Motto:
1. No commander can be successful whose time is occupied with administrative details.
2. Proper delegation of initiative to subordinates is the secret of successful command. E. A. Anderson.
I. First Letter
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE STAFF
The French General Desaix, whom Bonaparte always considered the best of all the great soldiers who served under his orders, claimed that "the chief command of an army is the most difficult thing on earth; it is the one work above all others which requires the display of the greatest number of qualities in a given time." Had Desaix lived to-day, after the new idea of a general's staff had been developed, he would say that this holds good even more in the case of the chief of the staff than in that of the general or admiral in command. It applies to a lesser extent to the subordinate staff officers, especially in the case of a small staff, where each officer must perform a great variety of duties.
In the old days the general or admiral had a staff which was selected for far different qualities than a staff of to-day is selected for. The poor leader had a staff selected for show purposes; the officers were usually chosen from the nobility for the express purpose of gaining the favor of those high in authority in the same way that relatives and friends of politicians to-day are given easy and lucrative government positions. A good general, on the other hand, reduced this type of officer to the lowest number he dared and selected what were considered in those days efficient staff officers. These were persons who would make good clerks or messengers; in addition, there were always a few of the picked officers of the entire army, to whom were given small bodies of troops for important distant operations, or who were assigned to hold an important key position or to lead a decisive charge in battle. The leader himself drew up all the plans and dictated the orders down to the finest detail.
This was the system of Marlborough and Eugene; of Turenne and Conde. Frederick, with all his genius, still held to it. The splendid Winterfeld—his chief-of-staff, and after Frederick, the finest German officer of that day—was noted for his brilliant conduct in distant raids and minor operations rather than for his careful planning of campaigns and the accurate arrangements for their execution—the duties of the chief-of-staff to-day.
Napoleon, as far as the staff work was concerned, followed closely in the steps of Frederick; perhaps he was influenced by his desire to keep his system, as he called it, secret; it was bad enough to have Jomini on the staff of one of his marshals; no such prying thinkers were wanted close at hand. The emperor was justified in this desire for secrecy, for when Jomini went over to the Russians he was able to give them the most important advice as to what Napoleon might be expected to do in certain situations. Therefore we see Chief Clerk Berthier acting as chief-of-staff and the intrepid Mouton or Rapp of the twenty-three wounds, leading the charges at critical moments. The small part played by Berthier is shown by the crude dispositions he made at the beginning of the 1809 campaign in Bavaria, when he commanded-in-chief for a short time, which proved that he had learned nothing of the system of the great leader with whom he had been so intimately associated for so many years.
It is true that with his system of doing everything himself the energetic General Bonaparte accomplished wonders with his small army, but this was due to his genius and wonderful activity. When the Emperor Napoleon began to campaign with his grand army, remarkable successes were still achieved, but when the forces grew larger and larger and the energy of the master diminished, the real faults of the system came to the light. No longer was it possible for one man—even had he been able to "put on the boots and the resolution of 1793"—to handle all the details; and unfortunately there were no other officers trained for this duty. The Russian campaign displayed error after error; chance after chance was thrown away. You may remember that during the retreat there was one time when the Russian army coming north from the war with Turkey seized the line of the Beresina and commanded all its crossings, thus completely cutting the line of retreat of Napoleon's army. The emperor, facing the worst disaster of his career, aroused himself and made one of his most beautiful moves. By a rapid march he threw a force across the river, routed the Russians and built a bridge. Half the army passed in safety, but night coming on the movement stopped, there being no staff officers present to oversee such an important march. A cavalry officer noticed that no effort was being made to complete the crossing and tried in every way to get action taken. As no staff officers could be found, he himself forced several thousand stragglers to cross. In the morning the Russians appeared in greatly superior numbers and the stragglers, who numbered about 40,000, all attempted to cross at once, fighting desperately among themselves for a passage, so that thousands were pushed off the edge of the bridge and finally the bridge broke through, causing the terrible disaster which is so famous in history. All this could have been prevented by one good staff' officer with authority to. superintend the passage.
Again at the battle of Leipsic the lack of a proper staff was apparent. On the third day of the battle Napoleon was suddenly given the news that practically all the artillery ammunition was exhausted; this made a retreat necessary. There was but one permanent bridge over the small river in the rear of the army and no person had thought to build the numerous other bridges which would be necessary for the retreat of an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men. In addition to this neglect a mere sergeant was left in charge of the blowing up of this bridge after the rearguard had passed. Being alarmed by the approach of a few Saxon sharpshooters, he exploded the mine while there were still 25,000 men to pass, with what serious results you may imagine.
In the Waterloo campaign—so beautifully planned and so wretchedly executed—a whole series of mistakes were committed by the staff, which probably had a deciding effect on the result of the campaign. After giving the most detailed orders for the first days, Napoleon gave both Ney and Grouchy—both of whom he knew to be incapable of using their own judgment on independent duty—very indefinite and unsatisfactory oral orders, so that neither had a proper understanding of his task. Later Grouchy sent an aid to Napoleon; although he arrived as the battle of Waterloo was commencing, he could get no orders for his general and was not even told that Napoleon proposed to fight a battle. I do not mean to defend Grouchy, for his mistakes were incomparably greater than those of Napoleon; for that matter the English were equally bad, and the Prussians none too good. I refer you to Ropes' splendid book "The Campaign of Waterloo" for a complete account of this terrible campaign; you will be pained to see the close competition between the three armies, each striving to make the worst mistakes.
When Napoleon was at St. Helena he made a very significant statement: "If I had to begin governing again I would not do precisely the same as I did then. I would look at things en masse; I would not bother myself about details." He recognized when too late the faults of his system!
I give to Scharnhorst the credit for developing the general staff idea. He was chief-of-staff to the Duke of Brunswick in the Jena campaign and had his sound advice been listened to, the complete defeat of the Prussian army might have been prevented. After the defeat of Prussia he became chief-of-staff to General Lestocq who commanded a Prussian corps in cooperation with the Russian army. His services were brilliant, the timely arrival of Lestocq's corps at Eylau giving Napoleon no more than a drawn battle where he had hoped for a decision. Later he had charge of the reorganization of the Prussian Army, and when war broke out again in 1813 he served as chief-of-staff to Marshal Blucher. He was ably assisted in his duties by Gneisenau and Muffling. Rugged old Blucher was well content to leave the planning of his operations in such efficient hands; all he claimed for himself was to be allowed to go into the thick of the fighting. Still even Scharnhorst was able to do no more than to introduce the new idea of a staff being of some real assistance to the general; unfortunately he was wounded in action and died; after that the Prussian staff work was far from brilliant. As an example, Muffling, the liaison officer with Wellington, stated before the Waterloo campaign that "the junction of the English and Prussian armies for a defensive battle was so distinctly prescribed by circumstances and the locality that no doubt whatever could be raised on the point." You doubtless remember that there proved to be considerable doubt. Gneisenau also sent out an order to the corps commanders to concentrate without stating that hostilities were imminent. Bulow therefore marched along so leisurely that he arrived too late to take part in the battle of Ligny, a delay which had for a time a very dangerous result. However, after Blucher had been injured in a cavalry charge at Ligny, Gneisenau took the responsibility of ordering a change of base and a retreat on Wavre. This splendid move on his part made possible the march to Waterloo which decided the campaign.
After the Napoleonic wars Clausewitz developed the ideas which Scharnhorst had originated; Moltke brought them to their culmination and proved their worth in war. The general looked on things "en masse"—as Napoleon advised; the staff prepared the information necessary for the decision: the general indicated this in its broad outlines: the staff filled in the rest of the plan and issued all the orders; then it saw that they were executed, only referring to the genera! for decision on matters of extreme importance. All the staff officers knew the doctrine of their general and thought along the same lines. More than this, all staff officers on all staffs were members of the same organization, the general staff, and had all been trained at the same school and in accordance with the same principles. Thus there was agreement upon all important matters throughout the entire army. The Prussian Army was the first which knew the true meaning of cooperation; the results won by this knowledge are shown by history.
Shortly before his death Moltke made a memorable statement "Our campaign and our victories have instructed the French, who, like us, have numbers, armament and courage. Our strength will be in management, in leadership, in one word, in the General Staff. This strength France may envy us. She does not possess it." It is fortunate for the world that the French took to heart this statement in which the reason for Germany's strength was so accurately depicted by her greatest soldier. The brilliant maneuvers which culminated in the splendid victory of the Marne could not have been carried out except through the agency of the French General Staff, an organization built up during twenty-five years of peace.
II. Second Letter
THE SELECTION OF THE STAFF
Having traced the historical development of the principles which should govern the operation of a staff, we are now in a position to take into consideration the principles which should govern in the selection of the officers who compose the staff.
As a preliminary step it might be well to see what qualities a general or flag officer should have and how he should be selected by the supreme command. I therefore beg your indulgence for giving you a few of my ideas on this subject. Napoleon was fond of saying: "In war men are nothing, one man is everything." While his idea is expressed in rather a Napoleonic—that is, exaggerated—manner, I think you will agree with it.
As one looks back on history, he can see that the greatest of leaders combined brilliant intelligence with extraordinary courage. They conceived the grandest combinations and carried them through to a successful conclusion with utter fearlessness. See how Alexander conceived his stupendous design of conquering the world with 40,000 men and did it by marching 22,000 miles in eleven years—an average of over six miles a day for this period! Look at Hannibal carrying out the grandest conception in military history, marching from Spain to Italy through an absolutely unknown country and advancing into the plains of Italy with 26,000 men against the first military nation of the world, which carried no less than 700,000 able-bodied men on its rolls!
But it is very seldom that such great brilliance and such strength of character are combined in one man. We cannot afford to wait for the arrival of such a man, for there are not more than one or two in a century. What then is the one most important quality for a general or flag officer to have? I often think of how much we lose by not taking advantage of the learning of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Perhaps you do not know that the careful historian Myers gives his opinion that the average Athenian possessed as wide an intellectual knowledge as the average member of the British Parliament to-day. The opinions of the Greeks are then of such a value that some cognizance should be taken of them. I will offer you two selections from Thucydides which bear on the subject we are now considering. The first comes from the Corinthians: "The execution of an enterprise is never equal to the conception of it in the confident mind of its promoter; for men are safe while they are forming plans, but, when the time for action comes, then they lose their presence of mind and fail." I think Napoleon must have been looking- over this statement when he said: "Any man can draw up a plan of campaign, but few are capable of making war, because only the great military genius can shape his action by events and circumstances. The best tacticians are often the worst generals."
The second selection I take from the speech of the heroic Brasidas, the greatest Spartan of his time, before a sea battle: "And whatever be your own inexperience, it is more than compensated by your superiority in valor. The skill of your enemies, which you so greatly dread, if united with courage, may be able in the moment of danger to remember and execute the lesson it has learned, but without courage no skill can do anything at all at such a time. For fear makes men forget, and skill which cannot fight is useless."
We must now see how nearly Napoleon's ideas coincide with those of Brasidas. You may remember that he said: "Men who do not possess much character but are highly intelligent are the least fitted for war; they are ships whose masts are out of proportion to their ballast. It is better to have a good deal of character and little intellect." Again he stated his opinion in a still more striking manner: "In France we shall never lack men of intellect or makers of plans, but we shall never have enough men of great character and vigor, in brief, men possessing the sacred fire." I believe every careful student of military history will confirm these opinions.
Therefore the first essential of a general or a flag officer is that he must have the "sacred fire." This must absolutely be insisted upon and every flag officer who has not this quality must be remorselessly eliminated from active commands afloat. But if the flag officer has this quality everything else may be forgiven him. Let him have vigor, resolution, energy, and courage—for thus I define the "sacred fire"—and all his commanding officers will imitate him and work will be accomplished, results will be obtained, and, if fortune gives him the opportunity, victories will be won. He can obtain intelligence from his staff, but from not even the most courageous chief-of-staff can he obtain the sacred fire. In the campaign of 1859 the Austrian commander-in-chief lacked this quality, which his chief-of-staff had. What was the result? Alternate timidity and recklessness, depending upon the influence which the subordinate's boldness had upon the superior's weakness at any particular time.
If the leader who is selected for his sacred fire has other good qualities, it is so much the better. If he can have, in addition, a brilliant intellect he will be a military genius of the first order. If he has only mediocre intelligence, still he will be a good and successful leader. I would prefer that, if he has not great intelligence himself, that he be broad-minded and have good common sense. Thus he will know how to use the intellects of his staff officers and will recognize good ideas and logical plans when they are presented to him. To obtain this broad-minded spirit and this common sense, T consider that the course at the War College is indispensable. Certainly no one year in the life of a naval officer will so prepare him for the duties of a flag officer.
There are, of course, innumerable other qualities which it would be good for the flag officer to have, but having indicated the most important ones, I beg your permission to go on to the consideration of the selection of the chief staff officer. You notice that I do not call him chief-of-staff or senior aid, for I wish to cover the cases of all staffs, big and little. You are already beginning to guess—as I can readily see—that as we all agreed upon the flag officer having to have the sacred fire, I am now going to propose that the chief staff officer should have all the intelligence. I assure you, however, that nothing is farther from my intention. On the contrary, I insist, with the utmost vigor, that the chief staff officer must also have the sacred fire, and that this quality is far more essential for him to have than any other.
At this time you will have to consent to a short digression. I have now an opportunity for saying a few words on a subject which I consider very important. Having insisted on the flag officer and his chief staff officer having what Napoleon calls the sacred fire, you will now say that all officers without exception should have this quality; I hasten to agree with you! But is any attention ever given to the development of this essential quality? We do not hesitate to use four years in developing the intellectual power of an officer, hut his moral power is left to be developed of its own accord and it is even true that there are many things in the navy which tend to make officers timid and to kill their initiative; often a thing is left un-attempted for fear of the court-martial which will kill his chances of promotion, which he may gain usually by doing merely what he is ordered and without the taking of chances. It is only by accustoming officers to run risks in peace that they will run risks in war.
We must be careful to avoid the mistakes made by the Russians, which were so clearly exposed in Kuropatkin's speech to the First Manchurian Army at the close of the Japanese War: "With us, men of independent character and initiative are rare. Search out such men, encourage them, promote them, and so encourage the growth of the qualities which are essential for all soldiers. Men of strong individuality are, with us, unfortunately passed over, instead of receiving accelerated promotion. Because they are a source of some anxiety to some officers in peace, they arc repressed as being headstrong. The result is that they leave the service, while others, who possess neither force of character nor convictions, but who are subservient and ready to agree with their superiors, are promoted."
Now how are we to encourage initiative and boldness? Experience in actual war is doubtless the best method, but such opportunities are seldom presented. The next best method, in my opinion, is flying. I therefore suggest that there be established at the Naval Academy at Annapolis a large naval air station, that flying be made a regular part of the course and that every midshipman be required to qualify as a naval aviator before being permitted to graduate. This should not require more than two months per man; the expense would be negligible when compared with the results which would be obtained; the lessons of boldness and daring learned would never be forgotten through an entire career.
You will doubtless claim that all this has nothing to do with the qualifications of a chief staff officer. However, it has a certain connection to this subject, for if every officer in the navy is inspired with this sacred fire, then the flag officer will have a certainty of selecting a suitable officer for this duty. It cannot be too often insisted that there cannot be too much sacred fire around the leader of a naval or military force. There is a saying of Napoleon which I have frequently quoted; I offer no excuse for again placing it before you: "People form a very incorrect idea of the strength necessary to wage, with full knowledge of its consequences, one of those great battles upon which depend the fate of an army and a country, and the possession of a throne." If the chief staff officer is not himself inspired with the sacred fire how is he to sustain his leader in one of those terrible crises where even the boldest leader weakens?
As the chief staff officer will have to do the greater part of the planning and issuing of orders, it is important that he should have a good practical knowledge of the application of the principles of strategy and tactics, and have been trained in the estimating of situations, the development of strategical and tactical plans and the issuing of orders. As the course at the War College provides this training in a manner unequalled by any other similar institution in the world, it will be of evident advantage for the chief staff officer to be appointed from among its graduates. As we have claimed it essential for both flag officer and chief staff officer to have force of character, it is likewise essential, if there is to be unity of command, for both of them to be of the same opinion and in substantial agreement upon all important military principles. The importance of having officers on the same staff instructed in the same military doctrines is shown by General Von Verdi who served on the staff of Field Marshal Von Moltke in the war of 1870: "Three chiefs at the head of the sections were: Bronsart for the movement of the troops, Brandenstein for transport and commissariat affairs, and myself for everything concerning the French army. We three had been friends ever since we had been boys in the cadet school. As Bronsart, Brandenstein and myself had always kept up our friendly relations and had been in the habit of exchanging opinions on military affairs, our whole training in troop leading had been of so uniform a character as would be difficult to find in any three others. This constant service in contact as well as our private intercourse was of great advantage to us now in our new functions in the headquarters staff. One of us, for instance, might suddenly be called away from his work while writing an order to one of the armies, to receive some fresh instructions, and another would then go and finish the document which the first had begun, and yet the whole would be completed in the same spirit." At the end of a year's course at the War College, it is remarkable how unified the ideas of the class of officers become; they begin with the most divergent theories and end in practical agreement on all substantial questions concerning strategy, tactics and leadership. The flag officer should therefore—if he has the good fortune to be a graduate of the War College—choose as his chief staff officer a member of his class there. I assure you that this is an advantage well worth striving for. It is also important for the flag officer to select an officer who is personally agreeable and devoted to him. Unless the chief staff officer has this spirit of loyalty, friction is certain to develop and the efficiency of the staff will be decreased. It is so easy for friction to develop and for little misunderstandings to occur that every precaution in advance to decrease them is well worth while.
To no person more than to a chief staff officer do the memorable words of Paul Jones apply: "He should be the soul of tact, prudence, justice, firmness, and charity." As the chief staff officer will usually be junior to a number of the officers serving under the orders of his flag officer, and as he is frequently junior to the commanding officer of the flagship, it is apparent that it is of prime importance that he be "the soul of tact." After force of character and knowledge of strategy and tactics, tact is the next important quality for the chief staff officer. You may readily imagine the number of misunderstandings which occur and the delicate situations which arise. An officer on the staff who lacks tact and has a quick temper can quickly ruin the morale of a command; when the morale is ruined, the command is ruined also.
The chief staff officer must be a man of order and system. There is much routine business in a staff and he must be capable of drawing up the most simple system for its handling. He must have a good memory and be careful and accurate, for there are a great many details which he must constantly keep in his head. He must also be an indefatigable worker, an officer who considers himself on duty at all times. He must be an officer who has had a wide range of practical experience; it is desirable that he should have had considerable experience in gunnery and engineering, for matters on these important subjects are being constantly referred to him for decision.
I am afraid that you will say that I require the chief staff officer to have every good quality, so that it will be an extremely difficult task to pick one out who will have all of these qualities. I agree with you, for I believe that the most difficult and most important task of the flag officer is to select his chief assistant. More hinges on this decision than on any other. I refer you to the celebrated case of Ney; you know what success he gained while he had Jomini as his chief-of-staff. After Jomini left we see Ney committing error after error in rapid succession, each one seeming more colossal than the one before.
After the chief staff officer has been selected it remains to pick out the subordinate staff officers. I will not go into detail about them; it is enough to say that they should have as many as possible of the good qualities which we have seen to be essential for the chief staff officer. There is but one point I would emphasize. It is commonly supposed that aids should be socially inclined, that one of their principal duties is to be capable of gracing a reception or ball room. We do not go to war in these days in the Louis XIV fashion—unless we happen, perhaps, to be one of the decreasing number of crown princes—and I cannot take exception too decidedly to this idea. As an illustration of the point I wish to make, permit me to summon Pericles as an authority: "Maritime skill is like skill of other kinds, not a thing to be cultivated by the way or at chance times; it is jealous of any other pursuit which distracts the mind for an instant from itself." The young officer can devote his time far better to the gaining of "maritime skill," and let it be "skill that can fight," than in playing the part of a social aid.
For a command on foreign station, it is essential that at least one of the staff officers be capable of acting as interpreter for French and Spanish. This is also important for a staff on home station, for there will be frequent opportunities for the student of French or Spanish to demonstrate his proficiency.
III. Third Letter
THE INTERNAL WORKINGS OF THE STAFF
Once the staff is selected, it must be organized for its work. We must therefore look into the question of the organization of the staff and see its internal workings. Once this is clear, then we will be in a position to examine the real work of the flag officer—the handling and management of his command—and see how the staff assists him in this work.
The chief staff officer is, of course, responsible for the work of the entire staff. Retaining certain of the more important specific duties of the staff for himself, he should divide the other duties among the subordinate staff officers. This division of duties depends upon the nature of duty the command is performing and the number and qualifications of the staff officers available.
Hardly any two staffs are similar. It may be of interest, how ever, to describe the organization of one staff as a guide. I ask your permission, therefore, to give you a few details concerning the staff with which I am familiar: There are three officers on this staff: the senior acts as senior aid and has general supervision over the work of the entire staff. He reserves for himself the specific duties of drawing up strategical and tactical plans and exercises in accordance with the general instructions of the flag officer and the issuing of the orders for their execution.
All the other specific duties are divided among the other two staff officers. One of them acts as flag secretary and handles all correspondence: he has charge of all the flag office personnel; he prepares, sometimes on his own initiative and sometimes under the direction of the senior aid or flag officer, the greater part of the outgoing correspondence; he receives the incoming correspondence and answers on his own initiative the greater part of it. Important incoming correspondence is referred to the senior aid, who answers the greater part of it, referring to the flag officer only matters of really major importance. In this way the flag officer is freed from all the numerous small, but often complicated, matters which come to him for decision from the ships of his command.
The third officer is called the communication officer, but his duties cover a far wider range than this title would indicate. He has charge of all signals and dispatches; he investigates all mistakes in signals and assigns each ship with the flag a standing for the weekly series of signal drills. He also has charge of communication exercises with aircraft and other experimental exercises. This officer has complete charge of all secret and confidential letters and publications in the safe, corrects all publications and keeps a careful record as to which are in effect and which are superseded, placing this information on the cover pages of the publications with the rubber stamps provided for that purpose. He also is responsible for the handling of all courts-martial. This duty would seem to belong to the flag secretary, but as both the communication officers who have served on the staff have been reserve officers who were formerly lawyers, this duty was given to them, and with especially fine results. I merely mention this fact to show that the qualifications of the staff officers must be taken into consideration in assigning their duties. The communication officer also writes the war diary, submitting it daily to the senior aid for approval. In addition to all these duties the communication officer also acts as athletic officer.
We must now for an instant consider the enlisted personnel of the staff. It is a matter of really great importance to have a good chief flag yeoman. His duties are almost as important as one of the staff officers. It is surprising what a mass of details have to be attended to and what a number of aggravating mistakes are certain to occur, even when the most thorough precautions are taken. A careful and accurate chief yeoman will greatly decrease the number of these mistakes. He should be required to do but little work himself, but should use his time in supervising the work of the other yeomen and in eliminating their errors. He should, however, handle personally all secret correspondence, being careful to prevent it from being divulged to other personnel of the flag office. In general, the flag yeoman and printers should be men of the most reliable and trustworthy character and should be cautioned against divulging official business to other persons. Rapidity of work is important, but it should never be gained at the expense of care and accuracy. The complaint of Major Dabney, chief-of-staff to Stonewall Jackson, is an excellent illustration of these principles: "Here we had a disastrous illustration of the lack of an organized and intelligence general staff. Let my predicament serve as a specimen. As chief of Jackson's staff, I had two assistant adjutant-generals, two men of the engineer department, and two clerks. What did I have for orderlies and couriers? A detail from some cavalry company which happened to bivouac near. The men were sent to me without any reference to their local knowledge, their intelligence, or their courage: most probably they were selected by their captain for me on account of the lack of these qualities. Next to the commander-in-chief, the chief of the general staff should be the best man in the country. The brains of an army should be in the general staff. The lowest orderlies attached to it should be the very best soldiers in the service, for education, intelligence and courage. Jackson had to find his own guide for his march from Beaver Dam Station. He had not been furnished with a map, and not a single orderly or message reached him during the entire day."
You have now seen the method by which the various specific duties of the staff are assigned to the various officers. However, it is not sufficient for each officer merely to attend to the duties to which he is assigned. There are many matters which arise which can be placed in no definite classification and which do not come under the jurisdiction of any particular officer. There are also matters which come under the jurisdiction of several of the staff officers. It is not always desirable to go through the regular procedure. The flag officer gives orders to the other staff officers without having the time to inform the senior aid; the senior aid may give instructions to the printer without first consulting the flag secretary; often it is necessary to take short cuts where immediate action and haste are necessary. This makes mistakes and misunderstandings possible unless there is the most perfect cooperation between the members of the staff; without exaggeration, the members of the staff must so work that it appears to an outsider that only one man is carrying out the entire staff business. How is this unity to be obtained—this unity without which the most brilliant staff officers will not be able to construct an efficient staff? This is a most difficult question to answer, but I will endeavor to place before you a few vague and general ideas on the subject.
First, the members of the staff must be bound together by a feeling of tact and kindliness toward each other. Second, all members must be inspired by a common love for their flag officer. Field Marshal von Moltke was able to inspire this fine spirit of loyalty in his staff officers. Every officer on a staff to-day should take to heart the wise words of Blume: "Among the staff of General von Moltke during the whole of the campaign, lasting more than six months, there was not a single jarring note. The staff formed a circle of friends, each of whom endeavored not only to do his own duty to the utmost of his ability, but also to do his best for the others. If this be a proof of its happy composition, the result was also largely due to the magical influence of the great man at its head. The superiority of his master mind left no room for jealousies. His fidelity to duty, his strict adherence to fact, his modesty and unselfishness, the dignity and high-bred serenity which never left him for a moment, even in most critical situations, the kindliness which never allowed a single impatient word to cross his lips—these exemplary qualities, brilliantly brought out by successes which belong to the history of the world, had a powerful effect upon those around him. To be an assistant to such a man, in such times, was a good fortune and an honor which every one tried to make himself worthy of by thorough devotion to his duty and the suppression of all petty jealousies. It may be truly said that Moltke's mind ruled in Moltke's staff."
A third measure for obtaining this unity of action in a staff is the proper dissemination of information among the staff officers. Unless each member of the staff has ready access to all information received and unless he is familiar with the manner in which each question is being handled by other members of the staff, he will not be able to carry on his own work intelligently and orders and counter-orders are sure to ensue. One method to place all this information before the staff is to put all papers received and sent on a file board which is shown to each staff officer daily for examination' and initialing. Another file board for secret and confidential papers should be used in the same way, these papers being filed in the safe by the communication officer after all have been initialed. A loose-leaf binder should be used for all signals sent and received and another should be employed for dispatches. Whenever signals or dispatches are sent or received, typewritten copies of them should be placed in these binders and sent to each officer for initialing. At the close of the day they should be removed from the binders and placed in the files. Should any officer of the staff be absent from the flagship temporarily, the signals and dispatches should be left in the binders until his return, so that he may quickly inform himself of all important business which has been done during his absence.
This method of disseminating information should be supplemented by frequent discussions and consultations by the staff officers. For this reason it is important that the desks and staterooms of all staff officers should be close together, because the nearer these are to each other the more consultations there will be. A subordinate staff officer having to make a decision, should, if he is not certain as to the proper procedure, consult with the senior aid. The latter should similarly consult with the flag officer on all important matters. It is much better to use a little time in consulting on a matter than to issue instructions "by direction" which have to be countermanded when the mistake is discovered by the flag officer. It also has an immeasurably better effect on the command. It is impossible for staff officers to talk over staff business too often, for it is in this way that a real staff doctrine, with which all are familiar, is developed.
But most important of all, it is necessary that staff officers should be actuated, not by ambition or personal feelings, but by devotion to their service and the most exalted patriotism to their country. ''Personal opinions, where they conflict with those of the flag officer, and personal animosities must be suppressed for the good of the command. Do not forget the warning of Machiavelli "Let only one command; several minds weaken an army.''
IV. Fourth Letter
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COMMAND
Now that we have gained some idea of the internal workings of the staff, we are in a position to see how the flag officer, assisted by his staff, administers his command. By this I mean the building up of the command to, and its maintenance in, an efficient condition for the discharge of its duties. When. we are once familiar with the methods of administration, then we are in a position to take up our last, and by far the most interesting and important subject—the handling of the command in the execution of its duties in time of peace and war.
The administration of a command is duty which is as uninteresting as the handling of a command in the accomplishment of its tasks is interesting. It consists of the management of a great number of details, covering a wide range of subjects, all of which must be handled with promptness and accuracy.
Before an officer is capable of administering a command he must be familiar with a great mass of regulations and instructions, by which his work must be guided. Among others he must study the Navy Regulations and Instructions, the Fleet Regulations, Instructions, Standing Orders, and Circular Letters, the Department General Orders, Bureau of Navigation publications and circular letters, Naval Courts and Boards, the Naval Digest, and his own publications and files for the last year. You will say that it is impossible for an officer to be familiar with all the fine points of all these publications, not to speak of others which would cover the whole page, were I to trouble you with them. I most certainly agree with you; if an officer were to attempt to know all the intricacies and complications of these publications, he would have time to do nothing at all for himself. However, he should endeavor to carry as many details in his head as possible and know where to find the rest in publications kept at his elbow and completely corrected to date.
Then, with the guidance of these standard instructions where they apply and with his own common sense where they do not, he must solve the innumerable problems presented to him and answer the questions which every officer of the command delights to place before him. And I assure you that it is surprising how good certain officers are in devising difficult questions. In matters concerning personnel the staff officer is required to pass on requests for change of duty, questions about the release of officers and men to inactive duty, the records of summary courts-martial; he appoints numerous courts and boards, draws up the specifications for, and appoints the members of, general courts-martial, writing the twelve letters which are necessary to convene a court of seven members. In matters concerning materiel he must pass upon requests for alterations and repairs, the assignment of upkeep periods and opportunities for coaling, surveys of Title B articles; he must place before the flag officer all the information concerning the material condition of the ships of the command so that he may decide as to the necessity for sending them to the navy yard for an extended overhaul period. He must also prepare all the reports required by higher authority and check up the reports which the vessels of the command should make to the flag. There are, as you may imagine, hundreds of other matters which must be attended to.
This doubtless sounds very discouraging, but it is not quite so bad as it sounds. There are, fortunately for the staff officer, a number of methods which he may employ to reduce the amount of work and make the necessary work as easy as possible.
As the question of administration is such a burdensome one, it is evident that each officer must carry his share of the burden. The administration of a command should be decentralized to the greatest possible extent. By this I mean that, while a certain number of very important questions must be forwarded to the flag officer for his decision, the greatest possible number should be acted on by the commanding officers of the vessels of the command without reference to the flag officer. In the same way the flag officer should refrain from interfering with the minor administrative questions of the vessels. This allows the flag officer to devote his efforts to really important matters and at the same time improves the morale and spirit of the commanding officers by showing them that the flag officer is confident that they will handle properly all matters concerning the internal administration of their vessels. The bad effect caused by the interference of the superior with the duties of the subordinate requires no proof even in the first year of the Civil war it was apparent to our officers; General Sheridan describes this matter very accurately: "His most serious failing was an uncontrollable propensity to interfere with and direct the minor matters relating to his command, and the details for which those under him were alone responsible. Ill-judged meddling in this respect often led to differences between us, only temporary it is true, but most harassing to the subordinate, since I was compelled by the circumstances of the situation not only invariably to yield my own judgment, but many a time had to play peacemaker—smoothing down ruffled feelings that I knew had been excited by Granger's freaky and spasmodic efforts to correct personally some trifling fault which ought to have been left to a regimental or company commander to remedy."
If by this decentralization the number of questions which come to the flag officer for decision can be reduced, the questions which still must be sent to him can be attended to more easily and more efficiently if their handling can be reduced to a system. It is true that many matters arise for which there can be no system; they may never have come up before and will never be brought to the attention of the flag officer again; these must be settled on their own merits in accordance with any instructions which can be found to apply to them or according to common sense, where no instructions cover them. But the great majority of matters which the flag officer must act upon are constantly recurring. A simple system should be devised for their handling and all staff officers and yeomen should be familiar with this system or policy, so that the decision can be made quickly and the yeomen will know exactly how to write the endorsement, or letter required.
The administration of a command can be greatly simplified if instructions are properly issued to the command. These instructions should be divided into two classes: 1st. Permanent instructions; 2d. Instructions which apply to but one particular time, and which become inoperative when this time has passed. All the permanent instructions should be issued in the form of regulations. These should be printed, placed in loose-leaf binders and issued to each officer of the command. Whenever changes in the permanent instructions are made, new pages for the regulations should be printed and inserted in the place of the pages which have become obsolete. In this way all permanent instructions will be in one compact booklet, which is always corrected to date. The issuing of permanent instructions in the form of circular letters is, in my opinion, very likely to cause confusion. You issue an original letter; then you cancel several paragraphs by a second letter; you modify more paragraphs by a third letter, and finally modify these already modified paragraphs by a dispatch. Who, I ask you, knows by this time what is in effect or superseded? Is it not better, when you wish to make a change, to issue the entire order, as modified, over again, take the superseded order from the loose-leaf binder and insert the new order, thus bringing everything up to date? On the other hand, instructions which are not permanent, but which apply to one particular time only should be issued in the form of circular letters. When these are complied with they can then be stowed away in the files, from which they need never be taken unless the matters to which they refer should be reopened.
I have now led up to what I consider a very important point. I warn you in advance that it is not a new one. The general principle I wish to bring to your attention is that paper work of all descriptions must be reduced to an absolute minimum. You will, I am sure, agree with me at once, and say that this is a very simple, self-evident principle, but just the same you must remember that Clausewitz said that "it is the simple which is difficult." It is all very well to say that paper work must be reduced, but still it is very difficult to reduce it. The staff officer should hesitate every time before he issues instructions or writes a letter. Let him realize the consequences of excessive paper work.
In the first place, the more instructions he writes, the more errors there will be in them, for he will make mistakes in drawing them up and the office personnel will make more in typewriting and printing them. But the number of mistakes will not only be proportional to the amount of correspondence issued; it will be more than this; the staff officer will be in a hurry to finish his work so he can go over to the air station for a flight; the chief yeoman will be wondering whether he will be finished in time for the baseball practice; the flag officer will ask whether a certain letter has been finished. As a consequence everybody will be in such undue haste to get the business of the day through that errors will be multiplied. Each error made will cause as much time to repair as it did to write the original letter, not to speak of its other evil consequences.
Now take for a moment the position of the officer who receives the papers which you issue. You must consider the fact that he is human and liable to make mistakes too. He is sure to make some errors in reading your letters, and it is at least reasonable to suppose that the number of these errors will be proportional to the amount of the correspondence. But as the correspondence increases it will become more and more complicated, and in his haste to get through with it all the errors will be multiplied to a dangerous extent. If an officer receives a great number of instructions of an unimportant nature, which seldom directly concern him, he is very liable to skim over them without paying close attention to them; then if something really important is issued, it is very possible that he will not notice it among the mass of unimportant details. Again, if you continually instruct your subordinate in all the small details and write them out every day, there is the chance that some day you will neglect to issue them and then he will not consider that it is necessary to carry them out that day. Listen to what Prince Hohenlohe has to say about such detailed instructions: "Again, and this is the most frequent case, it is done by general staff officers who are too deeply versed in details, who wish never to omit the least trifle, and also in no small degree to let their light shine and show that they know everything. Thus you may find that outposts are enjoined to be alert, to send patrols and reports at the proper time. When such orders are not exceptionally necessary, this is wrong, for in most cases the order does not fit the case of each corps. But the result is—and that is the most objectional point of the matter—that the troops become accustomed to having everything specifically ordered, and they then believe themselves justified in omitting the performance of everything not so ordered. They will eventually believe that the outposts need not be alert, that the enemy is being watched by other troops, if for once alertness is not specially mentioned. Again, this or that leader does not feel himself bound to report matters unless reports are expressly required. The sending of patrols is also omitted without an express order, because on former occasions it had been specifically prescribed, but was not in this case."
I never read this passage without thinking of our captain's night order book. The idea of having a night order book for the officer of the deck is an excellent one. The times of changing course, the courses to be steered, the times lights should be sighted, their characteristics, the times for taking soundings—all these should certainly be entered in the book. But is it necessary to fill it with instructions for the officer of the deck to keep a careful lookout, to make all the required reports to the captain, to give all vessels a wide berth, and to observe the rules of the road? There are also certain instructions which should be entered in the morning order book, but is it necessary to begin with a statement as to the time of reveille and turn-to? Cannot the officer of the deck be trusted to have reveille on time without a written and signed statement every morning? Should it be necessary for the supply officer to make a formal request to the captain to keep the galley fires lighted until nine o'clock? What attention does the commanding officer pay to the report that ten o'clock lights are out, and would he ever notice it if this report was forgotten? Is it not time that we threw overboard some of these "relics of barbarism"—as one of my classmates used to call them—and get up to date on little things as well as big ones?
But we were talking of paper work and, therefore, must get back to it for just a while longer. The reports an officer makes often go to the department or the commander-in-chief. Any negligence or delay then, in your reports will be brought directly to the attention of officers high in authority. Therefore, no matter what may happen to your other duties, you may never neglect your paper work. If this is excessive a great part of your best time must be given to it, and the actual practical work with your guns or boilers must get along as best it may. As this practical work is many times more important than the writing of letters, you see that a very unsatisfactory situation arises. You find that you are in a position of the Russian officer, about whom Kuropatkin writes so bitterly: "In battle it is men he has to deal with, and not files of paper and storehouses. But situated as he is at present, he is so overburdened with important administrative details that most of his time is passed dealing with requisitions and inventories instead of flesh and blood."
Now that I have pointed out to you the many evils caused by excessive paper work you will without doubt ask me how it may be reduced. Permit me to pass a few general principles in review before you:
First, the staff officer must not write instructions about unimportant matters. In writing a letter you expend a certain amount of your own time, the time of your yeoman, and the time of the officer who reads your instructions and tries to understand them. Often letters are written on such complicated, though unimportant subjects, that they are sent from one office to another until they are covered with endorsements, each officer receiving them not being sure that he has cognizance of that matter and not having courage enough to either make a decision or throw the correspondence in the waste paper basket.
Second, when it is necessary to write about important matters limit yourself strictly to what is important and leave out other details.
Third, express what you have to say about important matters as concisely as possible.
Fourth, write so clearly that the officer whom you are addressing will understand immediately the idea you wish to convey. If your instructions are vague, he will have to ask questions and you will have to answer them. If I were not afraid of having my paper deleted I would refer you to the first general order authorizing the wearing of service chevrons as an amusing example. Above all things do not acquire that "Delphic Oracle" style; that is of writing a letter so that it can mean two things; after the officer addressed has done one of them, you then inform him that you meant the second ; should he do the second, you have the privilege of saying that you meant the first.
Fifth, you cannot watch too carefully for careless errors in the preparation of a letter. Do not be in so much of a hurry that you sign your letters without reading them. I warn you to look even at the address, as it is easy to make a careless mistake in this—just as easy as in any other part of the letter. After you have signed a letter to a wrong address once, your examination will probably be more alert for a time.
Sixth, see that the chief yeoman checks up the addresses on the envelopes. I could give some startling figures on such unfortunate errors.
Seventh, you can do quite a little of your work orally. There should be a conference of commanding officers once a week and a great many questions can be settled there. The flag officer should encourage commanding officers to come on board the flagship and discuss with him and the staff such details as must be brought to their attention.
Eighth, call for as few reports as possible. Let ships forward direct to the department and the commander-in-chief the numerous reports prescribed. Only when they contain some data of importance should they be forwarded to the force commander. In one force the only routine reports are a roster of officers when changes occur and a ship's diary with short daily entries and a monthly statement of important defects in personnel and materiel.
I am glad to announce to you that we have now completed the discussion of the administration of the command. You may now consider it well organized and ready to carry out any operation ordered by higher authority.
V. Fifth Letter
THE HANDLING OF THE COMMAND
We must now consider the various methods which a flag officer may employ in the handling of his command and see how his staff assists him in this—the most important of all his duties.
As an example please imagine that a critical situation has suddenly been reported in a small foreign country and that the flag officer has been directed by higher authority to send a vessel of his command to one of its ports.
In order that the flag officer may intelligently decide upon the vessel to send he must first see what duty will be required of it. It is the duty of the chief staff officer to place before him the exact situation in the disturbed country. An estimate must be made, from an examination of past history, as to the probable nature of the disturbances. Will the conflict be between two factions of the natives or will citizens of our own or other countries be endangered? Where will the disturbances most probably take place, at a seaport or inland? Where are American citizens and where is the greater part of the American property? What action will the natives most probably take should it be necessary for a landing to be made to protect the lives and property of Americans? What forces will they bring against us? Will they be well drilled and armed?
Next, the chief staff officer should place before the flag officer information concerning each ship which is available for the duty ordered, so that he may judge as to which one will best fulfill the requirements.
First, he should determine the times at which each ship could arrive at the port designated by superior authority. The distance to the port should be determined, and, allowing for the probable state of the weather, the approximate time required to cover it at different speeds. Then the following questions for each ship available should be answered: What is the percentage of fuel on hand? Will it be necessary for her to coal before leaving or en routed How long will it take her to get up steam and be ready to get under way? Considering the present material condition of the engines and boilers, the efficiency of the engineering personnel, and the present condition of the ship's bottom, what sustained speed can she make good? Assuming this speed, at what time will she arrive at the port designated?
Second, the flag officer should determine the relative merits of the commanding officers of the ships available. The chief staff officer should have answers for the following questions: Is the commanding officer familiar with international law? Will he probably cooperate on friendly terms with the American consular and diplomatic agents in the country to which he is ordered? Will he act tactfully toward the natives? Will he sympathize with the natives or with the American citizens in the country? Will he act on his own initiative without instructions from higher authority should there be necessity for such action? If fighting should take place, has he the necessary force of character to bring it to a successful conclusion?
Third, the flag officer must decide as to the relative fighting strengths of the ships available. What is the draft of the ship? How close in to the shore can she anchor? What is her battery? What time has elapsed since she last held target practice? How many men has she in the landing force? Is it well trained? How long since it has fired on the rifle range? How many machine guns are available?
Fourth, a decision must be made as to the relative ability of the ships to maintain themselves in the port to which the ship must be ordered. Will the draft of the ship permit her to anchor in a sheltered berth? How many days can she remain in the port without having to replenish her fuel supply? Is the fuel used coal or oil? Can proper fuel be obtained in the port or at another port close at hand? When did the ship complete the last overhaul period in a navy yard? How much longer can she be maintained without another overhaul period? What are the facilities of the engineer department for making repairs? How many days' provisions can the ship carry? How many days' supply will be on hand at the time the ship leaves? Can the fresh water supply be maintained indefinitely without obtaining water from the shore? Is the cold storage in good condition? Is the ship screened from mosquitoes?
The chief staff officer, after supplying all this information to the flag officer, should give his opinion as to the proper decision. The flag officer should then inform the chief staff officer of his decision and give him orally a general outline of the movement order to be written. The chief staff officer should then have a rough copy of the order typewritten under his direction and should submit it to the flag officer for his approval. When approved by the flag officer the proper number of copies should be carefully typewritten. Every word of it should then be carefully checked by the chief staff officer. The mistake of one figure in a latitude or date may ruin an entire operation; such mistakes are certain to occur sooner or later unless every precaution is taken; the figures in the order should be compared with the original data, worked up by the chief staff officer. After he is certain that the order is correctly written he should present it to the flag officer for signature and then send the original copy to the ship selected for the duty.
If immediately after the flag officer has made his decision, a signal is made for the ship to get up steam, there will usually be sufficient time to write the order in this way and deliver it to the ship before she is under way. However, if there is some special reason for haste, the making of the rough copy may be eliminated and the smooth copy can be made first. The most satisfactory method in this case is for the chief staff officer to write the smooth copy of the order immediately on his own typewriter; this can be done easily in ten minutes; five minutes more should be allowed for the delivery of the letter by a fast boat; thus you see that the order should be delivered in about fifteen minutes.
You are doubtless surprised by this celerity of staff work. You perhaps think that the chief staff officer must be an expert on the typewriter to write an order several pages long in the short space of ten minutes. But of course the secret is that the order is only two paragraphs long, and there are not over four lines in each paragraph. Permit me to give you an example of such an order.
American Patrol Detachment,
Dolphin, Flagship,
Key West, Florida,
19 March, 1920, 2.35 p. m.
Movement Order
No. 52
Forces
Raleigh, Captain
1. Situation in Haiti is critical. Rioting has occurred in Port-au-Prince. American lives and property endangered throughout Haiti. Eagle is at Cape Haitien. Dubuque is due to arrive Port-au-Prince twenty-two March.
2. Raleigh proceed immediately to Port-au-Prince, assume command of all Naval Forces in Haiti and protect American interests.
Signed
Rear Admiral
Raleigh Commanding American Patrol Detachment
Copy by boat to:
Copies by mail and dispatch to:
Operations
Commander-in-chief
Eagle
Dubuque
Naval Station, Guantanamo
You will note that this form follows the usual form for campaign orders as far as this applies to the order to a single ship. A standard approved form should, of course, always be used, for this increases the readiness with which orders can be written and understood.
In the first paragraph is given all the information of the situation and of other vessels with which the officer to whom the order is addressed may have to deal. In any written communication it is always proper to begin with a statement of the situation so that the person addressed will have all the facts clearly placed before him before considering the order, suggestion or recommendation which is contained in the second and succeeding paragraphs of the communication. I would carry this system so far as to make it apply to all dispatches, signals, letters and other communications as well as movement and campaign orders. You doubtless know that in writing a letter it is often hard to get started. If you begin with a statement of the situation with which you are thoroughly familiar the rest of the letter can be written easily.
In a movement order it will be found advisable to place all the instructions in the second paragraph. Two paragraphs are not necessary for the instructions to a single ship and the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the campaign order form are seldom necessary, and when necessary can be placed in the first paragraph as coming under the head of information. You will notice that the instructions are very simply and concisely stated. Perhaps you think they are vague and that the phrase "protect American interests" is indefinite. However, they would not seem vague if you could see the detachment doctrine. This prescribes clearly and precisely the various methods which should be used in accomplishing this mission. Not only the commanding officer is familiar with the doctrine, but every officer on his ship thoroughly understands it. Furthermore this question has been frequently discussed in many conferences of the commanding officers at which the flag officer has set forth his ideas on such operations. Also the methods used in similar situations in the past is described in the detachment diary, which is printed and issued to all ships for the purpose of indoctrinating the officers and building up a detachment spirit.
Again it would be very undesirable for the flag officer to issue detailed instructions to cover this special situation. In the first place no officer can be thoroughly familiar with what is happening at a place over 500 miles away. Even the most voluminous dispatches could not permit him to have an intimate knowledge of a rapidly changing situation. In addition to all this consider that it will take the ship two days to reach its destination. Certainly you cannot expect the flag officer to predict what will happen during this period in advance. Moltke tried to predict for three days in advance when the third army and the army of the Meuse were advancing toward Chalons in 1870, but he had to issue a counter-order during the third day because the French made a move which nobody at the time would have considered possible.
You know of many instances where officers on detached duty were held down to detailed hard and fast orders. It is the principal lesson you will learn in reading the campaigns of Frederick the Great. Even as marvelous a leader as Frederick was could not get altogether out of the old way of doing business. Absolute and strict obedience of orders to the letter was what he required. You may see this idea in his enthusiastic praise of Moritz of Dessau after the battle of Leuthen, "You have helped me, and performed every order, as none ever did before in any battle." Again you may notice it in his cruel rebuke to the old Dessauer: "I am greatly surprised that your Serenity, as an old officer, does not more accurately follow my orders that I give you. If you were skill-fuller than Caesar and did not with strict accuracy observe my orders, all else would be of no help to me. I hope this notice, once for all, will be enough; and that in time coming you will give no further causes to complain."
You will see the effect of these ideas all through Frederick's campaigns. When he could oversee every detail all went well. When he gave one of his generals an entirely independent command in a distant sector he almost invariably did splendidly. But when he tried to issue any instructions to a torce at some distance or to get two separate forces to cooperate under his orders the results were often unsatisfactory! Thus he pushed Finck into an awkward position at Alaxen to cut off the retreat of the Austrian army; but Finck, although the next best officer to Frederick in the entire army and although he had such splendid officers as Wunsch, Wolfersdorf and Mosel as subordinates, had never been trained in such operations. As a general acting independently he had an excellent record and he knew how to lead a division under the direct orders of the king, but in such a case as this he had no idea as to what to do. Instead of following the spirit of his orders, which indeed were liberal enough, he followed them strictly to the letter and his entire force was destroyed by overwhelming numbers. Very truly does Carlyle say: "If Frederick could have made himself into two; and, while flashing and charging in Daun's front, have been in command at Maxen in Daun's rear—Frederick could have made a pretty thing of this Maxen enterprise. But there is no getting two Fredericks. Finck, a general of approved quality, is the nearest approach we can make to a second Frederick and he proves tragically inadequate." But it was only Frederick's unreasonable system which made his ablest assistant "tragically inadequate."
Again in 1760 General Fouquet, a most magnificent officer, was being driven back somewhat before the three-fold numbers of the Austrians. Frederick, angered by the loss of Landshut, gave him peremptory orders to retake it. "Deeply hurt, he read this order; and vowing to obey it, and nothing but it, used these words, which were remembered afterwards, to his assembled generals: 'Meine Herren, it appears, then, that we must take Landshut again. Loudon, as the next thing, will come on us there with his mass of force: and we must then, like Prussians, hold out as long as possible; think of no surrender on open field, but if beaten defend ourselves to the last man. In case of a retreat, I will be the last that leaves the field; and should I have the misfortune to survive such a day, I give you my word of honor never to draw a Prussian sword more. '" Landshut was retaken by Fouquet with his 13,000 men, but the sixth day afterward Loudon came down with 31,000 and poor Fouquet never drew sword again.
Napoleon, in many ways, improved upon Frederick's system. In a great many cases he allowed great initiative to his subordinates. But how many times do we hear him say that no one knew his system. The reason for this is well shown by a little note from Berthier to Ney in the Eylau campaign: "The emperor, marshal, has in forming his plans, no need either of advice, or of anyone acting on his own responsibility. No one knows his thoughts; it is our duty to obey."
I claim for our own country the honor of being the first to use in actual warfare the new system of command. The Confederates were the first to allow the subordinate a reasonable latitude in the selection of the methods to be used in the execution of a plan, while at the same time they insisted on a most loyal obedience to the spirit of this plan. At the beginning of the Peninsula campaign Lee wrote to Jackson: "The blow, wherever struck, must, to be successful, be sudden and heavy. The troops must be efficient and light. I cannot pretend at this distance to direct operations depending on circumstances unknown to me, and requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment as to time and execution."
Henderson says of Jackson: "He was not one of those suspicious commanders who believe that no subordinate can act intelligently. If he demanded the strictest compliance with his instructions, he was always content to leave their execution to the judgment of his generals: and with supreme confidence in his own capacity, he was still sensible that his juniors in rank might be just as able. His supervision was constant; but his interference rare: and it was not till some palpable mistake had been committed that he assumed direct control of divisions or brigades."
It is true that these principles were not grasped by the commanders of the Army of the Potomac for several years. Even as late as the Battle of the Wilderness in 1864 General Meade held to the old system. Let Sheridan tell how it worked: "A little before noon General Meade sent for me, and when I reached his headquarters I found that his peppery temper had got the better of his good judgment, he showing a disposition to be unjust, laying blame here and there for the blunders that had been committed. He was particularly severe on the cavalry, saying, among other things, that it had impeded the march of the Fifth Corps by occupying the Spotsylvania road. I replied that if this were true, he himself had ordered it there without my knowledge. I also told him that he had broken up my combinations, exposed Wilson's division to disaster, and kept Gregg unnecessarily idle, and, further, that such disjointed operations as he had been requiring of the cavalry for the last four days would render the corps inefficient and useless before long. Meade was very much irritated, and I was none the less so. One word brought on another, until, finally, I told him that I could whip Stuart if he (Meade) would only let me, but since he insisted on giving the cavalry directions without consulting or even notifying me, he could thenceforth command the cavalry corps himself—that I would not give it another order. The acrimonious interview ended with this remark, and after I left him he went to General Grant's headquarters and repeated the conversation to him, mentioning that I had said that I could whip Stuart. At this General Grant remarked: 'Did he say so? Then let him go out and do it!'" Sheridan did it!
But I see that my fondness for history has induced me to go somewhat deeply into my subject. To tell the truth I had an ulterior object in giving you this information about our Civil War generals. The Germans are usually credited with introducing the modern system of command. Perhaps they were the first to use it as a set policy, but you can see that they had the example of the four greatest generals of the Civil War to follow: Lee, Jackson, Grant and Sheridan.
But if the issuing of detailed orders has a bad material effect, it has also a very evil moral effect which is even more important. Fancy poor General Loudon, who, after storming Schweidnitz in a brilliant enterprise and taking 3000 prisoners, 211 heavy guns and 135 mortars, was nearly dismissed from his command for disobedience of orders, he not having informed the Empress and War Council at Vienna of his plan in advance. On the other hand picture happy Sheridan and his splendid cavalry corps starting out after Grant's inspiring command: "Then let him go out and do it." To carry out an operation after all the plans have been arranged for you is not nearly as interesting as though you are allowed by a chief, who will give you his utmost support, to make your own plans and carry them out without interference.
When an order can be typewritten and delivered by boat the time taken to draw up the order and transmit it is very small. In this case it would not take very long to write a whole page or even two. However, when it is necessary to send the order by dispatch, the length of the order has a very important effect upon the time taken for its transmission. It requires no proof to show that an order which must be written, coded, enciphered, sent by radio, relayed by land wire, sent again by a shore radio station, received by a ship, deciphered, decoded and written out will be greatly delayed in transmission if it is lengthy and complicated. Coding and ciphering are duties which require great concentration of thought and in which one must be on the constant lookout for mistakes. They are not popular duties and often must be carried out under adverse and uncomfortable conditions. Often the coding officer will be wakened in the middle of the night; at such a time a whole page of matter to code or decode is not a pleasing sight; if the ship is running without lights, the room where the coding must be done is usually hot and stuffy: a heavy sea often does its part in adding to the pleasures of the occasion. Coding and enciphering is tiring work and after working at full speed for an hour it is surprisingly easy to make mistakes, even though you go slower and slower and try to become more and more careful. The coding officer is not nearly so liable to make mistakes in the case of three short messages sent at different times, as in the case of one long message, having a number of words equal to the first three combined, which must be coded without an intermission. The same applies to the transmitting of the dispatch by radio; this is also a duty which requires intense mental concentration, and when an operator gets near the end of a long message his alertness decreases and garbled words are the result. For all these reasons a long message will be delayed in transmission. Furthermore some parts of it may be so badly garbled that no sense can be made of it at all and the entire message must then be repeated. However, should it ever be necessary for some special reason to send a lengthy order by dispatch, it will be well to send the important part of it—such as the order to proceed—in a short dispatch, following this with a longer message—which can be received after the ship is under way—giving the detailed orders.
The staff must take care that none of their confidential papers and orders get adrift, are seen by unauthorized persons, or that their contents are divulged by officers or men of the staff in too free conversation with outsiders. In the Antietam campaign the Federals picked up a copy of Lee's recently issued campaign order in Frederick. This had very disastrous results as it placed Lee's entire plan in the hands of McClellan. Arrangements must also be taken to see that orders are not lost in transmission. In the Eylau campaign the Russians captured an orderly on whom was found Napoleon's orders to Bernadotte. This allowed them to escape the trap laid for them by the master and also left Bernadotte without orders, so that he did not arrive in time for the battle.
It is more difficult to write an order, dispatch or signal, so that it can be immediately understood by everybody, than you would believe. An officer who can write a clear order ought immediately to be ordered to staff duty for this reason alone. You may have heard the interesting story of General Grant's aid; he was an old major who had a reputation for being particularly dull and stupid; everybody wondered the reason for his being on such a competent staff; finally one officer asked the reason; the general replied that every order before being issued was shown to this officer; if the major could understand it, it was assumed that it was perfectly written and that any other officer in the entire army could. I am compelled to doubt the accuracy of this story, but it illustrates the suggestion I wish to make. Every officer of the staff who writes an important communication of any kind should submit it to another staff officer and ask his opinion as to whether it is clear or not. If there is any doubt in the mind of the second staff officer, it should be rewritten. One of the most extraordinary orders ever issued was the one sent out by Lee's staff before the attack on Malvern Hill. It read as follows: "Batteries have been established to rake the enemy's line. If it is broken, as is probable, Armistead, who can witness the effect of the fire, has been ordered to charge with a yell. Do the same." This order was sent only to D.H. Hill and Magruder and then countermanded before being sent to the other divisions. Soon after it was received by General Hill the Federal skirmishers attacked Armistead, and Hill, taking this as the signal for the attack to begin, moved out alone with 10,000 men against the entire Federal army, meeting of course with a costly repulse.
Whenever an order is issued it is important that copies of it should be sent to all other officers who may be interested in the operation. It is very important that every officer who is in any way concerned should have all the information possible of our own and the enemy forces. In the campaign of Waterloo alone I could show you ten cases where the most important information was not forwarded. For instance, General Reille did not inform his commander, Ney, that the Prussians were seen on the right forming for battle near Ligny. Later in the day Erlon's Corps appeared in the left rear of Napoleon's forces: as Erlon had sent no aid in advance telling of his approach. Napoleon thought they were enemy forces and delayed the attack of the Guard for two hours, a delay which prevented him from crushing utterly the Prussians at Ligny. But the most remarkable errors were made after the conclusion of the simultaneous battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras. Wellington did not hear that Blucher was defeated until 10 a.m. the next day; Napoleon did not inform Ney of the result of the battle of Ligny until 8 a.m. and Ney did not report the result of the battle of Quatre Bras until noon. The French threw away at that time wonderful opportunities which would have decided the campaign.
You possibly think that I lay too much stress on the issuing of what you may call purely formal orders. Possibly you think that instead of writing an order it is sufficient merely to send an aid over with the necessary instructions. Jackson tried this once at the battle of Gaines Mill. You may be assured that the results were anything but satisfactory. Then you may call the officer, to whom you wish to issue the orders, to a conference, but even this is a poor procedure unless written orders are given to him also. Ney and Napoleon talked over their plans nearly all the night of the 15th of June, but so indefinite an idea did Ney get of the duties required of him that, although he was supposed to move at 6 a.m., he did not start until noon of the next day, when he received peremptory orders to do so. Napoleon gave Grouchy only oral orders to follow the Prussians and poor Grouchy, who was the last officer in the world to whom 33,000 men and an important independent command should have been given, had not the slightest idea as to what to do, nor could he obtain any more information or other orders until it was too late. He had heard the emperor reprimand Ney for not following his orders "pure and simple" and so he was content to follow the Prussians as ordered. You know what the results were.
Once a decision is made and the orders issued, they must not be changed except for the most important reasons. Immediately after you send out an order you begin to be assailed by doubts, to wonder whether it can be carried out, to imagine all sorts of difficulties. In such a situation remember the words of Frederick to his brother: "I have seen with pain that you represent everything to yourself on the black side. I beg you in the name of God, my dearest brother, don't take things in their blackest and worst shape—it is that which throws your mind into such an indecision, which is so lamentable. Adopt a resolution rather, what resolution you like, but stand by it, and execute it with your whole strength." This seems a very simple axiom and the easiest thing in the world to do. You perhaps wonder that I even mention a matter which is so self-evident. But, in my opinion, to arrive at a clear, definite decision and to carry it through unchanged is the most difficult task in the entire art of command. In how many beaten armies do you see the confusion caused by the indecision of the commander? The Prussians in 1805, the Austrians in 1859, McClellan's army in 1862, Pope's in 1863 and the French in 1870 were defeated by the indecision of their leaders even before a battle was fought. It is true that these armies were led by mediocre commanders, but how many great leaders are there who have not shown this fault at some time during their campaigns? See Cffisar at Thapsus hesitate to give the word to advance until the legionaries themselves spontaneously burst forth! Frederick gives way to despair after the terrible defeat of Zorndorf. Massena hesitates until too late before the lines of Torres Vedras. Napoleon allows Bessieres to persuade him not to use the Guard at Borodino. Look at Wolfe at Quebec: "Within the space of five hours we received at the General's request three different orders of consequence which were contradicted immediately after their reception, to the no small amazement of everyone." See Nelson worrying himself literally to death over the escape of the French fleet. All these officers were specially noted for their strong character and resolution, and if such men as they sometimes showed indecision it is certainly something against which every precaution should be taken. The best precaution is to have a staff of strong officers who are absolutely loyal to their chief; they should assist him to come to a clear and definite decision, and when once made "to stand by it and execute it with your whole strength." The chief staff officer, especially, should be the most optimistic person in the world; should he see the flag officer, bending under the weight of his responsibility, begin to have misgivings as to his own plan, he must argue with all his might that the original order was correct, that the difficulties in the way of its execution are exaggerated and that counter orders should not be issued. He must recall the words of Napoleon: "But when I have come to a resolution everything is forgotten, except that which will lead to its attainment." A staff officer who criticizes an order after it has been issued without the strongest reasons should be dismissed from his post. A staff composed of such officers will soon ruin any command.
A flag officer is frequently required to cooperate in the execution of a task with officers of his own service, with the army and with allied forces. In order that this cooperation may be effective it is necessary that a kindly and friendly spirit exist between his staff and the staff of the other officer, as most of the business will be carried on through the agency of staff officers. If the staff officers conduct the negotiations tactfully many delicate questions can be smoothed over and the business so arranged that it will be to the advantage of both commands. Blucher's cooperation with Wellington at Waterloo is probably the best example of one army coming to the assistance of another in the very nick of time. Only one day after the Prussians had been badly defeated at Ligny and while their commander was still on a sickbed as the result of being ridden down in a cavalry charge, he received word from Wellington that the British would give battle to Napoleon the next day at Waterloo provided they could count on having the assistance of two Prussian corps. Blucher replied: "I shall not come with two army corps only, but with my whole army: under this understanding, however, that should the French not attack us on the 18th. We shall attack them on the 19th."
We have now come to the end of these letters. Let me pass in review some of the most important points.
First, a flag officer afloat must be selected for his force of character, courage and resolution.
Second, he should select as his chief staff officer a man of great force of character, who has a practical knowledge of strategy and tactics, administrative ability and who is in substantial agreement with him on all important professional subjects.
Third, the flag officer and the chief staff officer should select the rest of the staff, choosing officers of known ability who have the same characteristics as are necessary for the chief staff officer.
Fourth, the administration of the command should be delegated as far as possible to the commanding officers.
Fifth, administrative details which must be passed upon by the flag should be handled quickly, accurately and carefully by the staff. Only the most important matters should be referred to the flag officer for his personal action.
Sixth, when the command is to be used for the carrying out of important duties or operations, the situation must be carefully and completely estimated by the chief staff officer; the flag officer should himself make the decision, considering, however, the opinions of the other staff officers.
Seventh, the decision once made, clear and concise orders should be quickly delivered to the selected vessels, every precaution being taken to prevent their contents from being divulged; the orders should state only the task to be accomplished, the methods to be used in its accomplishment being left to the initiative of the officers on the spot, guided by the force doctrine.
Eighth, the orders once issued, the flag officer must stand by his decision with all his force and should not issue counter orders except for the most important reasons.
Ninth, the flag officer must cooperate in the most friendly spirit with other officers of the navy, of the army or of foreign services allied to his.
It may have occurred to you that through the entire length of this paper I have been trying to prove to you the advantages of the offensive spirit, the fighting spirit that has always been alive in our navy, and, with God's help, always will be. But we must always remember that we must always keep on building up this spirit. We have already enough skill, but we want skill that can fight, we want the sacred fire. Please take for your motto the noble words of Brasidas as he entered into his last battle: "I will show you that I can not only advise others, but fight myself."