Some Ideas About The Effects Of Increasing The Size Of Battleships

SOME IDEAS ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF INCREASING THE SIZE OF BATTLESHIPS

By Captain E.J. King, U. S. Navy

 

I. Foreword

 

These ideas have been derived from many sources, probably none of them original, during a period of several years. They have been assembled in this form in an endeavor to bring them into orderly and related sequence for the readier consideration of just what advantages and disadvantages are involved when battleships are increased in size. Statement of obvious considerations is frequently made in order to express in full the connection of ideas.

 

A ship may be defined as a large self-propelled floating structure. A ship of given size displaces a volume of water equivalent in weight to the weight of the ship and its contents. On the displacement (size) of a ship depends its usefulness for the purpose for which it is built, whether naval or merchant, freight or passenger. Such usefulness is measured by the weight which can be carried in addition to the hull (or structure) weight.

 

Shipbuilding, in common with all other technical arts, is a matter of continuous progress; every ship must be an improvement of her predecessors of the same type; there is no finality and there can be none. The whole history of shipbuilding (naval and merchant) is one long series of steps in increase of displacement (size); there have been no permanent backward steps. The same fact holds true of all the mechanical arts; evolution and the developments in strength of materials and in application of power are continually bringing into play increased size to carry more power, or increased power to make the same size more effective; it is apparent that the combination of increased size carrying increased power must be the most effective of all.

 

With increased power or increased size, and certainly when the two are combined, comes increased cost, and in increased cost lies the principal reason for opposition to the increased size (displacement), at least of battleships. It follows as an economic axiom that increased size (displacement) which involves increased cost can be considered justifiable only if there is adequate naval return for the increased cost. It should be noted, however, that increased cost is not necessarily due to increased size (displacement) alone, as will appear later.

 

II. The Qualities of Naval Ships Generally

 

The term "useful displacement" is used by naval architects to represent the total carrying power of the hull structure which is available for embodying in the design the desired military qualities. The greater the total displacement the greater should be, in a well-designed ship, the relative "useful displacement," as such increase may be considered analogous to increasing the side of a cube, when the volume is increased to a markedly greater relative amount than is the area.

 

Certain essential qualities must be found to a greater or less extent in the design of all types of warships, be they battleships, battle cruisers, light cruisers, light cruisers (scouts), destroyers, submarines, and even in the cost of aeroplanes and dirigibles. Where any one or more qualities predominate, it follows that the other qualities must obviously be reduced in relative amount or even so far reduced as to become nominal.

 

The most essential qualities are:

Strength, both local and structural.

Stability and buoyancy, even when badly damaged.

Speed and handiness, for purposes of mobility.

Habitability, for the maintenance of personnel.

Economy of first cost and maintenance (upkeep); these two matters may sometimes appear to be opposed.

Length of vitality, which relates to the amount of fuel, ammunition, stores, etc., which affect the time that the ship can remain an efficient fighting machine.

Slowness of destruction, provided for by means of armor and by subdivision into compartments.

Armament, consisting of guns and torpedoes for the purposes of attack.

 

To summarize, the ship (hull structure) must have the strength and stability, and buoyancy to furnish "useful displacement" sufficient to efficiently carry the weights needed for:

 

Armament.—Attacking power—guns, torpedoes. Protection.—Resistance to destruction—armor, compartmentation.

Mobility.—Speed and handiness—motive power, turning qualities.

Endurance.—Longevity—fuel, ammunition, stores, etc.

 

Habitability is a relative term and is found in battleships to such a degree as to need no special comment.

 

First cost and upkeep are questions which will be taken up later.

 

The total displacement of a completed design is therefore to be considered made up of the following items; of these the maximum weights in the case of a battleship go to hull structure, protection, armament and machinery. The data concerning the most recent battleships are not available, but some idea of the relative apportionment of weights may be gained from the percentages cited, which obtain in the case of certain completed ships:

 

(1) Hull structure and fittings 35%

(2) Armor and protection of hull structure 17%

(3) Armor for protection of armament 8%

(4) Armament and ammunition 18%

(5) Machinery 12%

(6) Fuel (on Acceptance Trial) 6%

(7) General equipment and stores (Acceptance Trial) 4%

 

It appears, therefore, that for a given displacement only a certain part of the total weight, or "useful displacement," is available to be used for the necessary fundamental qualities of a naval vessel, and that on the service for which the vessel is intended depends the general apportionment of weights to be used for the several qualities. If, in a battleship, it is desired to increase the armament, either the protection, the mobility, or the endurance (or two or all of them) must be reduced or the displacement (size) must be increased; obviously the same statement holds true in regard to the other qualities. It matters little whether the armament consists of many guns of large caliber or of fewer guns of greater caliber, it is the weight and distribution of weight necessary for the desired armament that matter. If there are many guns of large caliber there may well be more gun positions to protect (which means more armor); if fewer guns, there may well be fewer gun positions to protect, but they will be of greater extent and probably more widely distributed.

 

III. The Qualities of Single Battleships

 

The primary qualities of a battleship are repeated, namely:

Armament.—Offensive or attacking power—guns, torpedoes.

Protection.—Resistance—armor and compartmentation.

Mobility.—Speed and handiness—motive power, turning

qualities.

Endurance.—Longevity—radius of action, ammunition supply, stores, etc. These are sometimes considered included in armament and mobility.

 

Armament is the means provided for attack, i.e., offensive action; ammunition supply is sometimes included.

 

Protection is the means provided to enable the ship to withstand the attack of other ships and should be thought of as resistive rather than defensive.

 

Mobility is chiefly concerned with the means for moving the ship as to speed; it includes turning qualities, which are inherent in the design of the ship as it is worked out. The fuel endurance, on which radius of action depends, is sometimes included under the heading of mobility.

 

Endurance relates to radius of action at various speeds, which depends primarily on the fuel supply; to amount of ammunition carried for a prolonged engagement at a high rate of fire; and to stores for the maintenance of armament, hull, machinery, equipment and personnel.

 

These qualities have now to be individually examined with a view to ascertaining what changes in them are effected by increase of size.

 

(a) Armament.—That the all-big-gun one-caliber battleship is the type that affords the greatest possible capacity of effective hitting may be considered established, especially in view of the present-day rapidity of fire of heavy guns and their greater accuracy at longer ranges.

 

Heavy turret guns such as make up the armaments of battleships cannot be mounted to advantage, i.e., so as to increase the effective hitting capacity, without considerably increasing the size (displacement) of the ship, because the number of gun-turrets that can be placed to best advantage is dependent upon the length or beam (or both) of the ship, both of which increase slowly with increase of displacement (size).

 

The battleship is essentially a gun-carrier. The only justifying reason in the minds of many for increase of displacement (size) is that such increase shall, primarily, be for the purpose of increasing fighting power, i.e., armament. This appears to be sound doctrine, as armament is the special and the only positive element of fighting power; the other qualities may be reduced to insignificance, but the possession of armament indicates a vessel to be reckoned with. Protection and mobility are for the purpose of rendering the armament more effective, which fact indicates their subordination to armament.

 

Armament has reached such a stage of development that there are now three distinct means of increasing fighting power, namely:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Increasing the number of guns.
   • Increasing the size (caliber) of the guns.
   • Increasing both size and number.

 

The first method increases fighting power by reason of the greater number of projectiles that can be fired, the second by reason of greater weight of projectile and the greater accuracy at great ranges, and the third obviously is a combination of the other two.

 

These three methods of increasing fighting power are embodied in three distinct variants of the dreadnought type, namely.

 

(1) Numerous guns in numerous turrets, which requires length of ship for advantageous arrangement, e. g. the ex-Brazilian Rio de Janeiro with fourteen 12-inch guns in seven turrets; the U. S. S. Wyoming with twelve 12-inch guns in six turrets.

 

(2) Fewer but very heavy guns in double-gun turrets, which requires additional length and beam for the separation necessary to get the stability and the local strength to carry the concentrated weights, e. g., the British Queen Elisabeth with eight 15-inch guns in four turrets; the most recent designs of U. S. battleships with ten (?) 16-inch (?) guns in five (?) turrets.

 

(3) Numerous heavy guns in fewer turrets, i.e., triple- and quadruple-gun turrets, which requires structural provisions similar to those cited in the case (2) just above, e. g., the French Tourville with sixteen 13.4-inch guns in four turrets; the U. S. S. Pennsylvania with twelve 14-inch guns in four turrets.

 

It is manifest that to carry these heavier batteries the battleship must be of greater size (displacement) no matter which one of the variants of type is built.

 

The larger ship is better from the point of view of operating the armament because it provides a steadier gun platform, being less affected by sea and swell. The command of guns, i.e., their height above the water, can be greater, thus enabling them to be used more effectively in heavier weather and at greater ranges, the utility of which has lately been shown in the battle off Coronel and in our own winter operations.

 

Bearing in mind the saying of Admiral Farragut that "the best protection against the enemy's fire is a well-directed fire from your own ship," it would seem that if superior hitting power at greater ranges can be attained, so much the less is the need for devoting a large portion of the available weight to protection (armor). The logical development of this view would appear to result in the disappearance of armor as a part of the provisions for protection (resistance), and to this conception may be traced, at least in part, the genesis of the "battle cruiser."

 

It appears, from considerations of armament, that increase in size of a battleship provides for:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • More weight available to carry more and heavier armament (greater fighting power).
   • Carrying more and heavier armament (greater fighting power) as result of increased size.
   • More efficient employment of the armament, especially in heavy weather, due to higher command and to being a better gun platform.

 

(b) Protection.—It seems advisable to consider protection as a matter of defensive qualities only in so far as protection provides for the defensive by increasing the resistance of the ship to damage or destruction.

 

Protection divides into two main parts, armor and water-tight subdivision (compartmentation).

 

Armor, when viewed as a resistive quality of a battleship, calls for weight to be used:

 

 

 

 

 

1. • For ensuring that the armament (and the armament personnel) shall be damaged or destroyed as little as possible.
   • For ensuring that the stability and buoyancy of the hull structure are not materially lessened.

 

Increase in size should permit better comparative armor protection because there is more actual weight available, while its distribution is not over any comparatively greater area. Here again enters the question of

(1) Many guns in numerous turrets.

(2) Fewer but heavier guns in few turrets.

(3) Many guns in fewer turrets.

 

If the ship's fighting power (armament) is increased, any of the three types of armament call for more actual armor weight.

 

Increase of size should result in better under-water protection (compartmentation) because of greater relative subdivision, while not increasing actual size of compartments. Torpedo (and mine) effect, like projectile (and bomb) effect, is more or less local and can thus be confined to a smaller relative area, hence the necessary stability and buoyancy can be more readily safe-guarded in the larger ship.

 

The most up-to-date and effective methods of under-water protection, e. g., multiple skins, armor bulkheads, cellular compartmentation, etc., not only call for more weight and more space (in order to work them in) but also cost enormously. However much they may cost they may be considered indispensable in these days of submarine and mining activities. Indeed, cellular compartmentation, in spite of its very great cost, may well become the only form of protection with which warships of the future are provided.

 

Increase in size does, however, produce a ship that offers a bigger target to both projectile (and bomb) and torpedo (and mine) as it will be longer, of greater beam, of possibly greater draft, and of probably greater freeboard with higher upper works.

 

As compared with weights devoted to mobility (speed) due consideration should be given to the permanence of service which effectively armed and protected ships can render in comparison with what often proves to be the short-lived value of faster ships with less protection, e. g., the present fighting usefulness of the Oregon compared with that of the Saratoga.

 

It appears, from considerations of protection, that increase in size of a battleship:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Permits of more effective protection of armament, stability and buoyancy against projectiles (by means of armor).
   • Permits of more effective protection of stability and buoyancy against torpedoes and mines (by means of compartmentation).
   • Will provide a larger target to both projectile and torpedo.

 

(c) Mobility.—That part of mobility which is due to handiness, or turning qualities, is of secondary importance, but will be presumably less when the size of a ship is increased, chiefly on account of the greater length, which tends to increase the turning circle. Handiness is also affected by:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • The shape of the under-water body.
   • The size, shape and location of the rudder.
   • The size, shape and location of the screws. Handiness has a tactical usefulness only.

 

Of all the qualities which a battleship should have, none is more disputed than that part of mobility which speed supplies. Opinions range from those who advocate speed as a more or less direct means of offensive action to those whose idea is that high speed is an uncertain quality provided at great cost from every military point of view. Time is everything and speed directly affects time and so helps to overcome lack of foresight and errors of judgment. The true value of speed probably lies in the view that speed is not to be considered a weapon, but that, other things being equal, speed adds to the efficiency of the armament and confers a potential advantage on the side possessing it.

 

In two battleship fleets of the same gun power and armor the faster fleet would have an undoubted potential advantage, but assuming that these fleets are equally well designed, this superiority in speed, with equality in everything else, can only be attained by an increase in displacement with consequent increase in cost of building and of maintenance for individual ships.

 

However, advocates of high speed are numerous, and are inclined to the construction of ships in which high speed and heavy armament absorb the weight now generally assigned to that part of protection which is provided for by means of armor. This is the "battle cruiser" type.

 

The opponents of high speed in battleships are somewhat insistent in their opposition. Their views may be summarized as belief that speed is an essentially precarious quality, too much so to absorb weight which could otherwise be given to other and more desirable and more permanent qualities. They point to the unreliability of speed due to foul bottoms, poor coal, green firemen, hot bearings, minor accidents to motive machinery, accidents to boilers or steam lines, damage to smoke-pipes in action, damage to hull by projectiles and torpedoes and mines, and in general to anything that may necessitate slowing down and may therefore prevent the availability and use of the high speed to which so much weight has been assigned, probably just when it is most needed.

 

Increase of size (displacement) of battleships only for the sake of providing more relative weight to be used to make higher speed is probably of doubtful wisdom, for to be logical increase of size should undoubtedly give marked increase in fighting power (armament).

 

However, in increasing size to mount heavier armaments if the same relative weights be available for speed-making purposes, it is usually the case that higher speed is attainable. The evolution and development of propelling machinery continues to enable faster ships to be built for the same relative weights. Increase of length consequent on increase of size (displacement) permits of the attainment of higher speed on less relative weight because speed (in knots) is, generally speaking, inversely proportional to the square root of the length (in feet), the ratio being expressed as V ÷ √L = K. Where K is greater than unity the speed is very high for any ship. Thus in increasing length to provide for heavier armament, it becomes possible to get higher speed without greater relative "weight cost."

 

The combined effect on speed of increased length, improved machinery and better design of underwater body is shown by the following comparisons. The ratio of designed horsepower to designed displacement in the case of the Kansas class (pre-dreadnought, 16,000 tons) was 1.03 for a designed speed of 18 knots; the same ratio in the case of the Pennsylvania (31,500 tons) is 1.00, but the designed speed is 21 knots. Again, the ratio of designed horsepower to designed displacement in the case of the Delaware (20,000 tons) is 1.20 for a designed speed of 21 knots, whereas in the case of the Pennsylvania, with the same designed speed, the same ratio is only 1.00. Some idea of the relative "weight cost" of very high speed may be gained from the cases of recent "battle cruisers" where the above-mentioned ratio has values in the vicinity of 2.75 for a designed speed of 28 knots, and from the case of British battleships designed for 25 knots speed where the ratio is 2.10.

 

Increased size (displacement) confers an additional advantage in that it permits of higher sustained sea-speed due to the greater seaworthiness of the larger ship.

 

Therefore, it appears from considerations of mobility, that increase of size may be expected to result in:

 

(a) Higher full speed on same relative weight.

(b) Higher sustained sea-speed.

(c) Less handiness.

 

(d) Endurance.—As has already been remarked, endurance may very well be included in armament and mobility, but it is deemed best to deal with it as a separate quality, as it directly affects the time that a ship can remain an effective fighting unit.

 

The ammunition supply that can be carried in the larger ship should be relatively more ample, thus enabling the heavier armament to fire more actual rounds, which makes her a more effective fighting unit, both at long ranges where the percentage of shots fired to hits made is small and at shore ranges where volume of fire is wanted. This has a distinct bearing on tactics.

 

The fuel supply that can be carried in the larger ship can also be relatively greater, resulting in greater fuel endurance which gives a greater steaming radius at all speeds. This has a great deal to do with strategical considerations, into which times and distances enter as matters of the first importance.

 

The stores carried in the larger ship can readily be provided in relatively greater quantity, which will increase what may be called the "cruising life," which is a strategical matter.

 

It would seem that, from considerations of endurance, increase of size can be expected to allow for

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Larger ammunition supply (battle).
   • Greater steaming radius at all speeds (strategical).
   • Stores for a greater "cruising life" (strategical).

 

(e) Summary.—The comparative advantages and disadvantages due to increase of size of a single battleship summarize as follows:

 

Advantages	Disadvantages
As to Armament:	?
Greater fighting power.	?
More efficient use.	?
As to Protection:	?
More efficient against projectiles.	Presents larger target to projectiles and torpedoes.
More efficient against torpedoes.
As to Mobility:	?
Higher full speed on same relative weight.	Less handy.
Higher sustained sea-speed.	?
As to Endurance:	?
Larger ammunition supply.	?
Greater radius of action.	?
Greater "cruising life."	?
As to Cost:	Costs more.

 

It seems, from the foregoing discussion and summary, that the sole disadvantage of major importance resulting from increase of size of a battleship, considered singly, is that it costs more; on the other hand, the larger ship is more powerful and has greater resisting qualities, is faster under all circumstances, and has a greater steaming radius and "cruising life." As the greater cost results in better naval "return for money invested," as regards the single ship, this seeming disadvantage is not one in reality.

 

IV. Probable Limits of Size of Battleships

 

Increase of size (displacement) must largely be gained by increase of length and of beam because any appreciable increase of draft is prohibited by the depth of water available (or likely to be available) in harbors and in channels leading to navy yards (dry docks).

 

It seems pertinent here to consider what the probable limits of size of ships may be. The apparent limits at present are

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • The difficulties in securing the necessary structural strength, i.e., a matter of material.
   • The locks of the Panama Canal, which are 1000 feet long by no feet wide, and should take a ship 980 feet long and no-foot beam.
   • The depth of water leading to our principal dry docks, which may be assumed at about 35 feet.

 

If the structural difficulties can be overcome there would seem to be no reason why ships should not reach the limiting dimensions thus imposed.

 

A ship 980 feet long, with 100-foot beam and 33-foot draft and with a "block coefficient" of 0.60, would displace approximately 55,000 tons. It should be noted that the assumed ratio of length to beam is near 10: 1, which is better suited to a vessel of the so-called "battle cruiser" type than to vessels of the battleship type where the requirements of "useful displacement," stability and steadiness of gun-platform call for a ratio of length to beam of about 6 or 7:1. Such a ratio in the case of a battleship intended to pass through the Panama Canal would indicate a maximum length of 700 feet and a probable limiting displacement of about 45,000 tons.

 

V. Numerous Battleships Considered Together

 

War is a matter of defeat or destruction of the enemy's armed forces; hence it is a matter of fighting power, which quality in the case of battleships is supplied by the armament, which is provided with protection (resistance) in order that it may continue to be effective while receiving the enemy's fire.

 

War is also a matter of movement in order that the opposing forces may come into contact (battle) in order to obtain a decision; in ships this quality is included in the broadest meaning of the term mobility.

 

War is also a matter of supply, since the forces must have ammunition, food, clothing, etc., and, in the case of ships, fuel in order to retain the quality called mobility; the matter of supply affects the endurance of the forces, i.e., the time that they remain of effective fighting value.

 

These attributes of war have already been dealt with from the standpoint of the single ship. War is further a matter of coordination of the available forces in order that the most effective use may be made of them; this co-ordination is employed in two principal ways, i.e., strategy and tactics.

 

Strategy relates to movements and dispositions made before contact with enemy forces with a view to increasing the probabilities and the consequences of victory. Tactics relates to movements and dispositions made after contact with enemy forces, "contact" meaning such proximity as renders battle imminent. Sooner or later strategical operations must result in battle.

 

Since numerous battleships are now being considered together, i. e., in their collective relationship, and as the premise that a given number of battleships of increased size is superior to an equal number of battleships of smaller size (older) needs no demonstration, it becomes necessary to include further elements of consideration regarding numbers. Such premises are found in an examination of numbers with regard to:

 

1.  

    

    

    

   1. • Equal collective (total) strength.
      • Equal collective (total) cost.

 

Both of which are covered by consideration of "a less number of battleships of increased size (larger battleships) versus a greater number of smaller size."

 

(a) Tactical Considerations.—For other service than a fleet action diffusion of power may be needed, within certain limits of course, such limits being largely a matter of judgment (as differentiated from mathematical calculation); but, as participation in a fleet action is the function and "reason for existence" of a battleship, the question should be largely studied from that point of view. It is to be assumed that the primary function of a battleship is to fight her armament while under way in company with other battleships and while engaged in battle against opposing enemy battleships which are also under way, i.e., tactics.

 

With increased size of battleships greater fighting power can be concentrated in a given length because more of it is embodied in individual units, which is highly advantageous from a tactical point of view if proper application of it be made. This advantage increases as the total fighting power involved increases, as it really is measured not only by what may be called "hitting power per mile," but is affected by the "number of miles opposed." The "distance" between larger ships may have to be actually greater in order to give the individual ships adequate sea-room in which to maneuver, but this only obtains in case of very marked difference in length (size).

 

A less number of larger as compared with a greater number of smaller battleships lends itself to better control of total fighting power because of the more centralized control, i.e., the total strength is contained in fewer units, which are manifestly easier to co-ordinate than a greater number of units.

 

The less number of larger battleships is preferable from a tactical point of view because of greater flexibility, i.e., there are fewer individual units to be coordinated in their movements.

 

The greater number of smaller ships present more numerous targets and hence call for distribution of fire by individual ships composing the smaller number of larger ships; and, vice versa, the greater number of smaller ships must concentrate two (or more) ships on one target, whereby the rate of fire is slower, in order to obviate interference in fire control. Since the larger ships are more efficient fighting units and are better protected, and if the proportion of "smaller" to "larger" ships is not assumed as great as two to one, this situation is not necessarily to the disadvantage of the larger ships individually, as those larger ships which are concentrated on have superior protection as well as superior individual fire and, in the meantime, those larger ships which are not concentrated on, direct their superior fire on weaker ships.

 

The probably greater speed of the larger ships is tactically advantageous as it may well enable them to gain a superior position, i. e., a position where their fire is more effective because the enemy cannot use his total fire.

 

The probably greater ammunition supply of the larger ships is a tactical asset because it enables them to maintain a given fire effect for a longer time.

 

The command of the guns in the larger ships should be higher, which is very advantageous in bad weather and for action at very great ranges. Also the larger ships should be better gun-platforms, especially in heavy weather.

 

The disadvantages, tactically speaking, are:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Disablement of a "larger" ship is a greater actual and also a greater relative loss of fighting power than the disablement of a "smaller" ship. To offset this disadvantage there is the larger ship's less liability to damage because of her better protection, heavier armament and greater ammunition supply, higher speed.
   • Handiness cannot be relatively as great, and, in order to permit of reasonable safety in maneuvering, "distance" may have to be made greater.
   • The larger ships individually present bigger targets.

 

From tactical considerations, the advantages and disadvantages of increased size of battleships, considered together, summarize as follows:

 

Advantages	Disadvantages
Greater concentration of fighting power.	?
Better control of fighting power.	?
Greater flexibility of movement.	?
Causes some opposing ships to concentrate.	Some ships must divide their fire.
Greater relative speed.	?
Greater ammunition supply.	?
Higher command of guns.	?
Better gun-platform.	?
?	Less handiness.
?	Bigger target.
Better relative protection.	Disablement of one ship is greater actual and greater relative loss.

 

(b) Strategical Considerations.—Some of the strategical considerations have already been indicated, but for the sake of clearness they will be mentioned again here.

 

Strategy is largely a matter of having a certain amount of fighting power at certain places at certain times. In so far as battleships are concerned, strategy chiefly demands massed power, which is represented by a number of battleships in company. Larger battleships are of greater value in a strategical sense because they permit the concentration of relatively greater power by the movement of relatively fewer units.

 

In regard to the diffusion of power sometimes mentioned in connection with strategical requirements, it should be noted that the aim is to be superior in force at the vital point and that this desired superiority of force can be obtained as well by means of fewer and more powerful individual units as from more numerous and less powerful individual units.

 

Times and distances enter so vitally into considerations of strategy that ships which have greater mobility and endurance are of most value in this respect. The battleship of increased size is therein better suited to strategical purposes because:

 

(1) Radius of action at all speeds is greater, due to greater relative fuel capacity.

(2) Sustained sea-speed in bad weather is greater because of greater seaworthiness.

(3) It has greater "cruising life" due to greater stores capacity.

 

From strategical considerations, it appears that the larger battleships possess all the advantages.

 

(c) Economic Considerations.—This is the real basis of controversy, i.e., will "larger" or "smaller" ships make the better return on the amount invested? There are many who view with extreme reluctance the expenditure of large and increasing sums on single units of fighting power and bring forward statements in support of their contentions which are not only economic, but tactical; the tactical matters having already been dealt with, the economic considerations will now be taken up.

 

It has been shown that increased cost is not necessarily due to increased size (displacement), i. e., it may be due to higher cost of construction of hull, of armor and especially of compartmentation, of armament, of motive machinery, of fittings and equipment, etc., whether such higher cost of construction be caused by increased labor cost (eight-hour law, better or more intricate workmanship, etc.) or by higher material cost. For instance, if the earlier (and smaller) battleships could have been built with equally good under-water protection, their first cost would have been much greater and the principal economic argument against the battleship of increased size would more obviously lose its seeming force.

 

It is a fact that the battleship of increased size considered as a single unit can be made to:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Have greater fighting power.
   • Be more resistant by reason of better protection.
   • Have greater mobility both as to high speed and as to radius of action, i.e., it is a better fighting unit.

 

While the original first cost of the larger ship is greater and the cost of upkeep of the single ship may be greater, the matter of the operation and upkeep of the less number of larger ships presents a different aspect, as in this respect they cost less because of:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Less total number of officers and men to man them.
   • Less total fuel cost to operate them,
   • Less total docking, repair and stores cost,

 

and it therefore appears that the total operating and upkeep cost of the less number of larger battleships must be less than the total similar costs in the case of the greater number of smaller battleships.

 

On the other hand, where the fewer larger ships are compared with the greater number of smaller ships, it is found that for the larger ships the damage or loss of a single ship is not only a greater unit loss in the military sense, but it is also a greater money loss; but, the larger ships are more effectively protected against damage.

 

From economic considerations, it appears that the advantages and disadvantages of battleships of increased size, considered together, are

 

Advantages	Disadvantages
More powerful units.	Greater unit first cost.
Less operating and upkeep cost.	?
Better protected units.	Greater unit loss risked.

 

Since the total first cost has been assumed to be the same whether larger or smaller battleships are built, it appears that the total operating and upkeep cost of the less number of larger battleships is less, which constitutes a decided economical advantage.

 

(d) Legislative Considerations.—An additional consideration which cannot be overlooked, although it may not be as it should be, is the fact that Congress does not use the budget system of making appropriations. "Increase of the navy" is voted by appropriating for certain numbers of vessels of certain types with fixed limit of unit cost, which is usually stated as "exclusive of armor and armament." As Congress is not likely to change its methods of making appropriations, our limited number of vessels should be as powerful as can be built.

 

(e) Summary.—The comparative advantages and disadvantages of numerous battleships of increased size when compared with those of a greater number of smaller battleships, including the bases of equal strength and equal cost, summarize as follows:

 

Advantages	Disadvantages
Tactical
Greater concentration of fighting power.	?
Better control of fighting power.	?
Greater flexibility of movement.	?
Some opposing ships must concentrate.	Some ships must divide fire.
Greater relative speed.	?
Greater ammunition supply.	?
Higher command of guns.	?
Better gun-platform.	?
?	Less handiness.
?	Bigger target.
Better protection.	Disablement of one ship is greater actual and greater relative loss.
Strategical
Greater fighting power in fewer units.	?
Greater steaming radius at all speeds.	?
Greater sea-speed in all weathers.	?
Greater cruising life.	?
Economic
More power units.	Greater unit first cost.
Less operating and upkeep cost.	?
Better protected units.	Greater unit loss risked.
Legislative
Congress appropriate for ships in specific numbers and not by lump sum.	?

 

From the above discussion and summary it appears that a given number of battleships of increased size are of greater tactical and strategical value and of greater economic value than the greater number of "smaller" battleships that can be built for the same amount, or that represent the same total fighting strength.

 

VI. General Summary and Conclusions

 

In the course of the foregoing considerations and discussion, the following main points have been developed:

 

The battleships of increased size, considered singly, can carry more fighting power, be protected for more effective resistance, have higher speed under all conditions, have greater radius of action and greater cruising life.

 

That battleships of increased size, considered together, are of greater tactical value, of greater strategic value, and of greater economic value (because of less maintenance cost).

 

The conclusion that is to be had from the considerations set forth appears to be definitely in favor of the battleship of increased size.

 

?

?

?

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SOME IDEAS ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF INCREASING THE SIZE OF BATTLESHIPS

By Captain E.J. King, U. S. Navy

 

I. Foreword

 

These ideas have been derived from many sources, probably none of them original, during a period of several years. They have been assembled in this form in an endeavor to bring them into orderly and related sequence for the readier consideration of just what advantages and disadvantages are involved when battleships are increased in size. Statement of obvious considerations is frequently made in order to express in full the connection of ideas.

 

A ship may be defined as a large self-propelled floating structure. A ship of given size displaces a volume of water equivalent in weight to the weight of the ship and its contents. On the displacement (size) of a ship depends its usefulness for the purpose for which it is built, whether naval or merchant, freight or passenger. Such usefulness is measured by the weight which can be carried in addition to the hull (or structure) weight.

 

Shipbuilding, in common with all other technical arts, is a matter of continuous progress; every ship must be an improvement of her predecessors of the same type; there is no finality and there can be none. The whole history of shipbuilding (naval and merchant) is one long series of steps in increase of displacement (size); there have been no permanent backward steps. The same fact holds true of all the mechanical arts; evolution and the developments in strength of materials and in application of power are continually bringing into play increased size to carry more power, or increased power to make the same size more effective; it is apparent that the combination of increased size carrying increased power must be the most effective of all.

 

With increased power or increased size, and certainly when the two are combined, comes increased cost, and in increased cost lies the principal reason for opposition to the increased size (displacement), at least of battleships. It follows as an economic axiom that increased size (displacement) which involves increased cost can be considered justifiable only if there is adequate naval return for the increased cost. It should be noted, however, that increased cost is not necessarily due to increased size (displacement) alone, as will appear later.

 

II. The Qualities of Naval Ships Generally

 

The term "useful displacement" is used by naval architects to represent the total carrying power of the hull structure which is available for embodying in the design the desired military qualities. The greater the total displacement the greater should be, in a well-designed ship, the relative "useful displacement," as such increase may be considered analogous to increasing the side of a cube, when the volume is increased to a markedly greater relative amount than is the area.

 

Certain essential qualities must be found to a greater or less extent in the design of all types of warships, be they battleships, battle cruisers, light cruisers, light cruisers (scouts), destroyers, submarines, and even in the cost of aeroplanes and dirigibles. Where any one or more qualities predominate, it follows that the other qualities must obviously be reduced in relative amount or even so far reduced as to become nominal.

 

The most essential qualities are:

Strength, both local and structural.

Stability and buoyancy, even when badly damaged.

Speed and handiness, for purposes of mobility.

Habitability, for the maintenance of personnel.

Economy of first cost and maintenance (upkeep); these two matters may sometimes appear to be opposed.

Length of vitality, which relates to the amount of fuel, ammunition, stores, etc., which affect the time that the ship can remain an efficient fighting machine.

Slowness of destruction, provided for by means of armor and by subdivision into compartments.

Armament, consisting of guns and torpedoes for the purposes of attack.

 

To summarize, the ship (hull structure) must have the strength and stability, and buoyancy to furnish "useful displacement" sufficient to efficiently carry the weights needed for:

 

Armament.—Attacking power—guns, torpedoes. Protection.—Resistance to destruction—armor, compartmentation.

Mobility.—Speed and handiness—motive power, turning qualities.

Endurance.—Longevity—fuel, ammunition, stores, etc.

 

Habitability is a relative term and is found in battleships to such a degree as to need no special comment.

 

First cost and upkeep are questions which will be taken up later.

 

The total displacement of a completed design is therefore to be considered made up of the following items; of these the maximum weights in the case of a battleship go to hull structure, protection, armament and machinery. The data concerning the most recent battleships are not available, but some idea of the relative apportionment of weights may be gained from the percentages cited, which obtain in the case of certain completed ships:

 

(1) Hull structure and fittings 35%

(2) Armor and protection of hull structure 17%

(3) Armor for protection of armament 8%

(4) Armament and ammunition 18%

(5) Machinery 12%

(6) Fuel (on Acceptance Trial) 6%

(7) General equipment and stores (Acceptance Trial) 4%

 

It appears, therefore, that for a given displacement only a certain part of the total weight, or "useful displacement," is available to be used for the necessary fundamental qualities of a naval vessel, and that on the service for which the vessel is intended depends the general apportionment of weights to be used for the several qualities. If, in a battleship, it is desired to increase the armament, either the protection, the mobility, or the endurance (or two or all of them) must be reduced or the displacement (size) must be increased; obviously the same statement holds true in regard to the other qualities. It matters little whether the armament consists of many guns of large caliber or of fewer guns of greater caliber, it is the weight and distribution of weight necessary for the desired armament that matter. If there are many guns of large caliber there may well be more gun positions to protect (which means more armor); if fewer guns, there may well be fewer gun positions to protect, but they will be of greater extent and probably more widely distributed.

 

III. The Qualities of Single Battleships

 

The primary qualities of a battleship are repeated, namely:

Armament.—Offensive or attacking power—guns, torpedoes.

Protection.—Resistance—armor and compartmentation.

Mobility.—Speed and handiness—motive power, turning

qualities.

Endurance.—Longevity—radius of action, ammunition supply, stores, etc. These are sometimes considered included in armament and mobility.

 

Armament is the means provided for attack, i.e., offensive action; ammunition supply is sometimes included.

 

Protection is the means provided to enable the ship to withstand the attack of other ships and should be thought of as resistive rather than defensive.

 

Mobility is chiefly concerned with the means for moving the ship as to speed; it includes turning qualities, which are inherent in the design of the ship as it is worked out. The fuel endurance, on which radius of action depends, is sometimes included under the heading of mobility.

 

Endurance relates to radius of action at various speeds, which depends primarily on the fuel supply; to amount of ammunition carried for a prolonged engagement at a high rate of fire; and to stores for the maintenance of armament, hull, machinery, equipment and personnel.

 

These qualities have now to be individually examined with a view to ascertaining what changes in them are effected by increase of size.

 

(a) Armament.—That the all-big-gun one-caliber battleship is the type that affords the greatest possible capacity of effective hitting may be considered established, especially in view of the present-day rapidity of fire of heavy guns and their greater accuracy at longer ranges.

 

Heavy turret guns such as make up the armaments of battleships cannot be mounted to advantage, i.e., so as to increase the effective hitting capacity, without considerably increasing the size (displacement) of the ship, because the number of gun-turrets that can be placed to best advantage is dependent upon the length or beam (or both) of the ship, both of which increase slowly with increase of displacement (size).

 

The battleship is essentially a gun-carrier. The only justifying reason in the minds of many for increase of displacement (size) is that such increase shall, primarily, be for the purpose of increasing fighting power, i.e., armament. This appears to be sound doctrine, as armament is the special and the only positive element of fighting power; the other qualities may be reduced to insignificance, but the possession of armament indicates a vessel to be reckoned with. Protection and mobility are for the purpose of rendering the armament more effective, which fact indicates their subordination to armament.

 

Armament has reached such a stage of development that there are now three distinct means of increasing fighting power, namely:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Increasing the number of guns.
   • Increasing the size (caliber) of the guns.
   • Increasing both size and number.

 

The first method increases fighting power by reason of the greater number of projectiles that can be fired, the second by reason of greater weight of projectile and the greater accuracy at great ranges, and the third obviously is a combination of the other two.

 

These three methods of increasing fighting power are embodied in three distinct variants of the dreadnought type, namely.

 

(1) Numerous guns in numerous turrets, which requires length of ship for advantageous arrangement, e. g. the ex-Brazilian Rio de Janeiro with fourteen 12-inch guns in seven turrets; the U. S. S. Wyoming with twelve 12-inch guns in six turrets.

 

(2) Fewer but very heavy guns in double-gun turrets, which requires additional length and beam for the separation necessary to get the stability and the local strength to carry the concentrated weights, e. g., the British Queen Elisabeth with eight 15-inch guns in four turrets; the most recent designs of U. S. battleships with ten (?) 16-inch (?) guns in five (?) turrets.

 

(3) Numerous heavy guns in fewer turrets, i.e., triple- and quadruple-gun turrets, which requires structural provisions similar to those cited in the case (2) just above, e. g., the French Tourville with sixteen 13.4-inch guns in four turrets; the U. S. S. Pennsylvania with twelve 14-inch guns in four turrets.

 

It is manifest that to carry these heavier batteries the battleship must be of greater size (displacement) no matter which one of the variants of type is built.

 

The larger ship is better from the point of view of operating the armament because it provides a steadier gun platform, being less affected by sea and swell. The command of guns, i.e., their height above the water, can be greater, thus enabling them to be used more effectively in heavier weather and at greater ranges, the utility of which has lately been shown in the battle off Coronel and in our own winter operations.

 

Bearing in mind the saying of Admiral Farragut that "the best protection against the enemy's fire is a well-directed fire from your own ship," it would seem that if superior hitting power at greater ranges can be attained, so much the less is the need for devoting a large portion of the available weight to protection (armor). The logical development of this view would appear to result in the disappearance of armor as a part of the provisions for protection (resistance), and to this conception may be traced, at least in part, the genesis of the "battle cruiser."

 

It appears, from considerations of armament, that increase in size of a battleship provides for:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • More weight available to carry more and heavier armament (greater fighting power).
   • Carrying more and heavier armament (greater fighting power) as result of increased size.
   • More efficient employment of the armament, especially in heavy weather, due to higher command and to being a better gun platform.

 

(b) Protection.—It seems advisable to consider protection as a matter of defensive qualities only in so far as protection provides for the defensive by increasing the resistance of the ship to damage or destruction.

 

Protection divides into two main parts, armor and water-tight subdivision (compartmentation).

 

Armor, when viewed as a resistive quality of a battleship, calls for weight to be used:

 

 

 

 

 

1. • For ensuring that the armament (and the armament personnel) shall be damaged or destroyed as little as possible.
   • For ensuring that the stability and buoyancy of the hull structure are not materially lessened.

 

Increase in size should permit better comparative armor protection because there is more actual weight available, while its distribution is not over any comparatively greater area. Here again enters the question of

(1) Many guns in numerous turrets.

(2) Fewer but heavier guns in few turrets.

(3) Many guns in fewer turrets.

 

If the ship's fighting power (armament) is increased, any of the three types of armament call for more actual armor weight.

 

Increase of size should result in better under-water protection (compartmentation) because of greater relative subdivision, while not increasing actual size of compartments. Torpedo (and mine) effect, like projectile (and bomb) effect, is more or less local and can thus be confined to a smaller relative area, hence the necessary stability and buoyancy can be more readily safe-guarded in the larger ship.

 

The most up-to-date and effective methods of under-water protection, e. g., multiple skins, armor bulkheads, cellular compartmentation, etc., not only call for more weight and more space (in order to work them in) but also cost enormously. However much they may cost they may be considered indispensable in these days of submarine and mining activities. Indeed, cellular compartmentation, in spite of its very great cost, may well become the only form of protection with which warships of the future are provided.

 

Increase in size does, however, produce a ship that offers a bigger target to both projectile (and bomb) and torpedo (and mine) as it will be longer, of greater beam, of possibly greater draft, and of probably greater freeboard with higher upper works.

 

As compared with weights devoted to mobility (speed) due consideration should be given to the permanence of service which effectively armed and protected ships can render in comparison with what often proves to be the short-lived value of faster ships with less protection, e. g., the present fighting usefulness of the Oregon compared with that of the Saratoga.

 

It appears, from considerations of protection, that increase in size of a battleship:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Permits of more effective protection of armament, stability and buoyancy against projectiles (by means of armor).
   • Permits of more effective protection of stability and buoyancy against torpedoes and mines (by means of compartmentation).
   • Will provide a larger target to both projectile and torpedo.

 

(c) Mobility.—That part of mobility which is due to handiness, or turning qualities, is of secondary importance, but will be presumably less when the size of a ship is increased, chiefly on account of the greater length, which tends to increase the turning circle. Handiness is also affected by:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • The shape of the under-water body.
   • The size, shape and location of the rudder.
   • The size, shape and location of the screws. Handiness has a tactical usefulness only.

 

Of all the qualities which a battleship should have, none is more disputed than that part of mobility which speed supplies. Opinions range from those who advocate speed as a more or less direct means of offensive action to those whose idea is that high speed is an uncertain quality provided at great cost from every military point of view. Time is everything and speed directly affects time and so helps to overcome lack of foresight and errors of judgment. The true value of speed probably lies in the view that speed is not to be considered a weapon, but that, other things being equal, speed adds to the efficiency of the armament and confers a potential advantage on the side possessing it.

 

In two battleship fleets of the same gun power and armor the faster fleet would have an undoubted potential advantage, but assuming that these fleets are equally well designed, this superiority in speed, with equality in everything else, can only be attained by an increase in displacement with consequent increase in cost of building and of maintenance for individual ships.

 

However, advocates of high speed are numerous, and are inclined to the construction of ships in which high speed and heavy armament absorb the weight now generally assigned to that part of protection which is provided for by means of armor. This is the "battle cruiser" type.

 

The opponents of high speed in battleships are somewhat insistent in their opposition. Their views may be summarized as belief that speed is an essentially precarious quality, too much so to absorb weight which could otherwise be given to other and more desirable and more permanent qualities. They point to the unreliability of speed due to foul bottoms, poor coal, green firemen, hot bearings, minor accidents to motive machinery, accidents to boilers or steam lines, damage to smoke-pipes in action, damage to hull by projectiles and torpedoes and mines, and in general to anything that may necessitate slowing down and may therefore prevent the availability and use of the high speed to which so much weight has been assigned, probably just when it is most needed.

 

Increase of size (displacement) of battleships only for the sake of providing more relative weight to be used to make higher speed is probably of doubtful wisdom, for to be logical increase of size should undoubtedly give marked increase in fighting power (armament).

 

However, in increasing size to mount heavier armaments if the same relative weights be available for speed-making purposes, it is usually the case that higher speed is attainable. The evolution and development of propelling machinery continues to enable faster ships to be built for the same relative weights. Increase of length consequent on increase of size (displacement) permits of the attainment of higher speed on less relative weight because speed (in knots) is, generally speaking, inversely proportional to the square root of the length (in feet), the ratio being expressed as V ÷ √L = K. Where K is greater than unity the speed is very high for any ship. Thus in increasing length to provide for heavier armament, it becomes possible to get higher speed without greater relative "weight cost."

 

The combined effect on speed of increased length, improved machinery and better design of underwater body is shown by the following comparisons. The ratio of designed horsepower to designed displacement in the case of the Kansas class (pre-dreadnought, 16,000 tons) was 1.03 for a designed speed of 18 knots; the same ratio in the case of the Pennsylvania (31,500 tons) is 1.00, but the designed speed is 21 knots. Again, the ratio of designed horsepower to designed displacement in the case of the Delaware (20,000 tons) is 1.20 for a designed speed of 21 knots, whereas in the case of the Pennsylvania, with the same designed speed, the same ratio is only 1.00. Some idea of the relative "weight cost" of very high speed may be gained from the cases of recent "battle cruisers" where the above-mentioned ratio has values in the vicinity of 2.75 for a designed speed of 28 knots, and from the case of British battleships designed for 25 knots speed where the ratio is 2.10.

 

Increased size (displacement) confers an additional advantage in that it permits of higher sustained sea-speed due to the greater seaworthiness of the larger ship.

 

Therefore, it appears from considerations of mobility, that increase of size may be expected to result in:

 

(a) Higher full speed on same relative weight.

(b) Higher sustained sea-speed.

(c) Less handiness.

 

(d) Endurance.—As has already been remarked, endurance may very well be included in armament and mobility, but it is deemed best to deal with it as a separate quality, as it directly affects the time that a ship can remain an effective fighting unit.

 

The ammunition supply that can be carried in the larger ship should be relatively more ample, thus enabling the heavier armament to fire more actual rounds, which makes her a more effective fighting unit, both at long ranges where the percentage of shots fired to hits made is small and at shore ranges where volume of fire is wanted. This has a distinct bearing on tactics.

 

The fuel supply that can be carried in the larger ship can also be relatively greater, resulting in greater fuel endurance which gives a greater steaming radius at all speeds. This has a great deal to do with strategical considerations, into which times and distances enter as matters of the first importance.

 

The stores carried in the larger ship can readily be provided in relatively greater quantity, which will increase what may be called the "cruising life," which is a strategical matter.

 

It would seem that, from considerations of endurance, increase of size can be expected to allow for

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Larger ammunition supply (battle).
   • Greater steaming radius at all speeds (strategical).
   • Stores for a greater "cruising life" (strategical).

 

(e) Summary.—The comparative advantages and disadvantages due to increase of size of a single battleship summarize as follows:

 

Advantages	Disadvantages
As to Armament:	?
Greater fighting power.	?
More efficient use.	?
As to Protection:	?
More efficient against projectiles.	Presents larger target to projectiles and torpedoes.
More efficient against torpedoes.
As to Mobility:	?
Higher full speed on same relative weight.	Less handy.
Higher sustained sea-speed.	?
As to Endurance:	?
Larger ammunition supply.	?
Greater radius of action.	?
Greater "cruising life."	?
As to Cost:	Costs more.

 

It seems, from the foregoing discussion and summary, that the sole disadvantage of major importance resulting from increase of size of a battleship, considered singly, is that it costs more; on the other hand, the larger ship is more powerful and has greater resisting qualities, is faster under all circumstances, and has a greater steaming radius and "cruising life." As the greater cost results in better naval "return for money invested," as regards the single ship, this seeming disadvantage is not one in reality.

 

IV. Probable Limits of Size of Battleships

 

Increase of size (displacement) must largely be gained by increase of length and of beam because any appreciable increase of draft is prohibited by the depth of water available (or likely to be available) in harbors and in channels leading to navy yards (dry docks).

 

It seems pertinent here to consider what the probable limits of size of ships may be. The apparent limits at present are

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • The difficulties in securing the necessary structural strength, i.e., a matter of material.
   • The locks of the Panama Canal, which are 1000 feet long by no feet wide, and should take a ship 980 feet long and no-foot beam.
   • The depth of water leading to our principal dry docks, which may be assumed at about 35 feet.

 

If the structural difficulties can be overcome there would seem to be no reason why ships should not reach the limiting dimensions thus imposed.

 

A ship 980 feet long, with 100-foot beam and 33-foot draft and with a "block coefficient" of 0.60, would displace approximately 55,000 tons. It should be noted that the assumed ratio of length to beam is near 10: 1, which is better suited to a vessel of the so-called "battle cruiser" type than to vessels of the battleship type where the requirements of "useful displacement," stability and steadiness of gun-platform call for a ratio of length to beam of about 6 or 7:1. Such a ratio in the case of a battleship intended to pass through the Panama Canal would indicate a maximum length of 700 feet and a probable limiting displacement of about 45,000 tons.

 

V. Numerous Battleships Considered Together

 

War is a matter of defeat or destruction of the enemy's armed forces; hence it is a matter of fighting power, which quality in the case of battleships is supplied by the armament, which is provided with protection (resistance) in order that it may continue to be effective while receiving the enemy's fire.

 

War is also a matter of movement in order that the opposing forces may come into contact (battle) in order to obtain a decision; in ships this quality is included in the broadest meaning of the term mobility.

 

War is also a matter of supply, since the forces must have ammunition, food, clothing, etc., and, in the case of ships, fuel in order to retain the quality called mobility; the matter of supply affects the endurance of the forces, i.e., the time that they remain of effective fighting value.

 

These attributes of war have already been dealt with from the standpoint of the single ship. War is further a matter of coordination of the available forces in order that the most effective use may be made of them; this co-ordination is employed in two principal ways, i.e., strategy and tactics.

 

Strategy relates to movements and dispositions made before contact with enemy forces with a view to increasing the probabilities and the consequences of victory. Tactics relates to movements and dispositions made after contact with enemy forces, "contact" meaning such proximity as renders battle imminent. Sooner or later strategical operations must result in battle.

 

Since numerous battleships are now being considered together, i. e., in their collective relationship, and as the premise that a given number of battleships of increased size is superior to an equal number of battleships of smaller size (older) needs no demonstration, it becomes necessary to include further elements of consideration regarding numbers. Such premises are found in an examination of numbers with regard to:

 

1.  

    

    

    

   1. • Equal collective (total) strength.
      • Equal collective (total) cost.

 

Both of which are covered by consideration of "a less number of battleships of increased size (larger battleships) versus a greater number of smaller size."

 

(a) Tactical Considerations.—For other service than a fleet action diffusion of power may be needed, within certain limits of course, such limits being largely a matter of judgment (as differentiated from mathematical calculation); but, as participation in a fleet action is the function and "reason for existence" of a battleship, the question should be largely studied from that point of view. It is to be assumed that the primary function of a battleship is to fight her armament while under way in company with other battleships and while engaged in battle against opposing enemy battleships which are also under way, i.e., tactics.

 

With increased size of battleships greater fighting power can be concentrated in a given length because more of it is embodied in individual units, which is highly advantageous from a tactical point of view if proper application of it be made. This advantage increases as the total fighting power involved increases, as it really is measured not only by what may be called "hitting power per mile," but is affected by the "number of miles opposed." The "distance" between larger ships may have to be actually greater in order to give the individual ships adequate sea-room in which to maneuver, but this only obtains in case of very marked difference in length (size).

 

A less number of larger as compared with a greater number of smaller battleships lends itself to better control of total fighting power because of the more centralized control, i.e., the total strength is contained in fewer units, which are manifestly easier to co-ordinate than a greater number of units.

 

The less number of larger battleships is preferable from a tactical point of view because of greater flexibility, i.e., there are fewer individual units to be coordinated in their movements.

 

The greater number of smaller ships present more numerous targets and hence call for distribution of fire by individual ships composing the smaller number of larger ships; and, vice versa, the greater number of smaller ships must concentrate two (or more) ships on one target, whereby the rate of fire is slower, in order to obviate interference in fire control. Since the larger ships are more efficient fighting units and are better protected, and if the proportion of "smaller" to "larger" ships is not assumed as great as two to one, this situation is not necessarily to the disadvantage of the larger ships individually, as those larger ships which are concentrated on have superior protection as well as superior individual fire and, in the meantime, those larger ships which are not concentrated on, direct their superior fire on weaker ships.

 

The probably greater speed of the larger ships is tactically advantageous as it may well enable them to gain a superior position, i. e., a position where their fire is more effective because the enemy cannot use his total fire.

 

The probably greater ammunition supply of the larger ships is a tactical asset because it enables them to maintain a given fire effect for a longer time.

 

The command of the guns in the larger ships should be higher, which is very advantageous in bad weather and for action at very great ranges. Also the larger ships should be better gun-platforms, especially in heavy weather.

 

The disadvantages, tactically speaking, are:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Disablement of a "larger" ship is a greater actual and also a greater relative loss of fighting power than the disablement of a "smaller" ship. To offset this disadvantage there is the larger ship's less liability to damage because of her better protection, heavier armament and greater ammunition supply, higher speed.
   • Handiness cannot be relatively as great, and, in order to permit of reasonable safety in maneuvering, "distance" may have to be made greater.
   • The larger ships individually present bigger targets.

 

From tactical considerations, the advantages and disadvantages of increased size of battleships, considered together, summarize as follows:

 

Advantages	Disadvantages
Greater concentration of fighting power.	?
Better control of fighting power.	?
Greater flexibility of movement.	?
Causes some opposing ships to concentrate.	Some ships must divide their fire.
Greater relative speed.	?
Greater ammunition supply.	?
Higher command of guns.	?
Better gun-platform.	?
?	Less handiness.
?	Bigger target.
Better relative protection.	Disablement of one ship is greater actual and greater relative loss.

 

(b) Strategical Considerations.—Some of the strategical considerations have already been indicated, but for the sake of clearness they will be mentioned again here.

 

Strategy is largely a matter of having a certain amount of fighting power at certain places at certain times. In so far as battleships are concerned, strategy chiefly demands massed power, which is represented by a number of battleships in company. Larger battleships are of greater value in a strategical sense because they permit the concentration of relatively greater power by the movement of relatively fewer units.

 

In regard to the diffusion of power sometimes mentioned in connection with strategical requirements, it should be noted that the aim is to be superior in force at the vital point and that this desired superiority of force can be obtained as well by means of fewer and more powerful individual units as from more numerous and less powerful individual units.

 

Times and distances enter so vitally into considerations of strategy that ships which have greater mobility and endurance are of most value in this respect. The battleship of increased size is therein better suited to strategical purposes because:

 

(1) Radius of action at all speeds is greater, due to greater relative fuel capacity.

(2) Sustained sea-speed in bad weather is greater because of greater seaworthiness.

(3) It has greater "cruising life" due to greater stores capacity.

 

From strategical considerations, it appears that the larger battleships possess all the advantages.

 

(c) Economic Considerations.—This is the real basis of controversy, i.e., will "larger" or "smaller" ships make the better return on the amount invested? There are many who view with extreme reluctance the expenditure of large and increasing sums on single units of fighting power and bring forward statements in support of their contentions which are not only economic, but tactical; the tactical matters having already been dealt with, the economic considerations will now be taken up.

 

It has been shown that increased cost is not necessarily due to increased size (displacement), i. e., it may be due to higher cost of construction of hull, of armor and especially of compartmentation, of armament, of motive machinery, of fittings and equipment, etc., whether such higher cost of construction be caused by increased labor cost (eight-hour law, better or more intricate workmanship, etc.) or by higher material cost. For instance, if the earlier (and smaller) battleships could have been built with equally good under-water protection, their first cost would have been much greater and the principal economic argument against the battleship of increased size would more obviously lose its seeming force.

 

It is a fact that the battleship of increased size considered as a single unit can be made to:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Have greater fighting power.
   • Be more resistant by reason of better protection.
   • Have greater mobility both as to high speed and as to radius of action, i.e., it is a better fighting unit.

 

While the original first cost of the larger ship is greater and the cost of upkeep of the single ship may be greater, the matter of the operation and upkeep of the less number of larger ships presents a different aspect, as in this respect they cost less because of:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. • Less total number of officers and men to man them.
   • Less total fuel cost to operate them,
   • Less total docking, repair and stores cost,

 

and it therefore appears that the total operating and upkeep cost of the less number of larger battleships must be less than the total similar costs in the case of the greater number of smaller battleships.

 

On the other hand, where the fewer larger ships are compared with the greater number of smaller ships, it is found that for the larger ships the damage or loss of a single ship is not only a greater unit loss in the military sense, but it is also a greater money loss; but, the larger ships are more effectively protected against damage.

 

From economic considerations, it appears that the advantages and disadvantages of battleships of increased size, considered together, are

 

Advantages	Disadvantages
More powerful units.	Greater unit first cost.
Less operating and upkeep cost.	?
Better protected units.	Greater unit loss risked.

 

Since the total first cost has been assumed to be the same whether larger or smaller battleships are built, it appears that the total operating and upkeep cost of the less number of larger battleships is less, which constitutes a decided economical advantage.

 

(d) Legislative Considerations.—An additional consideration which cannot be overlooked, although it may not be as it should be, is the fact that Congress does not use the budget system of making appropriations. "Increase of the navy" is voted by appropriating for certain numbers of vessels of certain types with fixed limit of unit cost, which is usually stated as "exclusive of armor and armament." As Congress is not likely to change its methods of making appropriations, our limited number of vessels should be as powerful as can be built.

 

(e) Summary.—The comparative advantages and disadvantages of numerous battleships of increased size when compared with those of a greater number of smaller battleships, including the bases of equal strength and equal cost, summarize as follows:

 

Advantages	Disadvantages
Tactical
Greater concentration of fighting power.	?
Better control of fighting power.	?
Greater flexibility of movement.	?
Some opposing ships must concentrate.	Some ships must divide fire.
Greater relative speed.	?
Greater ammunition supply.	?
Higher command of guns.	?
Better gun-platform.	?
?	Less handiness.
?	Bigger target.
Better protection.	Disablement of one ship is greater actual and greater relative loss.
Strategical
Greater fighting power in fewer units.	?
Greater steaming radius at all speeds.	?
Greater sea-speed in all weathers.	?
Greater cruising life.	?
Economic
More power units.	Greater unit first cost.
Less operating and upkeep cost.	?
Better protected units.	Greater unit loss risked.
Legislative
Congress appropriate for ships in specific numbers and not by lump sum.	?

 

From the above discussion and summary it appears that a given number of battleships of increased size are of greater tactical and strategical value and of greater economic value than the greater number of "smaller" battleships that can be built for the same amount, or that represent the same total fighting strength.

 

VI. General Summary and Conclusions

 

In the course of the foregoing considerations and discussion, the following main points have been developed:

 

The battleships of increased size, considered singly, can carry more fighting power, be protected for more effective resistance, have higher speed under all conditions, have greater radius of action and greater cruising life.

 

That battleships of increased size, considered together, are of greater tactical value, of greater strategic value, and of greater economic value (because of less maintenance cost).

 

The conclusion that is to be had from the considerations set forth appears to be definitely in favor of the battleship of increased size.

 

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