The naval powers differ among themselves in geographic position, resources, policies, racial characteristics and military tradition. As the modern navies have trained and fought over a period of many years, each navy under the influence of conditions peculiar to that nation has developed its own accepted methods for providing, maintaining and training its fleet. Among the several systems which have developed within the naval establishment of the United States and under which our navy operates, the system which most directly concerns line officers at sea is the system of fleet training.
There are some officers who will say—perhaps only half seriously—that we have little or no system in our fleet training. If system implies perfection of method, this, of course, is true. But accepted methods, established by authority and adhered to in practice over a period of years, do constitute the essential part of a system and officers of any considerable service in the fleet, who have seen the same cycle of exercises repeated from year to year, must realize that, whatever its deficiencies, there does exist in our service an established system of fleet training.
If this system is excellent it may be profitable to examine it with a view to seeing where similar methods may be applied in other naval problems; if it is unsatisfactory or only partially successful in producing a fleet ready for war, then we may even more profitably study it with a view to determining its weaknesses, and discovering means of overcoming them. The purpose of this article is to outline such a study and, if results warrant, to make definite proposals for improvement.
The subject of fleet training is a broad one into which enter considerations not of themselves matters of fleet training. The financial policy of the government as it affects the Navy, the recent naval treaties, foreign policies and international relations are matters of this kind. It is therefore desirable to make certain assumptions and set definite limits to our discussion before proceeding further. For the purpose of this article we assume:
- That our fleet will remain at about its present size (built or building) for the next five years ;
- That the fleet will be operated on about the same scale as at present, with perhaps some slight improvement in funds available;
- That the organization of the fleet and of the Department will remain about as at present;
- That our international relations will remain substantially as at present;
- That there will be no radical changes in the basic war plans.
The above assumptions concern matters connected with our subject which we will exclude from further discussion. On the other hand there are two subjects which might be excluded by a strict interpretation of the term “fleet training,” but which from their nature must be considered. These subjects are recreation and material upkeep. Fleet training is largely a question of employment of time and no schedule of employment can be formulated without considering the time to be allotted for material upkeep and for recreation.
Having thus indicated the limits of our discussion it is desirable to set down the essentials which any reasonably satisfactory system of fleet training must cover. For some subjects this would be a difficult undertaking and one over which much argument might arise. But speaking in general terms, it is probable that most officers will agree that our system of fleet training must provide for the following:
(1) Material upkeep; (2) operating efficiency; (3) tactics; (4) gunnery; (5) communications; (6) logistics; (7) strategy; (8) recreation.
In this list no attempt is made to arrange subjects in order of importance—all are essential. Their relative importance and the time and effort which should be devoted to each are debatable, but this list may be used as a basis for discussing our present system of fleet training. However, before proceeding further it is desirable to sketch in something of the historical background which lies behind this system.
We have had a modern fleet for about twenty years. Our fleet really began with the definite acceptance of the principle that fighting ships do not constitute a fleet unless they operate together as a fleet. From about 1904 until about 1910 our fleet, for all intents and purposes, consisted of from three to five divisions of battleships. There were also from one to three divisions of cruisers which generally operated separately from the battleships. Except for the cruise around the world the battleships were based in the Atlantic. Generally speaking, there was time and money for material upkeep. Gunnery was in a state of intensive development and there was very considerable tactical work—but directed principally toward excellence in the “parade ground’’ type of battleship maneuvers. There were no fighting instructions.
As destroyers and submarines became available in small numbers, they operated from time to time with the battleships, but it was not until 1915 that the fleet was organized into forces of various types and it was generally recognized that a modern fleet is much more than two squadrons of battleships. During this time the engineering competition was firmly established with resulting increase in operative efficiency. Gunnery continued to be the principal activity of the fleet and made consistent progress. Tactics was developing slowly but continued to be largely a matter of separate drills by battleships and by destroyers, with occasional joint operations including cruisers and submarines. In 1916 the first fighting instructions worthy of the name were issued by the commander-in-chief and the fleet was first drilled in fleet formations. The operations of the summer of 1916, culminating in the “battle” between the active and reserve fleets and the landing at Rockaway Beach, were the most advanced work of our fleet up to that time and promised well for the future.
Then came our entrance into the World War. Our part in this war was such as to delay in many ways the development of a well-rounded fleet, but it taught us invaluable lessons for future development. Among these lessons are the following:
- War involves a vast expansion of even the largest peace-time fleets.
- A war fleet is an extremely complex organization of all types, whose efficient coordination, before, during, and after battle, is the greatest problem of the commander-in-chief.
- To meet this problem there must be well conditioned ships, efficient communications, standard instructions and endless training.
In other words this war taught us, as nothing else could, the magnitude of the problem of training a modern fleet for war.
The period immediately following the war brought demobilization and curtailment, with the accompanying disorganization which included the division of our fleet in 1919 into two sub-fleets, one on each coast. In 1921 the mobilization or war organization was changed from the previous “type force” organization to the “task force” organization in the form of a battle force, scouting force, control force and fleet base force. This organization was particularly well adapted to the “built and building” fleet as it then existed. In 1922 this mobilization, with some modifications, was made the standard organization and once more we had one United States fleet. In 1923 the Office of Fleet Training was established in the Navy Department. In the meantime, the Arms Conference, by limiting capital ship tonnage, had further enhanced the importance of fleet efficiency as compared with fleet tonnage, and the development of planes and carriers had added new complications.
During this twenty-year period which has been briefly outlined we have developed our present system of fleet training. It is an annual or one-year system in which each year is a cycle of training. Ever since the establishment of the gunnery year, and the engineering year, there has been a fleet year. This fundamental of the system has remained unchanged.
But while the cycle of training has been continued at one year, there have been vast changes in the fleet work which constitutes that cycle. The problem of fleet training today is far different from what it was in 1904. In 1904, modern gunnery was in its infancy. There were three target practices a year and no engineering competition. The fleet, composed almost entirely of battleships, could go through practically its whole repertoire of evolutions in one day. There were no extensive strategic exercises for there were few if any scouts, and only a few “war games” on a small scale. There were no radio, no smoke tactics, no planes or carriers, submarines, depth charges, bombs, gas, or destroyers. When things went wrong there was money and time for overhaul. Today gunnery exercises have multiplied until there are from seven to nine forms of practice for each type of vessel. The engineering competition has been established with its full power and bonus runs and mandatory periods of overhaul. Strategic exercises require wide dispersion of forces and considerable periods of time for their execution. Tactical exercises are no longer questions of drilling battleships. There are many types—each with its own type tactics—and all to be coordinated in the tactics of the fleet. Fleet formations may be 100 miles in diameter and the most elementary training in fleet evolutions is a matter of weeks, where before it was a matter of days. Logistics and recreation have made increased demands in the fleet schedule, and with the increase in fleet activities and the decrease in navy yard funds, it is becoming more and more difficult to find time for necessary material upkeep.
In other words, our problem of fleet training has grown enormously in the past ten years and every year is making increased demands on the time, skill, energy and devotion of the fleet. So far we have made no change in the one-year system other than to cram more and more into each year’s schedule. Is this annual system sufficiently elastic to stand the constant pressure of increased activities, and, if so, when shall we reach its elastic limit? As any system is best judged by results, let us make a brief estimate of the present condition of our fleet in the essential elements of training for war.
(1) Material Upkeep: Due to lack of funds the periodic overhaul of ships at the navy yards has been reduced to such an extent that more and more time is required for material upkeep of units operating with the fleet. The prime importance of allowing sufficient time for this purpose is recognized and emphasized by the Department and by the commander-in-chief, while at the same time every effort is being made to obtain more money for the yards. Periods amounting to nearly one third of the schedule are allotted to upkeep and they should be sufficient. But do the ships actually get that much time? As a general proposition they do not, and here lies the difficulty—the difference between the time allotted on paper and the time actually available in practice. There is a great difference—and it is well recognized in the fleet, but the best efforts of those in authority seem unable to reduce it. The cause is also recognized—certainly it is discussed at length—unforeseen calls for ships. As a matter of fact such calls for ships have averaged about the same over many years, and are unforeseen only in that they cannot be named and described in advance. The truth is the schedule under the present system is so “tight” that we cannot afford to see them and allow for them; we must continue to hope that next year will be different. The schedules necessary under the one-year system do not give enough actual, bona fide days for material upkeep.
(2) Operating Efficiency: Operating efficiency is largely dependent on material upkeep. But considered separately, the best way to gain operating efficiency is to operate, and the ships of our fleet do operate. The engineering competition is a vital part of our fleet-training system and while the necessary records take only the time of individuals, the various trials take time in the fleet schedules. They are the real test of battle engineering efficiency and last year twenty-five per cent of destroyers and thirty-four per cent of all ships eligible did not complete their prescribed full power trials. How many ships that did complete their trials had the required week before and after their runs? A reason—not the only reason?—but an important reason lies in the schedules of our yearly system. They are of necessity too “tight.”
(3) Gunnery: Using “gunnery” to mean all exercises in the use of the elements of attack—gunnery has maintained for twenty years the primary place in our system of training for war—and our gunnery efficiency shows it. Gunnery is the best organized of fleet activities. It has the most highly standardized exercises, the best records, the most comprehensive plans and the most frequent and definite tests of efficiency and progress. It has also the most prestige. The time has been, and recently, when to suggest the equal importance of any other element of fleet training was to verge upon heresy.
We have seen that the number and complexity of gunnery exercises have steadily increased. They will probably increase further with the development of air craft. None of the present practices can well be dispensed with; in fact, it would seem desirable to increase the experimental and advanced practices. This would require more time for gunnery, which already is the element of training most favored in the fleet schedules. But without any new forms of gunnery exercises, is sufficient time available under the present system of existing practices? The consensus of opinion seems to be that it is not. This observation is based largely on experience in the scouting fleet—whereas conditions in the battle fleet are probably more favorable. All fleet exercises should be conducted with celerity and precision; but we know that target practices are like propellers—there is a maximum speed above which there is marked loss of efficiency. The writer knows not only a single practice, but whole sections of the gunnery schedule that have been “speeded up” beyond the maximum limit of efficiency. He may have been unfortunate, but he is willing to risk the statement that many of the responsible officers concerned believe our gunnery exercises have frequently suffered by too much “speeding up,” in an endeavor to keep up with the schedules necessary under the present one-year system.
(4) Tactical Training: We have long been backward in the tactical training of our fleet. Slow in recognizing the magnitude of the problem as it has grown by leaps and bounds in the modern fleet, we have delayed in according it a position of importance coordinate with gunnery. Fortunately, there are signs that tactics is now gaining recognition. In the past tactics has suffered from lack of standard instructions, lack of records, lack of planning and tests of efficiency, lack of a “home office” in the Department, but most of all it has suffered from lack of time in the fleet schedules. With the establishment of the Office of Fleet Training and the support of the commander-in-chief, many of these shortcomings are in course of being rectified. But neither the Office of Fleet Training, nor the commander-in-chief, can put more days into the year, and tactics cannot get more time in a yearly schedule unless it displaces something else. The schedule allots time to tactical exercises, but there is not enough time available or it isn’t used for the purpose assigned. We find a light cruiser in commission a year and a half that has been in formation two hours, a division of destroyers that in six months has never once drilled as a division and has been in squadron formation just three times in going from point “X-Ray” to Hampton Roads. The tactical training of our fleet for war has suffered in the past, is now suffering and will continue to suffer because of the “tight” schedules of the present system.
(5) Communications: Our system of fleet training fully recognizes the importance of communications. It is a lesson deeply impressed by the World War. That our communications are eminently satisfactory is not true, but the problem is recognized. Fortunately, communications in one form or another enter into all forms of fleet training. For this reason communications are not dependent upon an allotment of time in the fleet schedules. They are always in the schedule. However, we should bear in mind that for this same reason, any form of training neglected in the schedule means that the communication problems peculiar to that activity are also neglected. In other words, a schedule that crowds out or unduly compresses strategic operations, fleet tactics, or advanced gunnery is deficient in communication training.
(6) Logistics: Logistics is an element of fleet training which is involved in all forms of fleet activities. Its importance is thoroughly recognized, and its various problems are receiving more study than ever before. It is true that the larger phases of logistics are matters of planning and administration, but what may be termed practical logistics holds a secure place in all fleet schedules. Ships must fuel and provision and the time for these operations cannot be reduced below certain limits, no matter how crowded the schedule. Even here we can see the effect of lack of time. Fueling at sea is a practical form of logistic operations which is important in any oversea campaign, yet we have had precious little exercise or training in such operations.
(7) Strategy: Strategy and strategic operations are recognized in our fleet schedules. As far as the training of subordinate commanders is concerned, strategic operations are more closely connected with the mission of the scouting fleet than with the mission of the battle fleet. They do, however, enter into the more advanced fleet maneuvers. We have had a scouting fleet for some years now and have had our eyes opened to the value of practical experience, as distinguished from theoretical study, in strategic operations. There have been strategic problems from time to time and we have somewhat standardized our practice. But have we made reasonable progress? Of course it is easy to find fault, but whatever the cause, it does seem that the fleet has not gained much practical experience in scouting and kindred operations. In the theory of scouting, officers are probably better grounded than ever before, but there are practical problems, communications, station keeping, concentrations, changes in plans and methods in which the fleet has not built up a fund of records, or of practical experience—in which the fleet is not trained.
The cause of our lagging behind in practical strategic training lies in the lack of ships, lack of time and possibly, in recent years, in lack of fuel. As to fuel, we can but do our best. As to the small number of ships available in the scouting fleet—notably during the past summer—we find unforeseen calls for destroyers and the midshipmen’s cruises are responsible, a fact which suggests that the schedule should recognize this condition, if possible, and shift to another period such operations as require practically all ships, leaving the summer to the training of smaller units—which brings us back to the question of the schedule and the time available for strategic training. Under the present system by which we attempt a little of everything each and every year, the fleet does not have enough time, when ships are available in force, to train the scouting fleet in its mission.
(8) Recreation: Recreation, in the form of athletics—queer as it may seem—is probably, next to gunnery, the best organized form of fleet activity. There seems to be no danger that it will not continue to receive its full weight in the apportionment of time, and in the demands upon the efforts of ships and officers. In fact, if there is any danger, it would seem to lie in the possibility of overdoing this form of fleet activity. Another form of recreation which perhaps more directly concerns the fleet schedules is the periodic return of the ships to their home ports, usually at the holiday season. This period is also available for a certain amount of upkeep, provisioning, and so forth, but it does represent a definite period which should not be reduced below three weeks and which, in the schedule, must he charged primarily to recreation. While there seems to be considerable pressure to reduce this period, due to the pressing demand for more working time, our present system has so far met this requirement.
The above brief discussion of the present condition of fleet training under the one-year system may be summarized as follows:
(1) As regards operating efficiency, communications, logistics and recreation, conditions are satisfactory and the one-year system is workable.
(2) As regards gunnery the conditions are fairly satisfactory and the one-year system has so far “stood up” under the expansion of gunnery activities. However, there is considerable evidence that the limit has been reached, if not passed, and that the “speeding up” of gunnery exercises necessary under the present schedules has in some cases seriously lessened the value of the exercises.
(3) As regards material upkeep, tactics and strategy, conditions are not satisfactory and the present one-year system is not working well. Apparently a point has been reached at which it fails to give, sufficient time for developing these elements of fleet training.
It seems, therefore, that our problem has attained such proportions that we can no longer meet it by a one-year cycle of training. If we attempt the impossible and continue to crowd more and more into each year’s schedule, conditions will grow worse instead of better. Our fleet, under such a system, can never closely approach the condition of a trained fleet. It is the realization of this fact that accounts for the disconcerting thought that we all have now and then: “Are we getting anywhere—or is the real fleet at the end of the rainbow?’’
If we are ever to have a well trained fleet, must we not lengthen the cycle of training? If the period chosen is sufficiently long, about the middle of the period we may expect to have a fleet well grounded in fundamentals and ready to go ahead, and at the end of the period, to have a reasonably well trained fleet with an accumulation of permanent records and experience in advanced fleet exercises never attained under our present system. Would not such a system give us more progress over a period of years, and a higher average readiness for war than has been or can be attained under our present one-year system?
For such an increased cycle of training, the period which suggests itself is two years. Eighteen months is probably too short and would throw the schedule out of step with the seasons. Three years is too long and would exceed the usual tour of duty of the higher officers.
What are the difficulties and disadvantages of changing to a two-year system? It has been said that much of our progress in gunnery and engineering has been built upon the principle of annual competition. This is true, but nothing in the two-year system of fleet training conflicts with that principle. Wherever there is or can be annual competition in engineering, gunnery, communications, or athletics, let that competition continue for the work done each year. It is not necessary that each year’s work should be a repetition of the preceding year, but merely that each year’s work should be competitive.
One officer who is concerned with fleet training brought up the question of our constantly shifting personnel, intimating that under a two-year system this difficulty would be doubled or at least considerably increased. There is ground for difference of opinion here, but one should watch his perspective before taking sides. A battery officer with a good gun pointer knows that the chance of losing him in two years is about double the chance of losing him in one. Granted. But our problem is one of fleet training and it is more difficult to train captains and admirals than to train gun pointers. As few officers go to sea for less than two years, their cruises will cover a whole period of fleet training. Some will start in the middle of the period, others at other times, but all responsible officers would hardly be changed at one time. Furthermore, all knowledge and experience does not leave the ship when the captain is detached. Fleet training is the development of team work among ships and larger units—it is more than training officers and men as individuals. Under existing conditions in our service there will always be a large turn-over of personnel, but in the writer’s opinion, the effect on fleet training will be no more serious under a two-year, than under a one-year system. In fact, it may be that the two-year system will tend to give more permanency of personnel, in that more definite planning will be possible. To those who cannot agree with this, the answer is that the advantages of the two-year system outweigh any disadvantages due to increased difficulties with shifting personnel.
Another possible disadvantage is the difficulty of laying out a two-year program with one-year appropriations. It is true that a radical decrease in fuel or men might force modifications in the second year of any training program, but there is less probalility of such changes now than there was two or three years ago. In fact, we have assumed earlier in this article, that the Navy, during the next few years, will be operated on about the same scale as at present. However, if there should be changes of plan forced upon us, by curtailments of appropriations, or other unforeseen conditions, the result on the training of the fleet would be no more serious under the proposed, than under the present system.
These questions of annual competition, of annual appropriations, and of shifting personnel, may be considered as weighing for or against the two-year system, but actually they are not of great importance. The real test of the proposed system is whether or not it will equal the results of the present system where satisfactory, and better those results where not satisfactory.
It has been stated that the one-year system is satisfactory as regards operating efficiency, communications, logistics and recreation. Here the two-year system would produce results equally good if not better. In fact, practical experience in problems of communication would be increased with the progressive training in strategic and tactical operations possible only under the two-year system.
Under the one-year system the results in gunnery have been satisfactory, except for recent signs of too much speeding up in an effort to keep up with the schedule. With probable gunnery development in connection with aircraft there will soon be demands for new practices, and, if we are not to lag behind other powers, there must be more experimental practices. Thus the cycle of gunnery training, already a tight fit in the annual schedule, is tending to expand. On the other hand, the pressure for other forms of training, notably tactics, is tending to compress the time for gunnery, in fact, has actually done so in the proposed plans for next year’s schedule.
The two-year system proposes to meet this condition by expanding the cycle of gunnery training from one year to two. This does not mean that the “weeks per year’’ for gunnery would be reduced by half. They would be reduced somewhat—for in no other way can additional time be found for upkeep, tactics and strategy—but the net result will be a better gunnery schedule. Under the proposed conditions we may return to thoroughness rather than speed in gunnery exercises. There will be time for more experimental practices, and a place in the schedule for the resulting standard exercises when they have been developed. Gunnery will have room to grow.
The present one-year system has not given satisfactory results as regards material upkeep, tactics and strategy. The schedule, of necessity, is too tight; there is not enough time for them, and in tactics it has been impossible to establish a progressive plan of training, beginning with elementary work and progressing to advanced exercises—as has been done so successfully in gunnery. The two-year system offers some hope for these backward elements of fleet training. It is no panacea for all our ills, but it does offer these elements more time, and this plan does more than merely increase the “weeks per year” for strategy and tactics. It “eases up” the schedules and makes them more flexible. The commander-in-chief can allot time with more consideration to outside circumstances, and the periods for each branch of training can be longer.
In discussing this subject with two officers whose opinions are entitled to considerable respect, one said, “The trouble is, we try to run before we can walk.” The other said, “Somehow we seem to start about the same place every year, get only so far, and then start over.” At first these remarks seem contradictory, but they merely apply to different phases of the same problem. The training of the fleet may be conveniently considered as comprising four stages—which, for lack of better terms, may be described as “freshman,” “sophomore,” “junior,” and “senior.” The first remark quoted is a comment on the fact that we omit the “freshman” stage of training. The second remark touches the fact that every year we start as “sophomores,” progress to the stage of “juniors,” but never get to be “seniors,” because, under our present system, we must again start as “sophomores” the following year. We now vibrate between a “sophomore” and a “junior” status in fleet training. Is it not worth while at least to try a system which permits us to start as “freshmen” and finish as “seniors”? The two-year system will do this.
If we accept as logical this division of training into four stages, we will divide the two-year cycle into four periods of six months each. This fits into the established custom of our service very well. There has always been a time of inactivity in our fleet during the latter part of December, and there has generally been, until this year, a similar time the latter part of June. These times would mark the end of the six-month periods.
The work in each of these periods should be planned and carried on so as to bring forth a well balanced development of all elements of fleet training during that period and a logical progression into the next period. Tactics and strategy should not be favored at the expense of gunnery and operating efficiency—nor vice versa. The proper portion of the six months should be assigned and given to material upkeep. The distribution of time among the different elements should be made by the commander-in-chief with the assistance and cooperation of the Office of Fleet Training.
The following is suggested as a tentative division of the twenty-six weeks composing each six months period:
Material upkeep 9 weeks
Gunnery 5 weeks
Tactics and strategy 6 weeks
Cruising, holidays, and miscellaneous 6 weeks
Total 26 weeks
It should be noted that these figures represent time in which the various subjects would have priority, and that other training, not in conflict, could go on. Thus there can be gunnery training during upkeep and tactics during cruising.
The first period should begin on July 1, as does the present fleet year. Changes in the commander-in-chief and other high officers should be made at this time, and, in general, this date should be considered appropriate for changes in personnel and in the units of the fleet. This would be the initial point in the cycle of fleet training, but the efficiency of the fleet would by no means drop to a dangerously low mark. It would be neither practicable nor desirable to change all officers or ships’ companies at once and while there must be a beginning under any system, there would be at this time a considerable carrying over of experience, training and permanent records from the advanced exercises of the preceding period.
The first period should be devoted to elementary training. This does not mean that the units of the fleet would not progress beyond the simplest forms of training during this period, but merely that they should start at the beginning and train progressively. About one week in three should be allotted to material upkeep. Gunnery, in this period, should include the first quarter of its cycle of training, beginning with the elementary forms of practice. Tactics should begin with the school of the ship, progress to the school of the division, and, in the case of destroyers, should include drill of the squadron as a single tactical unit. In the scouting fleet this period should include simple strategic exercises with the particular object of giving practical experience in communication, station keeping, concentrations and change of plan. The work of this first period would be done in areas now used during summer and fall, except that it would probably pay to have the scouting fleet go south about the middle of October for six weeks in the vicinity of Guantanamo and the Bay of Gonaive.
The second six-month period should begin after New Year’s and continue with about the same division of time as before; that is, one third for material upkeep and the remainder for cruising and training. This period should continue the gunnery schedule and advance it to the half-way mark. In tactics it should include for the battle fleet formations and maneuvers of the battle line, anti-submarine screening, and training of destroyers, submarines and aircraft in connection with the battle line, this training to include the simpler forms of smoke tactics and night and day attack. For the scouting fleet this period should include some training in formations and maneuvers of the battle line in order that the battleships may be able to take their place in the battle line if necessary, but more particularly should it include training in extended formations, concentrations and surprise attacks, with special emphasis placed on communication problems. The scouting fleet during this period should undertake more elaborate strategic exercises in combination with tactical training. During this period the scouting fleet and control force will be in southern waters. The battle fleet and fleet base force should unite with them for a part of the winter. However, when the whole fleet is assembled advanced fleet problems should not be attempted. The forces available should be used to complement each other and to supply sufficient ships to make intermediate training more realistic. Among the exercises to be undertaken at this time should be control and fleet base force operations and joint operations with the Army.
The third period should begin with July and include the summer and fall. Training should begin where the second period left off. If practicable, the whole fleet should be brought together for a part of this period in order to provide forces for training the larger units properly. This is particularly true as regards the strategic training of the scouting fleet. If not practicable to unite the fleet during this period, it may be desirable to advance the gunnery schedule more than would otherwise be done, in order to give more time for advanced tactics and strategy during the fourth period.
The fourth period should begin after New Year’s of the second year and include winter and spring. It is the period for advanced training when the several parts of the fleet, as a result of progressive training during the three preceding periods, are ready to be welded together into one fleet. This period should include the usual proportion of time for upkeep and should complete the most advanced gunnery exercises. However, it is primarily the period for tactical and strategic training in the form of fleet drills, evolutions and operations. The period should end with a test mobilization and a series of advanced fleet operations under war conditions.
We have attempted only to sketch the bare outline of the work to be undertaken in the four periods which are to compose the two-year cycle of training. The details of the plan to be set forth in the fleet schedules will require all the resources of the commander-in-chief and the Office of Fleet Training. But the fundamental principle must always be kept in mind—start at the beginning and proceed logically and at efficient working speed toward the objective of a fleet trained for war.
In this article we have undertaken to examine our present system of fleet training, to estimate the results obtained under that system and to propose an improved system. We may summarize as follows:
Present System.—(1) Our present system of fleet training is an annual or one-year system in which we attempt a complete cycle of training each year.
- The principle of this system has remained unchanged for twenty years.
- Since the war this system has given reasonably satisfactory results in operating efficiency, communications, logistics and recreation.
- It has given fairly satisfactory results in gunnery but recently the crowded schedules of this one-year system have forced gunnery into a “speeded up” condition, somewhat beyond the limits of efficiency.
- The present system has failed to give satisfactory results in material upkeep, tactics and strategy.
- The schedules under the present system are crowded beyond the possibility of any additional fleet work.
- Under the present system we have begun to exceed the most efficient speed for fleet work.
- At present we vibrate between two stages of intermediate training, without ever passing through an elementary stage, or attaining an advanced stage.
Proposed System.—(9) It is proposed to change the cycle of training from one year to two years—to adopt a two-year instead of a one-year system.
- Under the proposed system the gunnery schedule would be enlarged to permit of additional practices, and, as expanded, would be extended over two years, thus “easing up” the schedule, and giving some much needed time to other branches of training.
- The additional “weeks per year” thus obtained from gunnery would be divided among material upkeep, strategy and tactics, which have suffered most under the present system.
- The two-year cycle of training would begin July 1 and comprise four periods of six months each.
- The following division of time in each six-month period is suggested:
Material upkeep 9 weeks
Gunnery 5 weeks
Tactics and strategy 6 weeks
Cruising, holidays, and miscellaneous 6 weeks
Total 26 weeks
- The first period would be for elementary training, the second and third for progressive intermediate training, and the fourth for advanced training.
- The training plan would be balanced and progressive throughout each period and from one period to the succeeding period.
- The final period of advanced training would end with a test mobilization and grand maneuvers under war conditions.
This two-year system of fleet training is proposed with no illusions as to its perfection. It is no panacea for all the ills of the Navy, but it holds promise of improving present conditions and building for the future. It is definite, it is constructive, and it aims, if only by the discussion it may bring forth, to advance the readiness of our fleet for war.