The naval aircraft factory has played and will continue to play an important role in the development of naval aircraft. The report of the President’s Aircraft Board chairman, Mr. Dwight W. Morrow, made certain recommendations relative to the functions of the naval aircraft factory, and also how to promote the civil industry. The following quotations are taken from the report:
…We find specific criticism of the continued operation of the naval aircraft factory. We believe that this factory should not be used on a production basis in competition with private industry, but that its maintenance for certain repair and experimental purposes is justified…It does, however, seem feasible to lay down a general policy.
It appears that it should be possible, at this stage of the development of the art, to select a given type of machine as a standard for two or three years, with the understanding that, barring some extraordinary development, no change would be made within that time. The industry would then be assured of a continuous series of orders for a standard design, while an excessive multiplication of types of equipment in service would be avoided. Those advantages seem to outweigh the small gain in performance of the individual airplane that might at times result from a willingness to put a new type into service every few months. There should be a standard rate of replacement, selected to give a complete turnover of service equipment at definite intervals, so that the number of new pursuit machines ordered, for example, might show no extreme fluctuations from year to year.
We therefore recommend:
- The adoption of a policy of continuity in orders and of a standard rate of replacement.
- Production orders be given only to companies which maintain design staffs of reasonable size and keep them active.
- Proprietary rights in design be fully recognized.
- Governmental competition with the civil industry in production activity be eliminated except in those projects impracticable of realization by the civil industry.
- During a period of production of a type accepted as standard there be placed a succession of small orders for experimental designs to be given limited service tests, the best of these designs produced during a two or three year period being adopted as the next standard. Such orders, distributed among firms having design and production staffs of proven competence, should be awarded at a liberal price, high enough to cover all the overhead expense involved in the upkeep of the design and experimental departments.
- Existing statutes covering the procurement of supplies and requiring competitive bidding be modified where necessary to allow putting the recommendations previously made into effect.
For the naval aircraft factory to carry out the spirit and recommendations of the Morrow board report, and to develop economically a civil industry for rapid expansion to produce large volumes of naval aircraft, whenever the national emergency arises, this plan is proposed. (This was prepared during the fall of 1924, and has been modified only in a minor degree).
Functions of the Naval Aircraft Factory: The Bureau of Aeronautics Manual, [1923] defines the duties of the naval aircraft factory as follows:
Development and manufacture of experimental aircraft and aircraft accessories of a nature requiring confidential development or of a class of work that may be performed-more expeditiously or more economically at that place than at civil plants. Also, a limited amount of aircraft production work, sufficient to maintain a nearly constant experimental working force and to obtain information on civil production costs. The naval aircraft factory will include in its activities the maintenance of the aircraft material storehouses and the maintenance and distribution of material therein, and the engine-testing laboratory.
This definition is so worded as to make possible a very wide variety and flexibility of interpretation. It is believed that aviation policies are reaching the point where they can and should be crystallized into definite and concrete plans for development extending over a period of years, retaining only that flexibility that is essential to all development. An interpretation of the duties of the naval aircraft factory that will accomplish this is suggested.
Present Needs of Naval Aviation: The factory should at all times be an instrument for serving the needs of the operating establishment. The one great material need of naval aviation at the present instant, is not a plane of one or more given types that is superior in performance or other qualities to any planes that have yet been built; the need is simply for reliable modern airplanes in sufficient quantity to make fleet and station operations possible on an adequate scale. Given this, the development of superior types logically follows, and follows along lines of proven experience. Given this, naval aviation can be demonstrated to the fleet and to the nation, and its value proven beyond argument. Without this, no matter how certainly we in aviation know its value, the entire Navy will never be solidly behind development of aviation to its maximum potentialities.
The purposes for which planes will be used by the Navy have become quite definite. To provide the service with planes, it is suggested, first, that the best type of plane suitable for each purpose be decided upon—the type chosen to be actually now flying, and not in the design stage or under contemplation,—and, secondly, that a sufficient quantity of these planes to supply adequately the service for three years be ordered on production contracts with civilian concerns.
It is absolutely necessary to keep our civilian aircraft manufacturers supplied with sufficient work to enable them to exist. Such production contracts, placed at figures which allow reasonable profits, will not only supply this necessary work, thus having civilian organizations available for aircraft construction at times of national emergency, but will keep the contractors in touch with naval aircraft needs and may lead to valuable suggestions covering improvements in design.
The Use of Competitive Designs: The system that has been in recent use, that of securing development by competitive design, undoubtedly has certain important advantages. The practice has been, however, to require manufacturers not only to submit designs, but to build two or three actual planes. Production contracts are then awarded to the lowest bidder for the construction of planes, chosen on the basis of the comparative performance of completed planes. This method is not only costly for the department, but it is unsatisfactory to the civilian contractors. It is impossible to frame a contract covering new design and construction, which will be acceptable to civilian contractors and still adequately safeguard the government. Aeronautical contractors must gamble on the acceptance of the two or three planes they build in competitive designs, in hopes of a large production order, and those who are not awarded a production contract must recoup their losses as best they can on claims for additional work or alterations not covered by contract. Production orders as suggested in the preceding paragraph, on the other hand, put them from the beginning on a sound, industrial basis.
In order to retain all the desirable features of the present system, experimental planes must be built somewhere from competitive designs. In order to prevent duplication of effort and repetition of unpromising attempts, design development and experimental construction within the Navy should principally be concentrated at the same point. Then, when it became desirable to ask for competitive designs, only those designs, or parts of the designs that give great promise would be accepted and passed on for development and experimental construction. It is, therefore, suggested that almost all detail design and all experimental construction be concentrated at the naval aircraft factory, since this is work to which it is peculiarly adapted.
Since operation of an aircraft factory, even on production orders, requires a small engineering force, the concentration of the principal amount of experimental construction elsewhere would not cause the contractors to do away with their design facilities. It would, therefore, still be possible for the Department to ask for competitive designs, at the same time permitting these contractors to operate small design departments and large production departments at maximum efficiency, with a resulting minimum cost to the government.
The present appropriation for aircraft allows only a limited amount for new construction. If each commercial aircraft organization, in order to compete in preparation of new designs, must keep a design force capable of preparing drawings in detail sufficient for construction purposes, the costs of the plans will be out of all proportion to their value, and the limited aviation funds will be spent unwisely.
It would be possible, however, for the commercial organizations to prepare type plans, in competition, with the small design force necessary for productive work, and at small cost as compared with the cost of detail plans. The bureau could then study the designs submitted, choose the most promising, or possibly combine the best points of several, in order to develop a design to give the improvements desired. One complete set of detail plans could then be prepared instead of a complete set for each competitive design submitted, and the logical place for the preparation of most of these detail plans is the aircraft factory.
Experimental and Development Work at the Naval Aircraft Factory: The following plan for controlling experimental and development work at the factory is suggested as one which is both economical and well adapted to giving operating units confidence in what is being done for them. A small number—some eight or ten—pilots, with good service reputations and adequate engineering education, and each with special experience in a given class of aircraft, should be carefully selected, and assigned to the naval aircraft factory for duty as project flight engineers. At least two of the planes of each class that will have been decided upon to fill immediate needs, should be sent to the factory. It would be the duty of the factory pilots to thoroughly familiarize themselves with the past history and development of the types of planes to which assigned, and to keep in touch with contemporary development elsewhere. All improvements and suggestions regarding these types, that originate with operating units and elsewhere, should be examined by the pilot in charge of each type, and if at all feasible, should be incorporated in these planes and tested at the factory by these pilots. If the suggested changes are demonstrated to be improvements, and approved by the bureau, they should then be generally adopted. At the same time, new designs of a type, whether originated within the Navy itself, or accepted for experimental construction, would be placed under the engineering supervision of this same pilot. Civilian engineers and technical assistants would be provided from the present force of the factory to supplement the professional knowledge of the engineer-pilot.
When experimental planes had been completed, thoroughly tested, and thought of sufficient promise to warrant replacing planes of that type in service, they should be sent to an operating unit, in charge of the engineer-pilot, for service tests, before production contracts are placed.
The pilot would know thoroughly the reason for every feature about the plane, would be familiar with all compromises that have usually been necessary, and would be in the best position to work with the operating unit in its appraisal, ready to forestall needless criticism and ready to accept useful suggestions, as he would be most desirous to see his plane put in service. Only after thorough demonstration to, and acceptance by the operating unit would the production contracts be let.
After demonstration as noted above and when production contracts are let, a building program could be arranged which would replace planes already in service with a minimum scrap value on the old planes. Also, there would be assurance that the new plane would be actually an acceptable improvement, and that the old ones would not have to be once more placed in service due to failure of the new types to fulfill expectations.
Under such conditions it should be possible to build up and perfect, at the aircraft factory, a testing technique of such an order that all test work could be concentrated there, thus affecting another economy and an additional conservation of effort.
Proposed Use of Metal Construction: At the end of the last war, spruce for airplane construction was costing the government about $1,000 per M board feet. Not only may the price of spruce go higher in case of another war but the amount available for airplane construction is limited.
Metal airplanes in large production can be manufactured more cheaply than airplanes constructed of wood provided the design considers mass production. For a given size and strength, plane structures built of metal are lighter than those built of wood. For this reason, and because of the uncertainty as to the supply of suitable timber national security requires that in the next war airplanes be of metal construction.
It is proposed, therefore, that each of the existing service types of airplane be re-designed for metal construction. The department would decide whether a saving of weight is to be applied by reducing the size, maintaining the same military load, or whether the size should remain constant and the military load be increased. Several of each of the types should be built of metal and given a thorough service test with operating units.
Proposed Plan for Quantity Production in Time of Emergency: In order to develop a plan whereby these various types may be put into quantity production in case of national emergency, it is proposed that one of the existing airplane manufacturing companies be designated to construct a certain one of each of the approved types. Surveys should be made of the manufacturing plants in the near vicinity of the manufacturer selected for building each type, and a plan of work developed, so that planes of that type can be economically manufactured in large quantities. In war, emergency parts would be manufactured in the surrounding factories and assembly made at the plant of the airplane manufacturing company. This plan would be followed out for each of the approved types of aircraft. In peace time, each manufacturer selected should be permitted to build several of his assigned type, in order to test out the plan of work.
Furthermore, since the metal airplane is the most logical type for war time construction, it should be used in peace-time operation; therefore, the manufacturer selected for each type could always maintain a fairly constant force working on the number required for peace-time operation. By the plan outlined above this peace-time force would serve as a nucleus for the larger force required for war-time operation.
The Navy Department should keep the development of all types of planes, and this development should include a complete and correct set of plans and specifications including designs for jigs and fixtures.
The naval aircraft factory has developed a high technique in metal construction, and, therefore, is best qualified to proceed with a large portion of the development of metal types, and to keep corrected for each approved type a set of plans and specifications, including designs for jigs and fixtures, for the use of the bureau in placing commercial contracts.
Aircraft Costs: In estimating for new ship construction, the Navy Department has been seriously handicapped by not having accurate cost data. Because the private shipbuilding plants have been long established and have such data, and their bids on proposed ship construction were usually very close together, it has always been desirable for the government to build, at various times, different types of ships, in order to know what can be done, and the costs for the various kinds of work. This also applies to aircraft, and, as the aircraft industry becomes more stable, it will become more necessary for the department to build, in government establishments, various types of aircraft, in order to determine costs.
The government’s policy is not to build all of its requirements, for it is necessary to keep alive industry whose profits should be reasonable.
There has been a considerable amount of controversy about government costs, but my experience has shown that government costs are, at times, comparable to those of outside contractors. The government has available experienced personnel and equipment for aircraft construction work, and, therefore, the Navy Department, by the proper distribution of its trained personnel and by proper organization, can have government work done at the cost of the private manufacturer, less his profit.
As the Manual of the Bureau of Aeronautics implies that it is necessary to place a limited amount of aircraft production at the aircraft factory, in order to maintain a nearly constant experimental working force.
Under the system outlined above, two or three planes of all types that are later placed in commercial production will be built at the factory. Such construction will give information on civil costs for given types of planes, will give the Navy itself desirable experience in construction difficulties, and will keep drawings centralized and available in one place for future orders. Such work, however, will not be in quantity production of the sort necessary to maintain a constant force. Reconditioning and overhauling of aircraft have been used in the past as fill-in work for the factory, but this work is of the type that can be more expeditiously undertaken at repair bases such as Hampton Roads, San Diego, or Pensacola, where organizations are in existence for that purpose alone. In order to utilize the factory organization to best purpose, it is suggested that such overhaul and repair work be reduced to a minimum, and that, instead, for fill-in production work to absorb idle time, the factory be given orders for new spare parts. The quantities of these spare parts should be sufficient to partly supply the requirements of the planes built under commercial contracts, and should be so chosen that they are those parts uneconomical to reproduce by the civil industry.
Since new construction in quantity is after all the only type of real aircraft production work that exists, this is the class of production work which should be carried on at this factory, as its organization is much better adapted to such work than to overhaul and reconditioning.
Summary and Conclusions: To put into effect the plans outlined above would require:
Legislation: (1) Authority for the Navy Department to place contracts without competitive bids at a price which will include a reasonable profit.
Personnel: (1) Assignment of about eight expert pilot-engineers to the naval aircraft factory to act as project engineers for the various types of planes required.
Material: (1) Transfer all experimental design development and experimental construction and testing to the naval aircraft factory; (2) Build at the naval aircraft factory, several of the various types of planes, in order to determine costs; (3) Give the naval aircraft factory sufficient orders for spare parts to absorb idle time; (4) The department is to select the key manufacturer and develop a plan of work, so that the various types of planes which are standard can be manufactured in large quantities in case of an emergency.
Pending the passage of necessary legislation, as noted above, the authorization for, and initiation of changes suggested under “personnel” and “material” would increase the effectiveness of the factory to a very marked degree. These changes are not dependent upon legislation, and regardless of whether peace-time authority for non-competitive contracts may be granted, these changes in policy would be of immediate benefit to the service.
Putting the aircraft factory on the basis indicated above would make maximum use of its highly perfected organization, with its trained design personnel, its extensive testing equipment, including the aeronautical engine laboratory, its excellent shop equipment, and its facilities for operating both seaplanes and land planes. The naval aircraft factory would then fulfill its stated duties, and in so doing, would make a far better experimental construction plant than it would an air depot, into which work might be put primarily for convenience.