Limitation of Naval Armament
(See page 427, March, 1926, Proceedings.)
The Naval and Military Record, 31 March, 1926.—In the course of an interesting article upon “The Limitation of Naval Armament’’ which he contributes to the March number of the United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Capt. Walter S. Anderson, U. S. Navy, reviews the disabilities under which his country labors in consequence of the Washington Agreement. We have always held the view that the United States gave away more than she gained on that occasion. In almost academic terms, so moderate and judicial in his language, Capt. Anderson categorically deals with the disadvantages which America has incurred in her naval position in the international pact, which her initiative brought about. In the first place, he points out that the United States had to “sacrifice eleven partially-completed heavy warships, battleships, or battle cruisers,” whereas Great Britain only scrapped four, “in such an early stage as to be referred to as built or building.” This had no effect upon the balance of power as settled by the Treaty, but it meant a very heavy monetary loss to America, as against a relatively light one on the part of this country.
More serious still, in his view, is the contemplation of the character of the ships America was called upon to forego. The program which was “scuppered” was an attempt to remedy one grave defect in the composition of the United States fleet—the absence of battle cruisers. Great Britain and Japan each retain four battle cruisers. “These great heavily-armored ships, carrying guns of battleship caliber, can also make high, speed. They have speeds of about 28 knots an hour. No United States battleship can exceed a small fraction more than 21 knots. What is the United States to do if its commerce be attacked by battle cruisers? The United States has nothing that could overtake a battle cruiser that could not be promptly blown out of water by a battle cruiser.” This is, perhaps, rather an extravagant view, since battle cruisers are certainly not designed for commerce raiding. However since there are none of these vessels in Capt. Anderson’s Navy, he probably has not given much heed to their role. He comes to the conclusion that “the lack of battle cruisers may yet spell national disaster for the United States,” and under the Washington Treaty she cannot begin to remedy this lack until 1933.
Other Points
The attitude of the British Admiralty in declining to approve of any increase of turret-gun elevation in the earlier United States battleships Capt. Anderson regards as very unfair. He declares that thirteen battleships require to possess this greater elevation. “At present they are out-ranged by the guns of the British battleships, because the latter have the greater angles of elevation…The responsible authorities state that the older retained battleships of the United States require extensive betterments. They need to be reboilered, to be converted to oil-burners, and to have more horizontal deck armor as protection against aerial bombing. They also need ‘blisters’ or bulges of the hull at the turn of the bilges, or similar provision to protect them from underwater attack, in the same way the British ships have been protected.” We fancy Capt. Anderson is carrying his lament a little too far here. As we are “bulging” our Queen Elisabeths the United States is at equal liberty to “bulge” her earlier battleships. The Japanese, he says, are so sure of their right to increase turret gun elevation “that they actually have increased theirs.” The Japanese officially declare that they have done nothing of the sort.
When Capt. Anderson comes to the restrictions upon the development of United States naval bases in the Eastern Pacific he touches what, in our opinion, is by far the most serious disability imposed by the Washington Treaty. Japan insisted that while the capital ship ratio proposed by the American Government might be acceptable under existing conditions, it could not be regarded as acceptable by the Japanese Government if the Government of the United States should fortify or establish additional naval bases in the Pacific. It has always been a source of surprise on this side of the Atlantic that America should have agreed to such a stipulation; but there is the fact. As a result, her battle fleet has nowhere to go beyond Hawaii, in the event of war, while the Japanese possess a swarm of potential “flying” bases in the mandate islands.
It is clearly realized in the United States Navy that Manila and Guam would promptly fall to attack by Japan, and that the task of recovering these places, with no base to work from nearer than Honolulu, would be a very serious undertaking. The Pacific fleet is well equipped with auxiliaries to enable it to maintain itself at sea for some weeks. But as the line of communications lengthens, so do the difficulties increase. Capital ships absolutely must have a base from which to carry on operations. America virtually gave away the keys to her strategical strength in the Pacific when she ratified the Washington Treaty. British policy in developing Singapore renders her only the more keenly conscious of the fact.
Navy Service Schools
(See Page 691, April, 1926, Proceedings.)
Lieutenant Commander B. F. Tilley, U. S. Navy. i. Commander Oscar Smith’s article is very interesting particularly to officers now doing sea duty as heads of repair departments on repair ships and tenders. Thanks to the excellent service schools now functioning at the Naval Training Station, Hampton Roads, Virginia, the fleet is gradually obtaining these excellent men, and most ships are today in a position, for the first time in several years, to fill their allowed ship’s complement in machinist’s mates, boilermakers, blacksmiths, coppersmiths, and electricians. The mechanical and electrical divisions of this school are turning out very good to excellent material as shown by the aptitude and rapid advancement of the school graduates once they report on board ship. Not very long ago my ship received six graduates of the Hampton Roads Machinist’s Mate School. All are now machinist’s mates, second class, one of whom already has the qualifications for chief machinist’s mate, while two others of the six show that they will be first class machinist’s mates within two years, the time prescribed by the Bureau of Navigation. As I have had no supervision of men graduating from the general division of the school, I cannot comment on the graduates from this division.
2. The system and curriculum outlined by Commander Smith could not very well be improved upon. It is, in my opinion, a much better method to select men from the recruits at training stations, instruct and apprentice them in their trades ashore prior to their reporting on board ship, rather than to send candidates from sea to the school. Second cruise seamen and firemen have not the ambition of the recruit if the latter is above average in intelligence. I am not favorable to reducing the courses in the machinist’s mates and electrical schools from thirty-eight and thirty-two weeks respectively to fifteen weeks.
3. The service schools should be maintained as at present, reducing the number of graduates as allowed ship’s complements fill up in the fleets. It has been observed that graduates from these Navy service schools adapt themselves very quickly to military duties on board ship. In fact these men stand out in all-around ship’s work and military duties.' All graduates of the schools on this ship have qualified in swimming and all have qualified as marksmen or better the first time they ever fired a rifle on the range.
4. With these excellent service schools in being, one wonders sometimes if a boatswain’s mate or coxwain’s school at training stations would not be an asset to the service these days. The art of sailing a boat is now almost a curiosity and on most ships, when a life boat is lowered at sea, the rowing and boat handling is usually a terrible exhibition of elementary seamanship. Why not a school for boatswain’s mates and coxswains to make them qualify as real seamen? This school might consist of a two or three months’ concentrated “post graduate” seamanship course at the Newport Training Station or at St. Helena, prior to rating the men. We have many deck petty officers who cannot splice either rope or wire and who cannot sail a boat. Only a comparatively few deck petty officers can efficiently take out a life boat in a rough sea. Recently I heard an old-time chief boatswain with about thirty years’ service say in distraction, “Oh, for a couple of Swedes!” meaning his present deck petty officers were poor seamen in comparison with those of former days.
Although the service schools are turning out excellent material for machinist mate and artificer ratings no provision is yet existent for obtain'ng what is now required most of all—some real sea-going seamen for our deck petty officer ratings.
The Threshold of a New Era in International Law
(See Page 1367, July, 1926, Proceedings.)
New York Times, 5 May, 1926.—Washington, May 4.—Codification of International law by the League of Nations would not suit the purposes of all the world powers nor perform the services in this regard required by the Present state of world affairs, according to Dr. David Jayne Hill, former Ambassador to Germany, who discussed the subject today before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Dr, Hill, who appeared before the committee to urge favorable action on the resolution offered by Representative George H. Tinkham of Massachusetts requesting the President to call a Third Hague conference for the codification of international law, declared that the League of Nations had treated international law as a secondary matter.
The suggestion for such a conference contained in the Tinkham resolution does not appeal to the President as worthy of consideration at this time because of the vital and more pressing questions pending before the nations °f Europe.
The President feels that the countries of Europe are all concerned with their own affairs and, therefore, would not feel disposed at this time to join 'n another Hague conference to consider clarification of international law.
Dr. Hill told the House Committee that the League of Nations had rejected the unanimous recommendation of its Committee of Jurists, selected to propose a statute for the Permanent Court of International Justice, that a series of conferences be held at The Hague for the advancement of international law.
“It is true,” said Dr. Hill, “that after refusing to accept the advice of •his committee, the League has assumed the task of the codification of international law under its own auspices and control.
This assumption of control by a single group of powers will, however, be regarded by many persons as a denial of the equality of nations, a denial already embodied in the Constitution of the League, and, will, therefore, tend to diminish the prestige of its work, although conducted in good faith and by able men. Just as the Permanent Court of International Justice suffers in some quarters because it is the League’s court, there would be opportunity to complain that the law was the League’s law.
Arguing against modification by the League, Dr. Hill declared that judicial decisions by an international tribunal, made without any basis of accepted few, imply an exercise by the Judges of the sovereign authority involved in an act of legislation, “and, therefore, cannot be forced upon any nation, or even freely accepted by it, without a renunciation of its national sovereignty.”
On the other hand, said Dr. Hill, when an international tribunal undertakes to declare and apply a body of law previously agreed upon and accepted by the nations which appear before it, “the tribunal exercises a strictly judicial authority based upon a law made by the nations under judgment.”
He sketched the rules and doctrines now existing under the name of international law, and spoke of the work done by the first and second Hague conferences. The war, he pointed out, prevented the convocation of a third Hague conference.
“It should not be overlooked that the Hague conferences were designed to be, and were, in no respect military or political in their character, but wholly and solely judicial,” he said. “That is what is contemplated now—a conference devoid of politics and devoid of militarism—wholly judicial.”
In the peace settlement following the war, Dr. Hall said, the judicial idea was not repudiated, but it was subordinated.
“So far as it was retained,” he said, “it was made to conform to the exigencies of the military and political groundwork of the world alliances aimed at in the organization of the League of Nations.”
Dr. Hill insisted that, as the League of Nations is now organized, it is representative only of a group of powers, and asserted that the League was not qualified for the creation, revision or extension of international law, “which is the affair of all nations, and not to be controlled by any single group of powers.”
Dr. Hill suggested that the determination of the time for a conference such as is proposed by the Tinkham resolution, should be left to the President and his advisers.
He concluded with this statement:
It is highly probable that the United States will never regard as binding upon itself any rule of action resolved upon by any group of nations, however large, which has not received its reasoned consideration and its free consent as a rule of international law, and, if this is a just prerogative of the United States, it points toward a general conference as a proper and necessary source of authority for changes and extensions in the law of nations.
The Value of the Submarine in Naval Warfare
(See Page 83s, May, 1926, Proceedings.)
New York Times, 24 May, 1926.—Editorial, “The Submarine’s Future.”—In the new naval disarmament conference the question of abolishing submarines may be raised by Great Britain again. At the Washington Conference she had a measure of success in opposing the submarine. It was decided that “a merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have been first placed in safety,” and that no attack on such a ship should be made except after refusal to .submit to visit and search. The signatory Powers also condemned as an act of piracy the seizure and destruction of merchant ships when the humane rules of warfare were violated. The “practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce destroyers” was recognized. Other nations were invited to adhere to the agreement entered into by the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan.
In the United States Naval Institute Proceedings for May is an article about the value of the submarine in warfare by Admiral Spindler of the German Navy. He had charge of the construction of submarines during the Great War. The translation is by Commander W. P. Beehler, United States Navy, retired. It seems that before the outbreak of war in 1914 Germany had no plan of using submarines against an enemy’s commerce, nor was her submarine force out of proportion to other units of the fleet. The submarine was regarded as one of the numerous auxiliaries in naval warfare. But when three English cruisers were sunk by the U-9 in September, 1914, “without the slightest counter-offensive,” the type was added rapidly to the service. No less than 343 boats were placed in commission during the war. Germany drew on her large reserve of officers and men for crews. The number of German submarines destroyed was 166, of which thirty- seven were sunk by mines and thirty-three by depth charges. “Of the many defensive measures,” says Admiral Spindler, “the very excellent development of the English convoy system for merchantmen proved an exceedingly great obstacle for the German submarine.” Many were the U-boats sent to the bottom by convoying warships. Strategically the Germans waged their submarine warfare at a disadvantage, for it was easy to blockade “the German Sight, located in a small angle of the North Sea,” with mine fields. Then the narrow Dover Channel could be well protected, and “the stretch of water between Norway and Scotland” was almost closed by mine fields with the valuable cooperation of the United States Navy. Great Britain’s anti-submarine forces included 65,000 men required for service on armed merchant vessels, 25,000 needed on auxiliary craft, and so many used for the manning, overhaul, supply and replacement of patrol vessels and in the shipbuilding yards that the German writer calculates that several hundred thousand men had to be withheld from the land operations in France. He says:
The possibility of success and the vulnerability of England have been proven. As long as submarines exist they will continue to be a threat to those nations which are unconditionally forced to rely upon overseas transportation.
The military value of submarines is said not to have been thoroughly tested during the war. Admiral Jellicoe admits in his book, The Grand Fleet that war vessels unscreened by destroyers were always in danger from submarine attack. He lost the fast cruisers Nottingham and Falmouth when the German high seas fleet steamed out toward Sunderland on August 19, 1916. Admiral Spindler’s list of British warships sunk by submarines during the war is impressive. That all sea powers believe the type is formidable the building of submarine cruisers indicates. Some are so large that they could find room for the crews of merchant ships overhauled and sunk. With increase of surface speed assured the new submarines could accompany a fleet mid be more formidable than ever.