*A lecture delivered at the U. S. Naval War College
This subject is one of such magnitude that it would be presumptuous to claim that what follows is even a review of its essential features.
The effort in this paper is to throw what little light I can upon one of the too often neglected branches of study in the Art of War, with a view to awakening our minds to its controlling importance.
This paper therefore will be an attempt at a brief discussion of logistics under the following heads:
(a) Definition.
(b) The importance of a proper comprehension of our duty in respect to knowledge of logistics.
(c) The relation that exists between logistics and strategy.
(d) The necessity of considering quality as well as quantity in supply, and the limitations thereby imposed on logistics.
(e) The influence of logistics upon the type of war to be waged.
(f) The importance of solutions of logistic problems in time of peace.
(g) How logistics is involved with peace strategy.
(a) DEFINITION.
The term "logistics," as applied to military science, has been given various interpretations by military writers, differing essentially in the extent of its application. Strangely enough, writers differ even in the derivation of the term; but the latest authorities seem to have correctly established both its derivation and its application.
Jomini derives the word "logistique" from the duties of the Major General des Logis, to apportion cantonments to the troops.
Farrow's military encyclopaedia has this to say under the heading Logistics:
Bardin considers the application of this word by some writers as more ambitious than accurate.
It is derived from Latin "logista," the administrator or intendant of the Roman armies.
It is properly that branch of the military art embracing all the details for moving and supplying armies. It includes the operations of the Ordnance, Quartermaster's, Subsistence, Medical and Pay Departments.
It also embraces the preparation and regulation of magazines for opening a campaign, and all orders of march and other orders from the General-in-Chief relative to moving and supplying armies.
Some writers, however, have extended its signification to embrace strategy also.
The latest authoritative French source gets as usual to the root of the matter and clears up the whole subject.
I will quote from the Dictionnaire Militaire an epitome of the French digest:
Logistique—Derived from the Greek, meaning the technique of numerical calculation, and employed in military language to mean the science of all that is concerned with military statistics and the speculative study of military art, of theaters of war, and of places of war.
Up to the end of the eighteenth century logistics was held to include everything embraced within the scope of knowledge of a General-in-Chief. This conception of logistics has filled the books of writers and military professors, so rich in theories and pedagogic speculations, even up to the present time.
The word "strategy" subsequently replaced the word "logistics" with writers and military professors, drawing its origin also from the Greek and defined more or less vaguely as the science of the strategist—of the General-in-Chief.
This definition is, however, too comprehensive to be clear.
The term "logistics"has therefore been reserved as applying to those laws according to which one provides for the feeding, marching, and resting of troops in the field in the best order and in security.
Such is the definition given to it in the School of Application of Artillery and Engineering, in the course on Military Art, of which Logistics forms the third part.
Logistics comprehends all the operations conducted outside the field of battle, and which lead up to it. It regulates the execution of those movements which in combination become the functions of strategy; for example, marches, cantonments, transport and feeding of troops. That is to say, it corresponds to that which we call the "Science of the General Staff."
With our minds somewhat cleared up in respect to the true meaning of the term, we are perhaps better prepared to consider the application of this branch of military science to the conduct of war.
(b) THE IMPORTANCE OF A PROPER COMPREHENSION OF OUR DUTY IN RESPECT TO A KNOWLEDGE OF LOGISTICS.
In no branch of the Art of War can we more surely and quickly increase our knowledge than in the Science of Logistics. For here we deal with facts and not fancies. Here the demands of the art are calculable and solvable by rule and method, and cause and effect are only separated in many cases by a problem in simple arithmetic.
Hamley, in his "Operations of War," after going into some detail on the subject of the supply of an army in the field, taking as a concrete example the French army in its Italian campaign of 1859, says:
At the risk of being tedious, we have given some of these details, because for want of them readers of military operations are often insensible to the vast preparations required for the commencement of war between great powers, and to the nature of certain facts which must enter into military calculations, and which, though they seldom appear on the surface of history, form the great elements of perplexity for governments and generals.
Sending forth an army is like sending forth a city equal to the capital of a great state, transporting it, with all its means of food and shelter, from place to place, at uncertain times and in unforeseen directions, and leaving it all the time entirely dependent on the territory from which it set forth for the maintenance of its numbers and the Supply of its daily wants.
In that paragraph the author sounds a note of warning that cannot be too carefully heeded by us. We may have little to do directly with shaping the military policy of our government, but we shall unquestionably be held responsible for the execution of our part of that policy in time of war.
There is an excuse for the masses of a peace-loving and peace-professing nation, in failing to comprehend the necessity of preparation for, and the vastness of the effort entailed in carrying on war; but there is no excuse for us, as students and embryonic practitioners of the art, if we fail to comprehend and give due weight to this important function of war.
We at least should be prepared and able to advise with judgment and from knowledge concerning military needs in time of peace as well as in war, and if we are schooled and our judgment is trained, we must eventually be, indirectly it is true but none the less forcibly, the shapers of our naval policy.
(C) THE RELATION THAT EXISTS BETWEEN LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY.
The necessary thing to be borne in mind is the relation that exists between logistics and strategy.
According to the definition with which we started, namely, that logistics is concerned with operations conducted outside the field of battle, and leading up to it, logistics has no direct bearing upon tactics. And this appears to be manifest.
But in its relation to strategy, logistics assumes the character of a dynamic force, without which the strategic conception is simply a paper plan.
The strategic conception may be that of a genius, but, if it be not based on a solid foundation of logistic facts, it can have no force and will be of no effect; unless, indeed, it lead direct to disaster.
There can be no more striking example of this than is evidenced in the campaign of Napoleon in 1812-13, in his march to and retreat from Moscow.
Here the greatest genius of war in the Christian era was prosecuting a campaign grander in its conception and possibilities than any ever before or since conceived. He was not unmindful of the demands of logistics, for no general that ever lived was more painstaking in its details. But it seems in this instance as if the very magnitude of the operation defeated its own ends. With over half a million men with the colors, Napoleon advanced against less than half that number of Russians, who, retreating deeper and deeper into the heart of their own country, led on the greatest master of the art of conducting war, until his thirst for a decisive and complete victory, often promised but never fully realized in this campaign, blinded him to or made him careless of the necessity of supplies.
Logistics was strained beyond the limits of reason; calculation could not support the demands of the strategic conception. Such utter rout and disaster followed the enforced retreat from Moscow that, of the magnificent army of over half a million, there were assembled with the colors, after the Deresine was crossed, scarce 10,000 men.
Jomini, in summing up the causes of the disaster that befell the French in the Russian campaign, says:
The principal error was in not recognizing that an army numerous enough to conquer peace in Russia could not be subsisted there if the Russians conducted a retreating campaign and led it into the heart of the country. If a decisive battle could be early won, success was probable; if not, Smolensk was the farthest point that, in 1812, could with safety be reached.
Napoleon in this campaign did not heed the teachings of the military historian Montesquieu, with whose writings he must have been familiar, and who, about 50 years before that campaign, wrote the following:
Great and distant enterprises perish by the greatness of the preparations which have been made to ensure their success.
Is there not for us in this a lesson to be drawn? In the nature of things, does the future hold out for us a possible necessity for conducting war beyond the seas? Does not that imply, as we stand to-day, long, attenuated lines of supply?
Have we figured out the actual amount of supplies—coal, oil, ammunition, and stores—that will be necessary to support an over-sea expedition? Or, having figured that out, and having harmonized, as General von der Goltz says, the being able to with wishing, have we calculated the number of vessels and their tonnage capacity that will be necessary to keep our force supplied?
Having done that, have we listed the available vessels so that we may have at our command within 30 days, for example, the bottoms necessary to carry our supplies to the fleet?
If we have done all those things and have not deceived ourselves with fictitious figures, and have rigidly eliminated speculative possibilities, we have laid the foundation in logistics upon which our strategy can build; and not until then have we created the possibility of the successful employment of our forces.
We must not forget that a modern fleet is a projectile of relatively short range, and its range does not increase with its size; in fact, the larger the fleet the greater become the difficulties of increasing its range, because of the limitations that logistics is likely to impose.
We are too prone to consider that the size of our fleet in battleships alone is a measure of our national strength. That is true only in part and, like all half-truths, has lurking within it a seed of danger.
A fleet of battleships is powerful only when its constant mobility is assured, when we are able to guarantee the free and unrestricted movement of that fleet to a given theater of war, and within that area after it has arrived.
Armies have been known to starve and fight and march on, and the tide of battle has often turned upon an effort that seemed to be and perhaps was superhuman; but fleets must not be starved, lest they fail to fulfil any function and become derelict.
Material is soulless; it cannot be pushed to an endurance beyond that which the mind of man designs for it.
These seem like trite statements, but the question is: Do we realize the truth in them with sufficient force so that we are prepared to say that the being able to is harmonized with the wishing; and that here are the facts and figures that show that, in an oversea expedition involving a movement of our total strength, our fleet will never starve?
(d) TILE NECESSITY OF CONSIDERING QUALITY AS WELL AS QUANTITY IN SUPPLY, AND THE LIMITATIONS THEREBY IMPOSED ON LOGISTICS.
Besides quantity in logistics, an important factor enters into the calculation when we appreciate the bearing that quality has upon the scheme of supply.
In regard to quantity, the only safe rule to follow is to provide for more than enough, to insure against losses that will be inevitable, due to delays, to enemy movements, or to any of the manifold causes that will lead to interruptions in the line of supplies.
In regard to quality, we cannot give too careful attention to the matter of fuel-supply when a fleet is operating at a great distance from a base, and without recourse to docks, and machine shops, to make good the ravages of storms, of accidents, or of conflict with the enemy.
Under such circumstances the efficiency and mobility of the fleet cannot be kept up without making provision for the supply to it of the best grade of steaming fuel and lubricating oils. The sources from which we can draw become correspondingly restricted; for, in respect to fuel, the markets of the world are no longer sources of supply.
The areas of production of good steaming coal, for example, are very restricted; and while depots may and do exist all over the world where such coal is kept on hand, the supply is in limited quantities in any one of them, and is usually covered by a government contract that will not permit of its release to an outside purchaser.
To make provision for anything else than the best grade of fuel is to discount the efficiency of the fleet at the very start. To use fuel other than the highest grade for steaming is to hasten deterioration of material, to lose speed, to overwork the personnel; and the combination of these results is a reduction of efficiency that tends to nullify all our training for success-in battle and to pave the way for disaster.
Here enters into the calculation, therefore, a vastly different proposition in logistics than we would have if we had the coal fields of the world to draw upon.
(e) THE INFLUENCE OF LOGISTICS UPON THE TYPE OF WAR TO BE WAGED.
Now let us see from another standpoint the influence of logistics upon the conduct of war.
It may be said without fear of contradiction that logistics has a powerful, if not absolutely a controlling, influence upon the type of war a nation is able to wage. Whether a nation can assume the offensive in war or be forced to act upon a pure defensive will be determined by the conclusion whether or not the Logistics of the campaign will support an offensive movement.
What will be the nature of our possible wars? What conditions have we already been bound to by our national policies?
Is the Monroe Doctrine, if ever assailed, to be supported by a defensive policy in war?
Surely we are on the defensive so far as the maintenance of that policy is concerned, but, should the issue become one of war, will a pure defensive support it? That is inconceivable.
What obligations have we assumed by our support and advocacy of the open-door policy in the Far East? When that policy is openly assailed, as it is conceivable that it may some day be, or when in effect its principle is violated and strained relations ensue between us and another power, is the issue to be met by our acting on the defensive?
Is the security of our outlying possessions guaranteed by moral force in the event of war? All of these things are inconceivable.
What then will be the result to us of a purely defensive attitude but national humiliation and loss of national character, the combination of which is the precursor to disintegration and national ruin?
This we will never admit to be our destiny, and our security from it will lie in our ability to assume the offensive at the outbreak of hostilities.
This offensive may lead us far afield; and we will find that logistics has so strong a bearing upon our offensive plans of campaign as to determine whether or not they may be undertaken.
In short, it would seem that logistics would almost determine whether we must suffer national humiliation, or conserve our national honor and integrity.
(f) THE IMPORTANCE OF SOLUTIONS OF LOGISTIC PROBLEMS IN TIME OF PEACE.
We should not forget that the most artful strategic conception, supported by valor and courage of the highest order, and the highest development of fitness to win, when once battle is joined, but unsupported by a complete and absolutely true solution of the logistic problems involved, is only a phantom that lures to disaster and ruin. With that fact established, we cannot but comprehend the vast importance to us of a thorough study and understanding of this function of war, and the necessity for timely preparation therefor.
Hamley says in his "Operations of War," when dealing with the subject of logistics and its attendant difficulties in war:
To see and provide for such circumstances imparts vigor and unity of action to a campaign; not to see and provide for them is to carry on war by compromises and make-shifts, and to end it in disaster.
The French general's statement to his Emperor, Napoleon III, in 1870, that the French army was prepared down to the last soldier's button, is but an example of that self-deception that the unprepared practise upon themselves.
Von der Goltz says in relation to the French project of war in 1870:
That will always be the fate of projects of war when preparations have not been made in time of peace to harmonize with them, and when the wishing and the being able are not in concert with each other.
By timely preparation we cannot mean the relegation of this duty to the time when war may be upon us. Much may be done in time of peace; in truth, that which should be done in time of peace will insure rapid and efficient mobilization and concentration, and make possible the pursuit of a campaign along the lines laid down.
Von Moltke's dictum that "errors in the original concentration of an army can seldom be remedied in the course of the subsequent operations" is very important to remember and is as applicable to a fleet as to an army. The only sure way to avoid such errors, and all errors incident to faulty logistics, is to solve all the problems involved beforehand.
(g) How LOGISTICS IS INVOLVED WITH PEACE STRATEGY.
The question of logistics is furthermore intimately involved in one phase of peace strategy—that which is concerned with the development and equipment in time of peace of efficient bases for use in war.
The subject of naval bases is closely allied to the subject of fortresses, about which so much has been written, and the pros and cons of their utility so abundantly set forth in military writings.
Napoleon, writing from Saint Cloud, September 3, 1806, has this to say on the subject (I quote only a short extract from his letter):
It was asked in the last century if fortifications were of any utility. There are sovereigns who have condemned them, and in consequence have dismantled their strongholds. For myself, I would put the question in another way, and ask if it is possible to make all the combinations required by war without fortified places, and would declare that it is not.
Without fortified depot towns, good plans of campaigns cannot be formed, and without what I call field places, furnishing shelter against the attacks of hussars and detached bodies, an offensive war cannot be properly carried on.
It is not straining to read into those sentences the words "naval bases" for "fortified depot towns," and "advance bases" for "field places," and appreciate the full applicability of his dictum to present-day necessities.
Hamley, in his "Operations of War," under the head of Fortresses, has this to say:
At the present time, France, by an elaborate system of fortresses on her frontier, shows her belief in their usefulness. Germany, on the other hand, continues to place her chief reliance on training, organization, numbers, and readiness for war—the attributes which gave her such complete success in 1866 and 1870.
The truth would seem to be that a nation which is always so strong and so ready as to be able to count on seizing and maintaining the offensive has little need for fortresses, and is wise to put her strength into her field armies; whereas a country which is unready and requires time to develop its resources is forced to rely on fortresses, and, provided they are well placed and correctly used, may derive great assistance from them. It does not follow that such a country might not, in the long run, derive greater profit from following Germany's example of strength and readiness.
What does this mean to us, in so -far as the situation in the Pacific is concerned? How would the preparation in time of peace of naval bases affect the logistics of a campaign in the Far East? Providence has so guided our destiny in the Pacific that we find ourselves the sole possessors of stepping stones that lead across that ocean. These have been provided us for use and not to be neglected. If we do not make proper use of them, they may be taken from us.
We are not required to take an inch of territory that is the property of any man or any state that owes allegiance to a foreign power. We have simply the task set before us to use wisely and with foresight the instruments that have been placed in our hands.
All of our positions in the Pacific are within easy steaming distance of each other, and nothing more .than a casual glance at the chart will be necessary to impress one with the wonderful potentiality that exists in those positions for the strategic control of that ocean.
With the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, Samoa and Kiska properly fortified and stored in time of peace, we shall have reduced the problem of logistics in time of war to its simplest and lowest terms. We shall have denied their use to an enemy; we shall have made provision for our fleet to pass, without encumbrance of train or impedimenta of any sort, from one position to another in whatever direction the need may be, leaving behind it a secure line of communication; we shall have conserved the mobility of the fleet; and we shall have made it possible to carry on offensive war.
Consider the converse of this and note the hazards and difficulties that hedge about the problem of logistics, and the consequent precariousness attending the task of conducting a war across the sea. We have in this case no supplies, save what the fleet may bring in its train. Any movement of the fleet becomes, therefore, subservient to the accumulation of vessels necessary not only to constitute the train, but to guarantee delivery to the fleet after arrival in the Far East, sufficient to maintain its life. The fleet, without a base to go to in the theater of war, where it can be secure from.harassment during periods of necessary refreshment, refueling and repair, is projected deeply into a hostile area with precarious lines of supply; and we have reproduced in naval operations the mise en scene that goes with the tragedy of Napoleon's march to and retreat from Moscow.
Consider the necessities of a fleet such as ours, operating far from a base. Simple calculation will show, in respect to one item alone, that 200,000 tons of coal a month will be necessary to maintain the life of that fleet in a theater of war in the Far East.
Without a secure line of communication, which cannot be guaranteed without holding a secure base with strong positions in its rear leading to home territory, is it not apparent that the logistics upon which the success of the whole plan must be based will not support the structure?
Such hazards as these may well be forced upon one during a period of war, and it may be that then we cannot escape them, but is it sane to plan upon such hazards in peace time, when the remedies are so apparent?
Measure the cost of peace time preparation in this respect with the cost of war time demands.
Logistics will supply the figures, and results will show that economics will itself be on the side of foresight.
Measure the results to be anticipated in conducting war under the two conditions. History will supply the data. It is full of such contrasts, and its decision is invariably on the side of foresight in preparation.
Who knows our destiny, or whither uncontrollable and unforeseen events may lead us?
Surely there was, in 1898, a providential enlargement upon our then apparent destiny in the Pacific.
Our mission in the world is Peace with Honor; by moral force if possible, by physical force if necessary.
By properly grasping and faithfully solving the logistic problems of the Pacific, we shall properly link up our outposts in the Pacific with the home country by fortifying, garrisoning, and storing those positions. In doing that we menace the integrity of no foreign power; we shape our present manifest destiny; and we supply that present-day expression of moral force that alone can ensure and guarantee peace.