EIGHTH LETTER
1 . CALDER'S DECISION
You will remember that Calder left Brest on August 16. His squadron was composed of the following ships:
Prince of Wales (Vice Admiral Calder) 98 guns.
Britannia (Rear Admiral Northesk) 100 guns.
Canopus (Rear Admiral Louis) 80 guns.
Spencer 74 guns.
Spartiate 74 guns.
Donegal 74 guns.
Tigre 74 guns.
Swiftsure 74 guns.
Conqueror 74 guns.
Leviathan 74 guns.
Prince 98 guns.
Temeraire 98 guns.
Neptune 98 guns.
Revenge 74 guns.
Zealous 74 guns.
Defence 74 guns.
Orion 74 guns.
Polyphemus 64 guns.
A total of 23 units.
He was also to have the Dragon (74 guns) and Goliath (74 guns), which were to the southward. Cruisers: Sirius and Attack.
On the 20th Calder was still in the Bay of Biscay, having been held up by contrary winds. On this date, when Villeneuve was entering Cadiz, Calder met the frigate Naiad which, as you will remember, had trailed Villeneuve to the westward on the 14th. Calder now changed his course a little to the northward, apparently with the intention of intercepting Villeneuve, but soon changed back so as to head direct for Ferrol. He sent the gunboat Attack on ahead to reconnoiter. On the 21st he arrived off Ferrol and saw that the combined fleet was not there, but received news that Allemand with the French Rochefort squadron was at Vigo. He therefore continued on to Cape Finisterre. Here one of his cruisers brought in word from a merchant captain that Villeneuve had left Ferrol on the 14th with 29 of the line and 10 cruisers and had disappeared to the westward. By the next morning (the 22d) Calder had passed Finisterre and was standing toward Vigo in the hope of meeting Allemand. In the evening he heard that Allemand had left Vigo four days before and that when last seen he was headed to the north. At the same time a frigate arrived from Cadiz reporting having seen nothing on the way up.
Now Calder had to make his decision. Let us see what information he had First, he knew from several sources that Villeneuve had left Ferrol on the 13th or 14th of August with 29 of the line and had headed to the westward. The great question was as to whether he had gone north or south. He had information that Allemand had gone north, but then why had he not met Allemand, having been directly in his path? A frigate coming from the south had not seen the combined fleet, but this proved little, as Villeneuve had probably not taken a direct course. Thus he had really no information of any value concerning Villeneuve's destination. Suppose Villeneuve had gone north and Calder now remained in his present position or went to the south! This would put Cornwallis in a perilous position. Suppose Villeneuve had gone south, and Calder went north or remained in his present position! Then Villeneuve could crush Collingwood and Bickerton, rally the Spanish ships at Cadiz and Carthagena and return to the north again with greatly increased numbers. Thus Calder had one chance in two of guessing Villeneuve's destination. If he guessed correctly and sailed immediately, all would be well. If he guessed wrong and sailed immediately, there was danger of a great disaster. But if he held his position and did nothing he would practically waste his whole squadron. He therefore decided to act and he guessed correctly. On the 22d Calder started south along the coast of Portugal.
It is probable that the one thing which did the most to cause this decision was the report that Allemand had gone north, followed by his failure to appear after Calder had apparently covered his route in that direction. It is a curious fact that Allemand had actually gone north, missing Calder by the greatest luck, in some way that has never been explained.
In the meantime, the frigate Iris which had been chased away from the combined fleet on the 14th, was heading to the southward to warn Collingwood at Cadiz. Off the Portuguese coast she fell in with the frigate Euryalus, commanded by the famous Captain Blackwood. These two ships then cruised for the combined fleet off Cape St. Vincent, after the news which the Iris carried had been sent into Lisbon. On the 1th Blackwood heard from a merchant captain that a large fleet was headed in his direction, and on the next day he sent off the Iris to carry the news to Ireland and Cornwallis that the combined fleet was off St. Vincent. The Euryalus remained to trail the fleet. On the same day he saw the combined fleet and was chased. He escaped but was unable to get through to join Collingwood. He therefore remained off St. Vincent to give the news to any squadron which might be following Villeneuve. Thus it happened that Collingwood was completely surprised off Cadiz. Nevertheless he managed to escape without loss and resumed the blockade, as we have already seen.
Calder touched at Lisbon on the 24th, where he received news from the consul that Villeneuve was at Cadiz. Standing on, he met the Euryalus off St. Vincent the same day. On the 30th Calder arrived off Cadiz, where he found the combined squadrons of Collingwood and Bickerton. This gave Collingwood, who as senior officer took over the command, a fine squadron of 26 of the line, of which seven were three-deckers, a total of 33 units in all. As Villeneuve had but 30 units in Cadiz at this time, you may see that the campaign had now been practically decided. The poor condition of the combined fleet, Villeneuve's consequent lack of resolution at the critical moment, and the very fortunate decisions of Cornwallis and Calder had turned the scale without a battle. The English had gained the moral ascendency and the customary decision of battle was not needed to decide the campaign.
It is curious to note how Barham's almost perfect plan had failed, while that of Cornwallis, while involving great risks, which were certainly justified, was crowned with complete success. The element of luck is always important in war.
2. ALLEMAND'S CRUISE
In examining the operations of Calder and Villeneuve we have touched in many places on the plan and actions of the Rochefort squadron. We must now make a more detailed exposition of this memorable cruise, which in many features is unique in history and from which we may learn many valuable lessons.
We have seen that on July 17 Allemand sailed from Rochefort after Sterling had disappeared. He had a fine squadron of five of the line, of which one was a three-decker of 120 guns, two frigates and two corvettes. After leaving port he opened his sealed instructions. They contained the following provisions:
1. From July 4 to 9 to make demonstrations off the Irish coast.
2. From July 29 to August 3 to be on the rendezvous west of Finisterre.
3. At the expiration of that time to go to the rendezvous southwest of Brest.
4.If Villeneuve did not appear there by August 13, to go to Vigo for orders.
5. He could go into Ferrol at discretion.
As he sailed on the 17th, it was perfectly evident that the time for the demonstration off Ireland had passed. But here Allemand made a notable decision. He would follow the spirit of the orders rather than the letter. He had still 12 days before the time he must be on the Finisterre rendezvous, and he resolved to try to get to Ireland and still be at the rendezvous by the 29th. In this intelligent obedience of orders Allemand gives a lesson which we must all take to heart.
In accordance with his decision Allemand headed due west. On the 19th he captured the English sloop Ranger in a position marked by the intersection of the direct line from Brest to Ferrol and the latitude of Rochefort. You may perhaps remember that this was the very position Cornwallis occupied on the 16th, only three days before. This was Allemand's first close escape. Cornwallis had left the Ranger there to question all neutral merchantmen. When Allemand learned of this mission from the prisoners he had taken, he resolved that he must sink all neutral merchantmen he encountered. However questionable this procedure may be from the viewpoint of international law, it was from the viewpoint of the naval officer a very wise precaution to take. Allemand's remarkable success in evading detection during a cruise of six months may perhaps have been caused by this procedure. It establishes an interesting precedent for us to-day.
Allemand continued on in his attempt to reach the Irish coast, but meeting contrary winds, he decided on the 24th that he could not get there in time and so stood away toward the Finisterre rendezvous. He arrived there on the 28th, one day ahead of time. Only one day before, as it happened, Calder had left this very position with 14 of the line to resume the blockade of Ferrol. This was Allemand's second narrow escape.
On the 29th Allemand sent out one frigate and two corvettes to within 35 miles of Finisterre and the other frigate to the northwest. Allemand remained on the rendezvous until August 4, when he received important news. First, he heard from an American ship that an English squadron had been sighted on July 31 60 miles north of Ferrol. Next he received news from a Swedish ship that on August 2 a squadron of nine ships, of which three were three-deckers, was 60 miles north of Ferrol. This was evidently Calder's squadron after Sterling had left on August 1. Allemand decided that it would be too risky to run the blockade into Ferrol and so stood away to his second rendezvous about 150 miles southwest of Brest. Although he was sighted by an English frigate, the Æolus, he evaded her during the night and, passing Calder unseen, arrived at his assigned position on August 5.
He soon found himself in difficulties. He knew that a squadron of nine sail was off Ferrol and that Cornwallis was close at hand to the northeast. He had already been seen by the 2Eo/us, which would probably give the news to Calder and Cornwallis. As soon as he arrived on the rendezvous the Naiad had seen him and had made off to the north, presumably to Cornwallis. In addition he had chased clear several other cruisers. From an English privateer he captured he learned that two Spanish ships of the line had been brought into a Channel port. On the 11th he learned through a Portuguese captain that they had been taken by Calder and that Villeneuve, having been sighted by the Curieux on the way back from the West Indies, was being closely pursued by Nelson. Allemand believed that his position was no longer tenable and on the next day, the 12th, headed toward Vigo. It was lucky he did because a day later Calder, during his retreat to Brest, passed over his position. This was his third escape. On the night of the 14th-15th, he passed very close to the combined fleet, as it stood to the westward from Ferrol. On the 15th, when near Vigo, he heard from a neutral ship that Villeneuve had been in Ferrol with 29 of the line as late as the 12th, but he thought it advisable to run into Vigo where he would get the orders from Paris and all the late information. He entered Vigo on the same day, the 15th. Here he found Villeneuve's order to proceed to Ferrol, and if the combined fleet was not there, to go to the Brest rendezvous. Accordingly Allemand left on the 18th, passed Calder in some mysterious way off Finisterre, and seeing that the combined fleet was not in Ferrol, headed for the Brest rendezvous, arriving there on August 30. Here he remained until September 5, when he obtained news from a neutral which convinced him that the combined fleet had gone to Cadiz. Therefore the following day he headed in that direction with the intention of joining the fleet there. By September 11 he was off St. Vincent, and there captured an English merchantman from which he learned that Villeneuve was in Cadiz, but blockaded by 26 of the line. As it was practically useless to attempt to run this blockade, Allemand called a council of war. In this he read to the assembled captains the instructions of the Emperor, which in his opinion covered the case: "You will consume your provisions in cruising wherever you can do the enemy most harm, and you will not return to port till six months after sailing. Use all your audacity to do harm to the enemy—that is the pith of what the Emperor commands." In accordance with this instruction he made a wide detour to the westward and northward and then headed directly for the mouth of the Channel. The Emperor could not complain that he had not used audacity.
On the 15th, as he proceeded to the westward, he passed close ahead of a great military expedition headed toward the Cape of Good Hope. This was escorted by only two 64's and must surely have been destroyed if sighted by Allemand. The missing of this convoy was a taste of bad luck to counterbalance his hitherto good luck.
By the 20th Allemand had reached a position about 300 miles westsouthwest of the Scilly Islands, which were at the entrance to the Channel. On the 24th a convoy of eight sail was sighted and chased and on the next day the escort ship, Calcutta (54 guns), and one merchantman were taken. The result of this chase was that it led Allemand into the very area which Sterling with six units of the Brest squadron had left six days before. As it happened, it also led him away from a rich West Indian convoy which was passing, so that he was able to capture but seven ships which had straggled behind. By the 29th Allemand decided that he could not hold this position any longer, and accordingly he stood away for Vigo. This was a lucky decision, because Cornwallis with his whole squadron was after him and indeed reached Allemand's cruising ground but a day after he had left.
Off Finisterre Allemand had another narrow escape. Cornwallis had sent Strachan with five two-deckers to keep watch for Allemand off Finisterre, but the latter passed within a few miles of him in some mysterious manner. On October 9 Allemand sighted the Agememnon (64 guns) on her way to join the blockading squadron at Cadiz. He chased, but the Agamemnon finally escaped. Then a convoy escorted by a frigate was sighted and four merchantmen were taken. These events had led the squadron far to leeward of Vigo. As the crews were in very bad condition due to the scurvy, it was now necessary for Allemand to get into a friendly port as soon as possible. He heard that Strachan with 10 of the line was waiting for him off Vigo, and as it would take him a long time to beat up against the wind to that port, he concluded that Vigo could not be reached. Cadiz was out of the question and he could not return to a French port because his orders required him to be out for six months. His only chance was to run for the Canaries. On October 11 he headed toward Teneriffe, where he arrived on November 4. The Spanish authorities gave him provisions and water and material to make his repairs. On the 19th he sailed for Cape St. Vincent, to raid the communications of the Cadiz blockading squadron. On the 23d he captured a merchantship and learned that a great battle had been fought off Cadiz. On December 19 he arrived off St. Vincent and learned of the great defeat suffered by Villeneuve. Now he stood to the northward and on December 24 ran safely into Rochefort. He had been absent for 161 days, of which 148 had been spent under way. He had brought all his ships back without injury and had inflicted moderate damage on the English commerce.
You might well consider this cruise a pattern for all operations against commerce which are carried on without the command of the seas. It would be impossible to praise too highly the skilful manner in which the French commodore mixed audacity with caution. Still we see that even when conducted with this skill the cruise had accomplished no result of importance. It is true that Allemand might with a little more luck have destroyed Baird's military convoy or some of the great trade convoys which he missed so narrowly. But, you must remember that, on the other hand, Allemand had seven or eight almost miraculous escapes from capture, so the luck must be called about equally divided.
Why was it then that this bold and skilful officer was unable to accomplish more? The great reason, in my opinion, was that a raiding squadron must avoid all fighting unless it has such great superiority as to be able to win without suffering any appreciable losses itself. Even an inferior hostile squadron, while itself beaten, may be able to cripple some ships of the raiding force. Under these conditions a crippled ship is as good as lost, as it must depend upon its speed to escape, and as it has no facilities for repairing its damage. Therefore, as a raiding squadron cannot fight, it must be constantly on the lookout for hostile squadrons, and must be constantly changing its position so as to avoid them. It is reduced to a strict defensive, and this has its inevitable effect upon the morale of the officers and crews of the squadron. It is impossible to accomplish anything without being willing to fight, unless you have some certain method of escape. If you have very superior speed, or a safe base near at hand, it will not be necessary to give all your attention to evading the hostile squadrons, and better results can be obtained. Allemand had none of these advantages, and thus was kept so busy avoiding the numerous squadrons all around him that he had no time to gain any great result in commerce destruction. War directed against commerce cannot have a great effect when it is impossible to command the seas, unless the raiding ships have some special way in which they may certainly escape. Such a war against commerce has never gained the decision in itself, although when combined with other operations it may play a part of certain importance.
3. PROTECTION OF THE TRADE ROUTES
When Calder had been detached with 23 units to Ferrol, Cornwallis with an equivalent force remained off Brest. While it had been necessary to divide the Brest squadron into two equal sections for the important reasons we have discussed before, it was also very important that these two sections be handled as nearly as possible as one body. Both divisions must be kept at all times between the two great hostile squadrons in Ferrol and Brest, so that both could be united for a blow in either direction. Suppose, for example, that Calder had met Villeneuve heading toward the Channel with a force he considered himself unable to face. Then it would be his best course to retire slowly before it, avoiding action by means of the greater efficiency in maneuvering and seamanship which the English squadron had. While the retirement was taking place, the information as to Villeneuve's advance would be forwarded to Cornwallis. The latter would raise the blockade of Brest, run to join Calder and with the united squadrons destroy Villeneuve, who would be unable to escape due to the inferior seamanship of his squadron. Then, Villeneuve defeated, Calder would follow him up with a small force, while Cornwallis would return to Brest, or, if the frigates off Brest had reported that Ganteaume had gone into the Channel, in that direction. In order to carry out such a plan, which required the close cooperation of two sections of the fleet, it was necessary for both Calder and Cornwallis to gain accurate and early information of the movements of the combined fleet and Brest squadron, and also for each admiral to inform the other of the movements of his own squadron. We have seen the great importance Cornwallis attached to this system of intercommunication in his order to Calder. He had already sent three frigates, Naiad, Iris and Nimble, toward Ferrol, where there were already two ships of the line, Goliath and Dragon. With Calder he had sent one frigate, Sirius, and one gunboat, Attack.
On the 19th, three days after Calder had left, Naiad, having spoken Calder, reached Cornwallis. He learned for the first time that Villeneuve had sailed from Ferrol to the westward. He at once sent back Naiad with another frigate, Hazard, with orders for Calder to go in pursuit of the combined fleet.
On the 20th Cornwallis received information from Barham that a large East India convoy was expected soon. He was ordered to take measures to protect it, if it seemed to be the objective of the enemy. The dispatch of Calder in pursuit of the combined fleet, in which he expected Allemand to be incorporated, was the most effective move he could have made to protect the convoy, and as he could not reduce his force by sending out further detachments at this critical point of the campaign, he paid no further attention to the order. It was well for him that he did not, for the next day, the 21st, Ganteaume came out of Brest and anchored in the fortified anchorage of Bartheaume outside the harbor. Cornwallis could not let him stay there, because, if Villeneuve were to appear, Ganteaume might be able to take part in the battle. Therefore on the next day, the 22d, Cornwallis stood in to attack. Ganteaume ran into Brest, and Cornwallis was forced to retire from under the heavy fire of the shore batteries. His object had been gained, as now there was no possibility that Ganteaume and Villeneuve could concentrate on the field of battle.
On September 1 Cornwallis received word from the frigate Melampus that Allemand on August 30 had been about 70 miles south of Brest. At this time Baird's expedition with an enormous convoy for the West and East Indies was about to sail. The East Indies convoy was valued at over $75,000,000 and the West Indies convoy was composed of over 200 ships. Also the Lisbon-Oporto convoy was about to leave the Channel. The situation was critical. On the one hand, it was necessary for Cornwallis to keep concentrated for Villeneuve's possible appearance. On the other hand, it was necessary for him to disperse his force so as to drive off Allemand. He had received an order from Barham to detach four or five of the line as soon as he would have sufficient ships to leave 18 of the line off Brest after the detachment. But now he had only 18 ships. He finally decided that the danger to commerce was greater than that which might be expected from Villeneuve and Ganteaume. On September 1 he sent Rear Admiral Sterling with one three-decker and four two-deckers—just Allemand's force—to bring the French squadron to action. Barham had originally ordered him to send the detachment to a position 300 miles westsouthwest of the Scilly Islands, but as Allemand had been seen off the French coast, it would be foolish to send Sterling to the position ordered by the Admiralty, which would take him in an entirely different direction. Cornwallis therefore ordered Sterling to look into Lorient and Rochefort, and if Allemand was not there to go to the northward "to protect the homeward-bound convoys and see them into the Channel."
Accordingly on September 1 Sterling left with Glory, Repulse Triumph, Dragon (which had not joined Calder), Warrior, and the frigate Crescent. He saw the next day that Allemand was not in Lorient, but was held up by bad weather on his way to Rochefort. It was not until the 10th that he heard from a neutral ship that Allemand was not in Rochefort. Up to the 6th Allemand had been but 60 miles to the west of him. On the 10th Sterling headed toward the entrance of the Channel, reaching a position about 80 miles westsouthwest of the Scilly Islands by the 17th. On the 19th he sighted Nelson with three of the line on his way to Cadiz, and from them received word that the East India convoy had arrived safely. He therefore returned to Cornwallis, joining the flag on the 20th. It is curious to note that on the very day he left his station, Allemand had taken up a position only 100 miles to the westward of him.
On the 5th Cornwallis had heard that Villeneuve had entered Cadiz on August 20. He believed that Ganteaume might make another attempt to break out, and therefore retained Sterling with his flag. He had actually with him 18 of the line, of which eight were three-deckers, 26 units, while Strachan with five two-deckers was in close to Brest.
On the 29th a storeship which had heard that Allemand was near the entrance to the Channel and a frigate which had actually seen him there reported to Cornwallis. As the French squadron showed no signs of leaving Brest and as several of their ships were seen to be refitting and would thus not be ready for sea for some time, Cornwallis now decided upon a bold move. His plan was as follows:
1st. To leave frigates to watch Brest.
2d. To station any remaining frigates around the Bay of Biscay to gain information.
3d. To send Strachan with five two-deckers to Cape Finisterre to wait for Allemand there, and
4th. To go direct for Allemand with his entire remaining force, 26 units.
This plan was put into execution at once. On October 1 Cornwallis arrived at the position in which Allemand had been reported. He searched for him for three days, and then meeting the convoy coming from Portugal, escorted it into the Channel. He arrived off Brest on the 8th. During his absence Ganteaume had made no attempt to escape.
Meanwhile Strachan with Cæsar (80 guns), Hero, Namur, Captain and Bellona, all 74's, was on his way to Finisterre. He arrived there on the 4th. On the 6th Allemand passed him without being seen. Strachan was reinforced by four frigates and was ordered to watch for Allemand and at the same time to observe and hold in port the one Spanish ship of the line at Ferrol, and the two Spanish and one French ships at Vigo, which were by this time again ready for sea.
NINTH LETTER
1. NAPOLEON AT BOULOGNE
On August 22 Napoleon at Boulogne received reports from Villeneuve and Lauriston, who commanded the troops embarked on the combined fleet, in which was announced the sailing of the combined fleet on the 13th. These letters disagreed as to the destination of the combined fleet. Villeneuve stated that he was still undecided as to whether he would go to Brest or to Cadiz. Lauriston said, on the other hand, that Villeneuve had told him that the combined fleet was going to Cadiz. Villeneuve's arrival had not yet been reported from Brest, that is on the 22d, the day these reports were received, but it was possible that the contrary winds had delayed him. By the next day, the 23d, Napoleon, arguing from the fact that nothing had been heard from the combined fleet for ten days after its sailing, and evidently placing reliance on Lauriston's letter, realized that there was a large chance that Villeneuve had gone to Cadiz, despite the fact that in his orders he had stated that this course of action was to be considered only as a last resort. Therefore, in order to provide for this possible case, Napoleon issued:
CAMPAIGN ORDER No. 7. AUGUST 23
1. Assumption—Villeneuve en route to Cadiz.
2. General plan—To concentrate a superior force in the Channel.
3. (a) Villeneuve to take on provisions for six months.
(b) To rally the six ships at Cadiz and those at Carthagena.
(c) With this united force to proceed to the Channel.
This would have been an excellent plan, if the combined fleet had been in condition to carry it out.
On the same day Napoleon received information from Ferrol that Villeneuve after leaving port had steered to the westward. This, however, was not a reliable indication as to his destination.
On the 29th Napoleon heard through English sources that Nelson had joined Cornwallis and that after his arrival Calder had been detached on the 17th with 20 ships of the line to the southward. By September 1 he had given up all hope that Villeneuve would appear in the Channel. Nineteen days had elapsed since Villeneuve had left Ferrol and if he had gone toward Brest something must surely have been heard of him by this time. It was therefore evident that the great combination had failed. Should he continue in his attempt to invade England or should he definitely give it over? Let us see from his point of view what the political situation was, for policy had to be considered in the great game he was playing, and his strategy had to correspond with the political situation.
First. What military forces had he available? The combined fleet was at Cadiz, about 35 units strong. It would require some time to get on provisions and repair damages. Its recent operations had proved its inefficiency, and its failure would still further discourage its personnel. It was evident that this fleet could not be expected to gain the command of the English Channel, and therefore that the invasion must be a failure. The grand army was still at Boulogne and in Holland and was ready for a move against either England or Austria. Thus, while the navy was inefficient and he could expect to gain nothing on the sea, the army was the best in Europe and was in an excellent position to commence operations on the continent.
Second. What forces could be brought against him? England was the only nation at war with him. On the sea the English had proved their strength and had parried the blow Napoleon had aimed at them. England was now in a position to change from the defensive to the offensive. Craig was at Malta with 8000 troops. The strength of this force could not be measured by its numbers, because it had the great advantage of being able to strike at any point in the Mediterranean. Baird had sailed from Ireland with a large force for some unknown destination. There were, in addition to these forces, about 40,000 regular troops in England which could be quickly transported to some unknown point in northern Europe. Thus England was in a threatening position. But England alone could not accomplish any lasting result on the continent. She must have allies. The worst of it was that these allies were at hand, for all Europe was on the very point of rising against France.
It was common knowledge that Russia had either signed or was about to sign an offensive alliance with England. The Russian general Lacy was at Corfu discussing courses of action for the use of the combined English and Russian forces in Italy. Russia was about to reinforce Austria with about 100,000 troops, paid with English gold. Austria had placed her army on a war footing and was sparring for time. Prussia and Sweden seemed wavering between peace and war, while of course Naples and Portugal were, as they always have been, under the thumb of England. Thus France was threatened by practically every power in Europe. English policy had succeeded in forming a great coalition against Napoleon, or rather, was just on the point of succeeding. The great crisis had arrived. It was impossible for Napoleon to wait longer. It was imperative for him to strike and strike quickly, as every day would add to the strength of his enemies, and now the failure of the combined fleet would further encourage them. There was no time for the combined fleet to get back into the Channel. A great success was needed to break up the coalition. Austria was the nearest nation to strike and the easiest to defeat, and now Napoleon decided to definitely give up the invasion project and to strike Austria with his entire force.
Therefore, on the 1st of September he gave the order to disarm the flotilla. Only a few hours after this decision was made, there arrived, by a very curious coincidence, the news that on August 21 the combined fleet had entered Cadiz. At the same time word was received from Allemand that he had entered Vigo and had left on August 16 for the rendezvous near Brest. This was bad business and called forth some harsh criticism of Villeneuve. Napoleon was further exasperated by the news that Villeneuve had seen the Didon and had made no attempt to recapture her, and by the fact that Collingwood had escaped so easily at Cadiz.
As soon as this news had been received, Decres sent off temporary orders for Villeneuve. He was:
1st. To take on provision for six months.
2d. Attack an enemy trade convoy that was heard to be on its way to the Mediterranean.
3d. To draw in the Carthagena squadron, and
4th. Not to allow himself to be blockaded by an inferior force.
These were certainly good orders.
Now that the Emperor had made his major decision to attack Austria, he busied himself with the actual plans of campaign. He first went over the dispositions of the Austrian forces. The main Austrian army was concentrating in northern Italy and was to be commanded by the celebrated Archduke Charles. The Russians from Corfu and the English in Malta would attack southern Italy. In Bavaria, an Austrian force under Mack was advanced well toward the Rhine. This force was only about 50,000 strong. Large Russian forces were coming up, but they would not be available for the first operations. Bavaria was the weak spot in the Austrian line.
Not only was it the weakest, but it was also the most important. A French advance through Bavaria on Vienna, would force the Austrians to retreat from northern Italy. This retreat in northern Italy would force a retirement in southern Italy. Bavaria was the keypoint. It was here that Napoleon would strike and with overwhelming numbers. But while attacking here, he could not neglect altogether the less important points. He must hold them with small forces acting on the defensive. Thus Massena was placed in northern Italy against Archduke Charles and St. Cyr was to hold southern Italy as long as possible. As these generals on the right flank had very weak forces, it was necessary to strengthen this flank in every way. As southern Italy could be attacked only over the sea, as long as Massena held his ground in the north, the greatest reinforcement St. Cyr could have would be the combined fleet, which by basing on Naples could definitely prevent the landing of the English and Russians in southern Italy.
Therefore on September 16 Napoleon sent orders to Villeneuve at Cadiz. They contained the following stipulations:
CAMPAIGN ORDER No. 8. SEPTEMBER 16
1. Assumption—Craig and Lacy about to invade southern Italy.
2. General Plan—To prevent a landing of English and Russian troops in southern Italy.
3. (a) The combined fleet to take on provisions for two months.
(b) To sail into the Mediterranean at the first favorable opportunity.
(c) To pick up the Carthagena squadron.
(d) To proceed to Naples.
1. To land the troops embarked on the fleet.
2. To do the utmost harm to the enemy.
3. To intercept Craig's expedition should it leave Malta.
(e) To attack any inferior force of the enemy wherever met.
As Napoleon did not believe Villeneuve capable of carrying out these orders, he sent, on the 17th, Admiral Rosily to relieve him of the command.
This order no doubt surprises you. It certainly seems different from all of Napoleon's previous orders, except the one to Ganteaume to go out to fight Cornwallis which he issued on July 20. It seems to have excited derision among the English naval critics, as Napoleon is accused by every one of them of practically throwing his fleet away.
Let us, however, examine the principles under which Napoleon had been acting from our own point of view and see if he can show that this action was perfectly consistent with his previous plans.
Up to this time Napoleon had been applying his principle of avoiding action until he had concentrated the entire French and Spanish navies into one body; that is, until he could unite Villeneuve with Ganteaume. This was in perfect accord with his repeated statements in regard to concentrating every battalion for the decisive battle, and, in my opinion, was sound strategy. At Brest the English held the interior position between the two French squadrons at Brest and Ferrol. It was thus very probable that the English could bring superior fighting strength, if not superior numbers, against either one of the French squadrons which might advance, especially as the English, with their very superior seamanship, which in those days was equivalent to what superior speed is to-day, could either accept or avoid action exactly as they pleased. Thus Napoleon was wise in avoiding, as far as he could, an action in which he was almost certain to have inferior fighting strength, as long as there was a chance for Villeneuve and Ganteaume to unite without fighting. This system of evasion, however, had not succeeded and now there was no prospect of Villeneuve being able to unite with Ganteaume. In addition to this the situation had changed, and to Napoleon's advantage. When Villeneuve had been at Ferrol, both Villeneuve and Ganteaume, and both Calder and Cornwallis might be considered in one theater of operations. In this theater the English held the interior position, so that they might throw the whole of their combined force against either Villeneuve or Ganteaume. Now, with Villeneuve at Cadiz, there were two distinct theaters of operations. Cornwallis was opposed to Ganteaume and Collingwood to Villeneuve, and while the English might still be said to hold the interior position, this was of little advantage because neither English squadron could assist the other in battle. Thus Villeneuve would not have to consider anything but the English squadron directly in front of him; he could neglect altogether the menace of the Brest squadron, something he could not have done at Ferrol. In the new situation Villeneuve would in all probability have superior numbers, if he could call in the Carthagena squadron, or if it could be made to do something to draw some of the English force away from Cadiz. But while Villeneuve would probably have superior numbers, it was almost certain that, considering the greater efficiency of the English, he would have inferior fighting power. Thus in an action the chances would be against him. The Emperor must have realized this. We saw that in his original plan of operations the chances of success were against Napoleon, but we were forced to admit that, despite this, the plan was probably the best which, wider the actual conditions, could have been devised. Now again we see that in the new plan the chances of success were not in his favor, but was not the new plan the best he could use? There are two alternate plans which you suggest. First, you say that he might have retained his fleet in port for the present in the hope that by some fortunate chance Ganteaume might be able to join Villeneuve or that the enemy might give Villeneuve some favorable opportunity to escape. It is true that there was some small chance of Ganteaume's joining Villeneuve or of Villeneuve's escaping from Cadiz in the bad weather of the autumn season, but the vital defect of this plan was that it meant delay. The longer the French and Spanish ships remained in Cadiz in idleness, the more inefficient they would become. Spain might at any time break off the Alliance, as she did three years later. England was very rapidly building ships and would soon have greatly superior numbers. Thus delay would weaken Napoleon and assist England. Also, the combined fleet would be of no assistance to the land forces at a critical point. The second possible plan was for the combined fleet to be split up into several divisions to raid commerce after the Allemand fashion. It is very doubtful whether the Spanish ships could have been used in this way and only about half the French ships were in proper material condition for such arduous service. While this plan might have caused the English considerable damage if it could have been properly carried out, it is very doubtful whether there were any French commanders who would have shown the skill and had the luck of Allemand. The results of the cruise of the divisions of the Brest squadron give us an indication as to what the result would have been. Such operations would have had no effect upon the land campaign, which for the time was of far greater importance than the war on the sea. Napoleon considered this second plan very carefully, but finally decided in favor of fighting. I think that you will now admit that Napoleon's plan was probably the best which could have been used, even though the chances of success were not very great.
At the same time when Napoleon sent these orders to Villeneuve, he decided to use the greater part of the Brest squadron for commerce raids, as it would have little chance of beating Cornwallis. These raiding divisions were not to leave until after Villeneuve had left Cadiz, as this might allow the blockading force off Cadiz to be reinforced.
As to the combined fleet, if its operations in the Mediterranean were successful, it was to be brought to Toulon. There it was to be reinforced by the ships being built there and at Genoa. If it were not able to get away from Cadiz, it was to be broken up into raiding divisions to leave during the bad weather of the autumn season. Orders to carry into effect these plans were issued on September 23. On that day Napoleon left Paris to commence the campaign against Austria.
2. VILLENEUVE AT CADIZ
The combined fleet arrived at Cadiz on August 20 in a terrible condition. Provisions were lacking, the spars and rigging of many ships needed repairs, and there were nearly 2000 sick, although over this number of sick had been landed at Vigo and Ferrol. The Spanish ships which were to have joined at Cadiz were not ready for sea. It was evident that nothing could be done until conditions were bettered and Villeneuve and Gravina set to work to do what could be done.
As the troops embarked on the ships were in a terrible condition they were camped on shore. The crews set to work to make the repairs as best they might with the insufficient facilities of the arsenal. Great difficulty was experienced in getting provisions, as there was a financial crisis at Madrid and the French commissary officer could not get the necessary money. Even though Gravina gave Villeneuve some supplies belonging to the Spanish ships, it was not until September 16, a period of nearly a month, that there were enough supplies to last a month and a half.
As you will remember, 11 Spanish ships left Ferrol, of which one was a three-decker. They were to be joined at Cadiz by six new Spanish ships. However, two of the 11 ships, Terrible (74 guns) and San Fulgencio (74 guns) could not be used further on account of their poor material condition. Of the six ships to be ready at Cadiz only Santa Trinidad (140 guns), the largest ship then afloat, and Bahama (74 guns) were fit for service. Thus, upon arrival at Cadiz there were only 11 Spanish ships ready, of which two were three-deckers. By September 16 San Justo (74 guns) was ready. On the 28th Rayo (100 guns) and San Leaddro (64 guns) joined the fleet. The last ship, Santa Anna (110 guns) was not ready until October 7. The combined fleet increased in strength as follows:
August 20 31 units.
September 16 32 units.
September 28 35 units.
October.7 37 units.
Of this number many French ships were in very poor condition.
On September 28 Napoleon's orders of September 16 arrived at Cadiz. Gravina at once reported to Villeneuve that 14 Spanish ships were ready for sea. Villeneuve decided to leave as soon as possible, fully expecting to fight the day he sailed. The order was actually given to embark the troops. A stirring proclamation was issued. If it had been possible to sail immediately, there would have been a good chance of success. But to sail at once was impossible. The troops had to be embarked and the wind had to be favorable. This delay killed Villeneuve's chances, because on the evening of the 28th news came in that three more English ships had arrived and on the 2d of October information was received from Madrid that this reinforcement consisted of four of the line and that Nelson had arrived to command in chief with great plans to attack the combined fleet inside the harbor. Villeneuve and Gravina were greatly affected by this news, and far from thinking of going out, began to organize a flotilla of small boats for the defence of the harbor, manned by the personnel of the fleet. There is no better example than this in all history of the effect of the personality of a single man upon the enemy.
Still Villeneuve hoisted the signal to get under way on the 7th of October, but influenced by the protests of his subordinates and "the observations which came from all sides on the inferiority of our forces," he gave up the movement and upon the request of Gravina called a council of war.
At this time, October 8, it was believed that the English fleet consisted of from 31 to 33 ships of the line, of which eight were three-deckers. This would give them from 39 to 41 units as against the 37 of the combined fleet. Under these conditions, success was practically impossible. I said before that Villeneuve would be superior in numbers if the Carthagena squadron could join him or could draw off from Cadiz an equal number of English ships. But the Carthagena squadron had done nothing and now Villeneuve was inferior in numbers, not to consider fighting strength. Therefore after some discussion, in the course of which Rear Admiral Magon made some foolish and insulting remarks about the Spanish officers, the council gave the following decision:
That it is necessary to wait for, a favorable opportunity, as is stated in the instructions of the admiral, and which can be brought about by bad weather which will drive the enemy from these shores, or by the necessity of dividing the forces of his squadron to protect his commerce in the Mediterranean and the convoys which may be menaced by the squadron, at Carthagena and Toulon.
In considering this decision we must note two points in Villeneuve's orders. First, he was to wait for a favorable opportunity of leaving Cadiz. What was meant by a favorable opportunity? Would he have a favorable opportunity for leaving Cadiz when he must certainly fight an enemy very superior to him? Second, the Emperor had ordered him to fight every inferior force he met. While this did not necessarily mean that he was not to fight a superior force, it might with reason be interpreted in this way.
I do not wish to go on record as favoring councils of war, and I cannot approve the insubordinate behavior of the officers of the combined fleet; still I have to admit that this decision is, in my opinion, not the disobedience of orders it has usually been held to be, but rather a very intelligent obedience of orders. It would appear very proper for the combined fleet to wait a reasonable time until the activities of the Carthagena squadron could draw off some of the English ships into the Mediterranean, or until the enemy would be forced to detach some of his ships for other reasons. As it happened, the actual events justified the decision. It was partly the threat of the Carthagena squadron and partly the necessity for renewing the supplies of his own ships which forced Nelson to weaken his squadron by an entire division.
On October 18 news to this effect arrived. A convoy, escorted by four English ships of the line, had entered the Mediterranean. Another ship of the line was at Gibraltar disabled and still another was entering the port. This meant a reduction of Nelson's force of six of the line. Here then was the favorable opportunity. As an additional spur, to action Villeneuve heard that Admiral Rosily had arrived at Madrid. Rumor said that this officer was to relieve him of the command. He immediately decided to put to sea. Early the next morning, the 19th, the combined fleet commenced to get under way. First the cruisers left and at 10 a. m. the first ships of the line went out.
3. NELSON AT TRAFALGAR
You will remember that on August 30 Calder joined Collingwood with 18 of the line off Cadiz. This gave the latter, as senior officer, 26 ships, of which seven were three-deckers, 33 units in all. You will also remember that at this time the combined fleet had but 31 units ready for sea, but Collingwood did not know this, as he could see about 35 ships in the harbor.
Collingwood disposed the squadron after the fashion of the "close blockade" as it was used off Brest, where he had been recently stationed. Admiral Louis with one three-decker and four two-deckers with a few cruisers was stationed about five or ten miles off the port, acting the role of an inshore squadron. The main body was about 20 miles off the port.
On the evening of September 28 Nelson arrived with Victory (100 guns), Ajax (74 guns) and Thunderer (74 guns), thus bringing the squadron up to 29 of the line, with eight three-deckers, or 37 units. At this time Villeneuve had but 35 units.
Nelson, while blockading a port, never tried to keep the enemy in, as Cornwallis and Gardner with the close blockade tried to do. He preferred to give the enemy every opportunity of coming out, so that he could meet him at sea and force a decision. This plan, the "open blockade," as it is called, had its disadvantages, as we have seen from our consideration of the two sorties of Villeneuve from Toulon, and Nelson for thee reasons could not well put his usual plan into effect in this case, because he could give Villeneuve no chances of escaping. If he could escape and headed toward the Channel, the situation would be very dangerous. He therefore designed a plan which combined the features of both forms of the blockade. As actually put into effect this plan was as follows:
1st. The main body was to be about 50 miles west of Cadiz, beating up toward the port when the winds were easterly.
2d. Captain Blackwood with five cruisers was to maintain a position close up to the port.
3d. Captain Duff with four fast 74's was to maintain the communications between these two bodies, but was to keep out of sight of land at all times.
In accordance with this plan Louis was withdrawn from in front of the port and the above dispositions were taken during the first days of October.
In order not to discourage the enemy's coming out, Nelson tried to conceal the news of his arrival. He did not succeed in this, as Villeneuve heard of it on October 2.
If the enemy would not come out of his own accord, he must be forced out. To do this Colonel Congreve's rockets, a new invention, were to be tried out. Also, the commercial blockade, commenced by Collingwood, was to be so perfected that the entry of provisions for the combined fleet would be entirely prevented.
The form of blockade used had one decided disadvantage which the open blockade did not have. In the latter form it was the custom to take up a position in some port or roadstead, fairly distant from the blockaded port, whenever it was necessary to take on provisions or water. In the present form of blockade, the main body would not be able to leave its position, and thus it would be necessary for a division of ships to be detached at a time to go to Gibraltar or Tetuan for renewing its supply of provisions and water. There were other reasons for keeping a division at the Straits. The Spanish squadron at Carthagena, despite the inefficiency with which it had been handled, was a menace to the English convoys passing through thee Straits and to Craig's force on the island of Malta. It might also be able to pass through the Straits and join Villeneuve at Cadiz. For all these reasons Louis was sent to Gibraltar on October 2 with Queen (98 guns), Canopus (80 guns), Spencer, Zealous and Tigre, all 74's. He escorted a small convoy bound for Malta. Nelson did not consider Louis as detached from his force, because he planned to run down to the Straits and to pick him up as soon as Villeneuve should be reported as coming out.
The day after Louis left, Blackwood, who with the frigates had taken up his station close in to Cadiz, sent a sloop after him with the information that the French troops were embarking. Louis, on the receipt of this information, sent the convoy on with an escort of two of the line, and with the rest of his division went back to Nelson. Nelson did not believe that Villeneuve was coming out and accordingly sent Louis back to Gibraltar. On the 7th he arrived there and went to Tetuan. Here he took on water and provisions until the 15th. After Louis' departure the squadron consisted of 31 units.
On October 8 the Royal Sovereign (100 guns) arrived. She brought important dispatches. War was about to break out on the continent. Craig had orders to join the Russians in an attack on southern Italy. Nelson was ordered to protect Craig's communications and assist his expedition in every way. These orders convinced Nelson that Villeneuve would soon try to get into the Mediterranean. They also emphasized the necessity of keeping a division at the Straits to watch the Carthagena squadron, as of course Craig could not attempt anything while this squadron was at large.
On the 10th Belle Isle (74 guns) arrived, and about this time Defiance (74 guns). The addition of these two ships brought Nelson's strength up to 35 units, excluding Louis' squadron. On the 13th Prince of Wales (98 guns) left and the Agememnon (64 guns) arrived. On the 14th Africa (64 guns) came in and on the 16th Denegal (74 guns) went to Gibraltar for repairs. The result of all these changes was that 34 units remained with Nelson's flag.
At 7 a. m. on the 19th the inshore frigates signalled that the combined fleet was coming out of port. It was about 9.30 when Nelson received this report, in a position 55 miles due west of Cadiz. He immediately signalled for a general chase in the direction of the Straits. About 3 p. m. a signal was received to the effect that the enemy was all out of port.
In the meantime Blackwood had sent a sloop on to Louis with the information. Nelson held on for the Straits to meet Louis, as he wished to be as strong as possible for the action. Louis had completed taking on stores at Tetuan on the 15th. He set out to join Nelson, but was forced back to Tetuan on account of bad weather. There on the 17th he received orders from Nelson to escort the Malta convoy past Carthagena. He set out into the Mediterranean at once. On the 21st he left the convoy and went in to blockade the Carthagena squadron until the convoy would be well clear. Thus the Carthagena squadron, by merely acting as a threat, was able to account for six units of the enemy on the day of the decisive battle.
At 1 a. m. on the 20th Nelson reached a position at the western entrance to the Straits and there he waited until the morning in the hope that he might see Louis. At daylight the combined fleet was nowhere to be seen, but by 8 a. m. Blackwood signalled in that it was due north of the English main body. Nelson decided not to force the action that day as he would not be able to get into range until late in the afternoon and as Villeneuve was so close to Cadiz that he might be able to get into port without fighting. Therefore he headed to the northwest until 2 p. m., when a sudden change of the wind threw his formation into disorder. By 4 p. m. the line had been formed again and the course was set to the southwest. Soon it was changed again to north, directly toward the combined fleet. At 8 p. m., all of Captain Duff's advanced squadron having joined the line, the course was made southwest. Blackwood with the cruisers kept touch with the enemy during the night.
On the next morning, the 21st, the combined fleet was in plain sight to the northeastward, distant about eight miles. Nelson decided upon battle and, forming his fleet into two very irregular parallel columns, advanced to the attack. Villeneuve formed in a long irregular crescent-shaped column and waited.
I will not attempt to decribe the famous battle which ensued, as that would be in the realm of tactics, with which we are not here concerned. The first shots were fired a little after noon and by a little after 1 p. m., the action had become general. It was contested with great bravery and skill on both sides, but finally, in part due to the failure of the French van to get into action, resulted in a great and complete victory for the English. Twenty ships of the combined fleet were taken or sunk, nine escaped into Cadiz, and four under Rear Admiral Dumanoir ran off in the direction of the Straits. About half the English ships were in condition for further fighting at the end of the battle. Nelson was killed and Collingwood assumed the command.
Immediately after the action ended a gale came up. A number of prizes were destroyed; others were seized by their prize crews.
Captain Cosmao, the senior officer on the ships which had escaped into Cadiz, went out with the ships in commission. He retook two ships, but in returning to port lost one three-decker and two two-deckers ashore. The sum total of all this was that there were:
At Cadiz: Five French ships, of which three were ready for sea. Five Spanish ships, of which one was ready for sea.
At Large: Four French two-deckers under Dumanoir.
Villeneuve was taken prisoner. Gravina and Magon died of their wounds. Only four prizes were saved by the English, and of these the English only used one ship in their service. On the 24th, Collingwood resumed the blockade of Cadiz. He sent on no ships to assist Craig's expedition.
You remember that Dumanoir had headed toward the Straits at the close of the battle. On the next day he saw ahead of him what he believed to be Louis' division. He turned to the westward in the hope of meeting Allemand. After searching for him for two days he set out for the Bay of Biscay. On the 29th he passed St. Vincent. On November 2 Finisterre was passed, but he was sighted there by three frigates, which quickly passed the word to Strachan who was close at hand with five of the line. The latter received the word after dark and gave the order for his widely dispersed squadron to concentrate on the enemy. The French division was lost in the night, but was picked up about 9 a. m. the next day, the 3d. The pursuit was carried on all that day and through the night. By noon of the 4th Strachan had concentrated the following force in position for attacking:
Cæsar 80 guns.
Hero 74 guns.
Courageux 74 guns.
Namur 74 guns.
Phoenix 36 guns.
Æolus 32 guns.
Santa Margarita 36 guns.
Revolutionnaire 38 guns.
Dumanoir had:
Scipion 74 guns.
Formidable (20 guns thrown overboard to keep from sinking 80 guns.
Duguay-Trouin 74 guns.
Mont Blanc 74 guns.
All these ships had suffered somewhat severely at Trafalgar.
The English frigates attacked the rear of the French column and compelled Dumanoir to accept battle. After a splendid resistance all four French ships were taken. This action brought to a close the naval campaign of 1805.
It may be interesting to note the positions of the opposing forces at the end of the campaign:
1. At the Texel: Six Dutch units, held in port by Lord Keith with about seven units.
2. At Brest: Ganteaume with about 24 units, held in port by Cornwallis with about an equal number.
3. At Lorient: One French ship of the line.
4. At Ferrol: One Spanish ship of the line, practically unfit for sea.
5. At Vigo: One French and two Spanish ships of the line.
6. At Cadiz: Rosily with three French and two Spanish units ready for sea, held in port by Collingwood with about 22 units, counting Louis'
division which had returned October 29.
7. At Carthagena: About nine Spanish units, which had done nothing during the whole campaign.
.8. At large: Allemand with six units.
So complete was the English victory that only Ganteaume and Allemand had squadrons really available for efficient service.
4. THE DECISION ON THE CONTINENT
We have already followed Napoleon in his estimate of the situation and have seen how he came to his decision to advance into Bavaria. The point to strike having been decided, it remained to determine how to strike. As Mack's small army still remained in its dangerous advanced position near Ulm, and as the Russians were still well in the rear, Napoleon determined to turn its right flank, cut its communications and force battle upon it with overwhelming numbers. A quick and decided success was what he must have for its effect upon the other European nations. The final orders were issued from Strasburg September 28 and by October 19 Mack's army, except for a few detachments, had been destroyed.
As the Emperor had foreseen, this success in Bavaria had an immediate effect in Italy. Archduke Charles, although he had beaten Massena, was .forced to retreat in haste toward Vienna, as soon as he heard of the disaster at Ulm. Craig and Lacy with a combined force of some 20,000 men landed on November 20 at Naples only to hear of the Archduke's retreat. After this they remained on the defensive.
While the success at Ulm had a great effect in Italy, it did not have an equal effect in Germany. To assist Prussia and to force her hand a combined force of 70.000 English, Russians and Swedes were to assemble in northern Germany. In the first week of November 11,000 English troops were landed and a treaty was signed at Berlin which said that Prussia would enter the war unless Napoleon accepted her mediation within four weeks.
Napoleon was therefore still in a dangerous position. But he boldly advanced, entered Vienna on November 13, crossed to the northern bank of the Danube, and marched against the combined Austrians and Russians. Using every possible means in politics to delay Prussia's blow until after he had gained the decision over his immediate opponents, he awaited their attack and at Austerlitz won a great and complete victory over them. This was the end of the coalition. Austria signed an armistice and sued for peace. Russia agreed to evacuate Austrian territory. Lacy left Naples and Craig soon followed. Prussia declared her intention of remaining neutral. The English and Russian troops evacuated Germany. Napoleon was completely successful. Russia, alone, of all continental nations, refused peace, but as her troops were nowhere in contact with the French, she was only formally at war. England, however, continued the struggle alone.
Thus the great result of the year's campaign was that England and France were deadlocked. England had won the command of the sea and France the command of the continent. The great war continued for eight more years before the decision was finally won. England had been able to retain her command of the sea. Napoleon, with all his genius, had failed in the incomparably greater task of retaining the command of the continent.