SOME MUTUAL RELATIONS OF GUNNERY AND TACTICS
By Captain Ralph Earle, U. S. Navy
"Damn the torpedoes," said Farragut, "Four bells, Captain Drayton, go ahead! Jouett, full speed!"—Mobile Bay, 5 August, 1864.
"Keep nearer to the enemy."—Beatty at Dogger Bank, 24 January, 1915.
The world war witnessed the development of new types of sea warfare such as the tactics of destroyers against submarines, of submarines against other submarines, as well as the beginnings of those to be employed by aircraft against both submarines and surface vessels, those utilizing smoke screens, noxious gases, seaplane carriers and torpedo planes. The newness of many of these weapons was such as to preclude their possibilities being given a real test and there have resulted many claims as to the potential power of each new weapon, some of which are conceded generally to be reasonable while others are conceded extravagant. Be that as it may, naval warfare is an extremely complicated profession and the old sailor's worries were few when compared with those of the modern seaman. The latter's greatest reliance must still be placed upon his own prompt offensive against each new instrument of destruction. Every offensive weapon produced is soon matched, if not actually excelled, by the defense adopted against it.
The extensive use of mines and depth charges against vessels operating both on and beneath water formed perhaps one of the most important types of warfare developed during the war. The recent experimental use of the aircraft bomb against old vessels has indicated that it too is most efficient when used as a depth charge.
Gunnery broadens its scope to meet the new conditions and must provide the means to defeat the attack of air forces, deadly gases, and whatever else the future may bring. The motive of the tactics that such gunnery most efficiently can utilize is well expressed in the words of the two great seamen quoted at the head of this article. The submarine was downed by the newly developed gunnery and tactics of the destroyer, and a similar fate is the portion of the forces of the air and of those using gases.
A few of the relations of gunnery and tactics will be touched upon with the hope that any means not now existent to defeat the new weapons may be studied and brought to perfection. To accomplish the great results desired the peace-time navy suffers from the lack of a proper allowance of personnel in its bureaus at the shore stations. The number of officers so assigned is generally only sufficient to carry on the routine of administration, none are available to intensively study and digest the mass of information acquired in war, while such is yet fresh in their minds. Any slowness of new developments in the navy is due principally to this insufficiency of officer personnel in the bureaus, the only places where the information is accessible. To reason out the lessons of the war, to develop the new devices indicated, while at the same time perfecting the old stand-bys is a task that requires the undivided attention of experienced professional men.
Naval gunnery is the art and science of firing guns, torpedoes, bombs, and other weapons in the best manner to effect the greatest possible damage to the target. Tactics similarly is the art of maneuvering a battle fleet before and during action against any enemy in the manner best adapted to ensure success; and it, therefore, requires superiority over the enemy in any or all of several factors; such as numbers, types, guns, speed, protection, use of radio and aircraft skill, experience, morale and doctrine. Tactical maneuvers include all that proximity to the enemy dictates as being the proper disposition of fleet or vessels to meet the conditions of the battle then imminent.
Beyond a doubt the relation of tactics to gunnery is so close that in order to obtain the desired final result—i.e., decisive victory in battle—instead of being dependent one upon the other, they merge and unite to form the one essential attribute that must be possessed by the victor at sea to a greater degree than is the case with his opponent.
Skill in both tactics and gunnery must be developed to the highest degree attainable, and 'a deficiency in either cannot be allowed to hamper the free use of the other in battle. Our naval commanders must be free to maneuver at any time secure in the fact that thereby they are not lessening the effectiveness of their gunfire. If this be not now the case a direction for study is surely indicated.
The tactical portion of gunnery is the method employed by the various war craft in getting the maximum destructive effect out of guns, torpedoes, bombs, depth charges, and other naval weapons.
Some maneuvers that affect gunnery are those that place the fleet or ship in an advantageous position as regards to sun better spoken of as the light gauge—wind, rain, and the methods employed when in gun or torpedo range to get the maximum destructive results of the gun and torpedo. At the same time fleet or ships must maneuver to decrease their liability to injury from the fire of the enemy.
Instruments for keeping the range of the target must be of such a character as to make the problem of hitting so simple that battle gunnery will be similar to that of a stationary vessel firing at a stationary target.
In order to derive the greatest effect from the armament, those tactics must be employed that will place the ship in the most advantageous position with regard to the enemy and take full advantage of all tactical considerations and compel him to expose the largest target while depriving him of the use of a portion of his battery. In order to succeed vessels must utilize their speed to compel the enemy to maneuver disadvantageously, to meet his maneuvers, and to make the range such that any advantages one possesses, armor, protection, or gun power may be utilized to the utmost.
The gunnery experience of the battle of Jutland indicated that a very searching inquiry into the methods of shooting might result in much betterment. In order to avoid torpedoes, of which seamen rightly stand in awe, both sides maneuvered constantly and no fire control then existing was able to make gunnery as good as if no maneuvering had been necessary. Can any fire control be devised to accomplish this?
If gunnery is of a grade such that it compels a steady course to be steered, then a ship will be compelled to fight on a course parallel to or converging upon the enemy, a condition only possible providing that the enemy is similarly handicapped. Notwithstanding the difficulties of keeping the range it is evident that maneuvering must be frequent in battle, and to win the decision our sights that direct the fire must be kept set constantly to the range and deflection necessary to ensure hitting the target, though both these factors may be changing continually. In other words, a commander-in-chief engaging an enemy must be able to use his ships at any speed from their highest to lowest with a completely free choice of courses, such choice being uninfluenced by any fear that the efficiency of his armament will be affected more by one maneuver than by another. Torpedoes, mines, aircraft bombs and submarine forces can be avoided in a large measure by maneuvering while still using the heavy guns.
Thus a survey of the subject confirms the fact that gunnery and tactics are so intimately related that they evidently must work in harmony, and give all an ideal to be striven for in the necessity of so providing means of control that the use of either is absolutely unrestricted by the other; and, upon investigation, it will be found that, if, by the application of modem science, such may be now the fact, nevertheless they have hampered each other in the past. Gunnery has always suffered when it has been found necessary to maneuver. This condition must be eradicated if we are to be truly efficient.
Tactics of the sailing ship and the auxiliary steamer were closely allied and, from the Texel, in 1665, when column of battle was first formed, through the Nelsonian era when close action was still the rule—although the long column had given way to several columns directed at logical points in the enemy's lines—down to the use of the ram which appeared at the same period as armor, they consisted in short-range fighting and followed the conventional principles. The ram as a weapon had its one great day at the battle of Lissa, July 20, 1866, being soon eliminated by the introduction of high-powered guns, long-range torpedoes, and the submarine.
The object of tactics, however, is still the same as when propounded by its first real master, Nelson, namely: that the only purpose of the battle is to secure a complete victory, and that only the offensive will accomplish this objective. Togo was a modern exponent of Nelson tactics which caution boldness as he, under gunfire, maneuvered so as to employ all his force while preventing the enemy from doing so, even though his own fire was reduced thereby for the time being. The studied tactics of Nelson, however, were not required by Admiral Togo as the superior force of the Japanese used without fear made the defeat of the weaker Russian certain beyond any doubt.
Farragut at Mobile Bay, August 5, 1864, passed the forts successfully, accepting the risk of damage by mines believing that, due to the known deficiencies of ordnance science of the day, long exposure to salt water had rendered the major part of them innocuous. The low velocities and the consequent small penetration of guns of that day, together with the tactical ability of its leader (shown in one respect at least by the lashing of his vessels two abreast), and of his boldness which bade him take the chance of mine explosions, enabled the fleet to pass the forts. The method of sweeping for mines adopted by the Brooklyn at that time was somewhat akin to present practice. To the heavy fire from the fleet and the smoke therefrom is attributed the small number of injuries received by the American fleet on that day.
A narrative of a few modern sea fights illustrates the conditions that have been imposed upon tactics by gunnery and vice versa. A study of the different conditions there existing will no doubt give a line upon the solution of the question and point us fair, so that all have to agree that the use of tactics and of gunnery must be unrestricted one by the other.
The Russo-Japanese war affords the first example of the use of modern, high-powered, long-range weapons equipped with sufficiently good sights and other appliances to render gunnery accurate at ranges not hitherto considered possible.
Battle of the Yellow Sea, August 10, 1904.—The Russian fleet immobile in Port Arthur made a sortie about daylight with the object of uniting with their squadron based on Vladivostok. This movement resulted in two distinct contacts with the Japanese fleet. A southerly breeze was blowing with a mist hanging over the sea. At 12:30 p. m. the engagement opened, the fire becoming general at 1:13 p.m. The Russians withdrew, some returning to Port Arthur, others to neutral ports. The Japanese maneuvered in squadrons with the Russians in single line. The Russians ought to have been sunk instead of being dispersed. At dark the Russians were surrounded by the torpedo fleet and repeated attacks were made against them, many torpedoes being fired. The cautious tactics of the Japanese prevented a decisive end to the action.
Tsushima, May 27, 1905.—The Japanese fleet maneuvered in squadrons and by superior speed kept the Russian fleet, then in a long flung unwieldy column, under superior gunfire. The weather was too rough for destroyers. These vessels made their attack upon scattered units of the enemy at night when the sea moderated. Scouting had indicated to the Japanese the formation and course of the enemy; radio signaling, then in its infancy, making the imparting of such information possible. The Japanese concentrated on van and rear, maneuvered by squadrons and kept the action at long range by utilizing superior speed and gun power.
At the commencement of the world war, August 4, 1914, the British navy began that continuous patrol of the North Sea, scouting close in to the German coast, which resulted in many contacts of the hostile forces with several casualties in both single and squadron engagement; the first being the sinking by a mine of the British light cruiser Amphion in the afternoon, August 5, 1914, immediately following her successful attempt to destroy the German mine layer Konigin Luise at some sixty miles off the Suffolk coast. The British destroyers and the Amphion, after a long chase of over thirty miles, accomplished this by their accurate gunfire, which tore away the Luise's bridge, damaged her bow, and smashed the propeller.
The largest guns used in this action were the four-inch, and reports indicate that the gunnery was excellent; all conditions favoring it, the range altering but little during the chase and making, in the smooth water with no demoralizing return shots, good marksmanship as simple as a target practice maneuver.
On August 10, 1914, in the North Sea, a British light cruiser squadron engaged several German submarines, the presence of the latter being indicated solely by their periscopes, which left their usual tell-tale wake. By the British, speed and changes of course were utilized to confuse the Germans, and then some brilliant gunnery by the Birmingham shattered the periscope of the U-13. Blinded, the latter dove under water and her consorts made off. Eventually she came to the surface only to receive a shot from the Birmingham which struck the base of the conning tower, ripping the whole structure clean out of the submarine, which sank like a stone.
The British, by utilizing high speed and frequent changes of course, together with accurate gunnery, developed at the very outset of the war proper tactics for fighting the undersea craft, for even under date of March, 1917, it was noted in authoritative dispatches from abroad that direct gunfire from the decks of men-of-war and auxiliary vessels had proven a most effective method employed in the destruction of submarines.
Thus it is seen that, but a few days after the war was on, the British navy discovered that good gunnery still proved to be a most efficient and practicable way to destroy submarines. The effectiveness of the depth charges dropped overboard, although at random, was soon improved by supplying new types of guns suited for such a special purpose and using gunnery in their employment. Tactics in these combats dictates speed and changes of course to avoid the attack and the use of good gunnery to destroy the attacker. This method is of course not sufficiently spectacular to attract popular comment for it lacks the means of stirring imaginative persons into inventing peculiar bombs, nets, guns and freak torpedoes. Nevertheless the real enemy of the submarine is good gunnery combined with tactics, the use of which soon destroys its power of damaging its prey.
Bight of Helgoland, August 28, 1914.—A British reconnaissance in force of the waters adjacent to Helgoland, begun late on the night of August 26, 1914, resulted in an engagement of considerable importance that lasted throughout the day of the twenty-eighth. A great number of gun duels took place between light cruisers and destroyers of British and Germans. The British generally possessed six-inch guns opposing them to four-inch guns of Germans. Ranges were between 4,000 and 3,000 yards. The British Arethusa, outnumbered, was severely damaged by gunfire. One German submarine is known to have been destroyed by gunfire. The German Mains after but twenty minutes of action was disabled and on fire, being sunk soon after. The British battle-cruisers came in at the proper time to rescue the Arethusa, then being chased by the Koln, and in turn chased the Germans.
At 12:56 p.m., during this chase of the Kvln, occurred the most spectacular incident of the day from a gunnery standpoint. The German Ariadne suddenly appeared on port bow of the Lion and steered at high speed at right angles to the Lion's course, the latter vessel firing two salvos that could not have included over four shots each, making sufficient hits to cause her to take fire and sink shortly afterwards. The rate of change of range, the Lion steaming twenty-eight and the Ariadne twenty knots, was thus from 1,000 to 500 yards per minute, thus overtaxing any system of fire control. That hits should be made at this rapidly changing rate was certainly "very creditable," to say the least. The battle-cruisers steamed to the northward and then northwestward sinking the previously damaged Koln about 1:25 p. m. Shortly afterward, both the Queen Mary and Lowestoff were attacked by submarines without damages accruing to either side. Thus ended a busy day, filled with all varieties of actions, the British light cruisers being saved from destruction by the timely arrival of the speedy and heavy-gunned battle-cruisers.
So again is illustrated the fact tactics call for the greater number of ships to ensure victory; that ships by steaming at high speeds with frequent changes of course can operate safely among submarines; that torpedoes seldom hit, even when—and numerous ones here were fired—at ranges of less than 6,000 yards.
The battle was won by gunfire. To the heavier armament of the British can be attributed their success in far greater measure than to their superior gunnery. Even the Strassburg, the largest German cruiser engaged, had but four-inch guns.
Coronet, November 1, 1914.—The British squadron in the Pacific cruising on the Chilean coast, was spread out in scouting formation, course northeast by east, order of ships west to east, Good Hope, Monmouth, Otranto, and Glasgow, and was proceeding at fifteen knots away from the heavy seas made up by the strong southwest gale, when they heard, at 2:00 p. m. on November 1, 1914, calls upon the radio indicating the presence of enemy vessels. At 4:20 the Glasgow sighted to the eastward the German squadron of four ships steaming on a southerly course, and the British vessels then closed in on the Good Hope steaming northwesterly courses. Upon the completion of this evolution at 5:30, they headed around in columns on the southerly course with the Germans seven miles distant to the east steaming south, the ships of both squadrons pitching into the seas and taking water over forward. The overcast sky, lightening towards sunset, silhouetted to the Germans the forms of the British ships to the westward.
German column order was Scharnhorst, the gold medal gunnery ship of that navy, Gneisnau, Leipzig in column at 400 yards, the Dresden one mile astern, with the Nurnberg much farther to the rear.
The failing light made the Germans a difficult target. At 7:03 p.m. fire was opened at range of 12,000 yards, the first shots coming from the Germans. The squadrons now were steaming to the southward into the sea on slightly converging courses, the vessels firing at their opposites. The growing darkness and heavy spray thrown up by the seas made handling guns and accurate firing very difficult, the British main deck guns which comprised the major part of their armament constantly being flooded by the seas. The spotting was seriously handicapped, due to the seas that swept the bridges and decks. The small cruisers made very heavy weather.
The third salvo from the Germans caused fires to break out forward on both the Good Hope and Monmouth. This certainly was getting the range quickly despite the rough weather. As soon as the Germans observed hits they changed course to parallel the British. The Otranto here left the British column and steamed away to the southwest. Range became about 6,500 yards and the Germans bore off a point, but the British changed their course and reduced range to 5,300, possibly with the idea of firing torpedoes. The moon now rising made the German vessels better targets for the British and so the former bore away slightly in order to change and increase the range. Darkness had come on, the range-finders on the German vessels used the fires on the Monmouth for awhile, but range-finding, spotting and pointing soon became impossible with the result that firing was stopped at 8:06. During the battle it is claimed that the Scharnhorst was hit but twice and the Gneisnau only four times. About 7:50 a column of fire from an explosion shot up between the stacks of the Good Hope. Total destruction must have ensued. About 8:00 p.m. a very heavy rain squall occurred. The Monmouth, down by the bow, turned away to get stern to sea. The German light cruisers were directed at 8:00 p.m. to follow and attack British with torpedoes.
About 9:26 the Monmouth was encountered and sunk by gunfire at closest range by the Nurnberg. The flashes of this late night action were observed, on the Glasgow standing away to the southwest straddled by splashes from the shots of the pursuing Leipzig and Dresden. The heavy sea prevented any work of rescue on the part of the Germans.
The Germans had sixteen major-caliber guns to the British two, although, as the former could not use all on the same broadside, the figure should really be quoted as twelve. The British had thirty-two six-inch against the German twelve. However, the Germans are reported to have had an excellent director firing system in this action, and this very probably accounts for their superior gunnery.
The "Sydney" and "Emden," November 9, 1914.—The German cruiser Emden about daylight landed a party on Direction Island with instructions to destroy the radio and cables. While this party, under the command of the executive officer, comprising forty-nine out of the Emden's crew of 361, was absent, the Australian cruiser Sydney was sighted at 9:20 steaming in towards the island, whereupon the Emden promptly steamed out for battle. At 9:40 the Emden opened fire, the Sydney promptly replying, sheering out so that the range could be kept great, an advantage she desired because of her heavier guns and one which she could maintain because of her greater speed; as one of her officers wrote, "We had the speed on the Emden and fought as suited ourselves." The Emden's fire was rapid and accurate at first but as the Sydney began to hit the gunnery of the Emden grew less and less efficient. A lucky shot at the very beginning carried away all voice pipes of the Emden and in consequence centralized control of fire was thereafter not feasible. The Emden’s smokestacks were shot away one by one so that her speed was further reduced. The opening range was 10,500 yards, a very long flight for the four-inch shell of the Emden and a range that gave a great advantage to the six-inch guns of the Sydney. The Emden made every endeavor to close the range (note the course at position 7 of chart) in order to overcome the odds of small guns and also to make a torpedo hit, her movements being rendered difficult because of damage to steering gear. The Emden’s ammunition supply also gave out before the end of the battle. The heavier shell soon decided the action, and, at 11:20, the beaten Emden grounded on North Keeling Island. The Sydney then left to pursue a merchantman, only to return at 4:25 p. m. when she fired the final shots at the Emden, which promptly surrendered.
The Sydney received but ten hits, the damage from which was "surprisingly small," while the Emden had been hit severely and had sustained 129 casualties out of the 320 on board. The ineffectiveness of the German gunnery can be laid to their Admiralty's policy which provided such small-calibered guns for a vessel destined in the very nature of things to cope with vessels of the same type that were armed with guns of a heavier caliber. The Germans did in this engagement what they repeated since, that is, attacked at early daylight important British ports with the result that when discovered and reported a long daylight remained during which the stronger British forces could search out and defeat them. Thus the Germans, engaged upon the task of destroying radio and cables, the work of but an hour, had appeared off Direction Island at early daylight with the natural result that the station was able to get through a message to the British vessel convoying troops some fifty miles to the eastward: "Strange warship…off entrance"—which message was sufficient to bring the Sydney at high speed to the island where the whole day remained available to her for the purpose of destroying the Emden. Gunfire, the tactics of the duel being governed by superiority of these weapons, accomplished this without material loss, as at no time was it necessary to close in order to hasten the end desired.
Falkland Islands, December 8, 1914.—This is one of the most interesting battles of the war from a plain gunnery standpoint. The British here used long-range firing, maintaining the range as they wished because of superior speed. Heavier guns and greater speeds were advantages that could not be offset; and, to make the odds worse, Von Spee had approached to attack at early morning. If he had waited till evening or, when seeing that he was outmatched, had turned sharply to southward and westward—either of these acts sufficient—more of his squadron would have escaped. And yet even when he saw it was too late to escape by flight, Von Spee had a "Cradock choice" but did not take it. He could have steamed into Port Stanley and attacked the British in the harbor, at anchor, and with steam not yet ready. It would have been a gallant fight, a desperate short-range action, and much damage might have been done before he could have been eventually defeated.
The maneuvering of Sturdee, voluntary for the sake of safety, explains his bad shooting, as his fire control methods would not permit such without detriment. Sixteen twelve-inch guns in action for five hours before two armored cruisers—either of which should have succumbed to twelve hits—were destroyed. Gunnery was surely not the equal of tactics at the Falklands.
The Canopus, lying in Port Stanley, opened on the Germans, firing across the land at 9:20 a.m. The British at that hour were feverishly completing coaling and raising steam. The Germans came on until the tripod masts of the Inflexible and Invincible were seen. The odds against them being thus disclosed, they steamed to the eastward, and a long running fight commenced. At 12:55 fire was opened at 16,500 yards by the British on the Leipzig. The British light cruisers attended to the light craft of the Germans, and the battle-cruisers from 1:20 p. m. engaged the Scharnhorst—sunk at 4:17—and the Gneisnau—sunk at 6:00. The ranges used were from 13,500 to 16,500, altered at will as the German shell struck or fell short.
The chivalry of the sea, so sadly lacking in the submarine warfare, was not wanting here, many lives being saved by the British seamen who spared no effort or risks to rescue German seamen.
Dogger Bank, January 24, 1915.—The British battle-cruiser squadron under Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, accompanied by light cruisers and destroyers, had put to sea on night of 23 January from Rosyth as information that German battle-cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers were out had been received. At 7:20 a. m. the next day, the Aurora signaled "Am in action with High Seas fleet." At 7:45, the Germans whose course had been N.N.W. turned sixteen points and at a speed of fifteen knots steamed E.S.E. with Beatty in full pursuit, his heavy battle-cruisers attaining the speed of twenty-eight to twenty-nine knots. The Lion and Tiger because of their superior speeds gradually drew ahead of the Princess Royal and she ahead of the New Zealand, and the Indomitable. The first sighting shots were fired by Lion at 22,000 yards, falling short, and firing commenced after the first straddle was made at 9:05 a.m. From 7:25 to 9:30 a.m. the British had closed the range from 28,000 yards to 17,000 yards, or at that rate of about 4,800 yards per hour.
At 9:30 range was 17,000, and at 9:50 had decreased to 13,000, the closest of the action. It was at 9 135 that signal was made on the British flagship to "engage corresponding ship in line." The Tiger did not get this order so that the Moltke was left undisturbed by shells to get in her fire on the Lion. To open the range the Germans changed course sharply to north under cover of a destroyer feint and smoke screen. At about 10:00 a. m. and for a short time thereafter, both sides did very ineffective gunnery. A destroyer attack at 12,000 yards received effective fire from Lion and Tiger, the attack being quickly abandoned. In a running fight such as this the Germans zigzagged to reduce effect of British fire as well as to keep their guns in action. The British adopted lines of bearing, and as guns became blanked in firing, changed together one point to port at least twice in order to keep the maximum number of guns firing.
The German battle-cruisers Seydlits, Moltke, Derfflinger, and Blucher, maintained their E. S. E. by course at top speed as a squadron until towards 10:30 a. m. when the Blucher, hit heavily, was left behind to her fate. This vessel had been dropping astern gradually, and, at 10:48, she hauled out to port, steering north being on fire and having a heavy list, where she sank at 12:05 p.m. The Lion was hit frequently and, at 10:52 a.m., to avoid submarines, British changed eight points to port and quickly thereafter to N. E. in order to close the range. As the Lion drew out of battle at 11:07 a.m., Beatty hoisted signal, "Keep nearer to the enemy." Unfortunately the action instead was broken off, and the chance of annihilating Germany's battle cruisers gone. When Beatty managed to transfer his flag to the Princess Royal via the destroyer Attack, it was impossible to again enter action as the Germans had escaped in the distance and the opportunity had gone.
The first ranging shots in this action were fired at 22,000 yards, hits began at 18,000, the range decreasing rapidly, but the change of range and its rate of change were very gradual and fairly constant, while the size of the target was at a maximum, the whole length of the ships being presented. Ideal conditions, those were for good gunnery, and while fewer hits than expected were made much progress towards greater accuracy has been made since. To lessen the damage accruing by skilful fire control, changes of course, together with destroyer attacks and smoke screens were used. The gun alone decided the tactics in this battle between these lightly armored and speedy ships. The heavier guns belonging to the British and the range being great, the bigger volume of fire and the close action, the importance of which was considered by the German navy to be greater than larger-calibered guns, did not help their battle-cruisers, which abandoned one, the pioneer of its type, to certain destruction and fled. The lesson evidently is that in actions between similar vessels the ones that have the heavier guns will possess the control of the blue water. As the power of the gun, and consequently the effective range of modern battles, increases, so does the realization that control of gunfire must increase in skill become more evident.
Jutland, May 31, 1916.—The German fleet was in the habit of making from time to time various two-day cruises in the North Sea as an entire unit in order to train its personnel. The British fleet was desirous of a contact, but due to distant bases and the extensive German mine fields found it difficult to time its movements, so as to arrive at the proper time to give battle. On May 31, 1916, the British battle-cruisers left Rosyth and the British grand fleet, Scapa, for a rendezvous in the North Sea. Due to some miscalculation the two parts of the fleet were still separated by some miles at the time when they had desired to join. The British fleet comprised twenty-nine dreadnoughts, nine battle-cruisers, nine armored cruisers, twenty-three light cruisers, and 147 destroyers. The German fleet was out on one of its exercise cruises, steaming in battle formation with light cruisers and battle-cruisers ahead, and comprised sixteen dreadnoughts, five battle-cruisers, six pre-dreadnoughts, fifteen light cruisers and about 123 destroyers. The force engaged in the action that commenced at 3:48 p.m. thus consisted of the largest number of vessels in a sea fight in modern times. This battle of the Jutland, or Skaggerack, is one in which ships and fleets maneuvered freely, changed courses by ships to avoid torpedoes frequently, and zigzagged in order to derange gunfire. When the latter was too heavy, destroyers made smoke screens and attacked with torpedoes.
The weather was clear, wind light and variable, the visibility varying from 21,000 to 10,000 yards. The action between the six British battle-cruisers and the five German opened at 16,000 yards. The fire was rapid though but few hits were made. Fifteen minutes after the action commenced a chance German shell caused the destruction of the Indefatigable; just a great black cloud of smoke rose in the air some 300 feet, and when it dissipated, the fine vessel was gone.
At 4:08 the British battleships of the Warspite class came into action with light cruisers astern. The superiority of the British was met with a destroyer attack by the Germans and as the English destroyers met them, a fierce engagement occurred between the lines which ended in the retreat of the Germans. At 4:30 the battle-cruiser Queen Mary blew up and sank. Again the Germans had made an extremely lucky shot for them. The hitting on neither side was constant or rapid, the long range made director-firing essential but even that was very difficult, due to smoke, water, and funnel gases. Range keeping was not perfected and the changes of course threw out the gunnery. Light began to fail at 4:30, and, as the fight went on, the range finders became increasingly inaccurate. The Germans had the best of the light.
As the German battleships were sighted, at 4:42, Beatty turned to starboard eighteen points. Von Hipper doing the same. At 5 152 the British fifth battle squadron counter-marched to port, received a fire from the German battleships, and engaged the German battle-cruisers at 14,000 yards. About 5:55 the British grand fleet came into action, and at 6:10 the Germans turned to the right 360°, Beatty changing course to east to pass ahead of the British battleships and take station on its eastern flank, the range being now 12,000 yards. At 6:30 the British fire was effective on the German line. At 6:35 Rear Admiral Hood was lost by the sinking of the Invincible. The German Lutsow left the line at the same time. Visibility grew worse rapidly, the enemy turning southward under fire at but 8,000 yards. Destroyer attacks and smoke screens aided the Germans in their turn southwest. The battle continued intermittently from 6:17 to 8:20 p.m., at ranges from 9,000 to 12,000 yards. The Germans kept on towards the west, the Weisbaden having sunk at 7:00 a.m. The Warrior was severely damaged and lost the next day. The fleets lost contact during the night and made port next day.
The Germans apparently concentrated their fire, as battle cruisers next in line to the ones sunk were hit but seldom. With enemy zigzagging, shells striking and detonating, water deluging decks, destroyer attacks, torpedoes, smoke screens and funnel smoke, the conditions of target firing were certainly absent and one can believe that the personnel would be at not much over fifty per cent efficiency. The gun pointers could see practically nothing. The accurate shooting of target practice was wanting and rate of hitting could not have been over one hit per gun per two hours.
At long ranges, such as these, gun pointers could seldom see the target and hence the director method of aiming had to be used. Gun fire was the main factor in this, as in other battles, an enormous number of rounds being fired. The damage done by the Germans, armed as they were with lighter guns must have been due to the fact that they maintained a great rapidity and volume together with a greater accuracy of fire.
Tactics of the fleet in sea battles initiated by DeRuyter and perfected by Nelson have been shown to the world in different phases, by Farragut, Sampson, Togo, Jellicoe, and Beatty. All these felt the restrictions of movement enforced by the limitations of modern gunnery, which ought no longer to exist. The adoption of real fire control and thus real gunnery should enable battle tactics to be developed without the irksome necessity of considering what will happen to the accuracy of the fire when unexpected changes of course or speed are made.
The fleet of Rear Admiral Sampson at Santiago, July 3, 1898, obtained but a percentage of 3.3 hits with the mean range only of 1,800 yards, when excluding the Oregon's few shots at the Colon fired at her extreme gun range of about 11,000 yards. During the battle there was practically no maneuvering and nothing else to interfere with accurate gun fire. The personnel was surely equal to that of the present day, the poor results being due in the, main to slow loading arrangements, poor sights, low velocity guns, and so on. In other words, materiel was then far behind the personnel. The telescope sight was there, but not sufficiently rugged to stand the shocks of gunfire, it being still crude, though much improved upon the first. The result of the battle was such that Santiago did not emphasize the lack of good control in the gunnery line sufficiently to arouse the navies of the world to its needs.
Even at Tsushima in 1905 the gunnery range had increased to but 9,000 yards, this latter increase being permitted by the gunnery improvements made in the interim. Such gunnery improvements are responsible for the changes in tactics and the disposition and caliber of main battery guns.
The real awakening and start of progress came along in the years 1901 to 1903, when matters in the gunnery line began to hum. Sir Percy Scott gave the gunnery of the English fleet a jolt on the China Station that was transmitted by Admiral W.S. Sims to the American fleet. Gunnery became a fetish, and in 1903 the late Professor P. R. Alger published his remarkable essay on gunnery which stirred our own navy to further efforts.
The range of 300 yards in Nelson's day produced slow ships and close action, while many calibers of guns were included in the batteries of vessels. In 1848, our ordnance had only just commenced to evolute into present-day types; and it is an interesting fact that in said year there devolved upon Commander J. A. Dahlgren, U. S. Navy, the task of equipping all our navy cannon with sights! The firing ranges were still inside of 2,000 yards, the pivot gun shooting a projectile of sixty-eight pounds being the main reliance in ships' armament; and again, in 1856, Dahlgren enunciated as a leading principle of ordnance that "the main element of ordnance power is represented by one caliber." Attempts had been made to follow that principle from time to time, but it was not really accepted and adopted by the world until Naval Constructor R. R. M. Robinson reproduced the idea practically in the South Carolina, and later in the Delaware type.
The telescope sight of Rear Admiral Fiske, improved by Commander Mustin, rapidly pushed possible ranges to the extreme limits of visibility. Gunnery then soon had to seek for better means of laying guns and controlling their fire.
The first real attempt at long-range firing was made possible by the modern director systems of fire introduced in the British navy by Captain Percy Scott, R. N., in 1911, on the Neptune. Long ranges thus became no obstacle, as the pointer at the director scope installed higher than the guns, could fire as soon as the masts of the target appeared above the horizon. In fact it is recognized that in the battle of Jutland the enemy target ships were much of the time invisible to the pointers because of the interference of the splashes, the powder and the funnel smoke quite as much as because of the low visibility conditions; and, without the director scope, accurate firing would have been impossible.
After this start in the present gunnery—which insured sea fights at long ranges, the next steps were taken with the view of keeping the range after it had been once obtained. Methods in vogue up to and including the battle of Jutland did not succeed in accomplishing this, but improvements in the methods and the instruments for range-keeping have worked wonders, until it is confidently believed that battle fleets of the world have a fire control system that will keep the target straddled by salvos, be the changes of speed and courses by both firing ship and target what they may.
The ranges at which modern sea fighting take place are variously estimated by our highest authorities, many claiming that not over 12,000 yards will be the determining range. Our target practices cause us to believe differently and to concur with the commander of the British fleet at Jutland, Admiral Jellicoe, who stated in March, 1916, that "ships of today open fire at 22,000 yards range and gunfire begins to be very effective at 18,000 yards"; and we believe that a 30,000-yard range is now not improbable.
Long-range target practices began to be held in our fleet, these being at ranges at first of but 4,000 yards and at stationary targets. But as ranges increased, so did the material improvement; it had to. The officers demanded the best and all gunnery started upwards.
Many able officers devoted their brains and their energies to the development of fire control, both organization and materiel. The principles involved were recognized and instruments to effect the desired results were gradually produced. Ammunition handling, rugged and immobile sights with better graduations, range finders, clocks, and projectors, all came in for much attention.
The Russo-Japanese war had showed quite clearly to all navies that long ranges were to rule in modern sea battles, and that the fleet having the best sights, gunnery, and fire control instruments, and organization was bound to win.
So by 1911 it was not unusual to obtain thirty per cent of hits at 11,000 yards under open sea conditions with our pre-dreadnoughts. It is axiomatic that to hit successfully at long range one must obtain correct ranges, apply the sight bar correction for atmosphere and temperature conditions, reduce dispersion to its minimum, spot the salvos on, and then keep the range after once it is found; a problem intricate in a high degree as the rate of change of range must be kept even though it is varying constantly due to one's own and one's target changes of both course and speed. The errors of rangefinders were reduced gradually to twenty-five yards in 6,000 yards by the training of their operators, and by improvements in the instruments both in size and ruggedness. Not only must any successful fire control system accomplish the foregoing but it must also enable the firing ship after once on a target to shift that target at any time without suffering a loss of accuracy.
Greater and greater ranges came within the possibility of ships as the power of guns increased, and as the necessity for keeping away from the long range torpedoes became apparent. Visibility then soon began to be a limiting factor in gunnery and hence the tops became the logical places from which to direct the fire.
The director scope mounted aloft became a fixture in all navies, and, as a result, ranges at target practice of over 20,000 yards, with higher percentage of hits than at Santiago, are now common; while in the future ranges of 30,000 to 35,000 may be expected, visibility being the only limiting factor. In battles during the world war, an extreme of 18,000 yards has been noted, but such an extreme range was not maintained, the ranges closing to 14,000 yards and less before decisive damage was inflicted.
Even with long ranges, modern battles indicate that the best shooting ships at target practices can be expected to give the best accounts of themselves in battle, as witness the record of the Scharnhorst.
Mechanical methods for gunnery control are decidedly necessary in battle. One knows, if the slightest unexpected incident occurs in target practice, how the poise and skill of gun personnel are upset and with what fatal results to the score. How much greater will this be in battle is easily comprehended. The usual estimate is that the mentality of a gun's crew is reduced in the strain of battle to fifty per cent of the normal. Such conditions, together with the noise and shock, naturally reduce normal mentality in a marked degree. Our mechanisms, not only for loading but for accurate shooting, must be made then so as to depend more and more upon the mentality of a few, that is they must be aided by the best mechanical and electrical appliances possible.
To insure good gunnery the best means that can be developed are adopted to insure correct sight bar range or elevation of the guns, errors in which magnify the errors in increasing proportion as the range increases. Other varying quantities to contend with are the constantly changing speeds and courses of your own ship and those of the target enemy, the atmospheric conditions, the obscuring of enemy by low visibility, by shell splashes, by other vessels or by smoke screens of destroyers or vessels themselves. Due to these conditions the rapidity of heavy gunfire with modern turret guns handled safely is not much over two per minute although loading times are short enough to permit many more rounds to be fired.
In the simplest conditions of gunnery we find that a stationary ship is able to hit a stationary target at a very satisfactory rate; but that as conditions change this is decreased greatly, as at target practice, and still further in actual battle and therefore gunnery should aim at providing means for reproducing the stationary conditions no matter what courses and speeds are used by both firing ship and enemy. To do this is no easy problem indeed, but modem science applied to fire control has made great strides towards its solution. Into this question comes also the fact that a target is likely to be invisible practically as much of the time as it is to be visible, due to smoke of guns, to the funnel smoke of the firing ships or of the next one ahead, or to smoke screens of the enemy, to splashes produced by short shots, or to enemy ships afire, all of which require that the method adopted for keeping the range must allow for these conditions. The courses and speeds must be altered at will without detriment to one's gunfire if torpedoes, mines and submarines are to be avoided. To hit with a torpedo also demands a great accuracy in fire control appliances and in trained skill in operators, as the course and speed of the enemy are vital to success here.
Shore fortifications, because of the accuracy of their gunfire insured by their immobility and accurate range-finding methods, are practically immune from serious bombardments by vessels. The odds in favor of the fort, however, are somewhat reduced by modern fire control methods. Vessels now can or should be able to bombard effectively by indirect gunfire, changing course and speed at will, and even do so at night when the flashes of their guns will be the only target for the fort. Thus serious damage to morale, personnel, and materiel of shore positions must be expected when attacked by a fleet. Flashless powder, developed by the navy in 1918, by not disclosing the firing vessels by the bright customary flash, practically prohibits a fort's returning the fire of a night bombardment while flares or illuminating projectiles disclose it to the attacking vessels.
To bombard, if not underway on changing and various courses and speeds, insures the range of the vessel being picked up by the fort, even though smoke screens should hide her, for in this case her position can be located by sound ranging, aircraft spotting and gun smoke. After the range of the vessel has been picked up by the forts, and salvos are landed about her, discretion will indicate to her the wisdom of withdrawing at once. If, in order to approximate the stationary conditions, the vessel moves slowly, it will be the more easily attacked by submarines. Speed and ever-changing courses must be maintained by the vessel. Gunnery, for long years after the modern high-power guns came into use, did not permit such movements without its effectiveness being absolutely nullified thereby. Now, however, fire control should be perfected to a degree that the commander afloat can feel no such handicap. Once he obtains the range he will keep it; and when, as in the case of a fort, his target is immobile, he can never lose it no matter how fast or how changeably he may steam, all smoke screens notwithstanding. His immunity to torpedoes is greater because of his movements, and also to mines because of modern methods of ship protection. Fire control has here made marked advances, and who can say with assurance that a bombardment may never be undertaken by a fleet, or by single vessels, underway.
Bombardments unless followed by strong land attacks do not give the measure of success that would warrant the risk of the operations. The modern examples of fort bombardments are the various attacks in the Dardanelles, the heaviest ones being those on March 1st, 18th and 25th, 1915. While the forts were seemingly silenced the enemy claimed that they were not seriously damaged and it is noted that they always resumed fire on the next attacks. A bombarding fleet must sweep for mines, must be prepared against submarine attacks, and must maneuver in order to make accurate return fire difficult. Without freedom of movement, casualties to ships are very heavy, and, unless the forts can be occupied, bombardments are without a gain commensurate with the loss. On March 19, 1915, for example, while engaging the forts at the Dardanelles Straits from 10:45 a.m. to 6:05 p.m. the battleships Bouvet, Irresistible, and Ocean were all sunk by mines, notwithstanding that sweeping for mines had been conducted carefully and systematically, while the Inflexible, because of the loss of her fire control stations, was put out of action. These bombardments did establish the power of the fleet to dominate fortresses by superiority of fire. All this is futile unless the fortresses are occupied by troops, for the damage done by the fleet is seldom real or lasting, the success is only momentary and spectacular, as forts can repair their damages and regain their former power far more quickly than battleships can be built.
The Konigsberg was destroyed in the Rufigi River on July 11, 1914, by the monitors Mersey and Severn, the fire being governed by seaplanes. Salvos were fired slowly, about two every three minutes, and, after once spotted on, the hitting was of such an amount that in thirty minutes no fire was returned by the German vessel.
This action at the Rufigi River showed that after the range was once obtained, in this case after but eight minutes, a rate of hitting of one per gun per two minutes was obtained with a six-inch gun at about 10,000 yards, a rather long range for that gun. Yet, on a previous occasion, the rate of hitting was about one hit per gun in four hours. This only shows what an extreme difference can exist between results given by a right method of fire control as compared with a wrong method, a ratio of 1,200. The tactics employed were correct but the use of gunnery on the first day was not efficient. The Jutland battle gave a rate of hitting of about one per gun per three hours at ranges never over 14,000 and for sometime from 12,000 to 8,000 yards.
Gunnery, of course, cannot insure hitting a target that constantly changes course, because to accomplish this it must possess the accomplishments actually possessed only by true prophecy. Nevertheless, the fleet in bombarding a fort does have this unknown factor eliminated and can derange the fort's fire by its own great mobility of such character that it in no wise will affect its own. Fire control in all navies does provide instruments designed so that changes of courses on the part of the enemy are quickly discerned and notice given to the fire control party.
In modern fleet actions all the conditions that existed at the Jutland, but intensified and added to, must be expected. Danger to all vessels existed in the air, on and under the water. Destroyers harassed the main fleets by their incessant activity with smoke screens and torpedoes, the water being literally alive with the latter. Torpedoes, with their long and even increasing ranges, fired promiscuously are a danger far worse than either the anchored mines or the floating mines drifting on the surface of the water. To defend oneself against the two latter paravanes and bow wave are generally sufficient, while to cope with the former speed with sharp and unpredicted changes both of speed and course are necessary.
For years admirals have been hampered by the fact that to even zigzag in an orderly manner would hopelessly derange modern gunfire, although it is a proceeding vital to success whether operating offensively or defensively. Whether or not such is the case now depends altogether upon the appliances fitted for fire control and the ability of the personnel operating them.
A fleet that constantly zigzags in battle and can yet keep hitting the enemy has an enormous advantage over one that cannot. To change the range by unexpectedly altering courses and speed is the most efficient means of reducing the effect of an enemy's fire; but such is not possible unless your own gunnery is of the caliber that is able to keep the range of the enemy without harm to its own effectiveness.
Torpedoes, mines, and bombs, whether from surface, undersea or aircraft notwithstanding, it is still the gun that decides the issue of all sea battles, and passively or actively it gives the naval power that commands the sea. The gun is the dominant factor, and tactics must use maneuvers and utilize speed so that the maximum gun power may be brought to bear on the enemy through guns well placed for maximum effect. To maintain the gun at its best for the longest time, a ship, by frequent changes of course and speed, must maneuver so as to vary the range of the enemy and thus lessen the accuracy of his fire by complicating his fire and control and, in order to avoid his torpedoes, zigzagging under fire is certainly necessary, and provision must be made so that the accuracy of your own fire is not harmed thereby. Freedom to change course and speed being then the requirements of modern tactics, gunnery must meet them, and so it does in an ever-increasing degree.
Scientific methods of range keeping and director firing in gunnery combined with seamanship of the old school remodeled to suit conditions, now have combined to such a degree that the commander of a vessel ought to feel free to change at any time speed, course, range, or target without losing any advantage or decreasing his offensive or defensive power. The mutual relations of tactics and gunnery thus have produced means whereby both may be used ad libitum without one thereby lessening the effect of the other. Both must excel and neither should hamper the other.
Gunnery then in the passing years has steadily progressed and may be said to be keeping pace with tactics, allowing the admiral free and untrammeled use of all its advantages. Such, we have seen, was not always the case, the increase in gun power being more rapid than the devising of exact methods to control it under all conditions at sea. However, fire control cannot do the impossible, and even if it is as perfect as practicable, the errors in the trajectories of guns at the ever-increasing ranges still make high percentages of hits problematical. Gunnery is also devoting much attention to correcting variations in flight of shell at long ranges striving to overcome the unknown factors that are ever present in the problem.
New ways of using torpedoes, depth charges, aircraft bombs and other deadly weapons are constantly being devised. But gunnery soon meets each new weapon. No one doubts but that a sufficient amount of explosive placed at the right spot will sink or destroy any vessel whether in the air, on the surface of the sea, or under the sea. The difficulty is to place it there. All big ships were doomed when the torpedo was invented, and yet again when the destroyer came into being, yet again when the submarine was produced, and now great faith is placed in the powers of aircraft, both torpedo plane and bombers. Even several torpedo hits are not fatal. The Marlborough at Jutland fired seventeen salvos after being torpedoed several times, eluded a submarine attack, and after the battle steamed to her base at twenty knots. A greater number of vessels were destroyed by heavy gunfire than by torpedoes. The Warspite hit by only two high explosive shells was in a much worse plight than the Marlborough with her torpedo hits. Also the damage ensuing from the hits of heavy bombs dropped by aircraft upon old capital ships proved of far less extent than had been expected. The target presented by a torpedo plane's ninety-seven-foot spread is enormous, as is likewise that of the big bombing planes.
The use of suitable tactics of ships in battle line will reduce their chances of being struck by bombs from aircraft with even greater ease than now is the case in avoiding torpedoes. To one who has watched an attack by bombing planes how evident is the point they must reach to drop a bomb upon a moving surface vessel. How simple it is for the anti-aircraft battery of that vessel to make it impossible for the aircraft to reach the point necessary. Many new methods of locating and hitting attacking aircraft are practicable. The method now used by the duck hunter in aiming his shotgun may be adapted to directing the fire of the big guns acting against aircraft. The numerous machine guns, semi-automatic guns of larger caliber, and the easily manipulated anti-aircraft guns of larger than four-inch with their perfectly functioning fuses make the lot of an attacking air-man anything but a happy one. To judge from experiences in the world war air pilots cared not to go over even the crudely directed batteries at Dunkirk and elsewhere. They will hardly dare to encounter modern anti-aircraft guns controlled with the efficient systems which are or will be devised to hit them both by day and by night.
The use of gas had added terribly to the dangers of modern war. There is an answer to that in like manner to which torpedoes, guns, and bombs have been countered. The bringing of gas in quantity to the scene of a naval battle involves problems in the solution of which not a real start has yet been made. If not invisible when spread, ships by tactical handling will avoid their neighborhood, the sea will soon dehydrolyze and render them innocuous. Then again, should an invisible lethal gas cloud pervade a ship, new masks not alone on individuals but on all intakes for air will counteract their deadly action, not to mention their real and most powerful offensive, or defensive if you prefer, antagonist; the cylinders of gas ready to release that immediately decompose the lethal gases made by man into the harmless ones which human beings are meant to breathe. Again the ventilating system of a vessel may be so constructed as to drive out noxious gases in a very short space of time. This is essential for even when the gas ejectors fitted to turret guns fail the turret's crew are greatly inconvenienced. While the best method of dealing with a gas attack is not yet in sight, it is certain that troops, cities or ships are not tamely going to submit to being gassed, as the advocates of gas warfare generally appear to think. There's another side to this gas question that does not appear often in print and that's the efficacy of the defensive methods developed to render its attacks innocuous.
Gas and the supergun of sixty-five or seventy miles in range may be used to drive a fleet out from under shore fortifications and compel it to seek the decision on the high seas. Gunnery will control the uses of both gas and supergun in such operations. The attacks upon fleets at sea by forces of air and gas are essentially difficult of execution. The airplane carrier is not yet developed successfully and when constructed along proposed lines will be a prey to the battle-cruisers of a nation provided with such vessels but will be a menace to a navy without huge battle-cruisers with their thirty-two knots of speed in all weathers and 48,000-yard gun range.
Some class proper tactics as superior to any armor protection—vide "Speed is armor," Lord Fisher—such protection being at best but partial and vulnerable, and it being nullified by proper gunnery of the enemy, and its lack being compensated for by fearless tactics.
The gunnery officers, whom the crew and sometimes their messmates regard as crazy enthusiasts, imbued with the mad desire to reach one goal—a higher percentage of hits and greater rapidity of fire than before—have made modern gunnery what it is now, and are daily improving methods, while the effort of ordnance to make the materiel more perfect than the personnel never slackens, and as one by one its defects are brought to light, they are studied in the hope of overcoming them.
Be the instruments no matter what, without enthusiasm, training, and ability in personnel, an accurate and rapid fire cannot be maintained at long ranges.
…as long as man is human, we shall have to count on men,
Though machines be ne'er so perfect, there may come a day perhaps,
When you find out just how helpless is a heap of metal scraps.
—HOPWOOD.
So the navy puts full reliance in its gunnery officers, and they so work as to push the gunnery of the fleet to the highest pinnacles. Unhampered by the fear that inaccurate shooting will result because of free maneuvering, the commanders afloat now place their vessels where and when they wish in the endeavor to get the tactical advantages necessary for maximum gunfire effect.
The conclusion, therefore, should be that modern gunnery, the fire control being in skilled hands, at the present date can offer no handicap whatever to an absolutely free use of naval tactics in battle; and further, it has so advanced that, properly utilized, a ship even may venture once again, as in the days of our grand admiral Farragut to bombard shore fortifications, and do it with the chances of success in its favor. Gunnery now does not hamper tactics, and therefore, as is usual in the see-saw of progress, the battle tactics of the fleet units must develop and provide surprises and Nelsonian means to inflict an overwhelming defeat upon an enemy.
In the preceding pages mention has been made of a few of the many problems in both gunnery and tactics that await solution at the hands of ordnance and gunnery experts during the years of peace. History tells us that we now can expect at least thirty-one years of freedom from war. During this period we must keep advancing in the profession of warfare on the sea, bearing in mind, when discouraged at the little attention that will be accorded the navy by our countrymen, what would now be the state of the Anglo-Saxon world had the British seamen given up their intensive preparations and researches during the one hundred years of peace vouchsafed their navy just prior to the world war.
All things in gunnery are possible to him who sincerely tries, and skilful use of the tools provided will win the day when the next main fleet action becomes an actuality. Let us have faith in our brains and our tools, use them both, and then all will continue to be well with the navy.