THE ROLE OF THE LINE
By Lieut. Commander F.S. Craven, U. S. Navy
1. The activities of the navy are many, but they all should proceed with but a single end in view—to prepare for war. In general, then, these activities should consist in determining what constitutes preparedness and in putting it into practice.
2. The first process is generally described as planning; the second is administration. Planning lays the foundation for administration. In the routine of peace times and in the conduct of routine activities during war planning must always look ahead because it must determine the aims, consider the means, and lay down the processes—that is, prescribe the organization and its routine. But in the crisis of battle, planning and administration for the purpose of tactics and strategy, become so closely related that they practically constitute a single process which depends on the instantaneous development of the action. Thus we have:
(a) Planning as a separate process.
(b) Administration as distinct from planning, and
(c) Command in war, which combines the two.
3. Planning requires a distinct mental attitude and specific mental equipment. The necessary mental equipment includes intelligence, originality, analytic ability, mental energy, and receptivity, and there must be temperamental qualifications, including open mindedness, fairness, modesty, carefulness, thoroughness, and the ability to collaborate with others. In addition to this equipment the individual who engages in planning functions should have special training, for although it is probably true that an untrained man having proper mental equipment could learn rapidly while he attacks his problems, it certainly is true that time would be saved and mistakes would be avoided were he trained. The intrinsic excellence of his work from the beginning certainly would be improved by preliminary training. This training must fit him as an expert in lines as follows:
In the general activities of the naval profession.
In the detailed functions of the branch to which he is assigned.
In the methods of scientific problem solving.
In the habit of acquiring exact information.
4. It appears almost superfluous to state that men who plan for the navy must be equipped as thoroughly as possible for their work. They must first be selected, then trained for just this work. In the earlier stages of their development it is inevitable that they will be more versed in the special functions of a selected branch than in the naval profession as a whole, because the one is a part, and thorough knowledge of the whole can only be gained through experience with all parts. Obviously the men who plan should be selected early in their careers so that they may have constant practice, because planning, to be successful, must deal largely with general principles. The ability to distinguish general principles is in itself difficult. To apply them properly to administrative purposes is an art.
5. Pure administration is the course of action required to interpret and to execute plans. In the navy an administrator is called an executive. To interpret plans an executive should possess in some degree the attributes also required for planning. A certain amount of planning experience would therefore be advantageous to him if obtainable without interfering with his administrative training. Opportunity is presented to the young officers who serve as heads of departments of small vessels to gain both types of experience at once. They should be assisted and directed by a well considered course of supervision and instruction by squadron or flotilla staffs.
6. To execute plans there are required attributes of rather a different order. The executive must be:
Possessed of initiative.
Quick to act.
Possessed of good judgment.
Forceful.
Possessed of personality in order to handle men.
Self-controlled.
Of high moral character.
Finally, the executive also requires training to fit him to perform his work, which, however, he must derive largely from experience.
7. When we attempt to define the characteristics for the great leaders who must command our fleets, administer our naval bases, direct the activities of the several elementary functions of the Navy Department, co-ordinate the efforts of the whole—then we must recognize several things. First, that these men must possess all of these characteristics in marked degree. Such men are rare. They can be but the cream of the many who possess the attributes for the one or the other class of work. They must be selected and by a process which shall be as certain as possible in its results. Such selection obviously cannot be made at an early period in their careers. Second, that no man can possess within himself the capacity for both planning and administration necessary to handle alone the activities of a great subdivision of the navy. He can only direct the performance of such activities by trained men. In a word, he requires a staff of trained men. In time of peace these men must work together to prepare that subdivision for war. Detailed plans must be made for war activities, and must be tested by application and trial so that they may be correctly matured. Thus these two branches of the staff must work toward a common end, each aiding the other, yet working independently. For planning requires time for research, for experiment, for weighing this against that, for the intense study of the effect of small details on general principles; whereas administration requires instant decisions and quick action so that the numerous demands of a routine may not produce an accumulation of matters unattended to, which spells inefficiency and invites defeat.
8. So it is with the great coordinator—the Chief of Naval Operations. He requires by far the most numerous and best trained staff because to direct operations he must have the assistance of men who are themselves the counterparts in experience and ability of the heads of the primary subdivisions. Each of these men requires the assistance of younger men, of both types, so that the volume of work may be handled. Thus we must have a central planning section of superlative excellence which shall investigate and define the basic principles governing the activities of the whole. They must prepare plans so general in nature that they will coordinate and develop the activities of subdivisions without restricting their proper freedom of action. They must work in close collaboration with the administrators at the source of power from whom, alone, they can derive the practical assistance necessary to the maturing of their plans. The plans they prepare become, in brief, the statement of military principles affecting all naval activities.
9. A word about the technical side. How frequently it is remarked that a battleship is the apotheosis of mechanical complexity! The inferences might be drawn that genius must be called to its production and genius also to its successful operation. But there is this difference: the greater the genius involved in production, the less mechanical genius will be required for operating. Consider the remark of the skilled advertiser: "A child can run it!" Consider as well the stress and excitement of battle, which seriously reduces the ability of the average man to engage in activities requiring mental effort. Only the simplest acquired habits of action, rendered practically mechanical by drill, can be relied on. What better principle, then, could be found for the design of naval ships and their equipment than to obtain operational simplicity? Nor what requiring greater skill of the designer? We must come to a realization that there is a limit to human capacity. We must recognize that superlative engineering talent is produced of superlative qualities made expert by intensive training and extensive experience. No seagoing officer can at once be an expert in his profession and an engineer of equal ability. But it is not beyond his powers to become an expert in his profession and at the same time to gain sufficient knowledge of engineering that he can direct and assist the activities of real engineering experts in attacking naval problems. In fact, we must have officers who spend their time alternately at sea and in this work ashore—and we also must have real engineers to devote their entire time to purely technical matters.
10. There is no logical objection to developing ordnance engineers, propulsive engineers—in fact, all types of engineering experts—from our own ranks, if we feel that our available material in Naval Academy graduates will yield the requisite supply and still provide us with line officers of ability. But these engineers must be recognized as such. They must be educated as such, must receive early training and post graduate training as such, must go through all the long process recognized as necessary in civil life, and more. They will have no time for regular sea service, nor will their need for constant touch with the technical details of their work permit it, except for those sent forth from time to time to note performances with a technical eye. There would be an advantage in recruiting these men from the Naval Academy because they would have the spirit of loyalty which permeates the service, and they would receive their early training in contact with the sea. But it does not appear to me that the service can afford this method to secure all of its engineering talent. The fascination of technical work appeals to youth, and we would be very apt to lose many of our budding leaders to the ranks of the technicists. This we must not do. The success of the navy in war is the primary consideration, and to ensure it we require a wide field from which to select military leaders. Civil life abounds with engineers from among whom may be drawn the preponderance of talent required. Naval Academy graduates of pronounced technical ability and inclination should be specially trained as engineers after a brief service at sea. They would form a strong link between the line and purely civilian technicists, and would provide a logical field for producing necessary leaders in naval engineering. But we must recognize the fact that civilian technicists of adequate ability must be paid according to the scale prevailing in civil life—we cannot retain such men at the salaries now paid.
11. We may venture now to state the role of the line of the navy. It is to study and apply the art of naval warfare; to guide and co-ordinate the production of equipment, to institute appropriate training, to conduct the operations of the navy in the event of war. Three types of men are required: First, the leaders who combine the attributes of the others; second, the planners; third, the executives. And of each type we must know accurately the relative excellence of its membership so that the greatest ability may be applied at the top and the dead wood may be eliminated from the bottom. The fields of activity for these men are both ashore and afloat, but their primary field is the sea, for there alone can they gain first hand the experience which must fit them as experts in their profession, comparable in efficiency with the experts in technical endeavors.