MESSAGE SIGNALLING IN THE FLEET.
By Lieut.-Commander Richard Drace White, Late Fleet Signal Officer, Atlantic Fleet.
The question of signalling sometimes reminds me of Mark Twain's remark about the weather. He said that people were always talking about it but nobody ever seemed to do anything about it.
People are always talking about signalling. I do not know of any other branch of the fleet's work that is so extensively and freely discussed. I do not know of any other fleet topic that arouses such sympathetic interest—in talk. Nor is the talk insincere. Many officers are thinking hard on the subject and are willing to go to great lengths to help signalling along. And as for doing things, the object of this paper is to show that Mark Twain's remark is not entirely apropos.
However, the road to successful fleet signalling is not altogether strewn with roses. There are some boulders. For example, it is one thing for a division officer to tell you what ought to be in the signal line, and quite another for him to give up his prize loader to the signal bridge; it is one thing to teach a sailor to punch holes with a dotter in a grossly enlarged slow-moving bull's eye, and quite another to get this same horny handed sailor to saying his prayers in semaphore; it is one thing to bring an offender at gun drill to a realizing sense of his error if he slows up a load and quite another to fix up a signal-man some two miles down the line who mangles an innocent sounding message from the commander-in-chief and causes a great deal of trouble thereby.
That efficient signalling is essential to the fleet's efficiency, no one who has been in the fleet can doubt. Much of the administration that would otherwise have to be done by letters and guard mail may be done quite as thoroughly and with greatly increased facility by signals. Much of it can be done only by signals. And as for comfort, it is impossible to estimate how much can be added to the comfort of those that live in the big ships if an efficient signal (telegraphic) service is maintained. One who has had the long used telephone taken out of his house can, in a measure, comprehend what it means. One who was recently tied up in the ice in the North River with many things happening, and the signal service gone bad also knows what it means. We are prone to appreciate our luxuries only when we have lost them.
There are many things that go to make up efficiency in fleet signalling. Men, material, methods, esprit, bridge discipline, all leave their mark on the output as they do nowhere else in the fleet. It is an ever changing, unstable, flighty, bit of man machinery that must be carefully watched and managed all the time if it is to be made and kept the dependable usable instrument that a proper signal service should be.
First of all, of course, in the making of a signal service is the man on the bridge. That he is difficult to get goes without saying. A specially intelligent, willing, trustworthy man is required. The work is fine to the point of expertness; it is frequently disagreeable since it must be carried on in foul weather as well as fair; it is trying in that it comes in lumps with large spaces of inactivity interspersed: and its proper performance must of necessity rest largely on the esprit of the signalman himself, since the supervision exercised is, as a rule, limited—in fact the supervision actually exercised develops too frequently into the nagging variety, the inevitable result of supervision by many masters. There is not really any live inducement to get men to the bridge. The extra pay of a signalman, is to be sure, three dollars, two, one or nothing depending on his class, but he is practically the only unrated man in the deck force required to stand night watches in port as well as at sea, he is actually at work a great deal of the time when his messmates are free to do as they like, his work is very disagreeable in bad weather during most of which his messmates are under shelter, and he is robbed of many opportunities for advancement that his messmates enjoy. For example, a man on deck, if he has the intelligence, handiness and other good qualities essential in a really good signalman, can, with much less effort than is required of a signalman in the latter's regular routine work, become a gun pointer and get ten dollars extra a month, and once he has obtained his classification can retain it a year with practically no effort at all. He also stands a better chance of advancement, since his good work is always visible to the division officer, the real governor of his future, whereas the signalman only comes to the attention of his division officer to explain some fault he is supposed to have committed. Naturally the division officer finds it difficult to see anything good in a signalman. As for the rating of quartermaster, the rate always looked to as the logical reward for a signalman, it is more apt to be given to a good helmsman than to a signal bridge man. The inducements, as may be gathered, are meager. Good men are, naturally, hard to get.
Now come to the signal officer. In regard to the battery, the captain shall assign officers to command of gun, powder and torpedo divisions in a manner that will, in his judgment, most conduce to the efficiency of the ship as a whole, and shall make no changes in such assignment except to the same end. As for signalling, he usually assigns as signal officer a midshipman from the last class to join the ship regardless of whether or not he has shown himself capable of handling a difficult situation, removes him or replaces him as circumstances seem to warrant and even goes without a signal officer for long periods at a time, detailing one for the occasion if the signal officer is sent for by the commander-in-chief.
But to go back to the man on the bridge, the question of the detail of men for signal duty is really a serious one. The deck complement of a ship is based on her guns. Enough men, outside the special branches, are allowed the ship to man the guns. Signalmen used to be detailed from men supplied to the ship primarily to man the guns. A certain number of signalmen, to be sure, had no gun stations, but generally speaking the first duty of signalmen was at the guns. There was therefore a certain amount of friction between the signal officer and the division officers as to the employment of these doubly employed men. It was difficult to carry out systematic work on the signal bridge on account of the frequent calls on the signalmen for work at the guns. The good men of the signal force generally occupied important gun stations, and were therefore required to be absent from the bridge a great deal of the time. Furthermore, the employment of these men at the guns left the signal force reduced, when the crew was at battle stations, to less than the force employed on the bridge in ordinary maneuvers and did not in any measure provide for reliefs for casualties in action among the signalmen actually employed as such. It was therefore proposed (and accomplished after much opposition) to have the complement allow for a certain number of men for signal duty only, to restrict the employment of these men to signal work only, to definitely forbid their being assigned to gun stations or stations other than those devoted to or connected with signalling. This permits of singleness of duty on their part, gives enough men to man in action the stations that are manned in ordinary maneuvers, and provides reliefs for casualties which are sure to come in battle, owing to the exposed positions signalmen must occupy. It was also ordered that the signalmen's ship work should be restricted, except in general evolutions, such as coaling, to work in connection with signalling, cleaning the signal bridge, and looking out for signal gear. This came near being the death blow to the scheme, for the signalman had been the officer of the deck’s handy man from time immemorial. He had always been messenger or quartermaster or boatswain's mate when the real occupants of those positions were below drinking coffee. The traditions of the navy appeared to hang in the balance. In this connection, it has always seemed a strange thing to me that, while an officer of the deck would never think of calling a wireless operator away from his desk to go on a message, he will without hesitation take a signalman from the bridge to attend to business that is in no sense his, and which can be done equally well by a dozen other unoccupied men whom he has at his command. Signalmen, as a matter of fact, are probably actually engaged in signalling twice the hours per watch that the wireless operators are in telegraphing. Their work is equally affected by distractions, and yet the consideration shown the two men is radically different. Take the wireless operator. In order that he may not be disturbed in his work, he is closed in by a locked door and an official dead-line. He has removed from his vicinity every annoyance from the boatswain's pipe to the commander-in-chief's band. An orderly is stationed to deliver wireless messages as they come. On the other hand, a signalman is dead lucky if he has a weather screen on a bail day, noise he is supposed to thrive on, and as for running messages, he is not supposed to run, he must fly. One of the most profitable innovations established on the flagship's bridge was the employment of the wireless orderly to deliver signalled messages as well as wireless ones.
The policy of restricting signalmen to signal duty only threaded a tortuous road to success. It meant in the first place, complete reorganization of the signal force of practically every ship in the fleet, for practically all the good men in the signal force were special men at the guns—pointers, captains, loaders or such—and as the puns had first claim, the signal force was for a while almost entirely made up of green men. This situation was to be expected, for the very qualities that make a man a good signalman make him good at his other work, particularly at the guns. Still, the situation resulting from the change was, I must confess, rather shocking. The end, however, justified the means, and once the new gang was got into shape it was luxury to the signal officer compared to what his task had been before.
The recruiting of new men for the signal force to provide for casualties, such as expirations of enlistments and discharge of worthless men from the bridge, is however always a difficult one. Good men are wanted in other places and, whereas there is always some place in division work where a mediocre man may be employed to advantage, there is no such place on the signal bridge. A wise signal officer therefore always has a few likely suspects under his lee whom he may call on in time of trouble. This was arranged for in the flagship by augmenting the signal force during the periods of slack gun drills, such as repair periods at the yard, and sending the extras back to their divisions when the work at the guns began again. In this way men were trained so that in case of need they could be called to the bridge with a minimum resulting confusion.
It has been frequently proposed to have a special signal corps for the navy, such as is provided for the army. I have always doubted the wisdom of such a provision. Many men can never make good signalmen. Others, although they can do so, do not, after they have tried the work, want to make good ones. It is therefore well to have an easy way to be rid of such men. The most salutary punishment that can be inflicted on a member of the signal force is to put him temporarily or permanently off the bridge. This, it is obvious, could not be freely done if signalmen formed a special corps.
The making of a signalman is interesting. Very few men of the gun divisions learn to signal sufficiently well by the signal drills now held to make them of particular value to the signal officer until they are specially trained. When a new man comes on the bridge he is about as well off if he does not know any signals at all. He will at least learn right when he does learn. Drill has very little to do with a signalman's efficiency. It is work that is needed. New and old alike have to be kept actually signalling practically all the time if they are to be kept efficient. Signalmen never tire of actual work at signals. It is the drill that makes them want to get off the bridge.
But plenty of work is not always to be had. Ships separate and go to the yards. Business gets dull even when the fleet is together. These are the times that the signal officer dreads. Many schemes have been tried to keep the force up and interested. I say interested because, unless the men are interested, a signal drill is worthless as no other drill can be. Signalling in cipher has proved very good, but it is difficult to do enough of that. P. D. L. work on time and accuracy test is good when mistakes and delays are pointed out to the offenders, but that too is difficult to keep going. One scheme that has proved very successful is to use a buzzer something after the fashion practiced at the wireless school at the New York Yard. One man is detailed to send while the others, each supplied with pencil and pad, read and record as the message is received. This demands a minimum supervision on the part of the signal officer. A glance at the sheets turned in reveals the progress of each man, and, best of all, it gives a line on men capable of making good recorders. (It is a curious fact that the recorder is almost the most important man in the watch and good recorders are more difficult to develop than good signalmen.) Encouragement along certain lines helps a great deal. If, when signalmen on watch are not actually engaged in signalling with other ships, they can be induced of their own free will to signal to each other, they will be kept in good shape with practically no effort on the part of the signal officer. The practice of permitting signalmen to signal between ships when no work is going on help no end. It has been employed successfully for several years in the fleet and except for minor friction, usually caused by misunderstanding on the part of some new signalman, no harm has ever come of it. It is practiced in all telegraph and cable concerns and is worthy of all encouragement.
One of the most difficult things to contend with is the tendency of signalmen to fall into the exclusive use of one code, to the detriment of efficiency in all other codes. Of course the ideal signal system would employ one code only. Men could easily be made proficient in that. Telegraphers and wireless operators who employ only one code get so they fairly think in the code. It becomes second nature to them. They read in the code as one ordinarily reads print. But it is a condition not a theory that we have to struggle with now, and signalmen must be kept proficient in all.
If signalmen were allowed to choose they would never use anything but the semaphore. In fact until certain precautions were taken in the fleet that was practically all that was used. This does famously while the ships remain in close formation, but when they separate, as when carrying out target practice, the semaphore becomes a complete loss. Signalmen who are expert at short ranges cannot read semaphore messages where wigwag signals can be plainly made out. Then there is of course a great deal of time when only shutter searchlight work is possible. On one occasion the signal force, which had been working faultlessly while the fleet was together, became completely paralyzed upon its separation for target practice. While expert at semaphore work they were quite at a loss at the codes that the situation required to be used. One experience of this kind was enough. Signalmen were required thereafter to transmit regularly a certain part of the work by searchlight, blinker or wigwag regardless of the distance, and little difficulty in this respect was subsequently experienced.
The mere training of men to send and receive signals is, however, only a part of the signal officer's business. The organization, the stopping of errors, the speeding up in order that the work in hand be done, the bridge discipline, the requirement of smartness in order that the spirit may be maintained, are all points that must he kept ever in mind. Team work puts its stamp on signal work as definitely as it does in gunnery. Unless some definite arrangement for interlocking the work is made, a bridge can become a torment of confusion second only to Rabel itself. Let a call be seen and the whole watch will, unless curbed, rush into the fray. They will shout back and forth, read the signal each man for himself, completely rob it of all meaning and end in loud impeachment of each other's intelligence. In the meantime any other call that flies is utterly disregarded.
As a matter of fact team work comes naturally on the bridge. The arrangement on the flagship's bridge was to have the watch divided into pairs, one man of each pair to actually signal, the other to record. In sending, the recorder read off the message if necessary. In sending to more than one ship, where several senders had to be employed at once, one man read while three sent. In receiving, one read while the other recorded. The men of each pair always worked together. The calling of a signalman also meant the calling of his recorder. With four signalmen and a quartermaster in the watch two signals could always be received or sent at the same time. And as the chief quartermaster and the relief watch were always called when the work was heavy, it was not unusual to see five messages being handled at once, with practically no confusion.
There is one requirement of an efficient signal service that deserves mention for its oddity, and that is that it get through unfailingly all messages entrusted to its care, or when this is impossible, report the failure to do so. It seems odd that the question should come up at all, but it is surprising how easy it is for signals to simply disappear in transit unless some special means are taken to prevent it; and further how extremely difficult it frequently is to fix the responsibility in such a case. The greatest step towards eradicating this evil is accomplished when signalmen are brought to realize that it is the sender's duty, not merely to send but to see that the receiver understands, and that he must persist in his sending until satisfied that this is done.
To be really efficient the service must also be rapid. A message given to the signal bridge must, as a rule, be sent immediately otherwise it is better to use the guard mail or send a special boat. It is astonishing how the time required to get signals through mounts up if any laxity in this regard is admitted. Strange as it may seem the rapidity of the code employed has very little to do with this feature of signalling. Occasionally a fast code will get a signal through which would be lost entirely if a slow code were used, but this is exceptional; and as for the ordinary work, the delays in getting the message to the bridge, of getting the next ship's attention, and of getting it delivered at the other end are the things that have most to be struggled with. As to getting the receiving ship's attention it may be put down as an axiom that the best ship at signalling is the one that keeps the best lookout.
The paramount problem of signalling, however, is the necessity for accuracy. Unless it can be confidently assumed that a signal will be delivered without error in practically every instance the signal service comes near being worthless. When you consider the sources from which errors may come in signalling, it is surprising that satisfactory accuracy is ever attained. Compare a message sent by telegram with the ordinary signal. In the first place the man who has the telegram sent is usually paying for the privilege. He is therefore careful to see that no fault of his forbids its getting through correctly. He writes out his messages as legibly as he can. If he is a bad writer he prints it. He puts it on a regular blank, checks his words and gives it to the operator. The operator sits down in an easy chair, in a warm office, with the copy before him, and sends it over the wire. The receiver, also in a comfortable chair, in a comfortable office, reads and records it as it comes. He checks the words, files the message, and sends it out.
The conditions surrounding signalling are different. If so and so wants to send a signal he scribbles it off on whatever is at hand, or he may send an orderly or a mess boy up to say please signal so and so. Maybe he shouts the message up to the bridge from the deck. In this practice alone there is abundant chance of error. As a rule one signalman must read while another sends, another source of error. If the signalman is careless in his manner of making his letters by semaphore there is a fertile chance of error, for the receiver is frequently so anxious to make good that if a man merely waves his arms from one bridge the signalman on the other will get some word out of it. Moreover there are many words that are, naturally, easily confused when sent by semaphore. Many a ship has had to shift berth because northwest and southwest are almost identical when spelled out by semaphore. There was an officer in the fleet whose name almost baffled all efforts to send it by signal. That was Lieutenant Conn. No receiving signalman could be induced to read it anything but Lieutenant Com (the com meaning commander) and growl at the fool on the other bridge that left out the officer's name.
Then take the receiving ship. The man that reads the signal cannot record it himself. He must have another man record for him, another source of error. The recording must be done in all sorts of weather. Frequently proper pads and pencils are not supplied. Often the recorder is not a literary person and his spelling is not like that of other men. And there are many other sources of error. In fact they are so numerous and so perverse that their stoppage in entirety seems almost hopeless. Still by systematic vigilance a surprising accuracy can be secured, and it is worth working for. The steps taken to secure this accuracy in the fleet are, I believe, worthy of recital.
A checking system was established which, although it appeared elaborate, was systematized into comparative simplicity. It consisted of first adopting a standard signal blank resembling the forms used in the Western Union and Postal Telegraph Offices, and requiring that all signals be inscribed on these forms before they were sent, if practicable. Each ship was required to adhere strictly to the standard form, even in regard to the size to which the form was cut, as any variation hampered the officer charged with the duty of comparing the records of the various ships, a task of considerable difficulty at best. These forms contained, in addition to blank places for the words of the message, places, each in its standard position for (a) the ship to which the message was sent or from which received, (b) the name of the person addressed, if the message was addressed to any particular person, (c) the date, (d) the time at which the message was acknowledged, (e) the number of words in the message, (f) the name of the officer or petty officer actually in charge of the bridge when the message was handled, and (g) the name of the signalman sending or receiving the message. In addition to this, the name of the ship on which the blank was used was printed in bold type across the top of the form. These forms were kept in pads in officers’ messrooms, staterooms, offices and elsewhere, and their use was easily made general In addition to the regular record it was required that one copy of every message sent or received be filed and forwarded for comparison to the flagship by the first guard mail after the day was completed. Carbons were used whenever practicable to facilitate the making of the extra copy and also to avoid errors of copying
In sending, the sender himself was required to read off the message whenever practicable and when not practicable to be sure of every word read off to him before it was sent. In receiving, the signalman who actually received the message was required to take the blank from the recorder, read it over, and when satisfied as to its accuracy, to sign it in a space reserved for his signature. This fixed the responsibility for one class of errors that had hitherto been flagrant. It is curious to note that this practice, instead of being shirked by the signalmen, was thoroughly liked by them. Some feeling of pride or responsibility seemed to be aroused by their overseeing and checking the work of somebody else.
After the receiver had checked and initialed the message it was given to the officer or petty officer in charge of the signal watch who also read over and initialed it, and then, and not until then, was the message ready for delivery. In case the officer in charge of the signal watch found anything improper about the signal or if it appeared to lack sense, he would have the signal repeated. In this way many of the errors were intercepted right on the bridge, for the officer in charge of the watch, knowing what was going on, could frequently detect errors in signals that would not be apparent to one not acquainted with the situation. Having initialed the message the officer in charge of the signal watch would send one copy to its proper destination and file the other to be sent on the succeeding day by guard boat to the flagship for comparison.
When all copies had been received on the flagship they were compared, and the errors noted and brought to the attention of the offending ships. From the data on the blanks the responsibility for error could be placed not only on the ship but on the watch and even on the signalman making the error. A tabular record was kept of the number of errors made by each ship and signalman in the fleet, so that all hands were on a competitive basis all the time. It soon became apparent not only what ships were poor but what signalmen on those ships were causing the weakness.
The employment of this checking system reduced the errors tremendously. The strictest count was kept. Misspelled words although their meaning was apparent were counted as errors. Moreover when a mistake was made it was counted against the sender as well as the receiver. And even with so strict an accounting maintained, there were cases of ships handling several hundred words a day, going for a week with as few as four errors.
The plan of counting errors against the sending as well as the receiving ship met at first with opposition, but it is, in my opinion, to the best interest of signalling, to so count it. In the first place it serves to bear in upon all that the responsibility of the sender does not end with his merely having sent the signal but only with his having made the receiver understand it. In this connection I am inclined to believe that the majority of errors made are due to faulty sending.
In calculating the errors made by the various ships, efficiency was rated according to the number of mistakes made in handling so many words, not simply the actual number made, for a ship handling a large amount of work will naturally make more mistakes than those handling only a small amount. The fairness of this must be generally acknowledged.
In counting the number of words handled by the various ships frequent surprises developed. Surprises that some ships handled so few words, and that others handled so many. Some ships would run along with a hundred a day. Others would go to a thousand. The record day for the flagship was something near three thousand. There are twenty-four hours in a day, therefore the average was over a hundred words an hour, and as very little signalling is done during the middle of the night there must have been handled during some hours from two to three hundred words. In the three thousand words in question there were eight errors, most of them misspelled words, which shows what can be done.
Generally speaking, the problem of message signalling in the fleet does not differ vastly from the problem that confronts the big telegraph companies of our country. Much may therefore be learned by adopting the methods used by those companies. In any event the aim should be to provide the fleet with as good a telegraphic service as is provided by them for the people at large. Perhaps such a service can never be attained, for the difficulties facing its accomplishment are great; hut the service that is can be made surprisingly good. Keep the fleet together, give the signal force plenty of work, remove from the sending of signals the requirement that some special formality be complied with before the privilege becomes active, make the sending of signals as free as the posting of a letter (the two are analogous), demand a quick, accurate, dependable service and it is surprising how quickly the service will respond to the demand.
Altogether signalling in a live fleet is bound to be a big problem. Its very life depends on its being kept big and its proper solution on its being regarded as big. The millennium is, of course, never reached but it can be so nearly approached as to make the signal service of a fleet a splendid asset to the fleet's efficiency and that is all any form of fleet work can properly become.
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