtedly meant to attack at close range but he also wanted the individual ships to keep their places. The Fighting Instructions and the Signal Book were too antiquated to rescue him from the dilemma. It was a physical impossibility for his juniors to obey literally, incompatible signals. The next day Graves endeavored to clear up the point by a memorandum to the effect that the signal for battle should not be rendered ineffective by strict adherence to the line signal. But this explanation of what the signals meant to his own mind came too late. The irretrievable damage was done.
Chance seems to have given the English the most opportune moment for the battle when the opposing force was the least prepared. It was not without reason that Admiral Graves afterwards wrote "the fifth of September was, I confess, a moment of ambition to me.” And well it might have been!
It was Graves’s intention to renew the battle the next day, but daylight disclosed his ships too badly damaged to keep the line, and, although practically calm, he held his wind while attempting repairs. On the seventh at noon, the wind changed to favor the French, and de Grasse approached and maneuvered during the night to preserve the wind, but at daybreak on the eighth the wind again favored Graves which enabled his fleet to look to windward of the French, who were then in bow and quarter line on the starboard tack, but de Grasse perceiving it, tacked his fleet together, forming a line approaching the enemy, who was upon contrary tack in line. De Grasse signaled for his van to pass to windward of the enemy who was then attempting to form line of battle by tacking in succession to come on the same tack and parallel to the French. It appears that Graves then realized how dangerous such a movement was, and to continue it would expose him to attack before his line could be half formed. Some ships had already tacked when he wore fleet together and formed line astern of his rear guard by which he gave up the weather gage.
In the nights of the eighth and ninth another variation of the wind gave the English the weather gage, but during the night of the ninth, by superior sail power, the French again regained it and under a press of sail stood for the Capes.
On the tenth Hood was much alarmed over the situation, so much so that he took upon himself the rather awkward and unpleasant task of sending advice to his superior officer. By his repeating frigate he sent the following letter to Graves:
Barfleur, at Sea, September 10, 1781.
Sir: I flatter myself you will forgive the liberty I take in asking whether you have any knowledge where the French fleet is, as we can see nothing of it from the Barfleur.
By the press of sail de Grasse carried yesterday (and lie must even have done the same the preceding night, judging from where lie was at daylight), I am inclined to think his aim is the Chesapeake, in order to be strengthened by the ships there, either by adding them to his present force, or by exchanging his disabled ships for them. Admitting that to be his plan, will he not cut off the frigates you have sent to reconnoiter, as well as the ships you expect from New York? And if he should enter the bay, which is by no means improbable, will he not succeed in giving most effectual succour to the rebels?
I trust you will pardon the offer of my humble sentiments, as they are occasioned by what passed between us, when I had the honour of attending your summons on board the London, on the eighth, in the evening.
I am, Sir,
Your most obedient, humble Servant,
(Signed) Sam. Hood. Rear-Admiral Graves, &c., &c., &c.
Graves sent for Hood and Drake, and it was decided to make for the Capes. But it was now too late, de Grasse was almost inside.
The maneuvers after the first day’s action are interesting only to complete the record and to show how skillfully de Grasse decoyed Graves away from the Capes in order that de Barras might enter unmolested. Graves was unaware of this deception, assuming all the time from the size of the French fleet that de Barras had already joined.
It was Hood’s opinion that Graves should have gone into the Chesapeake immediately after the engagement of the fifth for the purpose of seizing the anchorage left by de Grasse and establishing touch with Cornwallis, a feat similar to his own a few months later at Basseterre of St. Kitts which establishes a presumption that it might have been done. But the questions can be fairly asked: Was not the British fleet badly disabled? What would de Grasse have been doing all this time, would he not have attacked again? If Graves had gotten in, would he have found material for refitting his ships and in this event would he not have been trapped and annihilated by the combined fleets of de Barras and de Grasse? There can hardly be a doubt that Graves thought this move impracticable.
We know that during these later maneuvers Graves was considerably worried over the condition of his crippled and numerically inferior fleet, and well he may have been had de Grasse decided to attack. On the eighth a half a gale was blowing and the Terrible made signals of distress and soon after dark her main topmast went by the board and the foremast was expected to follow at any minute. This misfortune in sight of a superior enemy, who kept his fleet extended and in motion, put him in a situation not to be envied and filled his mind with anxiety. While in this predicament, the Pegasus joined from New York with the intelligence that six victuallers and a storeship under convoy for New York had fallen in with a French fleet and been captured, and a delayed letter from Rodney telling of the sailing of de Grasse and Hood from the West Indies, and other belated information.
The frigates Richmond and Iris were despatched to the Chesapeake with despatches from Clinton to Cornwallis, and to reconnoiter. They played the French a shabby trick by cutting adrift all their anchor buoys in Lynnhaven Roads, but it is likely that the anchors were nearly all recovered later. They paid for this unkind act by being cut off and captured by the incoming French fleet.
De Grasse arrived in the Chesapeake on the eleventh and was pleased to find his strategy justified as de Barras had entered the day before. The combined fleets, comprising thirty-six ships of the line, united under de Grasse18 and anchored at Lynnhaven.
On the tenth, when the French fleet was out of sight of the London, the frigate Medea was sent to reconnoiter. She returned and reported the French at anchor inside. Graves asked Hood for his opinion as to the next move to be made under the circumstances. Hood’s reply ill concealed his chagrin, stating it was nothing more than he expected from the press of sail the French carried on the night of the eighth and on the ninth which made it very clear to him what de Grasse’s intentions were. Sir Samuel “would he very glad to send an opinion but he really knows not what to say in the truly lamentable state we have brought ourselves.”
A council of war was held on the London on September 13, and it was resolved to proceed to New York and put the ships in the best state for service. With the return of the English to New York, the mastery of the sea was definitely surrendered to the French who were now free to lend full cooperation to the forces on land and bring the campaign to a speedy close.
During this interval the American and French armies had reached the mouth of the Elk River at the head of Chesapeake Bay. The van of these forces, under Count d’ Austine, embarked on American vessels and reached Williamsburg (twelve miles
18 De Barras, although senior, magnanimously waived his rank to serve under his junior.
from Yorktown) by way of the James River on the nineteenth; the remainder, under Marquis Viomesnil, marched to Baltimore and Annapolis and embarked on frigates and transports sent by de Grasse under command of Marquis de Villebrune. On the twenty-fourth all united at Williamsburg. Washington and Rochambeau had been there from the thirteenth, having come overland with their aides de camp. On the eighteenth they came on board the Ville de Paris to concert their plans.
De Grasse then left the anchorage at Lynnhaven, where ships were not safe in northerly weather, and anchored in line at the mouth of the York with springs on his cables ready to repel the British if, when reenforced by the expected arrival of Admiral Digby from England, they should attempt to relieve Cornwallis. This position also enabled him to quicken the siege by facilitating the transport of munitions and stores. Three vessels were also sent to anchor with springs on their cables at the mouth of the James. On the thirtieth, at the request of Washington, de Grasse detached 800 marines from his ships to reenforce Marquis de Choisy who was blockading Gloucester with the Duke de Langun’s Legion of 2,000 Americans.
Yorktown was invested on the twenty- ninth, trenches opened on October 6 and 7, and on the seventeenth Cornwallis asked for a stipulation. The articles of capitulation were signed and the formal surrender of 7,247 troops and 2,000 sailors took place on the nineteenth.
Admiral Digby arrived in New York from England with the Prince George (90), Canada (74), and the Lion (64), reenforced by the Torbcy (74) and the Prince William (64)—Rodney’s ships from Jamaica—and on the day of the surrender he left with twenty-five ships of the line and Clinton with 7,149 troops on transports intending to relieve Cornwallis.19 They arrived at the Capes on the twenty-fourth and were met by scouting vessels with the news of the surrender. Seeing de Grasse at anchor in a crescent-shaped formation with thirty-six sail of the line extending from York Spit to the Horseshoe, he dared not enter, and after cruising offshore for several days with the vain hope of enticing the French out, Graves left for New York on the twenty-ninth, arriving November 2.
19 Graves still retained command.
No further attempt to retrieve the situation was made. It was realized that a decision had been reached. De Grasse, anxious to fulfill his engagements in the West Indies, embarked the troops of St. Simon and sailed from American shores on November 5.
It matters not to this campaign that de Grasse was met and defeated, and himself in the Ville de Paris captured by Rodney soon afterwards at Dominica; his fame will always remain secure in America. This great combined movement of military and naval forces was carried out with truly remarkable precision—notwithstanding slow communications—and it is to de Grasse and sea power as he handled it that America owes unending gratitude. The successful conclusion could not have been had without control of the sea, which thanks to poor distribution of ships and poorer tactics against the ability of de Grasse rested safely for America’s cause.
Naval warfare in the War for American Independence has not been studied among us as fully as its intrinsic value merits, nor is our debt to the influence of sea power generally recognized. Had the educators of America sensed this source of national strength and safety, and duly appreciated its bearing upon the birth and life of the nation, and had they seen to it that the lesson was taught in the schools, it is but reasonable to suppose that crafty diplomats and scheming politicians would have been unable to persuade the United States Senate to lend sanction to the Limitation of Armament Treaty at Washington, 1922, by which our country was deprived of its right to fortify and develop its Far Eastern bases in locations that control its possessions (as all other nations are allowed to do), and which permits the Open Door to be closed. Still less would it have consented to sacrifice the nation’s security and posterity’s birthright to its fair share of the world’s trade by scrapping three hundred and thirty millions of dollars’ worth of modern line of battleships, which money had actually been spent, while its nearest competitor scrapped a few dollars’ worth of blueprints.
Is this blunder going to occur again at Geneva or at the expiration of the Washington Treaty in 1932, are the people of the United States going to sanction further weakening of its Navy already reduced appreciably below even its treaty strength, or is too late to learn the lesson which George Washington sought to teach us when he wrote:
In an open operation and under all circumstances, a decisive naval superiority is to be considered as a fundamental principle, and the basis upon which every hope of success must ultimately depend.
America must not forget!
Editor’s Note: On pages XXX, XXXI and XXXII are reproductions of famous paintings by the artist, John Ward Dunsmore, who has generously given special permission to the Naval Institute to publish them. These are copyrighted and must not be republished. In the February number of the Proceedings the remainder of his paintings, some thirty-seven, will be reproduced.