FROM 1 JUNE TO 1 JULY
THREE POWER NAVAL CONFERENCE
Aims of Powers.—The Three Power Conference for Limitation of Naval Armament held its first meeting at Geneva on June 20, and when this issue of the Proceedings went to press was still in session. The chief representatives were Ambassador Hugh L. Gibson and Admirals H. P. Jones and A. T. Long for the United States; First Lord of the Admiralty W. C. Bridgeman, Viscount Cecil, Admiral Jellicoe and Admiral Field, Deputy Chief of Staff, for England; and Viscount Ishii and Admiral Saito for Japan. In general terms the American delegates sought to apply the 5-5-3 ratio to cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, with the definite tonnages for each nation in each class, not far below the present status. The British desired to reopen the question of capital ship tonnage and if possible secure further reductions in this type, and in the second place to limit and eventually eliminate 10,000-ton, eight-inch gun cruisers, and maintain their predominance in smaller cruisers of 7500 tons and six-inch guns, which with the many British bases would he of equal value to them, while giving increased potential value to the forty or more liners and large vessels of their merchant marine which could be armed with six-inch guns. The Japanese proposals were not easy to grasp, but proposed limiting the tonnage of each nation in auxiliaries to vessels now built or building while excluding from consideration small submarines and aircraft carriers under 10,000 tons. It allowed for certain “special adjustments” to balance fleets, such as substitution of cruisers for destroyers by the United States.
An expert committee was formed on June 21 to reach agreement as to the existing tonnage of auxiliaries of each of the three nations, and study the three sets of proposals. As the conference went on, it became clear that the American delegates would firmly refuse to consider reopening the capital ship question, prior to the next general conference in 1931, and Japan acquiesced in this view, although at the time she appeared willing to endorse the British proposal. Furthermore, the United States refused to consider the elimination of 10,000-ton cruisers, or to grant Great Britain’s need of greater cruiser tonnage than ours. Great Britain disclaimed any desire to exceed the United States in total naval strength. On June 30, the expert committee agreed to limit destroyers to 1,000 tons and destroyer leaders to 1,850 tons, and to apply the term cruiser to auxiliary vessels of larger tonnage. To indicate the aims of the three powers, whatever the final decisions reached, the proposals of each nation are here given.
United States Proposals
- The proposed new treaty to supplement the Washington Treaty should be coterminous with it and contain provisions for extension or modification similar to those of the Washington Treaty. It might he desirable to provide for the possibility of reconsideration in the event that the requirements of national security of any contracting power in respect of naval defense are, in the opinion of that power, materially affected by any change of circumstances.
- Provisions for the limitation of auxiliary naval armament should he by classes of vessels as follows:
- The cruiser class.
- The destroyer class.
- The submarine class.
- An exempt class, not subject to a limitation.
- Limitation by total tonnage in each of the several classes should be modified as necessary to provide for transition from the status quo to the final tonnages in each of the several classes.
- The United States, while suggesting tonnage limitations of various classes, will accept as low a total tonnage limitation in each of the several classes of auxiliary vessels, on the basis of the principles of the Washington Treaty ratio, as the British Empire and Japan will accept.
Definitions.—The cruiser class shall include all surface naval combatant vessels which are of standard displacement of more than 3,000 tons and not exceeding 10,000 tons and not carrying guns exceeding eight inches in caliber.
The destroyer class shall include all surface naval combatant vessels of standard displacement of 600 tons and not more than 300 tons, which have a designated speed greater than seventeen knots.
The submarine class shall include all vessels designed to operate below the surface of the sea.
An unrestricted class to include vessels of limited combatant value. The technical definition of vessels to fall within such a class should be the subject of future agreement.
Replacement.—The age limit for replacement in the several classes shall be as follows :
- Cruisers, twenty years;
- Destroyers, fifteen to seventeen years.
- Submarines, twelve to thirteen years.
Limitations.—Proposals for tonnage limitations by classes:
Cruiser classes.—For the United States, 250,000 to 300,000 tons.
For the British Empire, 250,000 to 300,000 tons.
For Japan, 150,000 to 160,000 tons.
Destroyer Classes.—For the United States, 200,000 to 250,000 tons.
For the British Empire, 200,000 to 250,000 tons.
For Japan, 120,000 to 150,000 tons.
Submarine Class.—For the United States, 60,000 to 90,000 tons.
For the British Empire, 60,000 to 90,000 tons.
For Japan, 36,000 to 54,000 tons.
In order to provide for the transition from the status quo to the proposed definitive tonnage limitation in the cruiser and destroyer classes, it is suggested that during the transition period existing cruiser and destroyer tonnage be considered together and that the tonnage to be scrapped be the excess over the combined cruiser and destroyer tonnage limitations. Replacement in each class should, however, only be permitted within the allowed maximum tonnage of that class. As applied to cruisers on the basis of a total tonnage of 300,000 tons and to destroyers on the basis of a total tonnage of 250,000 tons, the proposal would work out as indicated below:
- The total combined tonnage of both cruiser and destroyer classes of vessels of all ages shall not exceed at any time:
For the United States—550,000 tons.
For the British Empire—550,000 tons.
For Japan—330,000 tons.
- The total tonnage of the cruiser class, less than twenty years old from date of completion, shall not be augmented so as to exceed:
The United States—300,000 tons.
The British Empire—300,000 tons.
Japan—180,000 tons.
- The total tonnage of the destroyer class, less than fifteen years old from date of completion, shall not be augmented so as to exceed:
The United States—250,000 tons.
The British Empire—250,000 tons.
Japan—150,000 tons.
- All excess in the allowed combined tonnage of vessels of the cruiser and destroyer classes now existing shall be scrapped. The choice of vessels to be scrapped shall be made by the power whose vessels are to be scrapped. Within the allowed tonnages no vessels scrapped shall be replaced until the date when she would have reached the age limit of her class.
British Proposals
Proposal No. 1 at once brought the Washington agreement into discussion by bringing up ship categories already decided at Washington in 1921 and definitely out of consideration at Geneva under the terms of the Coolidge invitation.
This proposal was to extend the accepted life of battleships from twenty to twenty- six years, which would force the United States to keep in commission for that much longer time thirteen ships with a fifteen degree gun elevation and maximum range of 22,000 yards against twenty-two British ships with a twenty degree elevation and a minimum range of 24,000 yards.
Proposal 2 was for limiting the life of eight-inch gun cruisers to twenty-four years, of destroyers to twenty years, and submarines to fifteen years, against the American suggestion of twenty, fifteen and twelve years. If the British plan were accepted, that nation would be forced to scrap about 80,000 tons in the cruiser category, while America would be obliged to build up to 150,000 tons over the present program, which calls for cruisers not yet begun.
Proposal No. 3 was a reduction in size of battleships “to be built in future” from the present limit of 35,000 tons to “something under 30,000 tons.” This would permit Britain to keep her new ships, the Rodney and the Nelson, each mounted with nine six-inch guns and which are the most formidable vessels ever launched, while the biggest American units would remain the West Virginia and Maryland, with inferior armament and already six years old, while Japan’s chief units arc already three years old.
Proposal No. 4 was a reduction in the future size of guns in battleships from the present limit of sixteen-inch to thirteen-and- a-half-inch. This would keep the American Navy in third place so far as armament is concerned as it would be impossible to build up to the agreed tonnage ratio except with smaller guns.
Proposal No. 5 was limitation of the displacement of aircraft carriers to 25,000 tons, instead of the present 27,000.
Proposal No. 6 was a reduction of guns on aircraft carriers from eight-inch to six- inch. This would force the United States to scrap the Lexington and Saratoga, each 35,000 tons, with eight-inch guns, while Britain retained six carriers already of 25,000 tons. Reduction in the size of guns would, in addition, permit forty-two British merchant ships of more than twenty knots speed to be converted into this category. They arc now unable to mount eight-inch guns, but six- inch ones would fit perfectly—according to both British and American naval architects.
Proposal No. 7 was acceptance of the existing ratio of 5-5-3 for cruisers of 10,000 tons and eight-inch guns. This would permit the United States to carry out the present Congressional authorization of ten such boats, which would bring the total to only 155,000 tons, or fifty per cent short of the total suggested by Mr. Gibson in his presentations.
Proposal No. 8 was a limitation of 7,500 tons and six-inch guns on all future cruisers after the number of 10,000-ton cruisers had been decided upon. This is the kernel of the British proposals, for it is well known that everything under this size of ship can only mount six-inch guns. This, therefore, would let in the entire British merchant marine. This British thesis was supported by Japan, who has a mysterious clause in her program as read by Admiral Saito asserting that ships with a maximum of four six-inch guns do not come within the competence of the conference.
Proposal No. 9 was limitation of the displacement of destroyer leaders to 1,700 tons and of destroyers to 1,400 tons. Great Britain now has eighteen destroyer leaders, or super-destroyers, mounting five-inch guns, against American destroyers with four-inch guns, so that America would have to build hastily up to this number of ships and equal caliber if she wanted to keep the ratio.
As to the destroyers themselves, it is the only class in which the United States now leads, except that more than half, according to naval experts, are now obsolete. One hundred and six in commission are due for the scrap heap in two more years if the American age limit of twelve years suggested by Mr. Gibson is adopted. Under British proposals America must keep these boats eight more years, building no new ones meanwhile, as she is already up to the proposed destroyer ratio.
Large type submarines would be limited to 1,600 tons and small type to 600 tons. This would immediately render useless all American seagoing submarines, three of which are built and three more authorized, of the V type displacing 2,100 tons. Fifty coastwise American submarines of the S type of 800 to 900 tons also are too big to meet the British idea.
This, according to Mr. Bridgeman, forms part of Britain’s avowed campaign against all submarines as a direct menace to her merchant marine as they proved in the last war. His proposal, however, would permit five-inch guns for all types, whereas only America’s six big submarines, which would need to be scrapped under such an arrangement, carry guns of that caliber, the smaller submarines mounting four-inch guns.
Japanese Proposals
N.B. Capital ships and aircraft carriers covered by the Washington Naval Treaty arc not included in this proposal.
- None of the conferring powers shall, for such period of time as may be agreed upon, adopt new building programs or acquire ships with the purpose of increasing its naval strength.
- By the term “naval strength,” used in Article 1, is meant the total tonnage comprised in the category of submarines to be agreed upon on the basis (a) of the tonnage of completed ships actually possessed by each power which have not reached the replacement age specified in Article 4 and (b) of the designed tonnage of ships now in course of construction by that power.
In determining the naval strength to he allotted to each power (a), the designed tonnage of ships not yet laid down but which are embodied in authorized building programs and (b) the tonnage of ships which will pass the replacement age during the execution of such programs shall also be taken into consideration.
- The following ships are excluded from the application of the foregoing two articles:
(a) Ships not exceeding 700 tons in displacement.
(b) Surface ships carrying no gun exceeding three inches in caliber or carrying not more than four guns exceeding three inches and not exceeding six inches in caliber, with or without any number of guns not exceeding three inches in caliber, provided, however, that the speed thereof shall not exceed twenty knots.
(c) Aircraft carriers under 10,000 tons.
- Each power may replace ships which shall have passed the ages hereunder specified or which shall have been lost by the construction or acquisition of ships of the corresponding category within the limits of the naval strength prescribed under Article 2.
Surface auxiliary craft above 3,000 tons, sixteen years; under 3,000 tons, twelve years; submarine, twelve years.
Provided that, although the normal ages for the replacement of ships are those above specified, exceptions may be permitted in case the conditions at present prevailing call for any special adjustments to be made.
- Any tonnage in excess of the naval strength prescribed in accordance with the provisions of Articles 1 and 2, as also any ships replaced by others under the provisions of Article 4, shall be disposed of according to the provisions to be agreed upon.
- Appropriate regulations shall be provided in respect of replacement construction in order to avoid sudden displacements of naval strength as between the conferring powers and to equalize as far as possible the amount of annual construction undertaken by each.
MEETING OF LEAGUE COUNCIL
Germany Asks Voice in Mandates.— At the regular quarterly meeting of the League of Nations Council at Geneva in the middle of June, the German delegate, Foreign Minister Stresemann, took, as has been his practice, the opportunity to bargain with France and England over the evacuation of the Rhineland, proposing that, if the demand for immediate evacuation were not pressed, Germany should be given in compensation a seat on the commission for supervision of mandates. This demand took M. Briand and Mr. Chamberlain by surprise, but otherwise brought no results at the time.
Aside from routine matters, the council was called upon to consider a protest registered by Albania against Jugoslavia for “brutal and unconciliatory demands” made for the release of an interpreter attached to the Jugoslav embassy in Albania and arrested by Albania as a spy. This was followed immediately, June 5, by rupture of diplomatic relations. The Albanian protest, it was believed, was supported if not inspired by Italy, which thus succeeded in casting on Jugoslavia the onus of blame for the present dangerous tension along the Jugoslav-Albanian frontier.
FRANCE
No Debt Agreement Ratification.— Replying to an interpellation in the Chamber, early in June, M. Poincare for the first
time came out with the definite statement that he did not intend to call for the ratification of either the Franco-American or Franco-British Debt Agreements. He declared that lie expected to secure better terms, and felt that it would he useless in any case to ask Parliament to ratify the present agreements.
Notes on International .iffairs
Peace Treaty Proposals.—The informal suggestion made by M. Briand last spring for a treaty between France and the United States “outlawing war” took more definite shape in draft proposals which Ambassador Herrick brought hack from Paris late in June. The proposals, said to he very simple and direct in form, will not be made public until after further negotiations in Washington.
Cahinet Ridiculed for Daudet Release.—France and the rest of the world were amused by the news that on June 25, the French Royalist leader and editor Leon Daudet, imprisoned for attacks on the police and government, had been released by the simple device of sending “faked” orders for his release from the Ministry of the Interior during the noon hour. An imprisoned communist leader was set free at the same time. It was believed that the ridicule arising from the affair might weaken the Poincare Cabinet.
RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE
Assassination of Soviet Envoy.— While welcoming at Warsaw the Soviet chart a d'affaires expelled from England, the Soviet ambassador at Warsaw, Peter Vojkov, was shot and killed on June 7 by a former Russian royalist—a youth named Boris Kovenho. For a time the affair threatened international complications. A series of notes was exchanged between Warsaw and Moscow, the Soviet government demanding a share in the investigation and a general sweeping up of royalist plotters in Polish territory. The Polish government expressed regret and made numerous arrests, hut refused to take seriously the more violent Soviet demands, regarding them as intended chiefly for home consumption.
Soviet Terrorism Renewed.—Following the break with England and the murder of Vojkov, which the Soviets attributed to British agencies, a renewed campaign against counter-revolutionaries was instituted by the Soviet authorities. Up to June 15 it was reported that fifty-five executions had taken place since Vojkov's death. A proclamation was issued at Moscow on June 9 purporting to give concrete evidence of British hostile activities in Soviet territory and calling for “decisive measures against spies, incendiaries, murderers, and their tzarist and white allies.”
Rumanian Caiiinet Upset.—The Averescue Ministry in Rumania resigned on June 5 under orders from King Ferdinand, and a new so-called “national cabinet” was formed under Prince Babu Stirbey. The Averescue ministry was created in March, 1926, after the resignation of Premier Bratiano, the “hereditary dictator,” hut was regarded as a mere screen behind which Bratiano continued to run the country. Prince Stirbey is a brother-in-law of Bratiano, and the change is thus not likely to upset Bratiano’s hold on Rumanian politics or his opposition to Carol as heir to the throne.
FAR EAST
Feng and Ciiiang Join Hands.—Negotiations early in June between Chang Tsolin and Chiang Kai-shek, the chief leaders in Northern and Southern China, apparently came to no result. A subsequent agreement, however, was reported between Chiang and the “Christian general,” Feng Yu-hsiang, which promised a decided strengthening of the Nationalist forces. As a result of this agreement, Feng sent a telegram to Hankow demanding the expulsion of all communists and the return of Borodin to Russia. He also agreed to join in a concerted drive toward Peking.
During June, Nationalist forces continued their advance into Shantung province and were reported on June 21 in possession of the port of Tsing-tao, and later in occupation of Hangchwang. Southern army leaders charged that Japanese troops in Shantung were fighting on the side of the Northerners, and although this was not fully substantiated, a virulent anti-Japanese propaganda was carried on throughout Nationalist China, and the anti-Japanese boycott at Shanghai gained strength.
In view of threatened hostilities in the North, 16,000 troops were sent by the powers early in June from Shanghai to Tientsin, including 1,600 U. S. marines and 400 artillerymen.
SUMMARY OF "FOREIGN AFFAIRS” QUARTERLY
The Middle West Looks Abroad.— Foreign Affairs Quarterly for July has several articles of unusual interest and significance. In “The Middle West Looks Abroad” Arthur Capper points out the greatly increased interest of farmers in international matters, due to (1) their desire for tariff protection for wheat and other farm products, (2) their concern over the success of Canadian cooperative wheat marketing and over increased imports to the United States of Canadian wheat and Argentine cattle, and (3) their enlarged outlook as a result of the World War and their cooperation in international agricultural organizations.
France vs. Italy.—In “France and Italy” Henry de Jouvenel shows the causes of increased ill feeling between France and Italy to be: (1) Italy’s desire for a colonial partnership with France in which “Italy would supply the partner and France would supply the colonies”; (2) Italy’s criticism of republican institutions and of France as a decadent people; (3) Italy’s virtual assumption of a protectorate over Albania by the Treaty of Tirana, November, 1926, in which maintenance of the “political status quo” in Albania is guaranteed by Italy without reference to the League of Nations; (4) Italy’s aim to extend her influence in the Balkans; .(5) Italy’s naval superiority in the Mediterranean based on her naval equality with France and greater concentration of interests; (6) sharp friction and anti-French agitation on the frontiers.
Scrapping tiie Submarine.—The Submarine by Arthur Pollen argues, rather speciously, against the efficacy of the submarine and also the torpedo as instruments either against commerce or war vessels, and ends as follows:
In June, before this article is published, the Geneva conference of the three great naval powers will be in session. Will either Great Britain or America lead off with a renunciation of the submarine?—with a double renunciation of the submarine and the torpedo too? It needs the first only of these to insure a sound principle for future discussions. Before the Preparatory Commission, Great Britain and the United States insisted that the limitations of naval effectives were dependent on every one acknowledging the principle that naval armament should be limited according to tonnage and by category. Great Britain modified this to include a modification of numbers as well as tonnage—but still according to category. The French held out for tonnage according to category, but not by numbers. It was left for Italy to propound the only sound principle, viz., that each country should arrange its total tonnage “to the best advantage of its national interest," regardless of categories—but giving six months’ notice of the types of vessel it proposed to construct. Except on one theory it is inexplicable that Britain and America should have opposed the Italian suggestion. My theory is that the Navy Department and the Admiralty simply have not the courage to act as the balance of expert opinion dictates. Each is afraid of being the first to renounce the submarine and the torpedo—possibly because behind the deciding voice there is still the clamor of conflicting opinion. Docs it not look as if we were keeping up our submarines and torpedoes, not because we believe in them ourselves, but because we fear the criticism that if others retain them we may be foregoing some unknown advantage?
We have had ten years now in which to think things over. The facts of the war arc there and the lesson of their analysis is unmistakable. For practical purposes the submarine has not rid itself of a single limitation, nor has the torpedo added to its real efficiency. That it has a larger head and greater range has, of course, added to the destructive power of the head, and the range at which a hit may conceivably be made. But power and long running have been purchased at a cost. The probability of hitting, both at short range and long, is manifestly lower than that of its predecessor. Meantime, it will be astonishing indeed if the means of countering the submarine have not multiplied and gained in force; if the means of detecting its presence have not improved; and if the weapons for destroying it, when located, have not advanced both in power and precision. Finally, the power of defending capital ships below water— one that was unsolved in 1914—is amply solved today. These Powers, then, that rely upon their battle fleets and therefore on their guns, have no excuse for retaining submarines at all, and would be well advised to balance the cost of torpedo armaments against the greater perfection which this expenditure can give them in the employment of what is unquestionably their main armament. If either Britain or the United States renounce even the submarine only, the way will be clear for adopting the Italian suggestion. A total tonnage limit would give free play to the judgment that can discriminate between the value of one weapon and another. So far as naval armament is concerned, it would not be long before the great Powers would recognize that the torpedo was obsolescent; the submarine out of date; and the seaplane of so limited utility that expenditure would not be enlarged by any such useless absurdities as aircraft carriers at twice the cost of battleships.