The descriptions of the naval battles of the Russo-Japanese war are being condensed more and more into one uniform picture. Clearer and clearer has become the light shed on the apparently confused courses steered by the different groups. It is becoming more and more easy to follow the decisions of the separate leaders. The more definitely the maneuvers of the ships are known, the better we can determine how far apart were intention and result, what decisions were thwarted by failures of personnel and material.
Naturally, the victor has no interest in bringing the details too clearly to light. His evident success is enough for his fame. In order to guard his war experiences won by bloodshed, it is better not to publish needless details. Therefore, it must not be expected that the work of the Japanese Admiralty Staff, recently made accessible to the German reader, gives exact details concerning the transmission of orders and battle signals. Would that the expert could receive more accurate information on this subject from the Japanese! However, up to the present time, the impression has existed that the Japanese disposed of their fighting force exactly as if on their drill ground,. in spite of the division of their fleet into many groups widely separated, and in spite of being under an occasional hot fire.
It is a very pressing question whether, in future naval battles, such perfect transmission of orders may be expected; whether the commander-in-chief of a modern fleet, in a fight against an equal, will have such sure control of his speaking apparatus, the signal system, as was apparently permitted the victor of Tsushima.
This question is of immense importance in the handling of a fleet. Battle tactics are closely connected with the battle signal system; the former is in a condition of dependence on the latter. If a signal does not immediately transmit every item of desired information to the leader, every order from him, it is an obstacle to tactics. The ideal condition is reached only when the signal system places the leader just.as if he were looking down on the battle-field with a bird's-eye perspective—just as if, like a chess player, he could place his figures exactly to his own liking.
This condition was far from existing in former naval battles. The history of naval warfare gives many examples showing that battle signals may fail and be misunderstood. Sending of orders during battle was therefore always limited to an essential minimum. It was a sign of splendid leadership if no signals were necessary. General fighting instructions, together with a complete mutual understanding between, and much drilling together of, the leader and his commanders, and battle plans worked out for special cases, were always the means of making signals during battle superfluous. Trafalgar is a classic example; Nelson contented himself with one battle signal.
Not so Togo at Tsushima. A glance at a sketch of the battle teaches us that many signals must have been made.
The foundation for this difference between Trafalgar and Tsushima must be sought in the development of ship construction and of weapons. Quick change of place, the ship's course largely independent of wind and weather, numerous changes of purpose, darkening of the battle-field by smoke and powder vapor, separation of divisions, a very different use of weapons—all these, and other things, will make necessary more frequent initiative by the commander-in-chief and subordinate commanders in the battles of to-day than in the battles of one hundred years ago. If the commander-in-chief cannot to-day show his initiative by the movements of his own flagship alone, and thus make plain his purpose; be must make use of signals. Signals are then displayed as orders to ships and subordinate commanders, and as orders for simultaneous maneuvers, that is, for turns (Wendungen 1).
In earlier times the use of signals to send orders, news and reports was reduced to the lowest possible limits. News signals were entirely restricted to the opening of the battle. During the battle, the commander-in-chief was almost entirely restricted to his own observation. If this applies to-day, the commander-in-chief must feel the lack all the more severely, the more he himself ought to intervene in a modern naval battle.
Now, how was it actually with regard to sending orders and making reports in the Russo-Japanese naval battles?
For the transmission of orders and reports during battle, a modern fleet has available: flag signals, radio-telegraphy, and despatch vessels. The Russians and the Japanese did not make use of these methods to the same extent. This is shown partly by the published reports of battle; in part, it must be concluded from the movements, of the ships. In this connection it must be borne in mind that the lack of unity of action on the part of the Russians cannot be charged with certainty to failure of signals; and that the happy unity of action on the part of the Japanese cannot be charged unconditionally to good signal communications.
The contestants entered the battle under very different conditions.
Without had not had any opportunity to drill his squadrons. Apparently, also, he had issued no plan of battle up to the loth of August. Rojestvenski had, it is true, issued general tactical instructions. They included: change to battle formation, use of ordnance, supporting disabled ships, transfer of Admiral to another ship, transfer of the command to the next in seniority, etc. During the outward voyage, opportunity was taken to have formal tactical drills for the groups so hurriedly thrown together. But the mutual understanding, which in battle must bind the commander-in-chief with his subordinates more closely than signals sent, was also lacking at Tsushima. Rojestvenski had only outlined the battle problems of the separate groups in a very general way. He had issued no battle plan, no "Memorandum."
It was otherwise with his opponent. It would have been strange if the Japanese, with their characteristics, had not assured to themselves every possible advantage in anticipation, by exercises, battle practices, issuing of orders and battle plans. Their close formation in the line drew this avowal from their opponent on August 10: "The first Japanese division was conducted as if in a peace maneuver." The distribution of the Japanese into numerous tactically almost independent subordinate commands made an extensive interchange of signals absolutely necessary before the battle. They are not known in detail; but it is well known that Togo had thoroughly prepared for the battle of the Sea of Japan, and had clearly indicated to the various groups their tasks therein. As the approach of Rojestvenski became known, "all the divisions commenced their movements against the enemy, in accordance with the problems which had been assigned to the separate groups"; at the beginning of the battle, the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions acted "in accordance with the previously given instructions for the battle."
Therefore a good part of the credit must, without question, be given to previous preparation, to the issuing of orders before the battle, if there existed a great superiority in unity of action of their entire force on the part of the Japanese.
With reference to the transmission of orders during the battle, it is to be regarded as an efficient performance if it is possible to transmit the necessary directions to other ships. It is a mark of higher efficiency if simultaneous tactical maneuvers can be conducted by signal without interference.
A not insignificant number of examples of the first can be named on the Japanese side. On the Russian side also, in spite of the greater destruction of signal systems, in spite of obstacles due to powder vapor and the water columns thrown up by ricocheting shells, many signals were sent and received even during advanced stages of battle. Several are mentioned: On February 9, 1904, the Variag, while under a heavy fire, made a flag signal to the Korietz, which was understood. On August 10 the Cesarevitch, toward the end of the battle, made a flag signal regarding the transfer of leadership to Prince Uchtomski, who received the signal aboard the Peresviet. On the same day, the Askold, under a heavy fire, signaled "More speed" and "To port," and was understood. On August 14, the Rurik, after being nearly three hours under s heavy fire, received the order by signal, "Proceed to Vladivostok," and sent a signal report " of the injuries to her rudder. At Tsushima, Nebogatoff signalled, toward the end of the battle, "Follow me." A majority of the ships received this signal. A short time before, Nebogatoff had received an order, by despatch boat, to go to Vladivostok.
There are also examples of the failure of signals on the Russian side. On August To, Prine Uchtomski hoisted the flag signal on the forward bridge rail—the signal gear had been destroyed—"Follow me"; it was not received by all the ships, and was not obeyed. Nebogatoff testified that he had not received a single order from the commander-in-chief at Tsushima between 1.55 and 6.25 p. m. No wonder, as it was impossible to make a signal on the fleet flagship to call a torpedo-boat alongside; and the signal personnel had been sent below by the flag lieutenant, because the signal system could no longer be used. Evidently, the Russians had been reduced to flag signals and despatch boats, while the Japanese, in addition to these methods, still had radiotelegraphy available. The reserved Japanese report does not make it clear whether an order was given by radio-telegraphy or by flag signal. Nothing is said about a notorious failure of signals: on the contrary, many orders by signal are mentioned which were made while under a heavy fire, and at the end of a long battle. Among these are the following: On February 9, 1904, the third Japanese division received, off Port Arthur, the order, while under the enemy's fire: "Get out of range." On May 27, 1905, the Mikasa, firing herself and also under fire, signalled to the fifth and sixth divisions, which were apparently keeping far away: "Attack the rear ships of the enemy." On the evening of the battle (7.20 p. m.), the commander-in-chief sent an order to attack to all destroyers and torpedo-boats, to which, partly to prevent misunderstandings, a cruiser was attached. At the same time, all ships received orders by radiogram, about discontinuing the battle, about the course and rendezvous. Radio-communication was no longer considered quite certain by the Japanese on the evening of the battle; the Tatsuta, the repeating ship of the first division, was sent, in addition, as a despatch vessel to confirm the radio-messages to the different groups. The Japanese main headquarters received a report of the result of the battle by radiogram on the same evening.
These examples show conclusively that both sides succeeded in sending more than once, even while under fire and during the later stages of the battle, short orders by signal to ships and groups: failures in such attempts at signalling are known only on the Russian side.
It would have been a very good exhibition of efficiency in signalling, had groups of ships been able to execute turns smoothly while under fire.
Turns by the Russian's during - baffle can readily be passed over, as there was only one such attempt made, on April 13 by Makaroff. Neither side was then under a heavy fire, and apparently the formation in the turn and line of bearing executed by the Russians was not completed.
On the Japanese side, numerous turns were made during battle. The following, taken from published accounts, are worthy of notice: On February 9, 1904, the third Japanese division, as already mentioned, received the order from Togo: "Get out of range." The division seemed to be in danger of having the Russian fire concentrated on it. The division, composed of four ships, immediately went ships right eight, points, and avoided the enemy. On April 13, 1904, the third division made another turn, this time under a heavy fire. On August to, the first Japanese division, six ships, turned about sixteen points, near the beginning of the battle. The ranges were large. No serious injuries had yet been sustained. On the same day, toward the end of the battle, after several Japanese ships had been seriously and several slightly damaged, the first division made a four-point turn, and, apparently firing, proceeded in a four-point line of bearing. At Tsushima, Japanese groups made numerous turns. The third division, four ships, turned about four points at 5 p. m., while apparently under a heavy fire. The division proceeded in a four-point line of bearing and got out of range. The first division, six ships, made six turns of about eight points each, three of them being from line. Only one of them was made under a moderate fire on both sides (2.58 p. m.). .During another turn (4.35 p. m.), firing was practically almost at an end. All the others were made while neither side was firing. In addition, the first division always had at hand a completely intact repeating ship.
These examples of turns during battle are a proof of good Japanese training in maintaining battle formation and in signalling. They do trot, however, serve as a conclusive proof of efficiency in signalling. Never did more than six ships turn together; never did they make a turn after they had all suffered severely; never at a time when they were hard pressed by the enemy and were themselves locked fast to him.
The Japanese were far from being in the ideal position for a leader, mentioned above; that is, like a chess player able to place his pieces after looking over the battle-field. After their overwhelming success, one was inclined, at first glance, to assume that their fighting strength, in spite of its separation into small groups, had cooperated continuously as a unit during the battle. One wanted even to deduce therefrom that separation into small groups and surrounding the enemy on all sides would be the tactics of the future.
This conclusion can hardly be supported by a close observation of transmission of orders during battle by the Japanese and the cooperation of groups. This closer observation will find no fault with the brilliant efficiency of the Japanese. But it is a fact that no complete unity reigned even in the separate groups. The distribution of targets is made known to us in the principal battles. The target was changed very often; on February 9, and August 10, 1904, almost all of the large Russian ships were under fire from almost all of .the Japanese ships. The lines of fire generally run apparently without rule, and cross each other. Had the leader been in a position to establish uniformity in fire distribution, he would surely have done so. But he himself was not at any time in a position to see clearly how the enemy appeared to the separate ships; and the signal system would not have sufficed to distribute the fire of the groups uniformly.
With reference to the cooperation of the separate groups, it is worth remarking that, both off Shantung Promontory and at Tsushima, the separate divisions did not by any means enter the battle at the same time; indeed, hours passed before they were in position. The battle at Tsushima was already almost decided between the battleships and armored cruisers before the first Japanese small cruisers got within range of the Russian small cruisers and tenders. The Japanese third and fourth divisions opened fire at 2.50 p. m., the sixth division at 4.45 p. m. and the fifth division hardly any sooner. It could not have been the intention of the commander-in-chief to have the fifth and sixth divisions get within range of the enemy so late. They had arrived on the battle-field at the right time, so that they cannot be reproached with a lack of the joy of battle. Their course until about 2.00 p. in. indicates that they understood the battle attack quite differently from what it actually became, due to Togo's evolution when firing began. Shortly after 2.00 p. m., they were ordered by the commander-in-chief to attack the enemy's rear ships; but, apparently, they were left to look out for themselves after that, and took 272 more hours to get within range of the enemy.
That does not point to continuous signal communication, to continuous uniformity of conduct of the battle from one position. For such leadership opportune reports of the state of the battle from the different positions would have been requisite. Not even one such report by radiogram has been made known. If, in spite of this, a great degree of cooperation on the part of the Japanese is to be noted, it was apparently not due to the transmission of orders by signal, but to personal observation, to personal decisions of subordinates, to the old English maxim—"mutual support."
As the first and second Japanese divisions, at Tsushima, at about 5 p. m., headed to the southward, in search of the Russian main body, which had withdrawn out of sight, the latter had gotten into a fight with the Japanese small cruisers, and was threatening them seriously. No report of this fact reached the first and second divisions. It was the sound of gun-firing in the direction of the smoke-covered main body of the enemy that induced Admiral Kamimura to separate his second division from the first and to hurry to the help of the small cruisers. Nor did the first division, now left alone, and out of sight of the hostile main body, receive any report from Kamimura about the movements of the enemy. Togo, apparently more by good luck than anything else, turned again to the northward at 5.30 p. m., when he also found the enemy. These selected examples of failure to report can be taken as sufficient to show that even their efficiency in signalling did not permit the Japanese to interchange this most important information during battle.
Japanese successes in signalling, which seem great at a first glance, must be brought back to their right measure. If decisions for the future are to be drawn from these successes— a short examination may be permitted here—it must be remembered that, assuming the same means of signalling, the effect of shrapnel and common shell against unprotected signal apparatus will have increased in the meantime. Therefore, a warning is needed against a too optimistic regard for the signal apparatus during battle. Of course, there will be moments of slackening of fire on both sides during future naval battles. During such moments, it will be possible to send and receive short orders by signal. Even turns, with small groups of ships, can then be made. However, one must guard himself against believing in the ability to make useful reports during battle because of the performance of the Japanese, and must avoid building up tactics of detached subdivisions widely separated from each other from a basis of signal communication under fire.
If it comes to pass that the leader in a modern naval battle is forced to adopt greater initiative than in earlier naval battles, and if the described uncertainty' of battle-signalling continues to exist, then the outlook for the leader is not very cheerful. The case can very readily be imagined that a line, finding itself in a hard-pressed position, might want to perform an evolution which would lend another direction to the battle and favor its purposes. If the means of signalling forbid this maneuver, the signal system becomes an obstacle to tactics, instead of advancing with technics and instead of giving it a new impulse.
But ought not the power of modern technics find a means of signalling capable of defying the enemy's fire? This may seem improbable at present, and be reserved for the dim future; but when it comes, what then? Would not the present questionable movements while under a heavy fire be thereby made possible? Most certainly. Further, would not a very extensive and most important transmission of information and orders during battle result, and leadership shape itself anew from the very foundation?
It is a question, whether the leader in a naval battle should not place himself, like the general in war on land, in the background, on a flagship, to which would pour reports from all sides; where, free from one-sided impressions, uninfluenced by the picture of destruction which would present itself to him under certain circumstances if he were aboard a ship in the line, he could get a clear idea of the state of the battle on all sides. From here, he could give his orders, after calmly weighing them.
The question of a centralized leadership from such a retired position is not new. But, up to the present time, just as soon as the idea is presented, it is condemned with earnest proofs. Its realization, with the present means of signalling, is not to be thought of, after the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War. Whether it will not be realized later, if signalling is ever perfected in the way referred to, naturally cannot be predicted with certainty. Yet, even in this case, one must not expect too much from the transmission of orders in battle.
Even when it comes to pass that very many reports can be sent to the central station on the flagship and orders can be issued in all directions, the naval leader will never have the control of. affairs as completely in his hands as the general in land warfare, located in rear of the battle-field. Indeed, it is hardly possible to speak of a "background"; in a naval battle, the "background" may become the "foreground" very quickly. On the water the battle picture shifts much more quickly than on land, for a strictly centralized conduct of affairs. Reports about the state of the battle afloat can only with difficulty be made as brief as necessary. Generally a fixed point is lacking for the designation of place. A maneuver of the enemy often demands an instant reply. Seconds are costly. The counter-maneuver, therefore, even when it is of decisive importance, cannot be ordered by a superior in the rear.
Therefore, it will always remain true that the leader in a naval battle will virtually have to depend on his own observations. He will, in spite of all the disturbances which would result from a position in the fighting line, so choose his position that he will hold the immediate control of affairs in his own hands at the decisive point. There, it will be possible for him, assuming improved signal communications, to get reports from the separate fighting detachments, and to send instructions to them. A rigid control is not to be thought of. The personal observations and the personal decisions of subordinate commanders will always assure the best tactical cooperation. Kamimura's "courir au canon" cannot always be done; the subordinate groups must keep each other in sight as much as possible.
Such a procedure, on the ground of a sound distrust in the value of signal communications in a naval battle, will also be the best eventually to bring about improved methods of signalling.