The first official recognition of the possibilities of a coast signal service in connection with the United States Navy was taken when the present Secretary of the Navy issued an order under date of the 18th of October, 1897, appointing a board for the purpose of considering the advisability of coast signal stations as part of the scheme of naval defense.
Commander John Schouler, U.S.N., was named as senior member, the other members being Lieut. C.H. Harlow, U.S.N., then acting as flag lieutenant of the North Atlantic Squadron, and Lieut. J.H. Gibbons, U.S.N., then stationed at the Navy Department and in charge of the Naval Militia Bureau; an invitation was extended to the writer to act as a voluntary member, and accepted.
In accordance with these orders the board assembled at the Navy Department in Washington, D.C., on October 25, 1897, and devoted a great many hours to the consideration of the systems of coast signal stations that had been established in other countries, to the needs of our own coasts, and to the existing means of communication between ships and shore.
The board recognized the important part that properly established signal stations would play in the defense of the country, and made the following report:
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C, October 27th, 1897.
Sir:—In obedience to an order of the Department, dated October 18, 1897, a copy of which is hereto attached, the board appointed for the purpose of considering the coast signal stations for naval defense, met at 10 A. M. on the 25th instant at the Navy Department.
After consideration of the question the board has the honor to submit the following report:
The board regards the question of communication as divided into two heads—
(a) From the sea to the shore.
(b) From the shore to the sea; and in its recommendation it has kept in mind such means of communication as are already recognized and established in the naval service within easy reach of the naval militia, and the possibility of enlisting the cooperation of the Treasury Department for using the life-saving stations, particularly such as are or might easily be put in telegraphic communication with headquarters.
(a) COMMUNICATION FROM SEA TO SHORE.
Considering the importance of receiving information from a distance beyond the range of visibility, there seems to be but one method which has already had sufficient success to warrant the board recommending it as the best method for communicating from a fleet, scouting vessels, or picket boat at distances ranging from 10 to 50 miles, with a possible extension to 100 miles—the homing pigeon. This, of course, is limited entirely to daylight; but inasmuch as the same difficulties which militate against the successful use of the homing pigeon are present with the fleet or scouting vessels in obtaining information, the board is of the opinion that this service, which already exists in the Navy Department, should be so extended as to cover such points of the coast as are within the control of the Treasury Department or the various State naval militias. At night the use of the search-light for distance of perhaps 10 miles, and the Very's night signals within 15 miles, have been experimented with to such degree of success as to warrant its recommending these two methods for communicating from sea to shore after nightfall.
(b) COMMUNICATION FROM SHORE TO SEA.
It is not believed that any system of flags in itself can be relied upon with any certainty, considering the difficulties which a calm, on-shore wind, a hazy atmosphere, and the peculiar character of a shore background present. The board is therefore of the opinion that some system based on the use of shapes or semaphores is the only one which can be relied upon. There already exists in section 1, part 3, of the International Code of Signals, with which all life-saving stations are either supplied or can easily be supplied, a system of distant signals requiring (1) a ball, pennant and square flag or (2) a 3-armed semaphore. The semaphore, however, should be fitted with four elements instead of three, as it is believed that the holding of the display for any appreciable length of time is of much greater value than the temporary transient display which it is necessary to make with any semaphore having less than the four elements.
It is thought that these 4-armed semaphores can readily be made to conform to existing codes or such codes as could be easily and quickly adapted to meet the peculiar character of the information which they are likely to be called upon to transmit. The board believes that it is necessary for these stations to have men thoroughly conversant with the wig-wag code, and that as far as possible it be required that they must be prepared to receive messages which are sent by this code. It is also believed that the semaphore or shape systems can be readily adopted to meet the demands of the wig-wag code.
It is believed that the means of transmission of intelligence from such stations as may be selected to the main telephone and telegraph wires either already exist or can, with the assistance of the naval militia, quickly be installed and afford a certain method of transmitting intelligence to headquarters.
Having those systems in mind, the board has so subdivided the coast that the important centers, such as naval stations or strategic points, shall be amply protected by the methods proposed; and it has the honor to submit herewith the points at which, in its opinion, homing-pigeon cotes and semaphore apparatus should be installed, and steps be taken to instruct a sufficient number of men at each one of them in the use of these appliances, so that the system may be carried on at least experimentally until more specific arrangements can be made for their care and maintenance. (See Appendix A.)
The board is fully of the opinion that the general supervision of this system of coast signal stations for naval defense should be under the direction of the Navy Department, each State having control of such subsidiary stations as may exist or be established within its limits; that there should be a general supervision exercised by the regular service in such a way that there should be no departure by any one of the districts, from the general scheme, which is to be directed by the Navy Department. It believes that a semi-annual inspection by some officers appointed by the Department would be sufficient for this purpose, and that it will devolve upon the naval militia to make also a semi-annual report as to the efficiency of such stations as they may establish in their districts.
It is suggested that the naval militia can very properly take charge of all lines of communication within their districts, establish subsidiary stations in connection with the coast signal stations, keep in touch with the men, and prepare plans for the rapid connection of all stations with the long-distance telephone and telegraph systems of the country. Further, that they make such arrangements with the different telegraph com panics as will enable them to keep their information up to date and be
able to report all changes to the Navy Department.
Any scheme of this nature will, of course, require the cooperation of
the Treasury Department. The naval features of it should be, in the
opinion of the board, under the direction of the Bureau of Equipment,
and steps should be taken by the Navy Department to secure such cooperation
of the Treasury Department as will insure an intelligent assistance
in matters of naval defense.
It is believed, as essential to the success of this scheme, that some extra
compensation should be awarded to the men that may be called upon
to take charge of and manipulate the plant at the various stations.
The board is of the opinion that a compensation at the rate of $S per
month extra for the keeper of each station should be given, and that a
certain standard of proficiency in the use of signals be adopted; and,
further, that a reward of $I0 be held out each six months for all such
persons employed at the stations as may be, upon inspection, found to
reach the standard.
It is not thought to be within the province of the board to go into
details of either pigeon cotes, construction of semaphores, or other
methods of signaling. The Bureau of Equipment is already supplied
with sufficient information to render the installation of these methods
a very simple matter. Their expense, of course, will have to be a subject
for special appropriation, but it is not believed that the sum total for
all stations will amount to any very considerable sum.
John Schouler.
Commander, U. S. N., Senior Member of Board.
C. H. Harlow,
Lieutenant, U. S. N., Member.
J. G. Gibbons,
Lieutenant, U. S. N., Member.
Frank B. Anderson,
Lieutenant, Signal Officer Naval Militia of
New York, Voluntary Member.
Appendix A.
There already exist homing-pigeon cotes at Portsmouth, N. H.; Newport, R. L; Navy Yard, N. Y.; Norfolk, Va.; Key West, Fla.; Mare Island, Cal.; Assateague Beach, Va., and Cape Hatteras, N. C.
It is proposed to utilize the following life-saving stations:
Machias, Cross Island, Me.
White Head, Me.
The Highland Lights, Cape Cod, Mass.
Chatham, Mass.
Shinnecock, Long Island.
Fire Island, Long Island.
U. S. S. New Hampshire, headquarters First Battalion New York Naval Militia.
Barnegat, N. J.
Atlantic City, N. J.
Wilmington, N. C. (to be governed by its connection with the North Carolina State Militia).
Tybee Island, Ga. (to be governed by its connection with the Georgia State Militia).
St. Augustine, Fla. (to be governed by its connection with the Florida State Militia).
Jupiter Inlet, Fla.
Tampa Bay, Fla.
Pensacola, Fla.
Port Eads, La. (to be governed by its connection with the Louisiana State Militia).
Galveston, Tex.
San Diego, Cal. (to be governed by its connection with the California State Militia).
Port Canby, Cape Disappointment, Wash.
Cape Flattery, Neah Bay, Wash.
The Bureau of Navigation concurred with the board in its recommendations, and the report was forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy, who approved it and returned it to the Bureau of Navigation with orders to take such steps as were necessary for carrying out the recommendations.
The Lighthouse Board and Life-saving Service were consulted, and both heartily entered into the plan, both stating that they would be glad to lend assistance fully and unreservedly.
On February 24, 1898, the acting chief of the Bureau of Navigation stated, in a memorandum to the Bureau of Equipment, that the Bureau believed that the Department was now in possession of sufficient information to warrant the establishment of one or more of the signal stations, and suggested that the first station be established at the Highland Lights, Highland of Navesink, or at Fire Island.
On looking back it seems a pity that this suggestion was not acted upon, as many problems that had to be experimented with during the emergencies of war would have been confronted and solved.
The Naval Militia entered enthusiastically into their share of the work, and spent time and money familiarizing themselves with the telegraph and telephone facilities of their localities; enlisted some of the most expert telegraphers from the ranks of the Associated Press dispatchers, charted the routes of all the trunk lines and sent reconnoitering parties down the beaches to observe the routes of the life-saving telephone lines and actual situation and surroundings of the lighthouses and life-saving stations. Sites for signal stations were selected and every possible preparation made to carry out the ideas of the Navy Department.
On March 15, 1898, Captain C.F. Goodrich, U.S.N., was ordered, in addition to his other duties, to make and report with all practicable dispatch, a preliminary plan of arrangements for establishing a coast signal service on the Atlantic and Gulf seaboards. Captain Goodrich visited all of the principal cities on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, conferring with the commanding officers of the Naval Militia in each State; he designated the points at which stations were to be located, what gear was to be used, etc., and requested the Naval Militia officers to ascertain the cost of erecting the houses for the shelter of the crews, the cost of the signal masts, flags and other gear, and to obtain bids from responsible persons, agreeing to do the work within a specified time; impressing on all, that the stations must all be established, manned and in full working order in ten days from the time the order was given to commence work; also, to arrange with private owners of land for the occupation of the land during the continuance of the war.
On this trip Captain Goodrich came in personal contact with the officers of the Naval Militia, and the impressions formed no doubt influenced him greatly in picking out the men whose names he sent into the Navy Department for assignment to command of the several districts.
On April 9, Captain Goodrich having reported, the Secretary of the Navy issued the following order:
April 9, 1898.
Sir:—You will at once establish the coast-line system of signal stations for national defense, according to the plans indicated in your reports to the Department. You are put in entire charge of this work, and are responsible for its details, but you will consult from time to time with the board now considering the policy of the Department in matters of offense and defense, and with them will determine just which stations should be established.
Upon your request the bureaus and offices of the Department will give you such assistance as may be necessary to carry the plans into effect.
Seventy-five thousand dollars from the appropriation for national defense has been allotted by the President for the purpose of establishing this system of signal stations.
Very respectfully,
John D. Long,
Secretary.
Capt. Caspar F. Goodrich, U. S. N.,
Washington, D. C.
On April 12, Captain Goodrich wrote to the commanding officers of the Naval Militia organizations giving the full list of stations to be established, dividing the two coasts into districts and giving a detailed statement of the number of men allowed at each station, their ratings and also a list of the signal and mess gear that the Department would allow.
On April 12, Captain Goodrich also wrote to the President of the Board on the Plan of Campaign, giving in detail the districts into which he had divided the coasts, the stations in each district, and wrote as follows: "My plans are in such a state of forwardness that practically any one of these stations can be occupied within twenty-four hours and an improvised means of receiving and transmitting signals immediately organized. To permanently equip these stations will take from ten days to perhaps three weeks, depending upon accessibility of the station and its proximity to a great commercial center, whence men and materials can be quickly drawn. In view of extemporizing a service on demand, and of the short time required to place a complete scheme in operation, the board yesterday, as I understand, agreed that, under the circumstances, it was advisable to delay expending the money allotted for the erection of masts and buildings until the necessity should absolutely arise; upon this understanding I am acting."
On the same day Captain Goodrich acknowledged the receipt of the Department's orders to establish the coast signal stations, and advised the Department of the decision of the Board on the Plan of Campaign.
On April 22, he received orders to telegraph the different Naval Militia organizations to establish the coast signal stations, and immediately sent the following message to all the States concerned:
"Establish and man coast signal stations already determined by me. Lowest bids; greatest economy; most speed necessary; let crews sign temporary agreement pending receipt of enlistment forms. No heliographs needed. Send future communications,
Superintendent, New York."
Goodrich.
These telegrams were received late in the evening on the 22d of April, and by midday of the 23d, messages began to come in from up and down the coast, stating that improvised signal stations were ready, and in from ten days to two weeks all stations, with the exception of a few on the Florida coast, located at very inaccessible places, had reported as fully equipped.
Prior to the final order to man the stations, and for ten days after that order was issued, the details of the work in the second district came under my personal supervision, and I feel more intimately acquainted with the work done in that district than that done in any other.
Every class of citizen that I was brought in contact with added something to expedite the work, in spite of the fact that it is rather unusual for a contractor to bind himself to do rush work under a penalty on an uncertainty. Our instructions were not to spend a cent, or to in any way commit the Government until we received our final orders; even when these orders came we were not accredited representatives of the Government, as we did not pass our examinations and receive our commissions until some ten days afterwards. Every department of commercial undertaking was choked with orders for war material of every character; prices went up with a rush, and it was only by using personal acquaintance and friendship that we were able to hold the prices down to the figures which we had sent in to the Department.
The telegraph and telephone companies rushed the work of constructing loops from their trunk lines to the signal stations and to the U. S. S. New Hampshire, which was moored at the foot of East 28th Street, New York City, and was used as headquarters of the 2d District, and, in fact, as the headquarters of the whole system of stations until the latter headquarters was transferred to Washington.
Assurances had been obtained from the civilian employers of the Naval Militiamen that their positions would be held open for them, and arrangements made with the State Government by which the men were paid and fed until such time as the National Government could muster them into the service.
Through the kindness of the Lighthouse and Life-saving Services, the men were sheltered until their shanties could be built, and in such places as it was impossible to use these services, the men lived under canvas.
Building materials, spars, mess gear and signal gear were rushed forward as rapidly as possible; in several instances the freight cars on which the spars and lumber were loaded were hooked on to passenger trains through the courtesy of the railroad officials.
The inhabitants of the towns near coast signal stations for some reason seemed to gather some sense of security on account of having the stations near them, and helped the crews in every conceivable way. One gentleman at Babylon, Long Island, used his fast pleasure steam yacht to carry mail and supplies to Fire Island, and kept this service up during the entire war, making two trips a day and special trips when signaled for.
On April 23, Captain Goodrich was relieved from command of the Coast Signal Service and Captain Theo. F. Kane, U.S.N. (retired) was appointed to succeed him, and on May 9, Captain Kane was relieved and was succeeded by Captain John R. Bartlett, U.S.N. (retired), then in charge of the office of Naval Intelligence. Captain Bartlett came on to New York, assumed command and moved the general headquarters to Washington, where it remained during the war.
Owing to the fact that the men had been sent to the stations without physical examination and without being mustered into the Navy, two surgeons and two line officers were immediately sent out to examine them and muster them in.
Regulations for the government of the service were prepared, printed, and issued, and provision was made for the care of the sick or injured, the Surgeon-General of the Marine Hospital Service cooperating at once on application. Medicine chests, containing simple remedies and directions for the treatment of simple ailments, were at once issued. Log books and inspection blanks, and forms for the return of property, were printed and distributed; routines of watches and drills established; a list of all the stations was printed and issued to all steamship companies; a "Notice to Mariners" was given to the Associated Press, calling attention to the location of the stations, and asking all ship captains to report anything of interest, and advising them that the stations would notify them of any news affecting their safety.
The cooperation of the Lighthouse Establishment, Life-saving Service and Weather Bureau, was sought and granted at once. The Lighthouse authorities pushed the work of connecting all of their most important Light Stations with the telephone systems of the country. The Life-saving Service had the majority of its stations connected by telephone with each other, with outlets at a number of points to the commercial lines, and the Weather Bureau had telegraph communication with all of its stations. By connecting the Coast Signal Stations with the Weather Bureau and Life-saving lines, the Navy Department had complete control of the beaches, and the coast signal stations had communication up and down the beaches as well as inland. Added to this, the life-saving system of patrolling the beaches each night placed every foot of the seacoast as far south as Ocracoke Inlet under the watchful eyes of men who had been trained for years to observe everything that floated and to endure every hardship.
The location of every army headquarters on the seaboard and of every fort or battery was charted, and information was sent out to each district telling how they could be communicated with in case of necessity. This information was also sent to the stations by the district officers.
Owing to the fact that the life-saving crews are laid off during the months of June and July, and that the coast signal service would lose a very valuable, if not its most valuable, ally, it became necessary to bring about legislation that would allow the retention of the majority of these stations in commission, and that would furnish the money necessary to pay the crews. This was accomplished, and the bill appropriating seventy-five thousand dollars became a law on June 7, 1898. It might be interesting to note that the fact of the life-saving stations being in commission during the usual off months, resulted not only in perfecting the system of signal stations, but in rendering valuable aid to the San Francisco when she went ashore, and in the saving of lives and property from several wrecks that occurred during the summer.
Experience taught the necessity of changing the location of some of the stations and the final distribution was as follows:
Appendix I.
List of Stations of the Coast Signal Service on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the United States.
[Navy Department, Washington, D. C, United States Coast Signal Service. John R. Bartlett, Captain, U. S. N., Superintendent.]
[Light-houses, life-saving stations, and Weather Bureau stations are cooperating with the United States Coast Signal Service. Messages will be sent direct to headquarters at Washington from all these stations.]
LIST OF DISTRICTS.
First district, United States Coast Signal Service, West Quoddy Head, Maine, to Gay Head, Marthas Vineyard, inclusive; headquarters, U. S. S. Minnesota, Boston, Mass.
Second district, Block Island, R. I., to Cape Henlopen, Del., inclusive; headquarters, U. S. S. New Hampshire, New York City, N. Y.
Third district. Cape Henry, Va., to Cape Fear, inclusive, headquarters. Navy Yard, Norfolk, Va.
Fourth district, Georgetown, S. C, to St. Simons Island, Ga., inclusive; headquarters, Light-House Inspector's Office, Charleston, S. C.
Fifth district, mouth St. Johns River, Fla., to Cape Florida, inclusive; headquarters, Jacksonville, Fla.
Sixth district, Key West, Fla., to Egmont Key, Fla., inclusive; headquarters, Port Tampa, Fla.
Sixth-A district, Santa Rosa Island, Fla.; headquarters. Navy Yard, Pensacola.
Seventh district. Mobile, Ala., to Galveston, Tex., inclusive; headquarters, Armory Naval Battalion, New Orleans, La.
The crews at the coast signal stations consisted of one chief quartermaster, three quartermasters of the second class, and one landsman. At several of the more important stations, an extra telegraph operator, rated as quartermaster of the second class, was allowed. The men were armed with rifles, and were at all times under regular Navy discipline as to watches and drills and as to all matters affecting the efficiency and health of the men.
Routine daily reports were made over the wires to district officers and by them to the general headquarters, and local tests of the wires were made at the beginning of each watch. Inspections were made by district officers at least once each month and reports made to general headquarters.
Arrangements were made with the telegraph companies to clear the wires when warned, so that the Department could have direct communication with any of the stations, and several experiments tried during the summer demonstrated that this was entirely feasible and took but little time; the wires were cleared between Washington and Miami, Florida, in one-half hour and the two coast signal offices put in direct communication; the same time was taken for Jacksonville, Florida. In this connection it is of interest to note that a message was sent from the Department to the Princeton, off Cape Henlopen, using the ordinary business routes, and an answer received, in twenty-two minutes; the message ordered the Princeton to the Washington yard, and the answer gave the time that she would get under way. Five minutes after she passed in the Delaware Capes the Bureau of Navigation was advised of the fact.
The service stood all the tests to which it was put; the nonappearance of an enemy is the only excuse that can be offered for not reporting one during the entire war; but as long as the Northern Patrol Squadron was kept off the coast, the stations kept the Department in touch with the different vessels, and the letters on file in the Department are evidence that the stations proved of value to several of the navy yards, keeping them advised of the movements of the vessels, and enabling the commandants to anticipate work by a number of hours. They also proved of great value to several departments of the Army by keeping them in close touch with the hospital and supply ships and transports, in many instances receiving and sending all the messages from the transports to the different camps and to Washington. This work could have been expedited and made more general if there had been signalmen aboard all the ships under control of the Army.
The means of communication from the stations to any point on beaches or inland were in every way satisfactory, and are capable of being made perfect at a very small cost, but the problem of off-shore communication still requires considerable study; the shapes which were hurriedly designed did not prove satisfactory, except as a designating mark for the stations; they were too heavy for anything but slow, tedious work, and yet were so light in construction that the high winds soon put them out of commission. At distances beyond flag range, the shapes were often apparently distorted (owing, no doubt, to atmospheric peculiarities), and impossible to read.
The Navy signal-book was not issued, and all signals by flag hoist had to be confined to the International Code, although the men were drilled daily in reading the Navy Code flags, and provision was made for receiving confidential messages in this code, and for forwarding the numbers to Washington by telegraph.
Very pistols and stars were not issued, but the stations were well supplied with rockets, to be used in connection with a code that was gotten up to provide for emergencies; and all hands were well drilled in the use of the Very Code, and could have received and forwarded any message sent in that way.
The question of an improvised Ardois outfit gave considerable trouble, owing to the limited range of visibility of the best oil lanterns that could be bought; but this difficulty was successfully overcome at Fire Island by using acetylene gas in lamps with specially constructed burners; the small hooded pilot flames in these lamps were lit electrically by means of a spark coil, and the supply of acetylene to the three double burners grouped around the pilot flame was controlled by magnets and dry batteries; it was possible to signal more rapidly with this outfit than with those installed on the ships, as there was never any necessity of waiting for the glow of the carbon filaments to die out. Experiments proved that the lamps could be read at a distance of nine miles. Full drawings and specifications have been filed in the office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, D.C.
Carrier-pigeons were not used for the reason that it takes time to train them, and it was not considered advisable to go to the expense of installing cotes. Events moved so swiftly that when we got around to the question of pigeons, Cervera's fleet had been cooped up in the harbor of Santiago. Then came the destruction of this fleet, and the actual necessity of the coast signal service as part of the scheme of national defense against Spain became unnecessary.
Undoubtedly the most valuable lessons derived from the establishment of the service, are not only the determination of the proper localities for the stations, but the intimate knowledge gained in regard to the splendid chain of stations under the superintendent of the Life-saving Service, which puts the entire control of the beaches in the hands of one man in Washington and the knowledge gained in regard to the Weather Bureau and Lighthouse Services and their electrical connections.
This country is now in a position to establish and maintain an excellent coast signal service without the expenditure of much more money than is already provided for by law. In closing, I do not think it amiss to quote the recommendations given in the report of the Superintendent of the Coast Signal Service to the Secretary of the Navy, all of which were carefully discussed and gone over before being embodied in the report. The suggestions are as follows:
(1) That each life-saving station should be made a Coast Signal station, for the reason that they are all connected (or can be readily connected) with each other by telephone (with offsets to the general telephone or telegraph systems of the country at convenient points) and their system of the patrol of the beach places almost the entire coast line under constant observation. Moreover, the men in this service are trained to see everything that floats within the range of vision, are trustworthy and well disciplined, and are already excellent signalmen with the international code. A knowledge of the "wig-wag" code and the navy night signals would perfect them for the purposes intended. A law should be enacted enabling the President to keep this service in commission during June and July, whenever the public interests demand it, and without special legislation.
(2) That each Weather Bureau station should be made a Coast Signal Service station, for the reason that the observers are trained signalmen with the international code, their stations are exceptionally situated for the purposes intended, and are all connected by wire with the general telegraph systems of the country.
(3) That the light-houses so situated as to fill in the gaps between the life-saving stations and the Weather Bureau stations be made Coast Signal Service stations, for the reason that it is possible at moderate expense to provide them with telegraph or telephone connections. Many of these connections have been made.
(4) That permanent Coast Signal Service stations be established at Monhegan Island (when connected with the mainland by cable); Rockport (Cape Ann), Mass.; Highland Lights (Cape Cod), Mass.; Montauk Point, N. Y.; Fire Island, N. Y.; Sandy Hook, N. J.; Barnegat, N. J.; Cape Henlopen, Del.; Cape Henry, Va.; Morris Island, S. C; Tybee Island, Ga.; Palm Beach, Fla.; Fowey Rock, Fla.; and Sand Island, Fla., for the reason that these points have been found to be important for observation.
(5) That at each of the stations suggested in the four paragraphs above, a four-armed semaphore apparatus and an acetylene gas "Ardois" system be installed, for the reason that these seem to be the best fixed mechanical appliances to meet the requirements of day and night signaling. Also that all stations be provided with "wig-wag" flags, international code signals, and "Very" pistols.
(6) That for use in time of war, a special signal code be prepared and furnished to all the stations of the Coast Signal Service, conforming to the navy code, and using the navy numeral flags and the "Very" pistols, for the reason that, although the international code is ample for communication in time of peace, its universal use makes it of no value when secrecy is necessary, and a code should be employed in war times which could only be read by those who have been furnished with it.
(7) That experiments be made for the purpose of training homing pigeons in connection with coast signaling, for the reason that they offer a solution of the problem of communication with vessels in the offshore patrol fleet. These vessels would most probably operate in districts having established bases, and at such a distance from the coast and from the inshore patrol that visual signaling would be impossible. A homing pigeon service cannot be improvised and be of any real value; the birds must be systematically and patiently trained for a year or two, not only to equip the cotes with trained carriers for that locality, but to furnish a stock with sea-bred breeders. Experimental cotes should be located at the bases of Naval Coast Defense districts, a small vessel provided with a carrier-pigeon outfit, and an officer detailed to develop this means of communication and superintend the systematic training of the birds. Unless this is done with intelligence and thoroughness for at least a year it would be useless to rely upon it at all.
Such a system could be very economically inaugurated, and could be maintained at a comparatively slight cost. A simple routine of drills, exercises and reports, based upon our recent experiences, could be readily put into operation, and small rewards or appropriate ratings would stimulate proficiency. In times of peace such a service would be of constant convenience to this Department and to the maritime interests of the country, and the constant practice would prepare the men for the emergencies of war. Attention is called to the fact that every other maritime nation has such a system, generally much more elaborate than the one herein proposed, organized by and operated under its naval or maritime department. I regard it as most essential to the naval and commercial interests of the United States.
The part played by the Naval Militia in this service has met with deservedly high praise, and the men are well adapted to the service. Any scheme for the establishment of a permanent service should take into consideration the possibility of drawing on the service for deep-sea cruising, replacing the crews with Naval Militia.